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In states without robust democratic institutions, public resources are often 
allocated on the basis of patronage. This distribution of patronage, along with the 
manipulation of official institutions (such as electoral systems and the judiciary) and the 
deployment of the coercive arms of the state provided the formula for authoritarian 
longevity in the Arab World. However, much regional scholarship continues to focus on 
the process through which patronage is distributed with little reference to how the 
underlying resources accrue to Arab regimes in the first place. Such studies fail to 
interrogate the organizational and financial interests of the external institutions (such as 
oil markets and aid organizations) that mediate this transfer of resources, and how those 
interests shape methods and patterns of resource distribution within Arab States. This 
paper is an attempt to identify some of these institutions and patterns by focusing on the 
array of patronage resources made available through the arms purchases executed by 
regional governments. 
The specific class of resources examined here is reciprocal investment contracts 
that U.S. defense firms negotiate with procuring country governments in order to 
facilitate arms sales, known in industry parlance as ‘defense offsets.’ Procuring states 
design their own offset policies, including the amount of investment that foreign arms 
manufacturers are required to make and the domestic enterprises where those funds must 
be allocated. The procuring state’s discretion over the process allows us to draw some 
conclusions about how these governments distribute offset investment to strengthen 
incumbents’ patronage-based support networks. This analysis also reveals how U.S. 
defense firms are able to influence the negotiation process in order to secure their own 
financial benefits. By examining how defense firms and their customers in the Middle 
East collude to structure weapons contracts in order to generate offset agreements that are 
mutually beneficial, we gain a better understanding of how patronage politics operates in 
the contemporary regional context. We are likewise alerted to the subtle ways in which 
influential external actors can insinuate their own interests into the process, and how the 
interactions between these groups create ever-evolving new opportunities for patronage 
politics. 
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“Come you masters of war 
You that build all the guns 
You that build the death planes 
You that build the big bombs 
You that hide behind walls 
You that hide behind desks 
I just want you to know 
I can see through your masks” 
 






First and foremost I have to thank my husband Ryan Carr for believing I would finish this, 
since I was genuinely skeptical at times.  I never would have been able to devote my time 
to this kind of ‘bourgeoisie’ insular endeavor if he had not been there to support me in 
more ways than one.  It is a sad commentary on the state of higher education that the 
average PhD student accrues nearly $50,000 in student loan debt, and has an ever-
decreasing chance of a secure position within the ranks of the academy.  Nearly 70 
percent of faculty members are in non-tenure track positions – and almost 34,000 PhD 
holders currently subsist on federal foodstamp aid, many while they serve as adjunct 
professors.  I imagine a great number of promising scholars were not so lucky in their 
partners as I have been, and are struggling to make ends meet.  This is dedicated to them 
as well.  
 
Of course I must thank my committee members, whose careful readings of my sometimes 
palaverous drafts must have demanded a great deal of patience.  Their substantive 
critiques informed not just this project, but also my overall development as a scholar.  
Indeed I learned more from this project than I would have from a decade of coursework.  
A few of these committee members also suffered (and indulged) my periodic declarations 
of abandoning the PhD program to pursue more lucrative and less-demanding employ in 
the private sector.  I hope that I can fortify and steel the nerves of my future students in 
the same way.      
 
I received funding and support from a number of organizations and institutions during my 
time in graduate school that also bear mentioning here.  These include (in no particular 
order): The Smith Richardson Foundation; The Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy; 
The American Institute for Maghrebi Studies; The George Washington University Center 
for International Business Education & Research; the Kuwait Program at the Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques; The Crown Center at Brandeis University; and the Niehaus Center 
for Globalization & Governance at Princeton University.  
 
Lastly I would like to thank my very supportive parents, whose complete unfamiliarity 
with the mechanics of higher education was a blissful redoubt.  I am only sorry I will not 
be able to offer this same heedless encouragement to my own brood.  Their 
unquestioning support was like a lifeline.  They never asked for status updates or 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………viii 
 
Chapter 1: The Arms Trade and Political Patronage in the Arab World 
 
Introduction: The Arms Trade as a Tool for Exploring Patronage Politics.........................1 
The Contemporary Outlines of Defense Offsets…………………………………………..7 
Breakdown of Chapters........................................................................................................9 
The Groundwork for a Multi-Case Comparison – Egypt and Jordan: Providing Patronage  
 to the Military………………................................................................................10  
The Gulf Cases of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE: Channeling Offsets to Domestic  
 Business Elites……………………………………………………………….......11  
The Distributive State and Political Patronage..................................................................13  
Defense Offsets as Rents?..................................................................................................21 
The New Reality of the Distributive State and the Patronage Utility of Defense 
 Offsets....................................................................................................................24  
The Legacy of the Distributive State: Antecedent Socioeconomic Conditions.................25 
Macroeconomic Shifts and Strategies of Patronage-Diversification.................................29 
The Strictures of Neoliberal Economics and Acceptable Mechanisms of Patronage……37 
The Increasing Saliency of Corruption as a Governance Issue………………………….38 
Defense Offsets and the Permissive Legal and Regulatory Environment of the Arms 
 Market……………………………………………………………………………41 
Domestic Oversight in Arms Exporting Countries………………………………………45 
Information and Resource Asymmetries in U.S. Agencies……………………………...48 
Getting Paid: the Evolution of U.S. Government Offset Policy and How Defense Firms 
 Recoup the Costs of Offsets…………………………………..………………….53 
Significance of Study and Contribution to Existing Literature.........................................58  
Defense Offsets as an Economic Instrument.....................................................................62  
Defense Offsets as a Political Instrument..........................................................................70  
The Legalization of Bribery……………………………………………………………...72 




Chapter 2: Defense Offsets in Context: The Origins and Evolution of Offsets and the 
Political Significance of Data Discrepancies  
The Origins of Offsets.......................................................................................................83  
Offsets in Context: The Evolution of Global Trading Patterns.........................................88  
Offsets in Context: The Evolution of Bribery ..................................................................95  
Offsets in Context: Economic Development Narratives...................................................98  
Offsets in Context: Defense Industry Subsidies..............................................................100  
Evolution in Offset Design..............................................................................................105  
The Increasing Diversity of Offsets.................................................................................107  
Defense Offset Multipliers...............................................................................................108 
v 
 
Offset Investment Funds..................................................................................................111  
The Proliferation of Offset Service Firms and Brokers...................................................112  
Offset Swapping...............................................................................................................122  
Pre-Performance Offsets..................................................................................................123  
Most Recent Innovations in Offsets.................................................................................125  
Data Concerns and Discrepancies....................................................................................127  
Dollar Values and Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) Data Sources………………...129  
Contradictory Guidelines in Official Offset Policies.......................................................137 
Number of Countries Receiving Offsets………………………………………………..139 




Chapter 3: Defense Offsets in the Oil-Exporting States of the Gulf: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates 
A Brief Historical Overview of Defense Offsets in the Gulf...........................................148  
‘The Shield’ and ‘The Dove’: Defense Offsets in Saudi Arabia.....................................149 
The Al Yamamah Offset: Saudi Arabia, the UK, and British Aerospace (BAE)............161 
The Distribution of Offset Benefits in Saudi Arabia.......................................................166  
Tawazun ‘Balance’ and Alfia ‘Goals’: Defense Offsets in the United Arab Emirates....167 
 The Bureaucratic Back-and-Forth: Defense Offsets in Kuwait......................................179  
The Provision of Privilege in the Gulf: Divergent Policies, Common 
 Outcomes.............................................................................................................192  
The Best Kind of Customer: The Gulf Arms Market and Defense 
 Offsets..................................................................................................................194 
The Arms Trade and Political Leverage..........................................................................196 
The Arms Trade and Accountability and Authority........................................................198 
Breaking into the Offset Business: Influential Actors and Institutions in Gulf Offset 
 Policies.................................................................................................................200 
Defense Offsets and the Structure of Domestic Economies in the Gulf: The Agency 
 System…………………....……………………………………………………..207 
State Support for Indigenous Investors and Foreign Firms in Offset 
 Ventures...............................................................................................................211  
Defense Offsets and Wealth Concentration.....................................................................217 
The Economic Fundamentals of Defense Offsets in the Gulf: Official Narratives vs. 
 Outcomes.............................................................................................................219  
Offsets and Employment.................................................................................................221 
Offsets and Regime Prestige: Aquaculture, Academics, and Aircraft............................224 
Conclusion: The Political Benefits of Offsets in the Gulf – Delivering Patronage and 






Chapter 4: Defense Offsets in Egypt and Jordan: Feeding the Military Machine 
Defense Offsets in Egypt and Jordan in the Context of Historical State 
 Formation.............................................................................................................234  
Defense Offsets in the Context of Economic Liberalization...........................................237  
Defense Offsets in Jordan: The King Abdullah Design & Development 
 Bureau..................................................................................................................244 
Regional Instability and Collaborative Arms Production in Jordan................................248  
Private Profit in Jordan’s Burgeoning Defense-Industrial 
 Complex...............................................................................................................254  
Domestic Subsidies to KADDB………………………………………………………...257 
Defense Offsets in Egypt: Building the Army’s Empire.................................................263 
The Structure of the Egyptian Military’s Economic Holdings........................................265  
Major Weapons Co-Production Agreements in Egypt....................................................268  
The Triumph of Patronage in Egypt’s Military-Industrial 
 Production............................................................................................................271 
In the Economic Driver’s Seat: Defense Offsets and the Military’s Production of 
 Passenger Vehicles...............................................................................................279  
One Degree of Separation: The Egyptian Military’s Interests in Private Sector 
 Firms....................................................................................................................285  
Domestic Subsidies to the Egyptian Military..................................................................292 
Defense Offsets in Egypt and Jordan: Hiding in Plain View...........................................299  
The Intensification of Offsets and Military Production in Egypt....................................303  
Defense Offsets as an Innovation in Patronage Politics..................................................306 
 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion – Loose Ends and Looking Forward  
What this Project Does (and Does Not) Attempt to Accomplish....................................313  
Defense Offsets in the Context of the Global Economy……………..............................315 
Defense Offsets and the Globalization of Military Production.......................................316  
Defense Offsets and the ‘Financialization’ of the Global Economy...............................323  
Defense Offsets as Exotic Financial Instruments............................................................324  
Defense Offsets and Foreign Direct Investment..............................................................326 
Defense Offset and Declining U.S. Geostrategic Power.................................................329  
Offsets in the Middle East and the Region’s Unique Economic Environment................331 
Defense Offsets Beyond the Arab World…....................................................................334  
Loose Ends: Shifting Trends in Gulf Defense Offsets and the Egyptian and Jordanian 
 Armies Amidst the Arab Uprisings......................................................................345 
Defense Offsets and the Growth of Arms Production in the Arab Gulf..........................346  
The Factors Underlying Renewed Interest in Military Production..................................350  
A Sampling of Current Arms Production in the Gulf......................................................359  
Defense Offsets, Indigenous Arms Production, and the Potential Impact on Inter-State 
 Conflict and Regional Arms Races......................................................................366  
The Military’s Economic Interest in a Revolutionary Context........................................369  
vii 
 
Egypt’s Maritime Transport Sector as a Microcosm for the Military’s Economic 
 Position................................................................................................................378  





Appendix A: Defense Offsets in Egypt, 1980-Present…………………………………391 
Appendix B: Defense Offsets in Jordan, 1999-Present………………………………...395 
Appendix C: Defense Offsets in Kuwait, 1994-Present………………………………..401 
Appendix D: Defense Offsets in Saudi Arabia, 1984-Present………………………….407 





































List of Tables 
 
Table 1: “Foreign Aid Per Capita, 1990 & 2006”……………………………………….36 
 1 
Chapter 1: The Arms Trade and Political Patronage in the Arab 
World 
 
Introduction: The Arms Trade as a Tool for Exploring Patronage Politics 
The late scholar Harold Lasswell told us that political science is the study of “who gets 
what, when, and how.”  In states without robust democratic institutions, the question of 
‘who gets what’ is often resolved through a system of patronage-based politics.  Indeed, 
much of the literature on authoritarian endurance in the Middle East was an effort to 
determine how Arab autocrats managed to accumulate patronage resources and distribute 
them through particularistic benefits to influential groups in order to maintain control 
over the levers of power.  It was this distribution of patronage, along with the 
manipulation of official institutions (such as electoral systems and the judiciary) and the 
deployment of the coercive arms of the state that provided the formula for authoritarian 
longevity. However, much of this scholarship continues to focus on the process through 
which patronage resources are distributed domestically with little reference to how those 
resources accrue to Arab regimes in the first place.  Scholars often fail to interrogate the 
organizational and financial interests of the external institutions (such as oil markets and 
aid organizations) that mediate this transfer of resources, and how those interests 
influence the methods and patterns of resource distribution within Arab States.  This 
paper is an attempt to identify some of these institutions and patterns by focusing on the 
array of patronage resources made available through the arms purchases executed by 
regional governments.  
 
The specific class of resources examined here is reciprocal investment contracts that U.S.
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 defense firms negotiate with procuring country governments in order to facilitate arms 
sales, commonly known in industry parlance as ‘defense offsets.’1 These proprietary 
investment agreements signed between the defense firm and officials from the importing 
government can take a wide variety of forms. Procuring states design their own offset 
policies, including the amount of investment that foreign arms manufacturers are required 
to make and the domestic enterprises where those funds must be allocated.  The 
procuring state’s discretion over the process allows us to analyze actual projects 
generated by defense offset contracts in order to draw some conclusions about how 
procuring country governments distribute this investment to strengthen their patronage-
based support networks.  An analysis of how these contracts are fulfilled also reveals how 
U.S. defense firms are able to influence the process in order to secure their own financial 
benefits, and how the efforts of these firms help fuel the expansion of offsets in the Arab 
World.  By examining how Western defense firms and their customers in the Middle East 
collude to structure weapons contracts in order to generate patronage resources in a way 
that is mutually beneficial, we gain a better understanding of how patronage politics 
operates in the contemporary regional context.  We are likewise alerted to the subtle ways 
in which influential external actors such as foreign defense firms can insinuate their own 
interests into the process, and how the interactions between these groups create ever-
evolving new opportunities for patronage politics. 
 
Although defense offsets first appeared after WWII – when President Eisenhower
                                                            
1 Although this paper is limited to the Arab World, a similar analysis could be undertaken of most other 
regions.  Additionally, non-U.S. defense firms also engage in offsets, and although I make reference to a 
few cases in the following pages, the focus here is on American companies.  
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demanded that West Germany purchase American-made defense material to “offset” the 
cost of stationing U.S. troops on the continent – they have evolved into a multi-billion 
dollar incentive system that permeates the global arms market and extends into nearly 
every sector of procuring country economies.  I argue that the impact of defense offsets in 
the Arab World is distinct not only because increases in the magnitude and complexity of 
offsets outstrip parallel developments in other regions, but also because they are uniquely 
well-suited to prevailing patterns of patronage politics in the region, and therefore serve 
as ideal mechanisms for allocating economic privileges that help sustain authoritarian 
support networks.   
 
My research indicates that variation in the design of official offset policies reflects the 
unique strategies adopted by ruling elites in the Arab World to secure the support of (1) 
the indigenous military and security institutions or (2) powerful business elites – two 
constituencies identified in the regional literature as crucial to the maintenance of 
authoritarian regimes.2  My analysis of existing data shows that in Egypt and Jordan, 
where indigenous military and security institutions remain an influential force in politics, 
the regimes’ offset policies are designed to channel patronage to military-owned firms 
                                                            
2 Droz-Vincent 2007; Richter 2007; Bellin 2004; Brownlee 2002; Henry and Springborg 2001; Springborg 
1989.  Pepinsky (2009) concludes that when regime supporters are divided according to the mobility of 
their capital assets, the authoritarian ruler is unable to mount a coherent response to economic crises and 
the regime breaks down.  Such was the case in Indonesia during the financial crisis of the late 1990s, when 
Soeharto was torn between an indigenous military establishment that favored protectionist economic 
policies due to its largely immobile asset base and an equally powerful ethnically-Chinese capitalist class 
that preferred the relaxation of economic controls in response to the crisis.  The patterns of offset-
acquisition in my cases (direct offsets in states with powerful military constituencies whose economic 
interests are tied up in state-owned factories and other immoveable assets like real estate and large-scale 
infrastructure vs. indirect offsets in states where the economic elite have more to gain from the expansion 
of services, the financial industry and commercial exports) largely mirror this distinction between mobile 
and immobile asset bases.  Where Pepinsky utilizes economic crises to illuminate the dynamics of (both 
successful and unsuccessful) regime maintenance strategies, this project utilizes offset contracts. 
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and enhance the capability of those firms to compete in the private sector.  Conversely, in 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, the regimes’ offset policies direct investment toward 
large family-owned conglomerates, which wield more political clout than the Gulf States’ 
defense establishments.  Although the strategies employed by these governments may 
differ – in the type of offset they seek and in how they distribute them – their goals are 
the same: to utilize defense offsets to provide political patronage to pivotal domestic 
constituencies in order to consolidate and maintain their support.   
 
In addition to informing our understanding of important power differentials that exist 
between groups of domestic elites in the region, this research also pushes the empirical 
boundaries of the traditional distributive state paradigm beyond its focus on oil revenues 
and foreign aid. As Moore and others have argued, two-plus decades of economic 
liberalization have fundamentally altered the universe of available resources and the 
institutional channels that regimes have at their disposal for the distribution of those 
resources.3  Systemic developments including the ideological triumph of economic 
liberalism have restricted the ability of regimes to utilize traditional, overt subsidies, 
while the region’s growing share of the global arms market has created a large reservoir 
of potential patronage assets. The sheer magnitude of money involved in the arms trade, 
as well as the secretive nature of the transactions and their exemption from trade-related 
oversight bodies such as the World Trade Organization, further contributes to the appeal 
of defense offsets as a system for patronage distribution.  
                                                            
3 Pete W. Moore. “Keeping the baby and tossing the water: Advancing the debate about rents and politics 
in the Arab World.” unpublished manuscript.  
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Defense offsets also provide us with some analytical traction that we may not get from 
examinations of oil revenues and foreign aid, which are highly fungible and subject to 
donor conditionality, respectively.  In contrast, governments and political institutions 
outside the importing country have little control over the dispensation of offsets, which 
are negotiated between the procuring country government and the private sector firm 
selling them weapons.4  This discretion on behalf of the procuring state allows us greater 
empirical purchase on the processes associated with the diversification of patronage 
politics and helps inform our understanding of coalition formation.  Similarly, defense 
offsets are discrete contracts that flow to particular recipients, which makes it easier to 
trace their path from the time the contracts are signed until the point at which the 
investments are distributed.  This is in contrast to resource rents, which are lump sums 
distributed through a broad range of institutions, as well as rents like preferential access 
to credit or subsidized use of public goods (such as land, electrical infrastructure, etc.) for 
which reliable documentation is rarely available. Although the information on these 
contracts is not collected systematically across cases, and significant secrecy and 
intentional obfuscation present challenges to data collection, it is possible to develop a 
coherent picture of the domestic actors on the receiving end of offset investment. By 
expanding our lens to scrutinize new types of resources available to the distributive state, 
we can improve the analytical leverage provided by what Schumpeter termed the “fiscal 
sociology” approach, which promotes a focus on how states raise and spend revenues.  
                                                            
4 This impotency however, is partially self-styled.  Because offsets enable defense firms to maintain their 
market share and provide (or are perceived to provide) important benefits to their host governments, those 
governments have an interest in facilitating offsets. Governments have helped facilitate offsets by passing 
formal legislation that restricts their oversight role, and by hamstringing watch-dog groups and under-
funding or downsizing federal agencies that collect information on offsets.    
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This will help refine our understanding of the mechanisms of political patronage in the 
Arab World.  
 
Far from complicating my thesis, recent events in the region illustrate the durability of 
the domestic actors and institutions that are on the receiving end of offsets and other 
types of regime-mediated patronage.  Like oil revenues and foreign aid, defense offsets 
have helped transfer privileges to these groups, increasing their political influence by 
supplementing their economic activities and further entwining their interests with the 
institutional fabric of the state.  Like the distribution of other privileges, allocating offset-
generated investment has required the establishment of bureaucratic agencies and the 
formulation of both formal and informal offset policies. Often, the recipients of offset-
generated investment have close familial and business linkages with the officials in these 
agencies.  By identifying new classes of benefits that go these privileged political actors, 
we can better understand the resilience of regime support networks.  The removal of 
incumbents such as former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak or challenges to the 
legitimacy of the Gulf monarchs will not fundamentally alter the influence of historically 
powerful domestic constituencies, and the particular constellation of military and 
business elites that have prevented the emergence of alternate centers of power in these 
states will persist unless offsets and other similar privileges are undermined by genuine 
political and economic reforms.5  I believe the applicability of this analysis – which rests 
                                                            
5 The current trajectory of reforms – such as those pushed by Hosni Mubarak’s son and former heir 
apparent Gamal Mubarak – illustrate the absence of prospects for democratic change.  When Gamal set 
about in 2008 promoting changes that would have enriched his private business associates – personified in 
the figure of Ahmed Ezz, the steel tycoon and former ruling party secretary for organizational affairs who 
stood to gain monopoly power over the Egyptian steel market – the military generals pointed to rising labor 
militancy and strikes as a threat to national security that required re-assessing Gamal’s preferred platform 
of “reform.”  Ezz’s control over the price of steel would have hurt military producers, for whom steel is a 
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on the explanatory power of global security markets and influential elite networks – will 
not only survive the recent events in the region, but also help inform our understanding of 
subsequent outcomes, including intermediate power struggles and the eventual 
configurations of post-revolutionary governments. 
 
The Contemporary Outlines of Defense Offsets 
 “Defense offset” is the term used to describe a range of industrial and commercial 
incentives that procuring countries demand from arms manufacturers in exchange for 
purchasing their products. Because offsets are unregulated (except in rare instances when 
they involve sensitive technologies) official offset policies vary widely by state.  On the 
low-end are states requiring that 35% of the original contract value be offset through 
inward investment; many states demand offsets equivalent to 50-60% of the original 
contract.  Beyond this, offsets in excess of 100% are routine, and a recent agreement 
concluded between BAE and South Africa included offsets nearly four times the value 
(400%) of the aircraft being purchased.6   
 
Classification schemes used by firms and governments generally divide offsets into two 
categories: direct and indirect.  Direct offsets are directly linked to the defense materiel or 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
primary input.  Most of Gamal’s closest associates were major beneficiaries of the corrupt privatization 
schemes instituted by the Egyptian government at the behest of international donors and financial 
institutions.  These individuals – who have been the primary targets of opposition activity – are now under 
investigation, barred from traveling abroad and their assets have been frozen.  In contrast, General (Ret.) 
Sayed Meshal, the Minister of Military Production, has kept his post. See also the comments of Rashid 
Khalidi and Robert Springborg in Ken Stier. 9 February 2011. “For Egypt’s Military, Big Business Means 
Staying Power.” TIME. 
6 This offset contract between BAE and South Africa was the basis for a major suit filed by the U.K.’s 
Serious Fraud Office, which resulted in a large fine.  I make reference to this and similar cases later in the 
dissertation, I include it here to provide a broad outline of offset activities.  The 400% figure comes from 
Burrows, Gideon. 2002. The No-Nonsense Guide to the Arms Trade. London: Verso Books, p87. 
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service provided, and can include co-production and/or licensed production of particular 
weapons systems; the transfer of related military technologies; investment in defense 
production facilities in the procuring country; or the use of in-country subcontractors or 
suppliers. Indirect offsets are investments in civilian, non-weapons related ventures.  
These can include establishing joint ventures with domestic commercial operators; 
transferring non-military technologies; eliciting investment from third parties; and 
providing capital or other financial assets (such as preferential credit terms) for state-
owned enterprises or investment vehicles.7 The end result is that procuring governments 
receive large infusions of financial resources. Janes Defence Weekly estimates that the 
Gulf countries alone raked in more than $30 billion in offsets between 1990 and 1997,8 
and industry forecasts estimate another $54 billion for the Gulf between 2010 and 2015.9   
 
Offset contracts are also proprietary agreements, meaning their details are only visible to 
the exporting firm and the procuring government.10 (Although the efforts of both to 
promote offsets as developmental tools means they frequently make information 
available through official publications and corporate literature) This makes them ideal 
vehicles for delivering subsidies to domestic interest groups.  Both the firms and the 
                                                            
7 In previous decades indirect offsets frequently took the form of a commitment on behalf of the defense 
firm to purchase commodities or manufactured goods from the procuring country or locate third party 
buyers.  However, such simple ‘barter’ schemes have largely been abandoned in favor of more complex 
transactions involving financial firms and offset brokers.  Programs designed by these intermediary firms 
often allow procuring countries to leverage offset investment as a financial tool to secure additional 
financing. 
8 Military-Offsets to Grow?  1 December 1998.  Jane’s Intelligence Review.  
9 CTO Newsletter. 24 May 2010. 28(10).   
10 This limited visibility is the culmination of years of industry efforts to conceal offset agreements, aided 
by the collaboration of their host country governments, who are keen to avoid the political backlash 
associated with outsourcing coveted defense jobs.  The process of eliminating oversight – and the 
associated political implications – are explored in depth in Chapter 2.   
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procuring governments have an interest in channeling offset-generated investment into 
the business ventures of influential domestic elites in the procuring country, who not only 
provide the base of support for political incumbents, but also serve as gatekeepers whose 
loyalty is indispensible for foreign arms manufacturers seeking a competitive edge in 
future deals.   
 
Breakdown of Chapters  
This chapter will situate defense offsets within the context of patronage-based politics in 
the Middle East, and explore how the unique characteristics of offsets make them a 
particularly attractive resource distribution mechanism for authoritarian regimes.  This 
project is a bit unique, in that it not only attempts a rigorous examination of domestic 
politico-economic structures, but does so with reference to a highly complex mechanism 
(offsets) with which few readers will be readily familiar.  As a result, a great deal of the 
first chapter is spent detailing how offsets function and laying out some rather mundane 
details regarding their history and typology.  Chapter 2 will outline the evolution of 
offsets, paying particular attention to recent innovations in offset design that have 
contributed to their proliferation and increasing complexity. This chapter will also treat 
the issue of discrepancies in available offset data.  Figures provided by procuring 
governments, defense firms, industry trade groups, offset brokers and service providers, 
public interest organizations, and independent researchers vary dramatically. The patterns 
and discrepancies in these various data sources provide a powerful insight into the 
interests of relevant actors and the complex networks involved in the offset industry.  
Chapters 3 and 4 will provide case material on my two groups of cases: the oil-rich Gulf 
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States of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and the populous oil-importers Egypt and 
Jordan, respectively.  The juxtaposition of Gulf and non-Gulf cases not only demonstrates 
substantive differences in the nature of patronage and clientelism in these societies, but 
also allows me to take advantage of the wealth of empirical data available for offsets in 
the Gulf countries and the theoretical rigor of the much larger literature on authoritarian 
dynamics in the region’s oil-importing states. Chapter 5 will clarify the theoretical goals 
and conclusions of this project, address some emergent trends that hint at the future 
trajectory of defense offsets in the Middle East, touch on some comparative cases outside 
the region, and explore areas of future research.  
 
The Groundwork for a Multi-Case Comparison 
Egypt and Jordan: Providing Patronage to the Military  
 
Whereas the militaries of the Gulf have traditionally been small, foreign-trained and 
depoliticized, and therefore a less potent political constituency, the military and internal 
security services have played a prominent role in the politics of the region’s more 
populous oil-importers, especially Egypt and Jordan.  These states exist in an atmosphere 
of bureaucratic authoritarian politics characterized by populist and nationalist discourses 
that have historically focused on achieving economic independence, often by building 
indigenous defense capacity and using the military as an engine for economic 
development.  Unlike the Gulf States, Egypt and Jordan (or Transjordan as it was known 
until 1949) inherited extensive military, police and intelligence structures built by 
colonial authorities, first to enforce their own rule, and later to mobilize the domestic 
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population in support of the Allied war effort.11  This trajectory of state formation has 
manifested itself in the pursuit of patronage that directly benefits the regimes’ domestic 
security constituencies.  The military’s historic role in the economy is reflected in the 
preferential access that military producers have to public goods such as scarce industrial 
materials (steel); infrastructure (airplane hangars, factories and warehouses); and hard 
currency.  Offset projects are an extension of these historic privileges, which in turn 
provide basic employment for rank-and-file soldiers, engineering positions for the large 
number of technicians educated in state-owned military and vocational schools, 
management positions for officers, and the prestige associated with being ‘chosen’ to 
partner with large foreign firms manufacturing technologically sophisticated products.   
 
The Gulf Cases: Channeling Offsets to Domestic Business Elites 
The character of defense offsets in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE reflect their 
unique historical integration into the global economy.  The abundance of oil and gas 
reserves in the Gulf States suppressed the industrialization imperative and military-driven 
modernization programs that dictated the developmental trajectories of Egypt and Jordan.  
The resulting absence of either large-scale manufacturing or politically potent militaries 
has produced a preference for indirect offsets.12  Although Saudi Arabia briefly flirted 
with the idea of establishing its own defense-industrial base in the 1980s and the UAE 
                                                            
11 For the legacy of colonial security policy see Martin Thomas. 2008. Empires of Intelligence: Security 
Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. For the role that 
war mobilization played in the shaping of regional militaries and internal security forces see the many case-
specific chapters of Steve Heydemann (ed). 2000. War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.    
12 Many scholars argue that the political and industrial elite in the West actively discouraged 
industrialization in the oil-exporting monarchies because they feared this would lead to a class-based social 
order that might generate conflict and endanger the regularity of energy supplies to the industrialized 
economies.    
 12 
offset program currently includes a handful of weapons-producing components 
(including the 2007 acquisition of the German gun-maker Merkel by the investment arm 
of the UAE’s Offsets Program Bureau,) there is currently little significant domestic 
production of defense material in the Gulf States.  Unlike the militaries in the populous 
oil-importing states, the Gulf militaries were never assigned (nor did they appropriate for 
themselves) the role of economic growth engine that came to be associated with 
developing country militaries in the latter half of the 20th century.13  Their small 
populations also precluded the potential advantage of military-led industrialization –the 
availability of cheap and/or conscript labor.   
 
The calculated accumulation of social and economic support from important tribal 
families and powerful merchants is what allowed the Gulf regimes to consolidate their 
rule – and it is these same families and business elites that are today the recipients of 
offset-generated investment. Although they were key to bringing to power the 
monarchies that govern the Gulf States today, they remain centers of economic, social 
and political power in their own right. Their support is provisional on the continued 
supply of patronage and state largesse that has characterized their relationship with the 
region’s monarchies since the discovery of oil and the lucrative state contracts that 
followed.  Offsets are a contemporary manifestation of this long-standing patronage 
system, facilitated by the region’s massive military budgets and the ceaseless quest for 
methods of distributing discretionary privileges to loyal elites.     
 
                                                            
13 Both modernization theory and dependency theory accord a special role to the military: as an inherently 
modernizing institution or as an engine to drive independent domestic industrialization, respectively.  
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The Distributive State and Political Patronage 
The argument for focusing on a state’s distributive capacity is based on the premise that 
an examination of the processes by which states raise revenue and manage spending will 
tell us a great deal about the social, political and economic character of the state and its 
relationship to society.14 In studies of the Arab World, the examination of a state’s 
distributive activities has necessarily centered on the ability of these states to generate 
‘rents’ in the form of oil revenues and foreign aid.  The definition of rent provided by 
classical economics is, “the difference between the market price of a good or factor of 
production and its opportunity cost.”15 This difference is easily demonstrated in the case 
of oil, which provides enormous revenues to the exporting state well beyond the 
immediate costs of exploration, extraction, refinement and transportation.16 Industry 
estimates put Saudi Aramco’s production costs at between $2 and $3 per barrel in 2005, 
up from about 7 cents in 1950 and 50-60 cents in the early 1990s.17  Meanwhile, the 
market price for a barrel of crude has averaged $30 between 1970 and 2008, ranging from 
$18 in 1950 to $30 in the early 1990s to $65 in 2005.18 Income from rents is distinct from 
                                                            
14 This is Joseph Schumpeter’s “fiscal sociology,” approach, which he championed in his text The 
Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, originally published in 1942. However, Schumpeter gives credit 
for the concept to one of his predecessors, the Marxist Economist Rudolph Goldscheid, who was writing at 
the beginning of the 20th Century. A great deal of my understanding of how rents interact with distributive 
politics comes from the writings of Pete W. Moore, whose works are cited in the bibliography. 
15 Waterbury, John and Alan Richards. 2008. A Political Economy of the Middle East. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, p16.  
16 Of course, profitability really depends on one’s definition of “cost.”  It can be argued that the societies of 
oil exporting states have paid dearly in terms of overall economic development, repeated foreign 
interventions, environmental degradation and a host of other ills that are never included in the market price 
of oil.  




other sources of government revenue such as taxes and tariffs because rents are in some 
sense unearned, or as Alfred Marshall termed them, “the free gifts of nature.”19 Nor does 
generating income from rents require the same institutional capacity as extractive 
activities like tax collection.   
 
The analytical concept of a rentier state, as it is currently understood, was first applied by 
Hossein Mahdavy of Harvard in his 1970 essay titled, “Patterns and Problems of 
Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran.”20 Scholars provide various 
economic thresholds for what constitutes a rentier state according to their cases and the 
particular phenomenon on which they focus, but the earliest theorists classified states as 
‘rentiers’ if they derived at least 40% of their revenue from rents. 21 The concept of the 
rentier state was contemporaneous with the rise of the world-systems literature, which 
posited that the forms of economic exchange taking place between developed and 
developing states had locked the latter into a position of structural dependence.  Their 
‘place’ in the global economy would be to supply cheap raw materials – including energy 
inputs, minerals, agricultural goods, and low-wage labor – to feed industrial expansion in 
                                                            
19 The Medieval North African philosopher Ibn Khaldun made a similar observation centuries prior when 
he lamented “the weak-minded persons” who seek to “discover property under the surface of the earth and 
make some profit from it” in the hope that “without any effort, he might find sufficient money to pay for 
the (luxury) habits in which he has become caught.” Ibn Khaldun.  1958.  Al-Muqaddimah (An Introduction 
to History).  Cited in Peter W. Moore.  2004. Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic 
Crisis in Jordan.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p19 
20 Hossein Mahdavy.  1970.  “Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case 
of Iran.” In Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day.  
M.A. Cook (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Before this, the concept of the rentier state was used to 
denote European states that made large loans to non-European states.  See Michael Ross. 1999. “The 
Political Economy of the Resource Curse.” World Politics. 51(2).   
21 It has since been pointed out that this threshold was arbitrary, there being no theoretical (or empirical) 
reason to suggest that alternative benchmarks might not be more useful.  Nonetheless it became the 
convention for much of the rentier state literature. Beblawi, Hazem and Giacomo Luciani. 1987. The 
Rentier State: Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World. New York: Croom Helm  
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the manufacturing hubs of Europe and North America. The economies of the developing 
countries would always, therefore, remain ‘less-developed’ vis a vis their wealthier 
counterparts in the global North.22  
 
The implication for less-developed rentier states was compounded, since abundant rents 
acted as a further disincentive for state managers to diversify their sources of income.  
Rentier states would thus encounter a host of economic obstacles, collectively termed 
“Dutch Disease” or “the resource curse,” that frustrate the development of economic 
sectors not directly linked to the rent source. Oil-rich states may have thriving sectors 
related to oil extraction (such as petrochemicals and tanker transport fleets) but sclerotic 
performance in manufacturing and service industries because high-returns in the former 
crowd out investment in the latter. Also, because oil-related enterprises are not labor 
intensive, they provide few avenues for employment, forcing states to subsidize domestic 
consumption.  Of course oil is not the only form of rent. States dependent on foreign aid 
will likewise experience difficulty in developing their economies, since domestic 
producers will be displaced (or prevented from emerging) because demand for goods and 
services is met by donor supplies.  
 
The political corollary to this economic stumbling block is the absence of domestic 
                                                            
22 To the dependency theorists, because the construction of the Arab state was coincident with the building 
of the oil economy, state institutions are responsive to this industry, rather than any socioeconomic or 
political pressures originating from society, whose own development is suppressed by the distributional 
structure of the state.   See Jacqueline Ismael.  1993. Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State.  
Gainesville: University of Florida Press.  See also Abdulkhaleq Abdullah. 1985. “Political Dependency: 
The Case of the United Arab Emirates.” Unpublished PhD thesis.  Georgetown University. For classical 
dependency theorists (that do not deal directly with Middle East cases) see Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974; 
Chirot 1977, 1994; Chase-Dunn 1989. 
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demands for institution-building and political representation, which produces an 
environment in which the distribution of privileges determines the relationship between 
the central authority and its citizens (or subjects).23 Accumulating income from rents does 
not require that those in power organize the levers of the state to facilitate economic 
activity, either through the provision of physical infrastructure or the supply of services 
like labor and capital regulation, which themselves would necessitate the creation of a 
functioning bureaucracy.24 Instead, the central authority can rely on accumulated rents to 
supply sufficient privileges to different groups in order to maintain their support.  By 
contrast, states without access to substantial rents must build and maintain infrastructure 
to facilitate economic activity and conclude some sort of social bargain establishing the 
states’ right to demand that citizens relinquish some portion of the fruits of their labor to 
                                                            
23 The relationship between rent-dependence, extractive activities like taxation, and regime type is highly 
contested, especially by Middle East area scholars.  Okruhlik challenges the validity of claims that Middle 
Eastern publics are placated with rent-based patronage by demonstrating that conflicts over the distribution 
of plentiful rents can be just as intense. Okruhlik, Gwenn. 1999. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise 
of Opposition. The Political Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics. 31(3): 295-315. Scholars have 
also sought to explain the absence of successful political contestation by focusing on the state’s ability to 
successfully repress dissent rather than puzzling over an apparently passive public (Brownlee 2002; 
Pripstein-Posusney 2004).  Other scholars examine the internal logic of theories that link extraction with 
demands for representation.  Herb contends that it was the very individuals and institutions employed by 
the state to collect taxes that eventually demanded political representation, and they did so because their 
role provided them with leverage vis a vis the central authority.  Herb, Michael. Fall 2003. “Taxation and 
Representation.” Studies in Comparative International Development. 38(3): 3-31. Because these arguments 
frequently center on observed distinctions between cases, I will address many of them in the following 
chapters.   
24 Scholars disagree over whether this produces a state that is isolated from society (and thus weakened) or 
insulated from society (and thus in possession of a greater range of options).  Isolationists claim this 
organizational shortcoming has prevented the state from developing the pathways and institutional 
openings necessary to channel public sentiment into the decision-making process, weakening the regime’s 
ability to respond effectively in times of crisis.  Insulationists counter that the regime possesses a greater 
space for action in responding to such crises precisely because it remains aloof from societal pressures and 
interest group demands.  Nazih Ayubi confronts this contradiction in his 1996 book Over-stating the Arab 
State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris. The author concedes a large 
‘quantitative’ presence of the Arab state – in industrialization, social welfare, public sector employment, 
and spending, but also insists that the Arab state, “has frequently to resort to raw coercion in order to 
preserve itself” and is not a strong state because it lacks both the infrastructural power that comes from 
processes of taxation and the ideological power to ensure the continued legitimacy of the ruling stratum, 
p3.   
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the central authority.  Such activities require extensive administrative organization. 
Unlike taxes and tariffs, oil revenues, foreign aid and defense offsets flow to states (and 
can then be distributed by state functionaries) regardless of productive economic 
activities or the provision of public infrastructure. 
 
Historically, rents have been central to the process of state-building and regime 
consolidation in the Middle East – for oil rich states and resource-poor ones alike.  Both 
the physical infrastructure and governing institutions of the modern Gulf States were 
financed by (and designed to service) the export of oil.25  And revenues from the export 
of oil were used to build the economic and political support networks that help sustain the 
Al Saud’s rule today.  Likewise, the Jordanian monarchy relied almost exclusively on aid 
– first from the British, then the Americans – to develop the institutions of the state and 
service the different patronage requirements of its support coalition.26  Bilateral aid, as 
well as successive tranches of loans and subsequent loan forgiveness, have provided for a 
massive chunk of the Egyptian state’s budget.  Indeed, the rentier character of the Arab 
state has been marshaled to explain a number of “big” dependent variables, including 
regime type (Beblawi and Luciani 1987), regime durability (Chaudry 1989), foreign 
relations (Brand 1994), economic development (Karl 1999), institutional design (Moore 
and Peters 2009), coalition-building (Yom 2009), capital-labor relations (Moore 2004 and 
                                                            
25 Anderson, Lisa. October 1987. “The State in the Middle East and North Africa. Comparative Politics. 
20(1): 1-18.  See also Robert Vitalis. 1995. When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of 
Empire in Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
26 Moore, Peter and Anne M. Peters. August 2009. “Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable 
Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.”  Studies in 
Comparative International Development. 44(3). 
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Bellin 2000) and domestic support for economic and/or political reforms (Okruhlik 
1999).   
 
Because regime authority in these states is predicated on the rulers’ ability to effectively 
allocate benefits to critical supporters, ruling elites are compelled to seek out new ways to 
generate patronage resources when extant sources become politically problematic or 
economically unfeasible.27 Similarly, the institutional edifice designed to deliver 
patronage to one group may not be well adapted to deliver patronage to a new group 
whose increasing influence demands that they be brought into the clientelist bargain.  In 
this case, the government must create these new institutions – through establishing new 
state agencies, cultivating new bilateral trade relationships, adjusting existing regulatory 
regimes, etc.  Defense offsets are emblematic of regime strategies designed to tap new 
sources of potential patronage, in this case, one that has emerged from the increasingly 
sizeable and sophisticated global arms market.  Defense goods and services account for 
an increasingly large proportion of regional trade, making it a convenient (and abundant) 
channel for the transfer of patronage.  Between 2001 and 2008 the value of U.S. arms 
transfer agreements with the Middle East was equal to 25% of all U.S. goods and services 
exported to the region.28   The total stock of U.S. FDI in the Middle East as of 2004 was 
$28 billion (1.4% of global U.S. FDI).  A very conservative estimate of U.S. offsets as of 
                                                            
27 Henry, Clement. M and Richard Springborg.  2001. Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East.  Cambridge University Press, p11. 
28 According to the “Survey of Current Business” published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. exports of goods and services during the period 2001-2008 were equal 
to $235 billion.  During that same period, the Congressional Research Service reported arms transfer 
agreements between the U.S. and Middle East governments amounting to $59 billion.  “Conventional Arms 
Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2008.” p14. 
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2004 is about $5.1 billion, meaning offsets during that period accounted for 18% of all 
U.S. investment in the region. 29 
 
Regional leaders have responded similarly to previous macro-shifts in regional political 
and economic realities that either obstructed access to existing sources of patronage or 
demonstrated the potential of new ones.  Switching superpower allegiances is a notable – 
and not uncommon – example.  In the 1950s, growing political unrest over corruption and 
nepotism in Jordan’s state institutions led the British to demand political reform in 
exchange for continued aid.30  But instead of dismantling these aid-financed patronage 
institutions – which formed the very foundations of political support for the monarchy – 
King Hussein orchestrated even more unrest by firing his leftist prime minister and 
imposing martial law, quickly convincing the Americans that a substantial (and 
unconditional) aid package was necessary to counter the growing threat of Pan-Arab 
socialism.31  Similarly, President Sadat’s rapprochement with the Americans supplied him 
with the economic aid he needed to lavish the military with new weapons,32 provide the 
                                                            
29 Figure from U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security annual offset report. FDI figures from U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad: Financial Outflows Without Current Cost Adjustment, 2009. U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. “International Economic Accounts: U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data. http://www.bea.gov/international/.  
Also see “Middle East Free Trade Area: Progress Report.” July 3, 2006. Congressional Research Service, 
p6. 
30 Moore, Peter and Anne M. Peters. August 2009. “Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable 
Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.”  Studies in 
Comparative International Development. 44(3), p268.  
31 Ann M. Peters argues in her unpublished dissertation manuscript that these same corrupt institutions 
persist today alongside parallel institutions financed largely by U.S. aid – the present-day legacy of the 
original aid package rushed through by President Eisenhower in 1957.  These donor-sponsored institutions 
provide public and social services to the Jordanian people, while the institutions administered by the regime 
operate as employment mills for key political constituencies.  
32 This new weaponry was especially significant because denials and delays in arms deliveries by the 
Soviets were widely blamed for Egypt’s abysmal performance in the 1967 war with Israel, when the 
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politically powerful officer corps with privileged access to business opportunities in the 
nascent private sector economy, and renew many of the domestic subsidies that had 
prevailed under his predecessor.33  The Gulf States have demonstrated an analogous 
capability to adapt their distributional arrangements, primarily by expanding state 
patronage to groups of modernizing business elites and technocratic-minded bureaucrats 
in order to cultivate a buffer of support against anti-regime sentiment from radical 
Islamists.   
 
Similar political and economic shifts continue to confront regional rulers, who realize 
they must innovate and adapt their distributive strategies to meet new exigencies and 
capitalize on their niche positions as oil exporters, important geostrategic allies, aid 
recipients, and major defense purchasers.  Defense offsets are not only modular in that 
they can be tailored to provide benefits to quite different domestic constituencies, but also 
serve as a hedge against disruptions in the flow of traditional rents such as oil revenues, 
labor remittances and foreign aid – which are dependent on oil price volatility and donor 
conditionality.  A focus on offsets allows us to examine the processes through which 




                                                                                                                                                                                 
equipment only arrived after the fighting was over.  See Keith Krause. September 1991. “Military 
Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships.” International 
Studies Quarterly. 35(3): P318-9.  
33 Marvin Weinbaum. April 1985. “Egypt’s ‘Infitah’ and the Politics of U.S. Economic Assistance.” Middle 
Eastern Studies. 21(2): 206-222.  
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Defense Offsets as Rents? 
Thinking about defense offsets in the context of the rentier state paradigm illuminates 
some important aspects of how offsets operate within a given state’s domestic political 
economy.  This is especially true if we adopt an expansive and fluid definition of rents, 
one that equates them with ‘easy money.’ That is to say, sources of revenue may be more 
or less ‘rent-like’ depending on what efforts the state must marshal in order to capture 
them.  Offsets display some features common to traditional rents (like oil and aid), but 
also differ from rents in important respects.  Initially, offsets appear to function as rents 
because they represent a form of unearned income that is transferred from an external 
actor (the foreign defense firm) to the procuring country government.  The purchasing 
government acquires these economic resources for doing something it would have done 
anyway: purchase defense equipment.  Like the “free gifts of nature” that generate oil 
revenues and related strategic rents, the offset investment is not the result of costly 
government efforts to overhaul the domestic economy and make it an attractive hub for 
investment.  And like oil and aid, offsets are mediated by the state, which decides where 
offset-generated investments are ultimately spent.   
 
However, defense offsets are also a sort of anti-rent, because in reality the procuring state 
pays for them.34 Ironically, it is not the procuring state but the defense firm that emerges 
from the exchange having gained financially, because the firm incorporates the projected 
costs of the offset into the original contract price and uses various other accounting 
                                                            
34 Arguably, states pay dearly for oil revenues and foreign aid as well; those dependent on the former are 
subjected to politically-destabilizing price volatility and frequent violations of their sovereignty, while aid-
dependent states find that most donor funds eventually find their way back onto the balance sheets of 
foreign firms, who are often granted preferential market access as a condition of granting aid.  
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mechanisms to minimize the actual investment they do make.35 Initially, this seems to 
present a major challenge to my theoretical claim that procuring countries are using 
offsets to generate resources for patronage distribution.  However, upon further 
inspection, it not only underscores a feature common to all forms of patronage politics – 
that they entail significant social costs – but also demonstrates why offsets are such an 
appealing vehicle for patronage. They satisfy the requirements of both defense firms and 
purchasing governments by providing financial gains to the former and an air of 
legitimacy for the patronage policies of the latter.  
 
Defense offsets are also unlike other rents because they provide a vehicle for distributing 
patronage to regime constituencies that is unhindered by donor conditionality (in contrast 
to foreign aid) or political debates over the allocation of state resources (as with oil 
revenues). The debate over distributing offset projects never takes place because the fact 
that the procuring country pays for the offset and designates the domestic recipient of the 
resulting investment is concealed.  This is possible not only because offsets are classified 
as trade related to national security – which exempts them from most potential sources of 
public scrutiny – but also because both firms and procuring governments have succeeded 
in depicting the offset as a concession made by the foreign defense firm.  Sometimes this 
concession is framed as an expression of corporate citizenship in which the defense firm 
makes the investment in the interest of developing and diversifying the economy of the 
procuring country.  At other times the offset is depicted as a sort of capitulation that the 
                                                            
35 The inclusion of this cost is not made explicit in the contract.  For instance, there is no line item that lists 
“offset cost.”  However, it is clear that the majority of procuring country officials are aware of this practice, 
and continue to require offsets despite the obvious financial costs. This is examined more thoroughly in the 
following pages.  
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procuring country officials manage to wrangle out of the defense firm.  Such careful 
framing means that the distribution of benefits in the form of defense offsets does not 
present the same political conundrum to Arab regimes that the distribution of other types 
of particularized benefits might generate.  Gwenn Okruhlik argues that distributive states 
are not devoid of political battles because the allocation of benefits and privileges can be 
just as contentious as extractive activities like taxation.  As Okruhlik aptly states, “money 
does not spend itself.”36  However, in the case of defense offsets, these privileges do 
appear to distribute themselves, since external observers justifiably mistake the foreign 
firm’s partnership with domestic commercial businesses and/or domestic military 
producers as based on some sort of objective calculation by that foreign firm regarding 
the domestic entity’s suitability – ultimately underestimating the degree to which the 
procuring government controls this decision. 
 
Defense offsets are also distinct from rents that may be generated through trade, such as 
licensing or quota preferences granted to well-connected businessmen.  Like offsets, 
these rents pose a cost to the state, because they represent forfeited revenues,37 but unlike 
offsets, the generation of these rents cannot be disguised as depoliticized investment 
flowing from multi-national (Western) firms into the domestic private sector or 
indigenous military production facilities. Defense offsets allow the procuring country 
                                                            
36 Okruhlik, Gwenn. April 1999. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political 
Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics. 31(3): p297. 
37 Boone demonstrates how commercial rent-seeking by powerful domestic elites can be sustained under a 
wide-variety of economic policy models adopted by states.  It turns out this capacity has little to do with the 
policies themselves, and more to do with the efforts by state officials to strike political alliances with loyal 
economic elites. See Boone, Catherine. 1994 “Trade, Taxes and Tribute: Market Liberalizations and the 
New Importers in West Africa.” World Development 22(3): 453-467.  
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government to sidestep the inconvenient truth that many forms of (apparently apolitical) 
external investment are in fact dictated by regime connections and elite politics.  Thus we 
have a situation where both procuring countries and defense firms support the provision 
of defense offsets because the procuring country is able to conceal the costs and political 
motivations involved in channeling offset investment to its political allies while the firms 
are able to pose as good corporate citizens while also supplementing company revenues.   
 
The New Reality of the Distributive State and the Patronage Utility of Defense 
Offsets 
 
So why do these regimes need the assistance of defense firms to facilitate the delivery of 
patronage they have been distributing for decades?  The answer lies partly in the 
changing context within which these regimes operate.  This next section will lay out the 
major changes that have altered the political patronage landscape. 
 
Offsets are an ideal vehicle for the distribution of patronage for a number of reasons, 
some of which have been alluded to above.  Important factors include the domestic 
context in the procuring countries, influenced by both antecedent social conditions and 
macroeconomic shifts that have altered the universe of patronage-generating mechanisms 
(and distribution channels) available to political leaders.  These shifts include not only the 
liberal trajectory of economic reform, but also the increasing attention paid to issues of 
corruption in the developing world. Additional factors are attributable to the unique 
nature of offsets, including their embeddedness in the sacrosanct domain of national 
security and the symbolism they provide to both procuring country officials and defense 
executives, both of whom wish to demonstrate the potential developmental benefits 
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associated with the expansion of the arms trade.  Still other factors include the domestic 
context in the exporting countries, most notably the permissive legal and regulatory 
environment within which defense firms operate, which helps facilitate the expansion of 
the arms trade and provision of offset contracts.  A good part of the remainder of this 
chapter will focus on these factors, which demonstrate the various aspects of defense 
offsets that make them such an appealing mechanism for distributing patronage.  
 
Antecedent Socioeconomic Conditions: The Legacy of the Distributive State 
The legacy of statist development in the Middle East has contributed to the concentration 
of capital and industrial resources, which facilitates the absorption of offsets into regime-
controlled patronage channels, making them politically expedient.  Because offsets are 
usually for large-scale, capital-intensive projects, the necessary infrastructure and human 
and financial resources are only found in those firms and institutions that possess close 
ties to their respective regimes.  In the Gulf, this is predominantly the royal families, the 
region’s large merchant conglomerates, and a small coterie of private businessmen whose 
personal links with the ruling families have brought them additional privileges. In Egypt 
and Jordan this includes those who inherited or extracted wealth from the large public 
sector during the previous period of etatism or during the subsequent process of crony 
privatization.38  Because the state controlled access to resources during the decades of 
central planning, regime-allied elites are often the only ones with sufficient resources to 
                                                            
38 See Heydemann, Steven (ed). 2004. Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic 
Reform Revisited. New York: Palgrave Press. See also Brommelhorster, Jorn and Christian Paes (eds). 
2003. The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. See also 
Siddiqa, Ayesha. 2007. Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London: Pluto Press.    
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either purchase public sector companies or gain access to credit in order to establish 
private enterprises.   
 
In the Gulf, the highly-diversified family-owned conglomerates that dominate the 
economy receive the lion’s share of offset investment, but the particular branch within the 
firm that ultimately receives offset-generated financing is sometimes a prestige-oriented 
enterprise (such as green energy or aquaculture) or one aimed at increasing employment 
(such as vocational training initiatives).39  However, despite the implied commitment to 
diversification and employment suggested by these initiatives, they often fail to realize 
their stated goal for the same reason that offsets feed into the existing patronage-based 
economic system.  Mainly, they are engineered to meet political (rather than economic) 
goals and are therefore economically unsustainable, as aquaculture has proven to be in 
most cases, as have the employment programs, which end up training migrants from 
South Asia because they fail to attract native Gulf applicants.   
 
Likewise, in Egypt and Jordan, the peasants, bureaucrats and urban poor that were the 
recipients of state oblations in the immediate post-independence period have been largely 
abandoned as a political class in favor of a more narrow pact that favors the military – 
including individual elite officers with extensive business interests of their own as well as 
                                                            
39 Despite a stated commitment to generating jobs, offset policy in the Gulf has been an abysmal failure in 
this respect.  In Saudi Arabia for example, the Janes Defence Group estimates that since the offset program 
was initiated in 1985, less than 4,000 jobs were created by offset investment, far below the estimates that 
firms provided during the negotiation process.  (estimate appeared in article by Sylvia Pfeifer. 10 June, 
2010.  “Overseas defence clients get tougher.” Financial Times). Other figures are even more conservative. 
Matthews calculates that a mere 2,000 Saudi jobs were created from over $100 billion in defense purchases 
that included offset packages. See Matthews, Ron.  2002.  “Saudi Arabia: Defense Offsets and 
Development.” In Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditure, Arms Production and Arms 
Trade in Developing Countries.  Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne (eds).  New York, NY: Palgrave. This is 
explored in detail in Chapter 3.  
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the larger collective institution. In these cases the offset-generated investment in military 
owned and operated enterprises is billed as an effort to increase hard currency reserves 
through arms exports (which, unlike other forms of production, are almost exclusively 
traded for dollars as opposed to local currencies); contribute to military self-sufficiency; 
and create spillover through the incorporation of military technologies into civilian 
products.  As in the Gulf cases, we will see in the intervening chapters that these stated 
goals have also proven illusory.  Instead, the main impact of defense offsets in Egypt and 
Jordan has been to embolden the military and grant it additional leverage and influence in 
the domestic economy and the broader political system. The steep increase in the 
complexity and dollar values associated with defense offsets demonstrates that regional 
regimes are quite proficient at adapting their behavior in response to demands generated 
by the liberalization of global commerce and the subsequent shifts in the composition of 
influential domestic pressure groups.  
 
The process of transitioning to a market economy has exacerbated these imbalances.  The 
absence of meaningful political competition in the region has meant that the twin 
processes of trade liberalization and asset privatization have been carried out under 
conditions that privilege individuals with government connections.  The long-term impact 
of this collusion has been demonstrated in the transition processes in many developing 
countries, where privileged networks of elites are able to use their newly acquired assets 
and dominant market position in order to undermine subsequent transition processes that 
might introduce elements of democratic accountability into the distribution of economic 
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resources.40  Instead of increasing the productivity and efficiency of major sectors such as 
agriculture or textile manufacturing by building the countries’ physical and regulatory 
infrastructure, the process of economic liberalization has concentrated investment in 
more speculative sectors where profits accrue quickly, including tourism, real estate, and 
the downstream petroleum sector.41  Additionally, offsets are often for strategic projects 
like weapons production, for symbolic projects designed to demonstrate economic 
diversification such as large aquaculture projects and renewable energy projects, or 
heritage industries, as with an offset in the UAE that built a facility to clone date palms.  
Because such high-profile projects are an important part of the regime’s public image, it 
is unlikely they would be entrusted to individuals that circulate far from the centers of 
power.   
 
Like other trade-based rents such as protocol trade and loan forgiveness, which are also 
likely to benefit regime allies as they are the ones with access to markets and credit in the 
first place, the distribution of offset projects consolidates power within the authoritarian 
support coalition.  This is further reinforced by the preferences of defense firms, whose 
executives favor concluding investment agreements with politically influential 
individuals who will be able to intercede on their behalf during future arms sales 
negotiations.  This also provides plausible deniability when critics accuse Western 
governments and firms of steering business toward a select (pro-regime) group in the 
procuring country: they are forced to do so because of pre-existing structural realities that 
                                                            
40 Heydemann 2004.  See also Joel Hellman et al. 2000.  “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, 
Corruption, and Influence in Transition Economies. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2444.  
41 Richter and Steiner, p24.  
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prohibit them from partnering with firms or individuals who do not have access to 
sufficient capital or equipment.  In standard regime discourse, the military (or 
businessman with regime connections) gets the contract because it has access to the 
requisite cheap/conscript labor and factory space (or capital), not necessarily because it is 
politically expedient for the incumbent regime to allocate the project to them.   
 
Macroeconomic Shifts and Strategies of Patronage Diversification 
Offsets are important not only because of the magnitude of assets they involve, but also 
because they serve as replacements or hedges for other sources of patronage that may be 
inherently unstable or declining.  Volatility in available patronage assets may be as 
politically problematic as an absolute decline, since evidence suggests that the 
distribution of subsidies is just as contentious as conflicts over extraction via taxation or 
other means.42  Defense offsets are particularly attractive to many developing country 
governments because they represent a resource that accrues directly to the state (and is 
distributed at its discretion) in an era when the ability of the state to mediate the transfer 
of economic resources is eroding.  On the one hand, aid and other forms of foreign 
assistance may be increasingly conditioned by donor states and institutions, restricting the 
ability of the regime to channel this largesse toward critical client groups.  A state like 
Jordan or Egypt may find that the political concessions (such as further normalization of 
relations with Israel or flyover rights for U.S. military campaigns) required to expand aid 
flows to deal with a burgeoning population of unemployed youth are increasingly 
difficult to meet.  Likewise, for the oil-producers, the vast expansion of public spending 
                                                            
42 Okruhlik, Gwenn. 1999. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition. The Political 
Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics. 31(3): 295-315.  
 30 
during previous boom periods has created a system of benefits that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to reduce.  This is especially true as the legitimacy of these regimes largely 
rests on their perceived ability to manage the state’s natural resource wealth to the benefit 
of the population.  On the other hand, the variety of available rents is no longer solely 
composed of direct transfers made to individuals, although these certainly still exist.  
Instead, many emerging rent forms are concentrated in the regimes’ ability and/or 
willingness to provide preferential access to economic opportunities, which vary 
depending on its power vis a vis global markets.   
 
Shifts in regime strategies for maintaining the ability to exercise control over a fluid rent 
base is visible across a broad spectrum.  In Iran the political leadership has relinquished 
much control over the economy to the Revolutionary Guard, an ally that increases in 
utility as domestic opposition forces increase in potency.  The Guard has in turn used this 
authority to acquire control over substantial segments of the domestic economy, 
including a majority stake in Iran’s largest telecommunications company.43  In Africa, the 
introduction of a modern taxation system enabled many regimes to selectively promote 
tax evasion, providing an economic perk to political allies that also acted as a check on 
potential opposition, as those outside the regime’s protective circle were selectively 
subjected to prosecution.44  In Jordan, the formation of QIZs (qualified industrial zones) 
provided tariff and tax-free imports of capital and intermediate goods as well as duty-free 
access to U.S. markets for Jordanian businessmen.  Financed by U.S. assistance, these 
                                                            
43 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7064353.stm 
44 Catherine Boone. March 1994. “Trade, Taxes and Tribute: Market Liberalizations and the New Importers 
in West Africa.” World Development. 22(3): 453-467.  
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privileges were extended as partial compensation for Jordan’s cooperation with the U.S. 
on geopolitical issues, primarily improving relations with Israel.45  Yet, instead of starting 
their own businesses and employing members of the Jordanian workforce, these 
businessmen maintained only those aspects of QIZ operations that provided immediate 
returns requiring minimal investment (the sale or lease of the facilities, construction of 
dormitories, the provision of security and other services) and turned the remaining 
operations (manufacturing and service provision) over to South Asian investors.  As of 
2003, only 9 of the 47 firms were owned by Jordanians and nearly half of the zones’ 
20,000 workers are foreign nationals.46  
 
Some of these traditional rents that may be in decline or present regimes with obstacles 
related to volatility include: (1) oil profits, both for the many states that have become net 
importers as well as for the oil exporters, who face equally difficult challenges to their 
own patronage distribution streams because of price volatility, (2) the drop in foreign 
economic and military aid since the end of the Cold War, including Gulf aid to the other 
                                                            
45 Offsets have also been used to compensate Israel for disagreements arising over defense technology 
transfers.  Although Israel did demand offsets for goods and services paid for with FMF prior to 1984 the 
dollar value was considered insignificant.  However, as the dollar value of offsets rose and knowledge of 
the program spread throughout the U.S. government, demands were made to institute a policy that would 
phase out and eventually eliminate Israel’s ability to request offsets on purchases it made using US military 
assistance funds.  A limit was placed at 15 percent for 1984, amounting to $225 million in offsets.  A 
ceiling was set at $200 million in 1985, $150 million in 1986 and 1987, and thereafter the amount was to be 
zero.  However, many of these offsets had been associated with the LAVI fighter aircraft project – a 
coproduction program with U.S. manufacturers that would have produced a product in direct export 
competition with the U.S.-built F-16.  Disagreements over technology transfer and other aspects of the 
LAVI eventually resulted in cancellation of the program, which dealt a major political blow to the Israeli 
government.  Offsets on FMF were subsequently re-authorized and continue to this day.  Here the U.S. 
used offsets to appease the Israeli government after its decision to block the development of a major 
weapons system led to negative political fallout.  Government Accountability Office. 22 June 1994. 
“Military Exports: Concerns over Offsets Generated with U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program Funds.” 
GAO/NSIAD-94-127. 
46 Pete Moore and Andrew Shrank. 2003. “Commerce and Conflict: U.S. Effort to Counter Terrorism with 
Trade May Backfire.” Middle East Policy. 10(3): 112-120.  
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non-oil producing Arab states, (3) declining tariff revenues as countries have reduced 
trade barriers within the context of regional and bilateral free trade agreements, and (4) a 
decline in remittances as migrant workers from the populous oil-importing Arab states 
are increasingly replaced by cheaper laborers from Asia.  The fact that the Saudis 
initiated their offset program in 1984 in the wake of the oil bust is probably no 
coincidence; revenues and government spending took a severe hit as oil prices began to 
fall in 1982, from $35/barrel to a low of $10/barrel in 1986.47  
 
However, the contemporary era of liberalization is not the first time shifts in global 
patterns of economic exchange have altered the pool of patronage resources available to 
Middle East rulers.  The taxes and tariffs levied on long-distance trade also declined 
dramatically during other periods, including when the centers of trade shifted to Italy in 
the aftermath of the crusades; after Mongol and Ottoman assaults destroyed many of the 
major Arab trading cities; and when European conquest of Sub-Saharan Africa made 
North African Arab intermediaries obsolete.48 The historian Samir Amin points out that 
this reliance on the surplus revenue created by trade left Arab rulers particularly 
susceptible to external actors’ efforts to disrupt the flow of goods.  This dynamic 
continues to characterize the region’s regimes, which must rely on revenues generated by 
their trading relationships and geopolitical importance in order to finance domestic 
spending.   
 
                                                            
47 In 2010 dollars this is equivalent to a drop from $92 to $20 per barrel.  
48 Samir Amin. June 1978. “The Arab Nation: Some Conclusions and Problems.” Middle East Report. 68: 
p6. 
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This decline in rents has occurred alongside significant demographic growth, which 
further complicates regimes’ spending policies.  The famous “youth bulge” and high 
population growth rates in Egypt and Jordan are well-known, but the Gulf States also 
face demographic challenges.  In these states revenue growth from hydrocarbon exports 
has not kept pace with population growth, and the fiscal burdens on the state are 
increasingly large.  For example, per capita income in Saudi Arabia fell from $15,999 in 
1980 to just $8,373 in 2002.  The national discourse in these states increasingly revolves 
around the inter-generational shift that must take place in order to make the domestic 
economy self-sustaining. New university graduates are told that the guaranteed state jobs 
and subsidies their parents enjoyed are no longer feasible, and that their respective 
societies must become “wealth-creating” as opposed to “wealth-consuming.”49  
Nonetheless, substantial revenue flows from oil and gas exports have enabled these 
regimes to make significant investments in infrastructure, public services and human 
capital.  This history of public expenditures has provided these regimes with some level 
of popular obeisance, but has also generated expectations that link the governments’ 
legitimacy directly with economic performance, a bargain that can constrain rulers just as 
it provides them with flexibility.50   
 
Oil price volatility and demographic growth have been such a shock to Gulf budgets that
                                                            
49 Marcel, Valerie and John V. Mitchell. 2006. Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p117.   
50 Auty and Gelb point out that the basis of political support in the Gulf regimes has shifted from its initial 
emphasis on religious and traditional legitimacy to one based on the development and modernization 
achieved via state spending from oil revenues.  Auty, R.M. and A.H. Gelb.  2001. “Political Economy of 
Resource-Abundant States.”  In Auty, R.M. (ed.) Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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the once inviolable oil and gas sector has been gradually opened up to foreign 
investment.  Formerly the national oil companies (NOCs) were treated as yet another 
political institution within the state apparatus, and as such were not only responsible for 
financing major infrastructure projects and other social spending programs, but were also 
off-limits to foreign investment.  The drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s forced the 
region’s oil producers to reevaluate their management of NOCs, whose managers have 
since gained a higher level of autonomy from the bureaucracy and consequently focus 
more on expanding their own production capacity than in building roads or hospitals.  As 
foreign investment laws have been liberalized, many of the Gulf States’ offset projects 
are now in the ‘downstream’ sector, which includes refinement, transport and marketing 
of oil and gas as well as processing them into other finished products such as fertilizers 
and plastics.   
 
For example the French defense firm Thales bought a 5% stake in Dubai-based Gulf 
Energy Maritime (GEM), the region’s largest operator of commercial tankers, to fulfill an 
offset commitment,51 and GEC-Marconi, the defense arm of General Electric (now part 
of BAE Systems) provided start-up capital to establish the Gulf Center for Remote Sensing 
(now Infoterra) to provide remote sensing of Abu Dhabi’s oil, gas and mineral assets.52  
In Saudi Arabia, defense firms have participated in at least twenty different 
petrochemical and oil/gas service ventures under the auspices of that country’s offset 
program.  It is possible that the increase in the magnitude of offsets has been facilitated 
                                                            
51 Abu Dhabi’s International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), the Emirates National Oil Company 
(ENOC) and Oman Oil Company (OOC) joined the joint venture after Thales.   
52 “Emerging Abu Dhabi.” 2006. Oxford Business Group, p176.  
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by the relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment in the oil and gas sector, since it 
provides a destination that can absorb large infusions of capital, streamlining the 
provision process.  Furthermore, as equity partners, defense firms are entitled to a portion 
of the revenues corresponding to their initial investment.53 The possibility that offsets 
could have played a role in such a dramatic shift in domestic economic policy in the Gulf 
countries suggests that the ebb and flow of exogenous rents can directly influence even 
the most sensitive policy questions.  
 
Similar revenue instability afflicts the region’s non-oil producers.  In particular, per 
capita income from foreign aid and remittances has declined dramatically in recent 
decades.  Concerns over the stability of military assistance can also be acute, since as 
suggested above, temporary dramatic increases in rents can raise both the expectations 
and the bargaining power of politically salient groups.54  The table below shows the 
decrease in official aid and development assistance to several of the region’s populous 
oil-importing states since 1990, the decade when most states began implementing offset 
programs in earnest.  The reality that Middle East states do not engage in any meaningful 
level of domestic revenue extraction also suggests that shortages in traditional rents 
would have to be supplemented with new ones, since tax revenues would be insufficient 
                                                            
53 Offset obligors (firms with offset obligations) frequently complain of being administratively burdened by 
numerous small offset projects in such fields as education or agriculture.  Investing in the oil and gas sector 
allows companies to offload their obligations relatively quickly and with less recourse to outside advisors 
or administrators.  Interview with M. Spiro.  
54 Military aid to Egypt, for example, has come under intense scrutiny in recent years.  Although it is 
unlikely that the magnitude of aid will be reduced, the possibility is surely one that the Egyptian regime 
wants to hedge against.  
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to meet growing spending requirements.55  For example, Egypt’s tax revenues in 2005 
were equal to 9% of GDP, relatively high compared to the other populous, oil-importing 
Middle East states but less than half the 18.3% average for even low-income countries 
and only about one-quarter the percentage for the EU countries (39%).56   Most GCC 
countries impose no taxation at all on citizens or national companies, despite the presence 
of free or heavily subsidized public services, but instead receive most of their tax funds 
from foreign entities.  
 
                                                            
55 Consistent with theories of rentier economies the MENA countries use rents instead of taxation to fund 
government programs, which theoretically reduces the demand for representation from the public.  Egypt is 
one of the only emerging economies where the effective tax rate paid by U.S. multinationals has increased 
over the past several decades; increasing from 28% in 1983 to 45% in 1997, providing further evidence that 
the Egyptian regime is looking elsewhere for revenues to avoid taxing the public.  See Soliman, Samer.  
2011. The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt Under Mubarak.  Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. See also Alex Cobham.  September 2005.  “Tax evasion, tax avoidance and 
development finance.” Working Paper Number 129.  Finance and Trade Policy Research Centre. Queen 
Elizabeth House: University of Oxford.   
56 Bird, Richard M. and Eric M. Zolt.  2005. “Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of Personal 
Income Tax in Developing Countries.” UCLA Law Review.  Taxes represented 17.9% of GDP in 1994 
according to official government statistics, but this was due to a low GDP, not a larger tax base.  Monthly 
economic digest. February 2000. Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Economy.  The tax 
income/GDP percentage for the 27 E.U. members in 2004 was 39% according to a EUROSTAT (the 
statistical agency of the European Commission). News Release. 22 June 2009. “Taxation trends in the 
European Union: EU27 tax ratio at 39.8% of GDP in 2007.” epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY.../2-








The Strictures of Neoliberal Economics and Acceptable Mechanisms of Patronage 
In addition to the volatility of revenue sources, the course of economic liberalization in 
the region has likewise altered the composition of acceptable patronage mechanisms and 
the socioeconomic character of those groups the regimes target for with their distributive 
policies.  The traditional realms of state largesse – such as employment in the 
bureaucracy – are no longer compatible with the strictures of the global economy or the 
demands of the international institutions that shape it. As a result, rulers must look toward 
alternative arenas (such as the international arms trade) in order to ensure a continuous 
supply of suitable sources of patronage.  Previous methods of privileging loyal elites, 
such as “sweetheart loans,” no-bid government contracts, and the sale of public land or 
state-owned factories for nominal fees, have become a flashpoint for regional discontent 
in the Middle East.  Defense offsets, on the other hand, are obscure, and their distribution 
is characterized as either apolitical private sector investment (in the Gulf) or efforts to 
enhance military self-reliance and increase exports (in Egypt and Jordan).  The price of 
defense offsets is hidden, as officials falsely claim they are financed by foreign firms.  
 
By granting privileged access to the mechanisms of commerce, these regimes can supply 
the economic resources necessary to maintain the vast edifices of support required to 
buttress their authority, while also obscuring the high cost to broader economic and 
political development. The specific ownership models prevalent in offset-generated 
ventures reflect this reality. Many ventures created through offset investment are 
partnerships between defense firms and private sector businesses – which become part of 
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the ‘success story’ of private sector diversification and the role of foreign investment, 
while others are partnerships with state-owned companies. These public-private sector 
partnerships (or PPPs) are also promoted by development theorists and proponents of 
liberal economic reform as a sort of halfway house on the road to full-scale liberalization 
and economic modernization.  In the Gulf these PPPs are nominally overseen by 
independent agencies tasked with managing them as private sector operations (i.e., as 
profit-generating enterprises) although the extent to which their governing boards are free 
of political pressure is unclear. 
 
The Increasing Saliency of Corruption as a Governance Issue  
The degree to which official corruption has become the cause célèbre of opposition 
politicians and multilateral organizations means that vehicles like defense offsets – which 
are legal and therefore possess at least a modicum of legitimacy – are attractive channels 
for transferring privileges to well-connected elites.  Offsets’ greatest utility lies in this 
ability to provide a patina of legitimacy to a system of elite incentives.  More traditional 
methods, such as “sweetheart loans,” no-bid government contracts and the sale of public 
land and productive assets for nominal fees, have become so ubiquitous that anecdotal 
cases of economic cronyism provide the core for narratives of economic 
underdevelopment coming from opposition activists, small-business owners, the IMF and 
World Bank and countless local NGOs.57  Offsets, on the other hand, are obscure, and 
their distribution is characterized as either apolitical private sector investment (in the 
                                                            
57 “A Special Report on Egypt: No Paradise.” 15 July 2010. The Economist.  
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Gulf) or efforts to enhance military self-reliance (in Egypt and Jordan) – all conveniently 
achieved at the (apparent) expense of foreign firms.   
The broad range of individual and institutional actors that have grown politically 
powerful by extracting corrupt payments from the global defense trade are not likely to 
disappear, even in the face of enhanced scrutiny and international legal regimes targeting 
corruption and corporate governance.  Offsets provide a convenient vehicle for achieving 
this same end-goal – that of transferring resources to politically influential actors in the 
procuring country – under a cloak of legality.  Because authoritarian leaders face fewer 
veto points (such as parliaments or independent media outlets) in the decision-making 
process they ‘own’ their defense markets in a way more accountable regimes do not.  
And even when watchdog entities are present, it is relatively easy for domestic actors 
and/or foreign firms to intimidate them, and offsets frequently provide political cover for 
this intimidation.  For instance, the German shipbuilder MAN Ferrostaal sent a letter to a 
South African newspaper claiming that its allegations involving the company’s payment 
of bribes to President Thabo Mbeki would “endanger thousands of jobs” by scaring away 
partners in its offset projects.58  Auditing documents obtained by a South African 
newspaper revealed that the number of jobs (retained or created) was miniscule – and that 
most of the funds were pocketed by government cronies that liquidated the operations set 
up by the offset program and absconded with the proceeds.59 
 
                                                            
58 “MAN Ferrostaal says bribery claims risk scaring off offset partners.” 25 August 2008. Deutsche Presse-
Agentur. Accessed 25 October 2009.  http://www.defenceagainstcorruption.org/news/in-the-news/220-
man-ferrostaal-says-bribery-claims-risk-scaring-off-offset-partners.   
59 Sam Sole. 28 October 2011. “The arms deal’s big deceit: The great submarine rip-off.” The Mail & 
Guardian Online (South Africa). http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-28-the-great-submarine-ripoff/ 
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Even when illegal activity is uncovered, offset programs are frequently spared further 
inspection because those under investigation claim further scrutiny would be a danger to 
national security.  The only serious investigation into the infamous Al-Yamamah arms 
deal between BAE (on behalf of the UK) and Saudi Arabia – which included hundreds of 
millions in offset investment and alleged bribes – took place in the U.S. Department of 
Justice, which claimed jurisdiction over the case because U.S. banks were utilized to 
transfer funds from BAE to Prince Bandar.60  The UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was 
forced to drop its own case in 2006 after Saudi officials threatened to cease cooperating 
with the British in the ‘Global War on Terror.’61 As a result, BAE admitted to 
‘accounting irregularities’ and paid about $440 million in fines to settle with both the 
British and American authorities – a sum that represents less than 1% of the profit BAE 
made from the Al-Yamamah deal.62  It is likely that Bandar’s bribes were uncovered only 
because he was Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the U.S., so unlike other members of the 
Royal Family who also received bribes, he had frequent occasion to utilize U.S. financial 
institutions.  The evidence available to the SFO, which was much more extensive, 
centered on Prince Turki bin Nasr, the son-in-law of the Crown Prince.63 
                                                            
60 Until BAE’s recent indictment on bribery charges in connection with sales to South Africa, Romania, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic the government had never brought suit against a single UK corporation 
despite anti-bribery laws dating back to 1906.   
61 Bandar left his ambassadorial post in 2005 when King Abdul Aziz appointed him Secretary General of 
the National Security Council – a largely irrelevant government agency that has taken no serious decisions 
or actions since its creation.  
62 Despite all the negative publicity, BAE Systems is currently in an acquisition spree.  Joel Johnson 
(former VP of the trade group Aerospace Industries of America) remarked at an industry conference that 
“BAE is buying everything that’s not nailed down.” CTO Newsletter. 22 February, 2010. 28(4).  
63 Ewen MacAskill and Rob Evans. 28 September 2005. “Britain ‘agreed in secret’ to expel Saudis during 
£40bn arms talks.” The Guardian (UK). 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/sep/12/freedomofinformation.saudiarabia. Accessed 18 October 20009.   
The documents included mountains of BAE receipts for various goods and services provided to members of 
the Saudi royal family.  For details see PBS Frontline transcript, which includes interview material with 
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Defense Offsets and the Permissive Legal and Regulatory Environment of the Arms 
Market 
 
 “Those things [offsets] need to be business deals among businessmen . . . government 
has no business overseeing offsets.” 
 
---- James McIrney Jr., then-executive vice president of the American League for 
Exporting Security Assistance, 1991. 64 
 
“Good commercial agents are better placed than an official to dispense the less orthodox 
inducements.”  
 
---- Advice of industrial magnate Sir Donald Stokes (1965), hired by then-Labor 
defense secretary Denis Healey to advise the government on how best to achieve 
greater competitiveness in the arms export market.65  
 
The character of the legal and regulatory environment surrounding the arms trade is, of 
course, related to the increasing centrality of military production in the manufacturing 
activity of the post-industrial western economies, which will likely increase as civilian 
manufacturing continues to contract. In addition to the prevailing domestic conditions in 
procuring countries, the policies and practices of weapons-exporting states and 
international institutions with jurisdiction over global trade flows also facilitate the use of 
offsets for political patronage. The international legal and normative structures that allow 
for state subsidies and non-transparency in areas of trade deemed crucial to ‘national 
security’ have the effect of aiding defense firms in exporting their products by overtly 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
CIA Agent Robert Baer. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney/etc/script.html. Accessed 
18 October 2009.  In addition to dropping the SFO inquiry, the Saudis also demanded that Downing Street 
deport two prominent Saudi dissidents living in London and resume direct British Airways flights from 
London to Riyadh, which had been suspended over fears of a possible terrorist attack.  
64 Lumpe, Lora. September/October 1994. “Sweet Deals, Stolen Jobs.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/articles/sweetdeals.htm 
65 This particular historical exchange is credited with launching the legacy of corruption that now pervades 
the British arms industry.  Rob Evans, Ian Traynor, Luke Harding and Rory Carroll.  13 June 2003. “Web 
of state corruption dates back 40 years.” The Guardian (UK). 
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limiting oversight and regulation – which facilitates the use of offsets in patronage 
politics.  The most notable legal example is the exemption on the ban in offsets granted 
by the WTO (and included in all bilateral trade agreements) for trade classified as 
essential to ‘national security,’66 similar to the WTO exemption granted for government 
subsidies to domestic defense industries. Although the WTO ruled that the U.S. provision 
allowing American firms to establish overseas Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) – 
subsidiaries that enable the parent company to avoid taxation and other regulations 
related to corporate transparency – amounted to unfair subsidies, this WTO ruling was 
not extended to defense firms – which have dozens (if not hundreds) of such entities.67  
And because these FSCs are frequently established in OECD-designated “tax haven” 
locations where financial transparency and regulation are absent, they are ideal vehicles 
for the surreptitious movement of money.  Nor is information on offset transactions likely 
to show up in corporate profiles or quarterly reports; one former industry trade group 
executive remarked in a speech at an offset conference that,  
My industry probably has billions of dollars of offset obligations.  They don’t 
show anywhere on our balance sheets because no auditor knows what to do with 
an offset. When you start asking us for performance bonds and penalty clauses, 
that’s going to show, and that makes people [ie, investors and shareholders] very 
nervous.  I am aware of some recent cases where companies simply weren’t 
willing to put that on their books.68 
 
Potential sources of regulation at the supranational level are largely irrelevant; they are 
either part of informal voluntary guidelines (such as the European Defense Agency’s 
                                                            
66 WTO exemption: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm. NAFTA exemption: 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/nafta/chap-101.asp.  
67 GAO. 2 February 2004. “International Taxation: Information on Federal Contractors With Offshore 
Subsidiaries.” GAO-04-293. www.gao.gov/new.items/d04293.pdf 
68 CTO Newsletter. 28 May 2008. 26(10).  
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‘Code of Conduct on Offsets’ which is legally non-binding); restricted in their scope (the 
OECD Convention Against Bribery only pertains to ‘public officials,’ not private agents 
or intermediaries who may be acting on their behalf); or attempts to extend commercial 
regulations that are ill-suited to controlling military offsets due to the wide range of 
‘national security’ exemptions.  These potential sources of regulation include 
international codes of conduct for military sales, WTO rules governing official 
procurement and state investment (also superseded by the exemption for national security 
trade), and a U.S.-specific prohibition against offsets in sales financed by U.S. military 
aid – a ban that is consistently circumvented.69   
 
Congressional attempts to impose prohibitions on “incentives” in arms deals have also 
met with significant resistance from both industry and the Department of Defense 
(DOD).  In 1989, Congress included a mandate in the National Defense Authorization 
Act requiring that contractors notify the Pentagon of any offset exceeding $50 million.  
Two years later, having received only three voluntary notifications on offset 
requirements, the Pentagon claimed the new law duplicated existing regulations at 
DOD.70  In response, Congress passed an amendment to the Defense Production Act 
requiring that contractors notify the Department of Commerce of any offsets over $5 
million.  But it was another two years (1994) before Commerce secured the necessary 
                                                            
69 Although formal US policy is never to fund offsets using FMF, the 1994 study by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) referenced several times above examined 48 sales worth $11.6 billion to Israel, 
Egypt, Turkey and Greece (the four largest recipients of U.S. military aid).  These contracts – all paid for 
with U.S. military aid – included offsets worth at least $4.7 billion.  
70 Lumpe, Lora. September/October 1994. “Sweet Deals, Stolen Jobs.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/articles/sweetdeals.htm.  
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executive order to draft guidelines on implementing the regulation.71  Industry advocates 
continued to demand definitional clarifications of what constituted incentive payments 
and narrower definitions of those parties affected by the amendment.   
 
For its part, DOD insisted that specific regulations needed to be implemented before their 
agency could uncover incentive payments in contracts, while the State Department 
insisted that the stipulations of the amendment were already being adhered to under 
existing oversight processes.  State also insisted that in the two years since the passing of 
the amendment in 1994 no offset agreements had even been included in FMS agreements, 
although an independent investigation by the Congressional Research Service found more 
than 20 cases of offset agreements included in FMS contracts during that same period.  
The fact that the arms trade is increasingly carried out under conditions of Direct 
Commercial Sale (DCS) rather than Foreign Military Sale (FMS), has also removed an 
element of oversight.  The conditions prevailing in the global arms trade have empowered 
customers to demand better terms, which includes a preference for DCS arrangements 
that do not include the 2.5% fee levied by the DOD on FMS contracts, which pays for the 
services of government contracting officers.  Once an export license has been granted, 
DCS contracts are carried out without U.S. government oversight, which removes even 
the limited oversight that government contracting officers have in FMS agreements.   
 
The purchase of large weapons systems (known as “all-up complete weapons systems”) 
are also more difficult to monitor, which is especially problematic for the Middle East 
                                                            
71 Government Accountability Office. 26 June 2008. “Defense Production Act: Agencies Lack Policies and 
Guidance for Use of Key Authorities” GAO-08-854 
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precisely because the region represents such a large share of the market for these big-
ticket, technologically advanced systems.  When drawing up contracts for “all-up” 
systems the contracting officer in the U.S. government is prevented from requesting 
submission of certified cost or pricing data from the firm, based on the assumption that 
the procuring country conducted a fair and open price competition for the weapon 
system.  Given the difficulties the U.S. State Department and DOD encounter in 
conducting competitive tenders on their own turf, it is unlikely that procuring 
governments can be expected to meet such requirements.   
 
Domestic Oversight in Arms Exporting Countries 
Oversight from the exporting firms’ host country governments is limited, despite the 
relatively large funds involved.  For example, the dollar value of offset contracts signed 
by U.S. defense firms in 2007 is equivalent to 70% of all economic and military aid 
provided to all the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 by all agencies of the U.S. 
government.72 But there is no central body responsible for all offset-related monitoring.  
Instead, one agency collects data (the Bureau of Industry and Security), another monitors 
overseas co-production facilities (the State Department), and yet another investigates 
bribery allegations connected to offset transactions (the Department of Justice) – and 
rarely do these agencies coordinate or share information.   
 
U.S. defense and export policy ties the hands of federal regulators and contract 
specialists.  Official DOD policy is “not to get involved,” in offset contracts, and to place 
                                                            
72 Figures from 2009 BIS annual report and U.S. Agency for International Development “U.S. Overseas 
Loans, Grants, Obligations, and Loan Authorizations, annual.”  
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responsibility for administering and enforcing the offset agreement solely with the 
procuring government. Specifically, DOD policy prohibits any agent of the U.S. 
government from:  
involvement with the negotiation of the offset agreement itself between the 
company and the FMS [Foreign Military Sale]73 customer, and no role in judging 
the merits of these agreements. In addition, the Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
(LOA) between the U.S. Government and the FMS customer and the contract 
associated with that LOA (between the U.S. Government and the contractor) do 
not include any of the terms of the offset agreement (such as the delivery 
schedule, acceptance criteria, etc.) even though the LOA and the contract may 
include costs associated with the offset.74 [my italics] 
 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) justifies withholding this 
information because, “foreign governments as a rule do not want offset costs 
isolated/highlighted.”75  The non-inclusion of this information allows officials in the 
procuring government to justify the approval of higher-cost contracts that funnel 
investment to domestic firms with high-level political connections, transferring what 
should be public money into private hands.  This slow erosion of visibility regarding 
offsets parallels the disappearance of ‘commissions’ as line items in the contract 
proposals submitted by U.S. contractors in previous decades.  Only after Watergate and 
the Iran-Contra Affair did the U.S. Government prohibit defense firms from reporting 
such payments in their contract budgets (which would allow them to recover the costs of 
                                                            
73 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are bilateral contracts concluded between the U.S. Government and the 
procuring country government, with the U.S. Government negotiating with the contractor on behalf of the 
purchasing government. FMS contracts generally involve substantial oversight. Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS) are negotiated directly between the contractor and the procuring country government, usually after 
the firm has acquired an initial license approval to export a particular weapons system. DCS contracts do 
not involve much oversight.  
74 U.S. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP).  
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/offsets_of_foreign_military_sales.html#q1.  Accessed on April 29, 
2009.   
75 ibid.  
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the bribes in the event that the purchasing country defaulted on their payment, in which 
case the firm was paid by the U.S. Government under as stipulated by the export loan 
guarantee program).  Thus, it is not that these commissions are no longer being paid – 
just that they are being paid under the umbrella of investing in the projects of crony elites 
and state-allied institutions.76  In addition to remaining at arms-length from the offset 
contract itself, contract specialists working for the U.S. Government can tell procuring 
country officials if projected offset costs have been added to the contract, but now how 
much money those projected costs represent:  
It is inappropriate for USG personnel to discuss with the purchaser the nature or 
details of an offset arrangement.  However, if known, the fact that offset costs 
have been included in the P&A or LOA price estimate will be confirmed should 
the purchaser inquire.  The purchaser should be directed to the US contractor for 
answers to all questions regarding its offset arrangement, including questions 
dealing with cost.77 [my italics] 
 
The above phrase – ‘if known’ – is important, because in practice U.S. Government 
personnel do not know whether offset costs are included in the price, or the amount of 
those costs.   And, if what the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency terms 
“adequate price competition” 78 exists, then it is assumed that further information on the 
offsets contained within the contract is unnecessary.  In reality, adequate price 
competition through competitive bidding is difficult to achieve, since the equipment is 
                                                            
76 Thomas W. Hill, Jr. November 1989. “Foreign Representatives: Saudi Law and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.” Arab Law Quarterly. 4(4): p298. 
77 Defense Security Cooperation Agency memo.  DSCA 00-01.  19 January 2000.  “Inclusion of Offset 
Costs in Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs).” Policy I-012655/99. 
www.dsca.mil/samm/policy_memos/2000/DSCA%2000-01.pdf 
78 U.S. contracting officers determine whether adequate competition occurred by consulting with the 
foreign government’s security assistance personnel.  See Defense Security Cooperation Agency memo.  
DSCA 00-01.  19 January 2000.  “Inclusion of Offset Costs in Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs).” 
Policy I-012655/99, p4.  
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often so technologically advanced and capital-intensive that only one company 
manufactures it.   
 
The criteria that offsets must satisfy (under U.S. law) in order for the exporting firm to 
seek full cost recovery is also incredibly vague and broad.  DOD considers offsets 
“allocable”  (and therefore a legitimate component of the overall contract that can be 
charged to the procuring country) if they are, “necessary to the overall operation of the 
business, although a direct relationship to any particular cost objective cannot be shown.”  
In support of this policy, defense industry spokespersons contend that dis-allowing cost 
recovery would make the provision of offsets prohibitively costly – something we know 
to be false.79  These advocates claim that rising costs would preclude them from offering 
offsets, rendering them incapable of securing any sales contracts. 
 
Information and Resource Asymmetries in U.S. Agencies 
Information asymmetries between U.S. Government agencies and the practice of 
allocating more resources to those departments whose traditional role has been to 
promote, rather than monitor, defense exports further exacerbates the problem of lax 
oversight. Although contracting officers within DOD and the State Department have 
direct access to arms export contracts and are therefore privy to information on specific 
offsets, they are restricted from disseminating that information, while employees of the 
                                                            
79 Chapter 2 outlines many of the accounting mechanisms that firms use to minimize their investment 
outlay while satisfying the demands of procuring country offset policies. South Africa provides a good 
example, where the German firm Ferrostaal invested €62 million and received credits for €3.1 billion from 
the South African Government’s defense offset agency.  Sam Sole. 28 October 2011. “The arms deal’s big 
deceit: The great submarine rip-off.” The Mail & Guardian Online (South Africa). 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-28-the-great-submarine-ripoff/ 
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BIS, who are charged with collecting, analyzing and reporting on offsets, are not privy to 
those contracts and therefore must rely on data provided by the firms.  The result is that 
reports coming from BIS rely largely on information provided by firms, industry trade 
groups, industry-affiliated think tanks and other organizations concerned with putting a 
positive spin on the offset business.  An example of this appears in almost every annual 
report on offsets issued by the BIS.  The language used in a section of the bureau’s report 
that stresses the centrality of the defense industry to the economic health of the US and in 
the execution of the country’s foreign policy was lifted – nearly verbatim – from a report 
compiled by the National Defense Industrial Association (a defense industry trade group) 
justifying the use of offsets in defense contracts.  Attempts by other government agencies 
to investigate offsets are similarly frustrated.  The GAO consistently asserts that available 
data is insufficient to allow any firm conclusions on the impacts of offsets, and routinely 
criticizes both DOD and the State Department for neglecting their mission of contract 
oversight by failing to address the issue of offsets.80   
 
Defense firms have likewise lobbied hard to limit public access to the data collected by 
government agencies, demanding to have the information classified as ‘proprietary’ and 
therefore inaccessible to the public.81  The European Defense Agency (EDA) – which 
reports to the European Council – has followed suit, requesting that information on offset 
                                                            
80 A GAO report found that the nature of data provided to BIS made it difficult to analyze offsets in terms 
of their economic effect.  Government Accountability Office. “Defense Production Act: Agencies Lack 
Policies and Guidance for Use of Key Authorities.” 26 June 2008. (GAO–08– 854). 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-854 
81 Joel Johnson, former VP for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association of America (an 
industry trade group) remarked of the BIS report, “We in the industry don’t like that report . . . we would 
like it ended or classified.” CTO Newsletter 28 May 2008. 26(10).  
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guidelines and practices be reported to the EDA but not made available for public 
release.82  Trends in industry consolidation have also made it easier for firms to conceal 
their offset activities.83 For instance, the BIS figure for U.S. offsets to Saudi Arabia was 
marked “proprietary” in 2007 (before subsequent changes removed all country-specific 
data points) reportedly because all the sales to the kingdom that year came from just one 
or two firms, which could then be identified as the offset providers.  This was a full two 
years before the industry succeeded in convincing law-makers that all offsets should be 
deemed proprietary, meaning the only information currently available are global 
aggregates.84 Industry spokespeople contend that if more detailed information was 
available, competitors could use it to fashion their own more attractive offset packages, 
which would give them an advantage in upcoming negotiations; or conversely, that 
making the information available would encourage procuring countries to demand ever 
increasing offsets if they knew a neighbor was getting more than them.  This is unlikely 
to be the real source of their opposition, however, since offsets are almost always 
publicized by procuring countries in order to justify defense expenditures, and many 
countries’ offset requirements are collected in subscription-only databases whose sole 
                                                            
82 CTO Newsletter. 9 February 2008. 27(3).  
83 Analysts at Price Waterhouse Cooper suggested that the wave of consolidation in the 1990s is being 
repeated, with M&As (mergers and acquisitions) averaging a value of $10-20 billion per year.  In addition 
to prime contractors absorbing smaller outfits, private equity funds are increasingly active buyers of small 
and medium-sized defense firms (Cerebus’ purchase of Dyncorp being one of the most well-known).  The 
troubling aspect of this is that because such funds are privately held the firms they purchase are no longer 
subject to SEC filings requirements, making it difficult to exert oversight. “Merger Market Heats Up 
Again.” 29 March 2010. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4557511   
84 Section 36(b)(1)(g) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) requires this information to be 
treated as “Confidential Information” in accordance with section 12(c) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2411(c)). This information is exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, 
United States Code, and shall not be published or disclosed without a determination that withholding is 
contrary to the national interest. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency memo.  DSCA 00-01.  19 
January 2000.  “Inclusion of Offset Costs in Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs),” Policy I-012655/99, 
p6. www.dsca.mil/samm/policy_memos/2000/DSCA%2000-01.pdf   
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customers are the defense firms themselves and industry consultants.  If they want 
information on their competitors’ practices, they pay private sector business intelligence 
firms to collect that information for them, they do not rely on government documents.  
Offset programs are also frequently promoted by the firms themselves, who have an 
interest in appearing ‘generous’ in their offset fulfillment in order to secure future export 
contracts.85  It is telling that, although the BIS is in charge of collecting data on offsets, 
the agency is not granted a budget to acquire subscriptions to these databases.  
 
Addressing an industry conference on offsets shortly after release of the 2009 BIS report, 
William Hawkins, then-Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business 
and Industry Council (which represents many of the suppliers and smaller firms whose 
business has been outsourced under offset arrangements) stated that the real reason for 
truncating the BIS report was that, “they [the prime contractors] didn’t want the 
American public to read the report.”86  Yet, the trend is toward continued restriction in 
the information that must be submitted to the BIS.  A rule change under current 
consideration would cut out reporting requirements for some types of offsets (barter, 
counterpurchase and buyback); eliminate the reporting category “cash payment” – 
transferring such transactions into the “other” category; eliminate the requirement that the 
offset recipient be identified; and require that firms only report those offset transactions 
for which they are directly responsible, making it easier for prime contractors to avoid 
                                                            
85 A more logical motivation for not publicly disclosing aggregated data is that it makes analysis of the 
political and economic impact of offsets more difficult, since researchers must cull through press releases, 
industry trade magazines, and official government correspondence to produce any data suitable for 
analysis.    
86 “Reviews of SMi’s Ankara Conference.” CTO Newsletter. 9 March 2009. (27)5.   
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reporting offset transactions by farming them out to smaller subcontractors who might 
themselves sign multiple offset agreements with foreign entities below the $5 million 
reporting threshold.87  The change also suggests a serious shortcoming in previous annual 
figures by clarifying that companies must report offset agreements even if the offset itself 
does not include defense articles.  Many (in fact, most) offsets are investments such as 
joint ventures or start-up capital for private enterprises that are not defense-related.  That 
the rule change had to single these out suggests that in the past many such transactions 
went unreported.  This is especially worrisome since these indirect transactions are 
concentrated in the developing world and constitute the overwhelming majority of offsets 
in the Gulf.   
 
The earliest BIS reports are based on figures provided by an average of 25 firms, a 
number that gets increasingly smaller in subsequent reports as industry consolidation has 
resulted in fewer and larger firms.  In 2007, the entire universe of (reported) offset 
agreements associated with defense sales were made by only 10 firms.88  Yet one 
company that provides services to defense firms to ‘streamline’ the offset process 
reported that for the month of May 2009, 60 prime contractors and 1,500 SME’s (small-
to-medium enterprises) were simultaneously involved in 245 offset projects in 17 
                                                            
87 A 1992 amendment to the Defense Production Act lowered the reporting requirement from $50 million to 
$5 million.  A 1985 report by the U.S. International Trade Commission reported that $108 million (1.1%) 
of the $8.7 billion in military offsets reported for the years 1980 through 1984 were for transactions less 
than $2 million.  If we assume that transactions are equally distributed across the cost spectrum, then we 
can estimate that perhaps 2.5% of transactions are under $5 million.  This would indicate that a significant 
dollar amount of offsets goes unreported each year.  U.S. International Trade Commission. October 1985. 
“Assessment of the Effects of Barter and Countertrade Transactions on U.S. Industries.” Report on 
Investigation No. 332-185 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930.  Publication 1766.  
88 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). 2009. “Annual Report on Offsets in Defense Trade.” 2009. 
Department of Commerce.  
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countries.89  This suggests that prime firms probably break up offsets into smaller 
components and distribute them across the subcontractors or suppliers in order to evade 
reporting requirements.90  In his 1999 testimony to a House Subcommittee on the impact 
of defense offsets, Joel Johnson, Vice-President of Aerospace Industries International, 
suggested as much by stating that he and other industry experts, “urge offset managers,” 
in the prime contracting firms to “spread about” indirect offsets.91   
 
Getting Paid: The Evolution of U.S. Government Offset Policy and How Defense 
Firms Recoup the Cost of Offsets 
 
Moves to restrict U.S. agencies from collecting data and exercising oversight paralleled 
the withdrawal of official DOD support and involvement in negotiating and 
implementing offset contracts.  Once the DOD was no longer in the business of financing 
and/or guaranteeing offsets, the firms themselves – increasingly on the hook for paying 
for offsets – needed to find some other way to offload their considerable costs. The policy 
of allowing contractors to pass-on the costs of their offsets emerged incrementally; first 
firms were allowed to recover “administrative costs” incurred in implementing offsets, 
this was later expanded to include all costs.92  
 
                                                            
89 Epicos.com (subscription required). 
90 The 1992 legislation was an amendment to the Defense Production Act that lowered the reporting 
requirement from $50 million to $5 million.  For a pre-1992 perspective on the threshold see Government 
Accountability Office. 17 December 1990. “Military Exports: Implementation of Recent Offset 
Legislation.” GAO/NSIAD-91-13. www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-91-13 
91 Testimony of Joel Johnson. 29 June 1999. “Defense Offsets: Are They Taking Away Our Jobs?” Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee on 
Government Reform.  U.S. House of Representatives. Serial No. 106-114, p143.  
92 Government Accountability Office. 18 December 1998. “Defense Trade: US Contractors Employ 
Diverse Activities to Meet Offset Obligations.” GAO/NSIAD-99-35, p2-3. 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS...99.../content-detail.html 
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In 1999 the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was changed 
to reflect this reality: 
A U.S. defense contractor may recover all costs incurred for offset agreements 
with a foreign  government or international organization if the LOA [Letter of 
Offer and Acceptance] is financed wholly with customer cash or repayable 
foreign military finance credits.93 
 
This means that the actual cost of whatever offset is requested by the purchasing country 
will be included in the contract as the (inflated) price of the equipment – a fact alluded to 
several times above. 94  When this inflated price is paid, the contractor uses this excess 
income to provide offsets. Although anecdotal evidence from individual cases reported in 
the media suggests that the amount added on by the firm greatly exceeds the eventual 
sum they pay out in offset projects, the secrecy accorded arms transactions, the U.S. 
government’s abdication of oversight of offsets, and extensive use of offshore havens 
makes isolating the actual cost of the offset virtually impossible.  This is especially true 
since the contract cost for material, support, training and maintenance for the same 
weapons system can vary significantly depending on current supplier prices, transport 
costs and personnel costs.   
 
It is clear that officials in (some) procuring countries are aware of the accounting 
mechanisms employed by defense firms, as the comments of one member of the UAE’s 
                                                            
93 Section 225.7303 of the U.S. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). 
94 Ironically, in a series of internal DSCA memoranda, Defense Procurement Director Eleanor R. Spector 
stated, “Contracting officers should treat all offset costs as allowable FMS contract costs. To disallow such 
costs means that U.S. companies must absorb offset costs that are required by the foreign government as a 
condition of making the sale.  It is only reasonable that foreign governments that require offsets should bear 
the costs of those offsets.” See Defense Security Cooperation Agency memo.  DSCA 00-01. 19 January 
2000. “Inclusion of Offset Costs in Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs).” Policy I-012655/99, p5. 
www.dsca.mil/samm/policy_memos/2000/DSCA%2000-01.pdf  
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official offset bureaucracy make clear: 
If we look at the procurement and try to find the offset cost you will not find it.  
There are a lot of ingenious ways to hide that cost. They are charging also for 
offset fees from countries that don’t have offsets for their procurements, just to 
take that extra money and try to invest it in a country that does have an offset 
program. And we know that this is true. 95  
 
This awareness lends credence to the substantive claim of my research: mainly that 
offsets are a covert tool regimes use to deliver benefits to privileged actors, not an effort 
to derive economic benefit from arms procurement.  If there are a handful of countries 
that could act as “price-makers” on the global arms market, the UAE is certainly among 
them, and thus it should be able to demand that offset costs not be included in potential 
sales – something it has never done.96  Even if we acknowledge that the UAE has put 
more bureaucratic resources into designing and managing its offset program than most – 
and is therefore more likely to be cognizant of the costs of offsets – there are sources of 
information accessible to all procuring country officials.  A DSCA (Defense Security and 
Cooperation Agency) memorandum detailing offset pricing practices is publicly available 
online, and therefore accessible to officials from any country.  And if the memo’s 
legalese is daunting, a postscript from the U.S. director of defense procurement provides 
more than adequate clarification:  
Contracting officers should treat all offset costs as allowable...[t]o disallow such 
costs means that U.S. companies must absorb offset costs that are required by the 
foreign government as a condition of making the sale.  It is only reasonable that 
                                                            
95 Comments of Saif Al Hajeri, Director of the UAE’s Offset Venture Group at the 2007 Middle East 
Regional Offset Conference held in Abu Dhabi. CTO Newsletter. 12 March 2007. 25(5).  
96 During the speech cited above, Hajeri suggested that the UAE did in fact have the necessary data to 
single out the added costs of offsets, and hinted that the government might even publish these figures in a 
general report.  But this report was never compiled. CTO Newsletter. 12 March 2007. 25(5).  
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foreign governments that require offsets should bear the costs of those offsets.97  
 
Richard Aboulafia, a defense industry analyst at Teal Group,98 was even more blunt in a 
June 2010 article in the Financial Times, “There seems to be a massive confusion about 
who pays for offsets.  It’s the buyer, not the seller.”99 In addition to official policy and the 
observations of analysts and foreign officials, the financial performance of offset 
agencies within the major defense firms also indicates that the firms reap significant 
financial rewards from the offset system. Thales International Offsets, SAS – the 
industrial participation arm of the French defense firm – has an annual net income of $5 
million.100  If the purpose of a defense firm’s industrial participation department is to 
invest ever-larger sums in the domestic economies of arms importers, it is difficult to see 
how they could turn a consistent profit.  
 
Despite the gravity of this revelation, strikingly few reports produced by the media or 
defense watchdog groups acknowledge the reality that offsets are financed by purchasing 
governments.  Aside from the above statements and memo excerpts referenced here, I 
have found only one article (an op-ed in an online English-language daily in India) that 
divulged this actuality.101  It is likely that this reference only exists because offsets had 
                                                            
97 See Defense Security Cooperation Agency memo.  DSCA 00-01. 19 January 2000. “Inclusion of Offset 
Costs in Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs).” Policy I-012655/99, p5. 
www.dsca.mil/samm/policy_memos/2000/DSCA%2000-01.pdf 
98 Joel Johnson, former VP of the industry association Aerospace Industries of America, is also at Teal 
Group.   
99 Sylvia Pfeifer. 10 June, 2010. “Overseas defence clients get tougher.” Financial Times.  
100 Hoover’s Profile. (subscription required). Accessed 10 May 2011.  
101 The (anonymous) blogger writes, “There is an economic cost to offsets.  Depending on the economic 
conditions prevalent in the offset [recipient] country...vendors hike the cost of their product to compensate.  
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recently become a hot news topic in Delhi after Lockheed Martin began initial delivery of 
C-130J transport vehicles and it was revealed that most of the offset projects on which 
the Indian government signed off either consisted of tertiary support equipment that 
should have been included in the original contract or named joint venture partners who 
denied ever having been approached by the firm or Indian defense officials.102  Just days 
later, confidential documents detailing the offset proposals of Lockheed and a handful of 
other firms for an $11 billion acquisition of multi-role fighter jets were found on a 
roadside in South Delhi.103  These unusual news items intensified public scrutiny of the 
revised offset requirements just passed by India’s legislature – most likely prompting the 
revelatory op-ed.   
 
Yet even under such conditions of enhanced scrutiny, the fable that offsets are a 
legitimate component of economic development programs continues, allowing firms to 
promote offsets as cost-saving and/or developmental measures – often using them as a 
pretense to chastise countries that attempt to trim their defense bill.  When Romania 
decided to purchase secondhand F-16s from the U.S. as opposed to issuing an 
international tender for new fighters, spokespersons for EADS (France-Germany), BAE 
(UK), and Alenia/Finmeccanica (Italy) issued a joint statement condemning Bucharest’s 
decision and lamenting the loss of investment and jobs that their offset packages would 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Therefore, an offset [recipient] country pays more for the import of defense items than it would otherwise 
have to if it did not impose mandatory offset obligations.” 8 January 2011. “Muddled defence offsets 
policy.” Pragati: the Indian National Interest Review. 
http://pragmatic.nationalinterest.in/2011/01/08/muddled-defence-offsets-policy/  
102 Ajai Shukla. 10 December 2010. “Lockheed offsets mock MOD norms.” Business Standard (New 
Delhi).  
103 “Secret IAF file goes missing, probe ordered.” 31 December 1010. PTI (Press Trust of India) wire 
service.  
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have provided in this “period of economic crisis.”104 Offset service providers also 
continue to characterize their projects as tools designed to “balance budgets” and “keep 
defense spending substantially down.”105  
 
This confusion is reflected in a confidential procurement document from the South 
African Ministry of Defense, which surfaced during an investigation into alleged corrupt 
payments funneled through offset contracts,  
In the case of the NIP (national industrial participation) projects [offsets], the 
assessment of ‘contract risk’ is much more controversial.  One side of the 
argument suggests that it is possible (or even probable) that suppliers have priced 
into their weapons contracts some or all of the penalties payable for non-
performance . . . It may therefore be in their interests to accept this cost rather 
than to take on the additional risks and potential costs of NIP projects.106 
 
Significance of Study and Contribution to Existing Literature 
The theoretical framework for this project draws largely from the most recent work on 
the rentier state.  Divergent findings by those working within this framework have 
produced calls to “push rentier theories in a more contextually sensitive research 
direction,” a task to which defense offsets are uniquely well-suited.107  Not only do offsets 
exhibit meaningful variation between cases that appears to map onto our understanding of 
how different types of authoritarian regimes seek to reproduce their support networks, 
they are also indicative of a class of trade-based rents that are of increasing interest to 
                                                            
104 CTO Newsletter. 12 April 2010. 28(7).  
105 Comments of Grant Rogan, CEO of offset services firm Blenheim Capital, at the 2010 Global Industrial 
Cooperation Conference in Budapest. CTO Newsletter. 24 May 2010. 28(10).  
106 CTO Newsletter. 13 October 2008. 26(19).  
107 Moore, 2004, calls for scholars to supplement Large-N studies with less parsimonious “messy” case 
studies, specifically focusing on different rent types, individual rulers’ strategies, contrasting sociopolitical 
antecedent conditions and other case-specific variables. 
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comparative political economists.108  The capacity of offset projects to constitute a new 
form of distributive institution has been completely overlooked by regional specialists, 
and has received only minimal treatment from political economists.  I believe this 
scholarly oversight stems from the opacity of data sources, itself a manifestation of 
efforts by both industry and governments to obscure this form of exchange.109   
 
Many works that utilize the rentier approach are criticized for an overly generalized focus 
on macro-economic or structural processes and related data sources, and (consequently) 
an inadequate treatment of variation in their impacts on individual rentier states.  When 
such generalized phenomena as “Dutch Disease” produced dramatically different results 
in different sociopolitical contexts (think Norway vs. Saudi Arabia) critics of the 
approach questioned its explanatory leverage.  Within-case variation presented a similar 
problem, as researchers demonstrated (or postulated) contradictory claims based on 
supply-side fluctuations.  The wild oscillations in oil prices, erosion of Cold War-era 
arms giveaways and sustained pressure to liberalize their statist economies prompted 
scholars to predict changes in Middle East politics ranging from political decompression 
to liberalization to outright democratization.  Many convincingly argued that as 
dwindling patronage resources threatened the distributional basis of the authoritarian 
bargain, regime legitimacy would similarly erode (Brynen 1992; Brynen, Korany and 
                                                            
108 Scholars have identified selective privatization, loan forgiveness, credit assistance, managed or 
‘protocol’ trade and income from previous investments of oil concessions as politically important rents that 
are understudied.   
109 Shana Marshall. November 2009. “Money for Nothing? Offsets in the U.S.-Middle East Defense Trade. 
International Journal of Middle East Studies.  
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Noble 1995; Salamé 1994; Geddes 1999).110   
 
However, what area scholars observed was a period of politics that was remarkable for its 
stasis rather than any significant indicators of change.  Discussions of authoritarian 
‘endurance,’ ‘resilience,’ and ‘robustness,’ soon dominated the literature, which sought to 
identify and examine those institutions responsible for reproducing the structures of 
regime maintenance.111  An emerging critique concerned the rentier state theory’s “lack of 
a conceptual avenue of how rent saturated economic structures are managed by state 
policies following a sharp decline of rent revenues.”112  The role played by exogenous 
shocks – the oil and debt crises in particular – in authoritarian breakdown in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere prompted scholars to ask what it was about the 
regimes of the Middle East that made them somehow immune to such tectonic forces.   
 
In response, regional scholars concentrated on the ways in which regimes were able to 
‘upgrade’ and ‘innovate’ their traditional methods of authoritarian rule through carefully 
calibrated institutional changes and superficial modifications that paid lip-service to 
democratic ideals but left underlying configurations of political power fundamentally 
unchanged.  These came in many forms, including the introduction of political 
                                                            
110 Barbara Geddes proves that this logic was not restricted to area scholars of the Middle East.  In her well-
known 1999 article “What do we know about democratizaton after twenty years?” she observed that, 
“various economic reforms were cutting profit opportunities out from under rent seekers all over the world.  
Economic reform reduced benefits to regime supporters at the same time that the crisis itself reduced 
acquiescence among ordinary citizens.” Annual Review of Political Science. 2: p139.   
111 King 2007; Pripstein-Psousney and Penner-Angrist 2005; Bellin 2004; Heydemann 2004; Brownlee 
2002; Perthes 2004. 
112 Richter, Thomas and Christian Steiner. November 2007. “Sectoral Transformations in Neo-Patrimonial 
Rentier States: Tourism Development and State Policy in Egypt.” German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies Research Unit, Institute of Middle East Studies. Working Paper, No. 61: p8.  
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contestation controlled through constitutional mechanisms and electoral engineering, 
increased ties with non-democratic states  - especially the “emerging” economies – that 
were less vocal about the need for reform, the formation of an alternate discourse of 
economic justice and collective rights to serve as a counterweight to prevailing 
definitions of democracy and individual human rights (Heydemann 2007), flooding 
emerging communications platforms with state discourse to drown out opposition voices, 
undermining the credibility of international legal and political bodies (Windsor, Gedmin 
and Liu 2009), extending state control over informal markets (Elyachar 2005; Boone 
1994) and by harnessing emergent rent sources such as selective privatization, loan 
forgiveness, credit assistance, and protocol trade (Moore and Peters 2009).  Similarly, 
researchers are examining specific sectors of the economy – such as tourism – to uncover 
how new forms of rents are created and distributed (Richter and Steiner 2007).  This 
project is meant to contribute to this research agenda by informing our understanding of 
how changing economic conditions drive innovations in patronage politics. 
 
Scholars’ increasing focus on a broader and more diverse body of rents is in response to 
two (related) phenomena, one empirical and one theoretical.  First is the process of 
economic liberalization taking place in the Middle East and throughout the world, which 
has shifted the forms of economic exchange open to exploitation for the purpose of 
generating patronage resources.  Defense offsets provide a good example here: the 
increasingly competitive defense market, driven by military budget cuts after the end of 
the Cold War, have enabled major arms importing countries to demand ‘sweeteners,’ 
including informal bribes as well as formal offset programs, which they then steer to 
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supportive domestic power brokers.  Unlike traditional patronage resources, offsets 
appear to be generated (and distributed) through apolitical market channels.  Second is 
the spate of work by Middle East scholars questioning key aspects of how the rentier 
paradigm has been applied (Herb 1999, 2003, Okruhlik 1999, Smith 2007).  Although 
these critiques have not fundamentally challenged the utility of a rent-centric approach, 
they have succeeded in forcing Middle East scholars to better document the processes 
through which regimes have utilized rents to secure their coalitions, and to better 
demonstrate the full range of available rent types and how these have differential impacts 
on regime etiology.   
    
Defense Offsets as an Economic Instrument  
Although research on the political impact of defense offsets is sparse, there are several 
studies by economists that seek to evaluate the effect offsets have on economic growth, 
diversification, and development. However, the paucity of available (and reliable) cross-
national or time-series data means that most of these are single case studies that address 
relatively limited time periods. This literature approaches defense offsets as a 
subcomponent within the larger category of barter or ‘countertrade,’ which (by one 
estimate) accounts for anywhere between five and thirty percent of current global 
trade.113  The simplest form of barter frequently entails the exchange of raw materials 
such as oil, timber or lithium from developing nations in exchange for capital goods like 
weapons, transportation equipment or telecommunications equipment from the 
                                                            
113 Brauer, Jurgen and J. Paul Dunne.  June 2004. “Arms Trade Offsets – What do we know?”  Paper 
presented at 8th annual International Conference on Economics and Security, University of the West of 
England, Bristol UK. 26-28 June. 
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industrialized countries.  Yet sophisticated barter arrangements have also become 
commonplace, promoted by the increasing number of firms specializing in designing and 
insuring barter transactions and the variety of financial instruments available to facilitate 
them.  Bartering their natural endowments enabled many developing countries to import 
finished products despite shortages of hard currency and chronic levels of indebtedness.   
 
Defense offsets follow this same basic logic: in order to ameliorate the political and 
economic costs of purchasing foreign-made weapons (which many within the procuring 
country are likely to argue should be produced domestically) purchasing governments 
can point to offsets as concessions they managed to secure from their wealthy trading 
partners.  Because sustaining production lines and reducing the per unit cost of equipment 
for the home-country military necessitates securing substantial export orders, exporting 
country governments have similarly supported the practice of offsets.  This is despite the 
potential long-term losses in technological superiority when transfers of sensitive 
technology are involved.   
 
Although defense firms portray offsets as purely economic phenomena generated by 
rigorous market competition, the capacity of offsets to contribute to development in the 
procuring country is extremely limited.  Based on theoretical models and historical 
assessments, the preponderant view of economists is that offsets are detrimental to 
development in importing countries for a range of reasons, many of which are unrelated 
to the fact that the countries are paying for the offsets in inflated contract prices.114  In 
                                                            
114 Brauer, Jurgen and J. Paul Dunne. June 2005. “Arms Trade Offsets and Development.” Africanus (South 
Africa).  35(1): 14-24. See also Dumas, Lloyd J.  September 2002. “Weapons Procurement and 
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addition to contributing to suboptimal procurement policy and the inefficient allocation 
of state resources,115 when countries barter prime commodities for arms the price they get 
is usually below the prevailing market price.  And when defense firms provide export 
assistance to fulfill their offset obligation, this prevents the emergence of an indigenous 
capability to process, market and/or transport the procuring country’s own goods, re-
producing the relationship of dependency.  Economists at the consulting firm Deloitte 
estimate that the redundancy and duplication necessary to engage in defense offsets (such 
as the construction of multiple facilities, subassembly travel costs, transporting personnel 
back and forth, etc.) is in the range of 20-30% of the overall offset value.116  
 
As Cold War imperatives faded and military budgets shrank, offsets became an 
increasingly important tool in a “race to the top” among governments seeking to 
subsidize their domestic defense industries and increase arms exports.  In this sense, 
offsets are part of a broader package that includes export loan guarantees, public 
financing, energy subsidies, government-financed trade shows, diplomatic salesmanship 
and other methods used to encourage purchases by foreign countries in an increasingly 
competitive international market.  This competition has done more than merely boost 
innovation, it has encouraged defense firms to engage in ‘regulatory capture.’ In this 
case, defense industry advocates succeeded in repealing or weakening legislation aimed 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Development: Do Offsets Mitigate or Magnify the Military Burden?” Paper delivered at the International 
Conference on Offsets and Economic Development. Cape Town, South Africa. 25-27 September. See also 
Taylor, Travis K. July 2001. “An Empirical Evaluation of Offset Arrangements.” Proceedings of the 
International Society for New Institutional Economics 2001 Annual Meeting.   
115 Banks, Gary. 1983.  “The Economics and Politics of Countertrade.” The World Economy.  6(2): 159-
182.  
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at limiting the scope of offset agreements, including regulations governing the 
outsourcing of defense manufacturing, the transfer of sensitive technologies, and the 
inclusion of incentives in defense contracts that aid foreign companies that are in direct 
competition with American firms.117 As outlined above, they were also successful in 
securing an amendment to U.S. procurement and acquisition policy authorizing firms to 
bill procuring countries for all the costs associated with their offset activities.118   
 
Political economists have shown that, with respect to large transactions such as arms 
exports, natural resource exports and large civilian infrastructure projects, international 
competition has actually increased the prevalence of corruption, precisely because each 
single contract is so lucrative.119  The high potential profits – and small penalties for 
those found guilty of malfeasance – mean that companies are willing to risk prosecution 
in order to secure contracts.120  This is reflected in the large number of corruption suits 
centered on defense offset projects.  These large contracts not only guarantee a 
company’s profitability for long periods, but are also important to local politicians in the 
                                                            
117 A bill that would have prohibited defense firms from offering assistance to help foreign companies 
compete in the U.S. was introduced by former Senator Russ Feingold in the early 1990s, but did not 
achieve passage.  
118 This is explored at length later in this chapter. Initially firms could only recover the costs associated 
with ‘administering’ the offset program (so, not the costs of equipment, etc.).  This was eventually 
expanded to include any cost the firm could associate with the provision of defense offsets.  This of course 
is only germane to those export contracts over which the U.S. Government has some jurisdiction in the first 
place, which would be those concluded as FMS (Foreign Military Sales) agreements, not those concluded 
under commercial terms, in which the U.S. Government does not intervene to ensure adequate price 
competition, etc.  
119 Carolyn Warner. 2007. The Best System Money Can Buy: Corruption in the European Union. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.  
120 The World Bank estimates that about $80 billion in bribes and pay-offs are generated by the defense 
trade every year.  Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index shows that arms manufacturers 
are perceived to be the industry most willing to pay bribes.  
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firm’s host state, who are seeking to maintain production lines, increase employment or 
raise campaign funds from large corporations.121 Consequently, many large defense 
firms, especially their aerospace divisions, are shifting resources to focus less on the 
traditional pillars of economic competitiveness and more on the business of politics.   
 
Authors of a study published in the Journal of Operations Management conducted 
interviews with 260 individuals in industry, government and academia to uncover the 
major drivers of current defense industry planning. They found that the large prime 
contractors were focused on reforming their governance structures by trying to divest 
themselves of some technical capabilities associated with machining, workforce 
management and manufacturing control whilst investing in others, including “systems 
integration, offset, mergers, politics and contracts.”122  
 
This shift is also reflected in the speech of a former industry trade group executive, who 
criticized delegates attending an offset conference for what he perceived as their perverse 
prioritizing of offset contracts over the actual military equipment, stating “you tend to 
hear more about offsets than the weapons system itself” and “you have heard a couple of 
talks this morning in which I never heard the words ‘weapons system’ spoken once.”123 
While industry critics tend to characterize the presence of offsets as a nuisance and a 
                                                            
121 BAE is currently under investigation for its offset programs in South Africa, which funneled money to 
African National Congress (the ruling party) campaign coffers through front companies and local suppliers 
that ostensibly participated in the firm’s offset activities.  
122 T. Williams, Roger Maull and Bruce Ellis.  2002. “Demand chain management theory: constraints and 
development from global aerospace supply webs.” Journal of Operations Management.  20: p703.  
123 CTO (Counter Trade & Offset) Newsletter. 28 May 2008. 26(10).  
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distraction, those outside industry contend that the increasing centrality of offsets may be 
driving unnecessary military acquisitions – not only straining state budgets but 
contributing to global arms races as well.124   
 
There is one study that suggests offsets might provide some concrete economic benefit.  
Published in the Journal of Policy Modeling, the study relies on observations taken from 
a bi-weekly newsletter called the Countertrade & Offset Newsletter.125  The author 
creates a binary typology of offsets based on whether they are designed to minimize the 
cost of the transaction [ie, the price the procuring country pays for the defense materiel] 
or to supply a ‘package enhancement’ that can be diverted to critical actors and/or 
institutions.  Although the ‘package enhancement’ offsets are found to be of no economic 
value, the author finds that offsets like sub-contracting, licensed production, co-
production and buyback [all direct offsets] can theoretically reduce the cost the 
purchasing country must pay for the equipment.  The potential discount comes either 
through sourcing some portion of the material or labor in the procuring country (which 
presumably has lower production costs),126 or by creating a real incentive for the foreign 
                                                            
124 Such critics include Transparency International as well as academics studying the economics of arms 
trade offsets.  
125 A subscription to this newsletter is quite expensive (over $1,000/year).  Consequently, even the U.S. 
Bureau of Industry and Security – the only U.S. government agency that systematically reports on defense 
offsets – does not have a subscription.  Instead, the BIS relies solely on annual reports provided by the 
defense firms themselves, which are not required to provide any supporting documentation, such as 
invoices or delivery schedules, to verify their figures.   
126 Offset-driven outsourcing has been particularly unpopular among lower-tier firms that supply basic 
components for the prime defense firms.  As demand for their product dwindles, so does the number of 
manufacturing jobs they are preserving, and the protectionist policies they can elicit from local politicians.  
Because lower-tier suppliers that provide specific components to be used in the construction of defense 
equipment are the most likely to lose out under offset schemes (which outsource this construction to the 
procuring country), prime contractors are frequently at odds with suppliers over U.S. offset policy. Thus the 
continued growth of offsets is driven not only by demand-side requests for offsets, but also by the potential 
economic benefits prime contractors get from outsourcing their supply-chain.  The Aerospace Industries 
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defense firm to improve the efficiency of its domestic offset partner. Because the foreign 
firm must rely on the quality of that partner’s inputs to maintain the integrity of its 
branded weapon system, the assumption is that the firm will act to improve management 
and cut back on waste and fraud.  
 
However, this logic is flawed for a number of reasons.  First, the defense firm’s 
imperative to secure future contracts probably surpasses concerns over efficiency and 
transparency in the domestic partner – especially if the collaborative project is limited in 
scope and will not be exported.  And since it is the reigning political class that dictates 
decisions on future arms procurement and identifies the domestic partners with which 
foreign defense firms must collaborate, these firms are likely to privilege the satisfaction 
of political elites over productive concerns.  Furthermore, in certain cases there may be 
no incentive for the defense firm to ‘discipline’ its domestic production partner.  A series 
of GAO reports published in the late 1990s/early 2000s found that co-production 
agreements with Egypt dramatically increased the per-unit cost of tanks and other jointly 
manufactured equipment. But because the program was administered through official 
U.S. military assistance channels, General Dynamics was paid the same amount 
regardless of the number (or quality) of units Egypt produced.  From the perspective of 
the Egyptian Military, the increased opportunities for employment, the provision of dual-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Association lobbies on behalf of the large prime contractors and is an avid proponent of free-trade 
(including lessening export restrictions and diluting the ‘Buy American Act’ that requires the U.S. 
Government to give preference to domestic manufacturers.  Many of the primes are partnered with 
European firms on major weapons systems; these lucrative partnerships are more difficult to maintain in the 
face of the protectionist policies promoted by their smaller counterparts, including the National Association 
of Manufacturers. For example, Northrop Grumman funded an intense campaign against Boeing and in 
support of its partner the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) to build the U.S. Air 
Force refueling tanker.  The Joint Strike Fighter is another example, financed by the U.S. and several 
European governments it involves Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and BAE, the latter of which now 
employs more workers in the US than in the UK. 
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use equipment, and the prestige of manufacturing the most technologically sophisticated 
main battle tank available outweighed concerns over cost.  This was especially true as 
most of the project was being financed by U.S. military aid, and because the military’s 
budget is a state secret, cost overruns could be easily (and discreetly) financed from other 
ministerial budgets without raising eyebrows.127  
 
Despite the fact that the majority of current research concludes offsets produce no benefit 
to the domestic economy, arms purchasers continue to pay significantly more for 
weapons contracts that include offset provisions.128  A survey of British defense firms 
conducted in the mid-1990s revealed that although offset requests at the time were 
generally equal to about 60% of the contract cost, the contract price was increased 100% 
by the defense contractor (ostensibly) to cover the costs of the offset.129  This supports the 
claim that offset requests by procuring countries are not based on economic concerns, but 
instead are politically motivated.130  One U.S. State Department official admitted as 
much, stating “it is rare in today’s international economy that offsets can be demonstrated 
                                                            
127 Government Accountability Office (GAO). July 1993. “Military Aid to Egypt: Tank Coproduction 
Raised Costs and May Not Meet Many Program Goals.”  
128 Brauer and Dunne, the foremost academics currently studying the economics of offsets conclude, 
“Extant evidence suggests that offset arrangements do not yield net benefits for a country’s economic 
development . . . Arms trade offset deals are more costly than ‘off-the-shelf’ arms purchases, create little by 
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130 Peter Batchelor and Paul Dunne.  September 2000.  “Industrial Participation, Investment and Growth: 
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to have purely economic advantages for the customer.  More often the real gains are 
found in the political arena.”131  
 
In addition to economic treatments of offsets, scholars have also evaluated their strategic 
implications.  These studies most often focus on the security implications of relocating 
defense production, transferring sensitive technologies, and the potential loss of in-house 
capabilities.  Conclusions frequently differ along industry-government lines; researchers 
employed by defense firms or coming from a private sector background frequently 
dismiss concerns over offsets.  These researchers claim that offsets are beneficial because 
they enhance interoperability among allies, or are at worst benign, since industry 
innovation outpaces the export of technology.132  Critics counter that offsets drive the 
need for excessive research and development (R&D) spending, not that speedy 
innovation enables risk-free offsets.133 Although my project does not explicitly deal with 
the security implications of defense offsets, the transfer of capabilities and materials to 
the defense and security institutions of repressive states is certainly an issue of concern.   
 
Defense Offsets as a Political Instrument 
As observed above, there are very few studies of the politics of defense offsets.  Even
                                                            
131 Stephanie G. Neuman.  Spring 1985.  “Co-production, Barter and Countertrade: Offsets in the 
International Arms Market.” Orbis.  165-181.   
132 Of course, Veblen’s insight that ‘invention is the mother of necessity,’ an inversion of the proverb 
‘necessity is the mother of invention,’ suggests that an activist approach to the exporting of weapons 
technology allows defense firms to demand public funds and other forms of government assistance to 
support continued research and development efforts.  
133 Markusen, Ann. November 2002. “The Arms Trade as Illiberal Trade.” Unpublished manuscript. 
Council on Foreign Relations.  
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 paired case comparisons that might give us some basis for deducing the role of political 
influences are scarce.  Reports and studies commissioned by trade groups or governments 
also tend to obscure the political components of offsets, as both parties have an interest in 
reinforcing a false boundary between their economic and political motivations.  One 
notable exception is a survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, 
which consulted “foreign and domestic entities” and concluded that “subsidizing interest 
groups” was primary among the rationales for offsets.134  Official surveys 
notwithstanding, firms and industry advocates characterize offsets as manifestations of 
objective market conditions, insisting that government regulation or oversight is 
unnecessary because offsets are commercial tools devoid of politics.135  Researchers 
likewise frame their puzzles in terms of economic, rather than political, imperatives.  
After discerning that importing states realize that the efficacy and social benefits of 
mandatory offset programs are dubious at best, and that defense firms price offset costs 
into their bids as a matter of course, two authors observe that: “Against this, buyers with 
any market power at all can negotiate price discounts as easily as package enhancements 
– and their preference for offsets remains to be explained.”136  However, if we examine 
                                                            
134 BIS Offsets, 11th Annual Report, p182.  I take the term ‘interest groups’ to be synonymous with 
‘political coalition’ or ‘elite network,’ expressed in the peculiar language of public choice scholarship in 
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135 Joel Johnson, former VP of Aerospace Industries of America, a prime contractor trade group, has been 
the most vocal proponent of this perspective.  In conference appearances and in Congressional testimony he 
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offsets from a political perspective, then the origins of this preference become plain.  The 
costs are diffuse because payment comes from the government’s defense budget, whereas 
the benefits can be delivered by the regime to targeted groups in its support coalition.  As 
a result, offsets have concrete political implications for procuring countries, as they 
confer real political power on recipient individuals and firms.   
 
The Legalization of Bribery? 
As the above section makes clear, companies price the entire offset into their contracts – 
not merely the price they may pay in penalties, which themselves are rarely imposed.137  
For such ambiguity to persist requires at least a minimum of intentional deception by 
selling firms, procurement officials or both. The fact that offsets are paid for by procuring 
countries with public funds and disguised as development initiatives or security 
imperatives makes them even more attractive to regimes facing scrutiny over their 
procurement policy in the age of privatization, restricted social spending and trade 
liberalization.  Kuwait, the UAE and India have, to varying extents, initiated policies 
designed to make it more difficult for firms to pass-on the costs of offsets.138  Kuwait 
                                                            
137 See Congressional testimony of Joel Johnson (below) regarding imposition of penalties for non-
fulfillment of offset obligations.  
138 A 2009 article in India’s Business Standard relates the following: “They [arms vendors] fufill their 
offset obligations superficially and add the costs to their bill.  That this is happening in India’s civil aviation 
sector (where, as in defence, vendors are liable for offsets) was evident from what former Civil Aviation 
Secretary Ajay Prasad told a gathering in Delhi last week. Revealing that Kingfisher Airlines had paid $50 
million less than Indian Airlines for similar Airbus aircraft, Mr Prasad explained that was because offsets 
were mandatory in the purchases by the government carrier. Evidently, the costs of those offsets were 
added on to Indian Airlines’ bill. Such subterfuge can be minimised through responsive policy-making, 
creating benefits for India’s defence economy without unduly taxing vendors. The MoD’s first offset 
policy, promulgated in the Defence Procurement Policy of 2005 (DPP-2005), has gradually evolved, 
mainly at the instance of Indian and foreign defence suppliers.”  “Offsets Take Off: Time To Go From 
Banking to Trading.” 25 November 2009. http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/offsets-take-
off/20/30/377532/. The UAE approach has been to make offset fulfillment dependent on the profits 
generated from offset projects, rather than the investments made by defense firms.  Kuwait announced in 
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went so far as to initiate a unilateral effort to cease offsets, though this was frustrated by 
government ministers and powerful domestic businessmen who had benefited by playing 
the roles of facilitators and middlemen.139 The network of prime contractors, subsidiaries, 
subcontractors, suppliers, domestic investment partners, offset brokers, and the financial 
and legal entities involved in offset advisory services form a parallel structure of power 
and authority that disperses responsibility and complicates the enforcement of standards 
of accountability – further contributing to the use of offsets as instruments of patronage 
and to the importance of offsets as a source of economic profit for these intermediary 
actors.  These networks often incorporate organizations that one would not expect to see.  
The Swedish defense firm Saab, for example, has utilized the powerful global business 
networks of one of its largest shareholders – the Wallenberg charitable foundation – to 
design offset business opportunities that appeal to procuring governments.140  Similarly, 
technocrats working in regional development banks are investigating the capacity of 
offsets to finance domestic infrastructure spending – and presumably advising procuring 
country governments on how to maximize their offsets.   
 
Ironically, the efforts of procuring country governments to exclude offset costs from arms 
contracts bear a striking resemblance to their previous attempts to ensure that the cost of 
bribes paid to individual ‘agents’ were not passed on in the price of arms contracts.  This 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2004 that it would halt offsets in government contracts after ‘discovering’ this practice of price hiking, 
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139 “Kuwait to halt offset projects in new government contracts.” 6-12 September 2004. GulfWire Digest. 
Accessed 25 October 2009. 
http://www.arabialink.com/Archive/GWDigests/GWD2004/GWD_2004_09_06.htm#BK3.  
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practice was so pervasive that many states in the Middle East passed strict laws 
prohibiting such activity.  In 1969 a decree by the Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers 
required a clause in all contracts specifying that no agent had been paid to secure the sale 
of the equipment in question, and that if any agent fees had been paid, an amount equal to 
those fees must be removed from the Kingdom’s bill.  Similar agency restrictions are in 
place in Iraq, Egypt, and elsewhere.  Author Ronald Kessler documents how the agency 
restriction is circumvented in his book on the infamous arms broker Adnan Khashoggi, 
who pocketed billions by working as an agent for Western defense firms doing business 
in Saudi Arabia.  He describes a meeting where a Western defense executive responds to 
Saudi inquiries about the participation of paid agents in the firm’s successful bid to sell 
equipment to the Kingdom: 
The next day at 1 P.M., Prince Sultan [then-Defense Minister] strode into his 
office at the defense ministry in Riyadh.  After thumbing through the contract, he 
[Sultan] turned to Gonzalez, the senior Northrop official at the meeting.  “Do you 
have any agent in Saudi Arabia?” he asked.  Khashoggi had prepared Gonzalez 
for this question.  He said Sultan would ask it, and he told Gonzalez to answer in 
the negative.  As instructed, Gonzalez answered, “No, not in Saudi Arabia.”141 
The ruse was possible because Khashoggi promised to be out of the country, thus “not in 
Saudi Arabia,” when the questioning took place for each contract.142  Although defense 
firms claim such practices are remnants of a corrupt past, they maintain the same foreign 
subsidiaries and domestic intermediaries that facilitated this earlier process of bribery, of 
which offsets can be seen as a logical extension.  Consider these two accounts: in order to 
facilitate his network of bribery, Khashoggi set up a number of ‘front’ companies, 
                                                            
141 Ronald Kessler.  1986. The Richest Man in the World: The Story of Adnan Khashoggi. New York: 
Warner Books, p78.   
142 Jim Hougan. 1978. “The Business of Buying Friends.” In Crime at the Top: Deviance in Business and 
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including Triad Corporation, Lauvier and Cantona.  These were incorporated in tax 
haven countries in order to process his payments – which showed up on the books of the 
major defense firms as “marketing contingency funds” or similarly innocuous line-items.  
These costs made a quick stop-over at a U.S.-based subsidiary on their way to Khashoggi 
so the defense firms could qualify for a tax break from the U.S. government.143  Former 
CIA operative Robert Baer characterized the Al-Yamamah offset deal between BAE and 
Saudi Arabia as “a huge commission-generating machine” with BAE overcharging for its 
hardware and spare parts, “with the difference going to commissions.”144   
 
The excess funds generated by including the offset cost in the contract can be transferred 
to a subsidiary of the contractor (frequently a Foreign Sales Corporation, or FSC) located 
in a jurisdiction with sufficient banking secrecy, and the money can then deposited in the 
appropriate account. According to a 2004 GAO report, the top five U.S. defense 
contractors have 44 foreign subsidiaries in OECD-classified “tax-haven” countries, 
whose legal systems can be used to avoid taxation and other forms of financial 
regulation, including requirements for corporate transparency.145  Traveling through these 
                                                            
143 Jim Hougan. 1978. “The Business of Buying Friends.” In Crime at the Top: Deviance in Business and 
the Professions.  John M. Johnson and Jack D. Douglas. (eds) New York: Lippincott Books.  
144 http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=9008.  It is generally well-recognized within the armaments 
industry that the U.S. has the most comprehensive legal guarantees against bribery, notably the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) passed in 1977.  This is reflected in the relative frequency with which 
reports of bribery by British, French, German and Italian arms manufacturers appear in the press, as well as 
frequent cases brought by U.S. manufacturers against European competitors for unfair business practices.  
For a first-hand account of this discrepancy between European and U.S. firms see Said K. Aburish.  1985. 
Pay-Off: Wheeling and Dealing in the Arab World. London: Andre Deutsch.     
145 These numbers exclude Lockheed Martin, which reported no subsidiaries.  In fact, Lockheed Martin 
does have an unknown number of subsidiaries, but none of these qualify as ‘significant’ according to the 
SEC’s definition.  These numbers also exclude BAE Systems (the U.S. arm of British Aerospace), which as 
of 2008 was the second largest defense contractor in the U.S., but was not yet designated as a ‘U.S. 
contractor’ when the GAO conducted the study in 2003.  The five companies referred to here are those that 
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opaque channels makes it impossible to exercise oversight of offset contracts.  There are 
numerous anecdotal cases illustrating this process.  In Zimbabwe, BAE made payments 
to John Bredenkamp – a prominent businessman, former arms dealer, and ally of the 
ruling ZANU-PF – by moving the funds from a London-based Lloyds TSB account into 
Red Diamond Trading, a BAE subsidiary registered in the British Virgin Islands, which 
then deposited the money in Kayswell Services (also registered in the British Virgin 
Islands), whose company records list Bredenkamp as a primary beneficiary.146 A similar 
role was played by RLI (Robert Lee International) and Travellers World Ltd., two 
companies that became waystations for BAE payments made to Saudi Royals as part of 
the Al Yamamah deal. 147 
 
These accounts are strikingly similar to what we see today, wherein offset costs are 
included in the inflated contract price, their “cost” to U.S. firms cited as evidence of 
intense competitive pressures necessitating continued government subsidies, and the 
resources are later distributed according to the designs of regime officials in the 
procuring countries – often through domestic firms that are little more than local agents 
importing foreign goods.  Indeed, today Adnan Khashoggi’s brother Amr operates just 
such a firm – Amkest Group – which acts as a domestic distributor of defense and 
security systems in Saudi Arabia.148  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
were the largest defense contractors in 2008 that were also covered by the GAO study (Boeing, Northrup 
Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon and L-3 Communications).  
146 Christopher Thompson and Michael Peel.  31 July 2008.  “UK-Zimbabwe: BAE linked to Zimbabwean 
arms dealer.” Financial Times (UK). 
147 David Leigh and Rob Evans. 4 November 2004. “Dismay at BAE as fraud office comes calling.” The 
Guardian (UK).  
148 Zawya Business Profile. (subscription required). 
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Procuring countries will also frequently express (at the outset of contract negotiations) 
that price may not be the decisive factor in the bidding process – but rather that the firms’ 
respective offset packages may be determinative. 149  Because offset agreements are 
confidential as well as legally and economically complex, they are able to conceal 
subsidies and payments to regime allies as legitimate contract costs – ensuring that the 
offset business is steered toward a local firm with the right political contacts. For 
example, the offsets contained in BAE’s 1989 jet sale to South Africa were widely 
criticized as being a major pipeline for corrupt transfers.150  In addition to payments to the 
ruling African National Congress (ANC), which were used to fund the party’s 1999 
election campaign,151 BAE also made payments to the late South African Defense 
Minister Joe Modise and other procurement officials who steered coproduction and 
subcontracting work to companies owned by their families and political cronies.152  
Although the BAE tender was nearly twice as costly as its competitors’ bids,153 Modise 
requested that a “non-costed” option be included in the evaluation criteria – otherwise the 
BAE bid would have been disqualified.154 
                                                            
149 Catherine Courtney. “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade.” April 2002. Policy Research Paper 001. 
Transparency International (UK).  
150 “BAE Investigation: Prosecution to have political impact.” 2 October 2009. Financial Times.  
151 One former ANC member told the U.K.’s Special Fraud Office that the commissions from the BAE deal 
were “how we [the ANC] funded the 1999 election campaign.” “BAE Investigation: Prosecution to have 
political impact.” 2 October 2009. Financial Times. 
152 Catherine Courtney.  “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade.” April 2002.  Policy Research Paper 001.  
Transparency International (UK), p12-13.    
153 Chris McGreal. 12 November 2007. “Former MP claims ANC killed BAE bribery inquiry.” The 
Guardian (UK). http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/12/bae.southafrica 
154 Catherine Courtney.  “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade.” April 2002.  Policy Research Paper 001.  
Transparency International (UK), p12-13.   The legal and economic complexity of the bidding process 
provides corrupt procuring officials with a credible excuse for accepting the higher cost contract from 
which their side payments originate.  This reality is reflected in the Tanzania case, which included an 
alleged payment of $11 million (30% of the contract cost) to a company controlled by the Tanzanian 
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The absence of any supranational guidelines or independent third party able to verify any 
aspects of offset deals has led many NGOs (including Transparency International and the 
Federation of American Scientists) to demand changes to the practice of offset provision.  
Transparency International reviewed two major offset deals as part of a civil society 
oversight program, one for the Colombian Air Force and another for the Polish Ministry 
of Defense.  TI concluded that the Colombian offset program was such a high corruption 
risk that it should be cancelled.155  TI also pointed out a number of specific red flags in 
the tenders it reviewed that suggested the offset contract would end up being a vehicle for 
corrupt payments, including inadequate legal oversight; offset options outside the 
expertise of potential bidders; a shortage of individuals qualified to evaluate or oversee 
the offset program; and non-existent penalty mechanisms.  In his 1999 testimony to a 
House Subcommittee on the impact of defense offsets, Joel Johnson, Vice-President of 
Aerospace Industries Association, which represents the major defense contractors, 
revealed just how arbitrary offset contracts are:  
Offset agreements will frequently have some financial penalty that will be 
imposed on a company for not completing its offsets.  Quite frankly, I don’t know 
of any U.S. company that has paid such liquidated damages . . . Companies do 
have contractual legal arrangements which would involve financial penalties.  
But, in point of fact, I don’t know of any company that has ever paid one.156 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
official who oversaw the deal.  Now, in the wake of the SFO investigation, the Tanzanian President is 
promising to pursue damages from BAE if it is revealed that the price tag was inflated in order to supply 
commissions. The 2003 sale of two frigates to Romania also included a suspiciously high price that led to 
an international inquiry. Numerous other NGOs have identified offsets as an instrument of bribery in the 
arms trade, including the Centre for International Cooperation and Security, the Federation of American 
Scientists, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
155 Mark Pyman.  “Offsets and Corruption Risk.” Global Industrial Cooperation Conference: European and 
U.S. Views on Offsets – Panel Session.  Seville, Spain.  12-14 May 2008.  Pyman was representing 
Transparency International’s Defence Against Corruption Programme.   
156 See Johnson’s 29 June 1999 statement to a House Subcommittee on the impact of defense offsets. 
“Defense Offsets: Are They Taking Away Our Jobs?” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee on Government Reform.  U.S. House of 
Representatives. Serial No. 106-114, p143.  The political sensitivities surrounding defense offsets in the US 
(especially regarding their implications for domestic employment) have the curious effect of encouraging 
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The spotty history of offset programs suggests that procuring governments may desire 
them precisely because they are opaque and their economic impact is difficult to pinpoint.  
Because the value of the offset differs depending on the source of information, and offset 
fulfillment can take years if not decades, it is difficult if not impossible to determine to 
what degree the offset program was implemented, exactly where the funds went, and how 
many potential jobs or exports they generated. As one former employee in an offset 
services firm explained, due to the complexity of offset agreements, many procuring 
country agencies tasked with overseeing offset implementation lack the tools to enforce 
compliance, and as a result, many obligations are merely fulfilled through the use of 
“confidential payments.”157   
 
Keeping track of offset progress can be very difficult, even in countries with fairly 
sophisticated bureaucracies. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, responsibility for certain offset 
projects has been transferred between different defense firms, contractors have been 
given credit for “moral” offsets, “best endeavors,” or for “encouraging” investment by 
third parties, and offset target deadlines for program completion are routinely missed 
without penalty.  Available data suggests that the success rate for Saudi offset programs 
is much lower than in many other procuring nations, yet Saudi Arabia ranks as either the 
first or second largest importer of arms, depending on the time period under 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
executives and industry advisors to remark on how ineffective they are as instruments of development for 
procuring countries.  No doubt such spokespeople must walk a delicate line between dismissing and 
praising the impact of their own business practices to different audiences.   
157 “Countertrade Outlook.”  19 May 1986, p1.   
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examination.158  It would stand to reason that Saudi Arabia’s market power would enable 
it to compel defense contractors to meet deadlines and value targets, but it is much more 
likely that because offset programs involve corrupt practices, defense contractors are able 
to push back against Saudi demands for penalty payments.   
 
Such accounts lend credence to the argument that offsets are nothing more than the 
institutionalization of a complex system of informal bribery that dominated the arms 
trade for much of the 20th century.  The channeling of offsets through many of the same 
structures as bribes (including the front companies) and by many of the same actors 
(including former intermediaries and official firm agents) facilitates their transmission 
and makes them useful tools for authoritarian elites to dispense assets to privileged 
members of their support networks – whether formally by investing in their business 
enterprises, or informally by direct payments. The organizational logic of this earlier 
system of bribery created the scaffolding upon which offsets are now exchanged.159  
 
The Layout of Remaining Chapters 
The following chapter will provide a more thorough history of defense offsets, putting 
                                                            
158 Matthews, Ron.  2002.  “Saudi Arabia: Defense Offsets and Development.” In Arming the South: The 
Economics of Military Expenditure, Arms Production and Arms Trade in Developing Countries.  Jurgen 
Brauer and J. Paul Dunne (eds).  New York, NY: Palgrave.  Also see Leo G. B. Welt and Dennis B. 
Wilson.  October 1998.  “Offsets in the Middle East.” Middle East Policy.  6(2): 36-53.  
159 Peter B. Evans makes reference to this ‘organizational logic’ and its creation of forward linkages in his 
discussion on the role of large bureaucratic monitoring mechanisms (intelligence and internal security 
apparatuses) in facilitating the nationalization of extractive industries in the Middle East. See 
“Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State: An Analysis of Developing and 
Industrialized Nations in the Post-World War II Period.” 1985. In Bringing the State Back In.  Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p198.  Today, 
the national oil companies and domestic intelligence agencies are probably the two most efficient and 
effective bureaucratic institutions in many Arab States. 
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their origin and evolution in context with reference to: (1) global trading patterns; (2) the 
transformation of methods of bribery and trends in government corruption; (3) shifting 
narratives of economic development; and (4) changes in how subsidies are provided to 
domestic arms producers.  Chapter 2 will also investigate some of the sources of offset 
data discrepancies, and ask what these divergent figures may reveal about the interests 
and actions of exporting countries, defense firms, middlemen and procurement officials.   
Chapter 3 will examine offsets in three Gulf States: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, 
where offset obligations have been used to finance joint ventures between defense firms 
and the private businesses of regime allies, and also to fund new domestic ventures 
launched by state-owned investment funds.  Chapter 4 will examine the cases of Egypt 
and Jordan, where military interests have been the beneficiary of offsets, through 
investment in military owned factories, and – in the case of Egypt – also through 
generating supply and subcontractor work for the business enterprises of high-ranking 
military officials. The final chapter will clarify the theoretical goals and conclusions of 
this project, address some emergent trends that hint at the future trajectory of defense 
offsets in the Middle East, touch on some comparative cases outside the region, and 









Chapter 2: Defense Offsets in Context: The Origin and Evolution 
of Offsets and the Political Significance of Data Discrepancies  
 
“From an industry perspective, offsets are certainly a nuisance.”  
 
Joel Johnson, Vice President of Aerospace Industries International,  
1999 testimony to a House Subcommittee on the impact of defense offsets1  
 
“It just seems to me when something is an inconvenience, seldom do you see people hire 
entire staffs and fill ballrooms full of people that deal with this inconvenience.” 
 
Congressman John Tierney (D) Massachusetts,  
in the same 1999 House Subcommittee hearing  
 
This chapter provides a brief background history of defense offsets, putting their 
appearance and evolution in context with reference to: (1) global trading patterns; (2) the 
transformation of international norms regarding corporate governance and public 
corruption; (3) shifting narratives of economic development promoted by international 
institutions; and (4) how changes in the global arms market have impacted the way 
subsidies are provided to domestic arms producers.  This chapter will also examine recent 
innovations in offset programs, including the application of multipliers, offset investment 
funds, offset swapping, pre-performance offsets and the proliferation of offset service and 
investment firms, and examine how these contribute to systems of government patronage.  
Finally, this chapter will lay out some of the incongruence in available offset data, not 
only to demonstrate the challenges presented by these divergent estimates, but also to 
inform our understanding of the unique interests and institutional affiliations of their 
                                                            
1 “Defense Offsets: Are They Taking Away Our Jobs?” 29 June 1999 Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee on Government Reform.  U.S. 
House of Representatives. Serial No. 106-114. 
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sources, and how their respective representations of offset data serve to further these 
interests. 
 
The Origin of Offsets 
Formal offsets made their first appearance under President Eisenhower’s Administration, 
which sought to balance the high cost of maintaining American troops in West Germany 
by requiring the German government to purchase U.S. defense materiel, thereby 
“offsetting” U.S. costs.2  The Cold War imperative of arming Europe and ensuring 
interoperability of allied weapons systems in the shadow of an ascendant Soviet Union 
promoted the spread of offsets throughout the transatlantic defense trade.  The advent of 
offset demand in the developing world can also be traced to U.S. efforts to rearm and 
reconstruct Europe’s defense industrial base, as these new national industries sought 
export markets to maintain production levels that had previously been financed by U.S. 
assistance.  Facing stiff competition not only from one another, but also from the ‘free’ 
transfers of weapons from the U.S. and Soviet Union, the European manufacturers added 
perks such as technology transfer and co-production in order to maintain their production 
lines.   Subsequent innovation – driven by both economic and political imperatives – has 
transformed this original program of modest government subsidies into a sophisticated 
industry that oversees tens of thousands of individual transactions and tens of billions in 
public and private funds each year.  Industry analysts estimate that about 150 countries 
have some sort of defense offset requirements – but almost half of those countries have 
                                                            
2 Verzariu, Pompiliu.  March 2000.  “The Evolution of International Barter, Countertrade, and Offset 
Practices: A Survey of the 1970s through the 1990s.” US Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, Office of Finance.  Office of Finance Publications and Papers, p6.  
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drafted their policies in just the last 15 years.3  This recent intensification suggests that 
offsets are indeed highly adaptable instruments that can be designed to conform to the 
political requirements of almost any procuring country – including those that have little 
or no defense industrial base to absorb them.  
 
Early offsets were overwhelmingly of the “direct” type – meaning they were directly 
related to the equipment being procured – and focused on co-production, licensed 
production and subcontracting in order to enhance the interoperability of weapons 
systems used by the US and allied states.  These agreements necessarily benefited 
domestic military and industrial actors – who reaped the windfall of increased local 
production.  However, the popularity of “indirect” offsets – those not related to the 
military equipment being purchased – has increased substantially since the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) began collecting data in the 1980s. During the period 
1980-1987, the OMB reported that 53% of offsets were indirect.4  By the first year the 
BIS collected data (1993), this figure had risen to 63%.5 This transition reflects a number 
of changing realities.   
 
In the past, Cold War geopolitics meant that many developing countries received their 
weapons for free or at a reduced price due to preferential financing terms, access to 
excess stockpiles, loans, and other arrangements.  For instance, the Soviet Union supplied 
                                                            
3 John O’Doherty. “Local pressure on defence groups’ global sales.” 12 October 2011. Financial Times 
(UK). 
4 “Impact of Offsets in Defense-Related Exports: A Summary of the First Three Annual Reports”. 
December 1987. U.S. Office of Management and Budget.  
5 BIS Annual Report, 2009.  
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weapons to many states in exchange for commodities rather than hard currency – Egypt, 
for example, paid Moscow in cotton.  Demanding offsets would have been politically 
unfeasible for these countries.  However, now that the free arms spigot has slowed, 
developing countries that must pay in hard currency are demanding offsets from sellers.  
Additionally, the military was often the largest source of infrastructure and manpower in 
developing countries, many of which sought to use military production to support 
strategies of import-substitution and indigenous industrialization more generally.  
However, the abandonment of import-substitution industrialization as a development 
strategy – and the requisite lowering of protectionist barriers that shielded domestic 
military producers – means that a great deal of production has shifted to the civilian 
sector.  As a result, these procuring countries prefer indirect offsets.   
 
Since the 1970s, when the average offset requirement stood at about 15% of the overall 
contract value, offsets have experienced a meteoric rise in magnitude.  Industry analysts 
put the figure at about 100% of the contract value as early as 1990,6 in some cases 
reaching as high as 300%.7  For example, in 2010 Lockheed Martin granted a $2.3 billion 
offset on a $1.4 billion Canadian purchase of C-130J tactical airlifters.  Similarly, Saab 
                                                            
6 It seems counterintuitive that offsets can exceed the contract value.  Yet they frequently do, for a number 
of reasons. First, individual transactions in a sector considered more significant by the procuring country 
can be granted multipliers, whereby the value of the actual investment is multiplied by a pre-determined 
factor and the seller is given credit for this higher value.  Second, defense contractors are often asked to 
invest in certain companies in the procuring country.  As a shareholder or investor, the defense contractor is 
entitled to a certain share of that company’s profits – which enables the contractor to commit to offsets in 
excess of the profits it makes from the initial sale.  See C.G. Alexandrides.  September 1990.  
“Countertrade and Global Strategies.” Contract Management.  30:5-6.  Also, as is pointed out several times 
in this paper, firms can recover most (if not all) of their costs associated with implementing an offset, 
usually by inflating the price of the original contract.   
7 Competition between France’s Dassault (which makes the Eurofighter) and Sweden’s Saab (which makes 
the Gripen) to supply Switzerland with fighter aircraft is predicted to drive offsets as high as 400%.  CTO 
Newsletter. 22 March 2010. 28(6).  
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offered Romania a 100% offset on the purchase of new Gripen fighters to lure Bucharest 
away from purchasing (cheaper) second-hand F-16s.8  U.S. firms seem to have been 
subject to less onerous offset requirements, which may be a function of product value 
(since U.S. defense goods are considered superior, U.S. firms have some advantage in 
negotiating smaller offset obligations) but could also be the result of under-reporting.  
The average offset reported by U.S. firms to the BIS for the period 1993-2008 is 71% of 
the contract value, from a low average of 34% in 1993 and to a high of 81% in 2007.9   
 
This increase is easy to explain, if we recognize offsets as a type of rent.  As a factor of 
production, rent increases as prices increase – and the ‘price’ individual defense 
contractors are willing to pay to gain access to markets in procuring countries has gone 
up considerably.10  Post-Cold War budget cuts have created incredibly competitive 
conditions for defense exporters, and Western firms can no longer rely solely on domestic 
demand.  Nor can Russia, which signed offset agreements of $1.7 billion in 2009.11  
Offsets are thus a reflection of the high value of gaining access to a procuring country’s 
defense import market.  Each individual contract is highly valued because companies’ 
survival often depends on a handful of extremely large, and infrequent, contracts.  Offsets 
are growing in magnitude and sophistication in the Middle East because the region alone 
counts for nearly half of all weapons sales to the developing world, making access to 
                                                            
8 Andrew Chuter. 18 April 2010. “Nations Seek More Offsets From Suppliers.” DefenseNews.  
9 BIS 14th annual report. 2009, p5.  
10 Adam Smith points out that, “High or low wages and profit are the causes of high or low price; high or 
low rent is the effect of it [price].” 1925. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  
p412.  
11 CTO Newsletter. 8 February 2010. 28(3).  
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their defense markets comparatively more valuable than access to other regional 
markets.12  Also, because parliaments and other formal institutions of government in the 
region are weak, regional leaders face few veto points concerning issues of arms 
procurement.  Objections based on price or equipment specifications that come from 
these weak institutional actors are, therefore, unlikely to be salient.  This makes it 
especially important for exporting firms to establish close relationships with the regimes’ 
power brokers, who may be the sole decision-makers.  This concentration of decision-
making power also manifests itself in the increasingly central role that a small number of 
Western defense firms play in the economies of many arms-importing countries.  
Although offsets have existed for decades, certain trends in offset requirements suggests 
these linkages are becoming increasingly dense.  An international survey conducted in 
the mid-90s showed that countries were beginning to demand more formal linkages with 
vendor firms for their local enterprises and more long-term investment strategies.13    
Also, as countries witness the rising offset demands in neighboring states and regional 
rivals, this spurs a tit-for-tat spiraling of demand.14  Today, offsets are a nearly ubiquitous 
feature of global arms deals, and many countries in the Middle East have formal 
government agencies that oversee offset contracts, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Turkey, Israel, Oman and Bahrain.  Several others implement them on an ad-hoc 
                                                            
12 For the period 2005-2008, the Middle East accounted for 55% of arms transfers in the developing world.  
Richard F. Grimmet.  September 4, 2009.  “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-
2008.” Congressional Research Service.      
13 Martin, S. and Hartley, K. 1995. “UK Offsets: Survey Results. Defence and Peace Economics. 6(2): 123–
39. 
14 This phenomenon was used by defense firms to encourage the U.S. Government to stop publishing 
country or region-specific offset figures.  Although individual firms were never identified in the BIS 
reports, the intensity of industry consolidation made it relatively easy to infer what particular firms were 
providing in offsets.  Industry argued that access to this information would only continue to drive up offset 
demands.  
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basis (Egypt, Jordan) or are currently drafting official offset guidelines (Libya, Tunisia 
and Algeria).15  The total value of offsets in the region is virtually impossible to estimate, 
as there is no supranational repository for information on offset contracts, and although a 
large proportion of the Middle East trade originates from U.S. companies, data collected 
by the U.S. government is problematic at best.16  The U.S. agency that collects 
information on offset activity (BIS) must rely solely on figures supplied by the defense 
firms themselves, and has no access to any documentation – such as invoices or delivery 
schedules – that might verify or contradict these figures.17 The implications of offset 
expansion and innovation, as well as data concerns, will be examined later in this chapter. 
 
Offsets in Context: The Evolution of Global Trading Patterns 
Offsets are a subcategory of special trading arrangements based on the bartering model;  
“offset” is merely the technical term used to denote the practice of “countertrade” when it 
is carried out in the context of military sales.  However, countertrade has largely vanished 
from the vocabulary of economists and policy-makers because global trading regimes 
                                                            
15 CTO Newsletter. (various issues).  
16 Data issues are explored in detail in the subsequent section on data discrepancies.  
17 The source of BIS data is made plain in this exchange between Joel Johnson, Vice President of 
Aerospace Industries International, and Congressmen Tierney is a 1999 hearing by a House Subcommittee 
on the impact of defense offsets: 
Tierney: “Mr. Johnson, right now, as I understand it, U.S. companies are not required to provide copies of 
their [offset] transaction papers to the Commerce Department.  Is that accurate?” 
Johnson: “What we provide to the Commerce Department on an annual basis is a record of every 
transaction over $100,000 to help implement an offset agreement.” 
Tierney: “But you needn’t provide copies of those transaction papers’ it is just whatever you say it is in the 
form that you want?  So that none of the sales contracts, none of the written offset agreements or the related 
paperwork ever goes to Commerce?” 
Johnson: “That is correct.”  
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such as the WTO have dramatically reduced its use as a trading strategy.  Offsets – 
because they fall under the security exemption included in all multilateral and bilateral 
trading arrangements – have not been subject to a similar fate.  In addition to being 
classified as “direct” or “indirect,” according to the materials and sectors involved in the 
offset project (ie, civilian vs. military) offsets can be carried out under different 
countertrade schemes, including barter, switch-trading, counter-purchase and buyback.  
These trading arrangements are – at least partially – a product of their historical time 
period, characterized by import-substitution industrialization schemes, debt crises and 
Cold War geopolitics.  In 1984, the U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that as 
much as 30% of world trade was subject to some form of countertrade, and estimated that 
this could reach 50% by the year 2000.18  
 
Current evaluations suggest this was a liberal assessment, and that perhaps 20% of world 
trade is now subject to some form of countertrade, and even this is mostly carried out by 
private companies without formal government involvement.19  Nonetheless, an 
examination of these arrangements – and how they were used in the context of the arms 
trade – is instructive.  Barter is generally employed to facilitate trade that might not have 
taken place otherwise, usually owing to financial illiquidity.  For example, the UK may 
agree to sell Sri Lanka armored personnel carriers in exchange for regular rice shipments 
over the next five years.  The UK prefers this commodity to payment in the local 
currency, which may be unstable; likewise Sri Lanka prefers to part with its commodities 
                                                            
18 Cohen, Stephen and John Zysman. 1986. “Countertrade, offsets, barter, and buybacks: A crisis in the 
making.” California Management Review. 28(2): p3. 
19 Dan West. 1 April 2001. “Countertrade.” Business Credit. A publication of the FCIB, a trade association 
for executives in finance, credit and international business.  
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rather than drawing down its hard currency reserves.  Switch-trading is similar to barter, 
in that it primarily occurs in situations where liquidity is an obstacle, but involves more 
than two parties.  For example, the UK may agree to sell fighter jets to India, but is 
unwilling to accept payment in rupees and already has a stable inflow of rice (one of 
India’s primary commodity exports) from Sri Lanka.  However, India has built up a trade 
balance with Sri Lanka, so arranges to have Sri Lanka supply the UK market with tea for 
five years.  India gets the jets, Sri Lanka pays off its trade deficit with India, and the UK 
receives payment in tea.   
 
Unlike bartering and switch-trading, counterpurchase and buyback involve the exchange 
of money.  Under the conditions of counterpurchase, the purchasing country pays for the 
defense goods, but a parallel contract requires the selling country to purchase specified 
commodities from the purchaser’s domestic economy (presumably because the selling 
country might have purchased this commodity elsewhere, thus this arrangement benefits 
domestic producers in the buyer country).  Buyback is similar, except that under this 
arrangement, the commodities purchased by the selling country are directly related to the 
equipment in the original contract.   For example, the selling country might be obligated 
to include in its finished product a certain number of components produced domestically 
in the purchasing country.     
 
Although such trading arrangements certainly enabled countries to overcome currency 
restrictions, they were also politically expedient.  Because advanced defense materiel and 
technologically equivalent commercial goods were unavailable on the domestic market in 
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most developing countries, they had to be imported.  But diverting scarce resources to 
purchase weapons and industrial machinery that many within the developing world 
thought they should concentrate on producing domestically was politically risky.  Offsets 
provided political cover, as purchasing governments could identify them as concessions 
they had managed to secure from the rich, industrialized countries of the West.  The 
advantages included: acquiring new technologies and capabilities, supporting key 
industries, gaining access to new markets, generating export earnings, and forming 
strategic alliances with MNEs (multinational enterprises).20 Similarly, the wealthy, 
industrialized states usually agreed to these arrangements because of the desire to cement 
alliances and favorable commercial relations in the context of the Cold War.21  The 
industrialized countries were especially eager to conduct countertrade with those 
countries rich in natural resources like oil and minerals.  They were less eager about 
opportunities for countertrade with resource-poor countries, although many of these were 
NME’s – ‘non-market economies’ in the nomenclature of the day – and a positive trading 
relationship was highly coveted in the Cold War context.22   
                                                            
20 Taylor, “Using Offsets in Government Procurement as an Economic Development Strategy,” p6.  
21 For a list of reasons companies would engage in countertrade transactions see U.S. International Trade 
Commission. October 1985. “Assessment of the Effects of Barter and Countertrade Transactions on U.S. 
Industries.” Report on Investigation No. 332-185 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930.  Publication 
1766.  
22 A 1985 report by the U.S. International Trade Commission reports that both Iran and   Iraq countertrade 
oil in exchange for military equipment.  Trading partners included Japan, the USSR, Brazil, Pakistan, 
Taiwan, France, Korea, Italy and India.  Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also cited in the report for requiring 
industrial investment from companies wishing to obtain petroleum concessions.  The report also indicated 
that in 1984, Saudi Arabia concluded a deal that exchanged $1 billion in petroleum for 10 aircraft from a 
U.S. company. U.S. International Trade Commission. October 1985. “Assessment of the Effects of Barter 
and Countertrade Transactions on U.S. Industries.” Report on Investigation No. 332-185 Under Section 332 
of the Tariff Act of 1930.  Publication 1766, p45.  
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However, such trading arrangements were (and continue to be) seen by free trade 
advocates as an unacceptable form of state intervention in the free market.  This was 
especially true during the Cold War, when a great deal of non-defense related 
international trade was conducted under barter-like terms, and even more so in the case of 
the Soviet Union, which employed countertrade to facilitate trade relationships and 
cement alliances even when the terms were unfavorable to Moscow.23  Countertrading 
schemes pursued by the Soviets (and their allies) were viewed with great suspicion by 
Western economists and intelligence agencies,24 as were similar schemes employed by 
the ‘developmental states’ of East Asia, including Japan.25   
 
Economists have largely condemned such agreements for a number of reasons.  First, 
because they allowed developing countries to postpone developing their own capabilities 
to process, market and transport goods since these terms were included in the 
countertrade contract rather than arrived at through the disciplining force of the market.  
Second, the price developing countries got for their commodities was usually on the low 
                                                            
23 Robert L. Waller, United States Air Force. 1990. “Soviet Countertrade.” United States Air Force 
Academy Journal of Legal Studies. Colorado Springs: Air Force Academy.   
24 Robert L. Waller, United States Air Force. 1990. “Soviet Countertrade.” United States Air Force 
Academy Journal of Legal Studies. Colorado Springs: Air Force Academy. However, Soviet countertrade 
schemes with the developed economies, and even many of the newly-industrializing states, were frequently 
derailed because trading partners were unwilling to accept Soviet-made products as payment (with the 
exception of vodka, which Brazil famously accepted in payment for a large shipment of coffee in 1989).  
Accepting commodities as payment also exposes the trading partner to potentially huge losses due to price 
volatility.  One countertrader in London told The Economist that the Russians had offered him goods 
ranging from snake venom to mouse skins in exchange for construction equipment and books. “East-West 
Countertrade.” 1989.  The Economist.  
25 Cohen and Zysman, “Countertrade, Offsets, Barter, and Buybacks: A Crisis in the Making.” This article 
is particularly interesting, as it takes a strongly derisive tone toward countertrade and other “government 
efforts to shape market outcomes,” seemingly on principle, but simultaneously recognizes the extraordinary 
success many governments have achieved through such policies.  
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end because developed country firms were better positioned to utilize certain trading 
tools – like international trading companies – that could find the most profitable buyer for 
whatever commodity the firm had purchased.  And third, because participating firms 
preferred payment in raw commodities over payment in manufactured components – 
which might not be sellable on the global market – thus discouraging indigenous efforts 
to industrialize.  This is intuitive, since such trades were frequently executed within a 
developed country – developing country dyad, where the developed country possessed 
more political and economic leverage to impose favorable terms.26  This is distinct from 
the case of other economic instruments such as tariffs, quotas and subsidies, which may 
also target key domestic sectors but are policies states can craft independently.27  
However, unlike offsets and some forms of countertrade for developing countries, these 
simpler instruments are prohibited in the WTO as well as in the bilateral trade agreements 
to which most countries are signatories.  This has helped shift the locus of protectionist 
policies onto the trade in defense goods, which not only contributes to growth in offset 
activity, but also signifies efforts made by developing countries to find alternative ways 
to pursue protectionist policies that are not subject to WTO prohibitions.   
 
However, it seems clear that offsets – and countertrade in general – are even less 
beneficial than traditional protectionist policies.  Because the offset negotiations are 
                                                            
26 One example would be the superior ability of developed countries to access the skills of international 
trading companies, which could peddle whatever commodity the firm had bought internationally in order to 
find a buyer that provided the firm with a net profit.  
27 Taylor finds that, in some instances, such independent trade tools may be more efficient and cheaper in 
protecting infant industry than countertrade strategies.  Taylor, “Using Offsets in Government Procurement 
as an Economic Development Strategy” p7.  It is interesting to note that, while such independent tools have 
been largely stripped from the economic policy arsenals of developing states, the less efficient forms of 
countertrade and offset – which frequently redound to the benefit of wealthy industrial exporters – are still 
exercised through various exemptions in WTO and bilateral agreements.   
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conducted under the strictures of arms procurement (rather than with respect to the 
requirements of the industry or firms designated to receive the investment generated by 
the offset) the inefficiencies and administrative burdens are multiplied.  For instance, the 
offset obligor firm may be asked to train a new cohort of indigenous managers at an 
aluminum smelting facility.  However, if that firm merely outsources this training 
requirement to a third-party vendor (as often occurs) the procuring country is paying not 
only the fees the third-party vendor would have charged it directly for the service 
(through inflated costs contained in the original arms contract), but also the 
administrative costs incurred by the obligor firm in its effort to locate, evaluate and 
transport these trainers.  The outcome may be better – the offset obligor may be better 
able to identify and recruit the most suitable third-party vendor – but this is by no means 
certain.   
 
The capability of offsets to deliver protectionist benefits to designated sectors of the 
economy also confers additional institutional power on the procuring-country officials 
responsible for negotiating defense offsets.  As a result, other government officials – 
those in the ministry of the economy, agriculture, etc. – may increasingly rely on them as 
a source of market power.  For example, ministries within procuring countries will 
frequently agree to budget trade-offs in order to facilitate arms purchases that may be 
beyond the budget allocated to the defense minister.  Thus, the minister of agriculture 
might consent to shifting some of his department’s budget to the defense minister in 
exchange for the income arising from a counterpurchase sale of agricultural commodities 
included in the offset agreement.  However, this entails the transfer of funds from a 
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ministry whose activities might fulfill a very pressing social need (food) in exchange for 
benefits that may never materialize.28   
 
Offsets in Context: The Evolution of Bribery  
 
“The tendency of the pecuniary life is, in a general way, to conserve the barbarian 
temperament, but with the substitution of fraud…in place of that predilection for physical 
damage that characterizes the early barbarian.”  
 
 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899 
 
Exogenous forces – notably the evolution in norms regarding bribery and corruption – 
may also be contributing to offset growth.  Indeed, offsets have evolved in concert with 
changes in norms and legal regimes regarding corporate governance and the 
accountability of public officials.  The combined force of initiatives aimed at enhancing 
the accountability of corporations and public officials, the increasing political power of 
watchdog groups such as Transparency International, the wide availability of data on 
weapons transfers from SIPRI and similar organizations, and the extant legal regimes 
dealing with international bribery, have almost certainly made the business of bribing 
more difficult.  Most notable are the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) passed in 
1977, which prohibits U.S. companies from paying bribes;29 the OECD Convention on 
Bribery; and the UN Convention on Bribery, as well as the increasing focus international 
organizations have placed on corruption and its detrimental impact on economic 
                                                            
28 This observation is based on a speech given by the Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport 
(Russia’s state-owned commercial defense firm) who stated, “Sometimes, the defense ministries of 
customer countries have a very low budget, so they write an agreement between themselves whereby 
different ministries – such as the ministry of agriculture – would partition the budget by way of the 
counterpurchase income.” CTO Newsletter. 8 February 2010. 28(3).  
29 The FCPA only applies to U.S. companies.  The U.S. Department of Justice has pursued charges of 
bribery against European companies, but only has jurisdiction when these companies are either publicly 
traded on U.S. exchanges or when some of the bribe money is spent in the U.S.   
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development.  Offsets are well-suited to replace bribery as a mechanism for facilitating 
the arms trade.  Not only are the agreements themselves either completely inaccessible or 
purposefully opaque, but they also achieve many of the same goals as bribes – primarily 
by rewarding the loyalty of procurement officials and intermediaries with material 
privileges.  In this way, offsets may signify the evolution – or institutionalization – of 
bribery in the arms trade.  Not only are they legally-sanctioned instruments of trade, but 
they are also preferred by both firms and buyers.  Firms prefer them because they are able 
to recover their expense by including the cost of offsets in the original contract, and 
buyers prefer them because they allow regime officials to direct benefits to individuals 
and institutions they choose without the stigma of corruption.  However, allegations of 
offset-related bribery have been extensive, and have led to efforts like the EDA’s 
(European Defense Association) “Code of Conduct on Offsets” – although compliance is 
voluntary and there is no associated enforcement mechanism.   
 
During the Cold War, the U.S. Government was directly involved in offset agreements – 
negotiating, designing, funding and implementing them as a tool to enhance cooperation 
and cement security alliances.  However, at the end of the Cold War in 1990, President 
George H. W. Bush implemented legislation that prohibited U.S. Government agencies 
from participating in offsets at any level.  By cutting contracting agents out of the 
process, firms are granted more space to execute offsets that may run afoul of anti-
bribery legal regimes. 
 
The UK has achieved a similar outcome with respect to many of its offset programs. As
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 explored in the chapter on the oil-exporting cases, Saudi Arabia’s first offset agreement 
with the UK – the Al-Yamamah contract – has been plagued by accusations of 
corruption.  Wafic Said, the Syrian-born son of an ophthalmologist-turned Saudi arms 
broker, relayed to another Syrian expat living in London that, in the expat’s words, he 
was “involved in arranging only the nonmilitary, commercial side of the [Al Yamamah] 
deal – the construction of schools and hospitals and that sort of thing,”30 that is to say, the 
offset side of the deal.  Said reiterated this point to the UK’s Guardian newspaper, stating 
that he benefited from Al Yamamah because the agreement led to construction in Saudi 
Arabia that involved his companies.31  It was Said’s Swiss accounts that were initially the 
focus of the British SFO investigation; although the Swiss courts authorized the release 
of his records the UK government shut down the probe before any of the information 
could be made public.32   
 
In an effort to defend the legality of specific payments made by BAE to Saudi officials 
that were made using US banks (thus coming under the jurisdiction of the US Department 
of Justice), former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh stated,  
The British government was paid a 2 percent fee.  That’s a 2 percent fee of an $83 
billion treaty to administer that contract and make sure that the money flowed 
accurately and properly with accounting.  So it’s more complicated than just a 
statement of money flowing through those accounts.  He [Prince Bandar, former 
Ambassador to the US] was allowed to use those funding streams with 
                                                            
30  “The Saudi Invasion of American Banks.” 1 February 1993. New York Magazine, p28. The Syrian expat 
is Ghassan Sakharia/Zakaria, whom the New York Magazine refers to as “editor of a gossipy Arab-
language magazine that is published in London.”  
31 David Leigh and Rob Evans. 7 June 2007. “Biography: Wafic Said.” The Guardian (UK).  
32 Daivd Leigh and Rob Evans. 29 November 2006. “BAE secret millions linked to arms broker.” The 
Guardian (UK).  
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authorization to make whatever expenditures the Foreign Ministry or the Minister 
of Defense and Aviation wish to occur.33 
 
The ‘authorization’ Freeh (who at the time of this statement was acting defense counsel 
for Bandar in the case brought against him by the U.S. Department of Justice) references 
here was facilitated by the fact that the arms deal was concluded as a bilateral treaty 
between Saudi Arabia and the UK rather than as an export contract, which effectively 
exempted the agreement from oversight by relevant UK Government agencies.34  Here 
we see that the simple act of labeling a fund transfer as an administrative “fee” rather 
than a bribe imparts (or is meant to impart by the agent) a sense of legitimacy.  
 
Offsets in Context: Economic Development Narratives 
 
Those theorists who suggest that offsets can positively impact a procuring country’s 
economic development frequently base their predictions on the ability of obligor firms to 
‘discipline’ a foreign workforce or industry – exposing it to the strictures of market 
competition and training its employees in more efficient management techniques.35  
However, this is predicated on the assumption that the firm will pursue this path in order 
to maximize the benefit from its own investment, or to ensure that any inputs produced in 
the buyer country and included in the firm’s final product are of sufficient quality to 
insulate the obligor firm from negative fallout.  However, because obligor firms recover 
most – if not all – the costs associated with the offset, there is little reason to believe 
                                                            
33 CTO Newsletter. 27 April 2009. 27(8).  
34 CTO Newsletter. 27 April 2009. 27(8).  
35 Travis Taylor. 2003. “Modeling offset policy in government procurement.” Journal of Policy Modeling. 
25: 985-998.  
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these costs are sufficient to spur the obligor firm to expend time and resources 
rehabilitating or streamlining unprofitable foreign operations.36  Also, because the final 
products that include domestically-produced inputs seldom become major exports for 
developing countries, the risks to the firm’s global reputation is minimal.  Developing 
countries that do have significant arms exports resulting from previous offset programs - 
like South Africa, Turkey and Egypt – are frequently major sources of weapons sales 
made to ‘rogue’ or pariah states under international arms embargoes who have little 
choice in terms of suppliers.37  
 
The political – rather than economic – appeal of offsets explains not only their longevity 
(as similar trading arrangements have been scrapped in favor of liberalized trade) but also 
how they have evolved over time.  For instance, rather than employ the term “offset” – 
which suggests a one-side cost-saving measure, vendor firms increasingly use the phrases 
“industrial cooperation,” “industrial participation,” or “economic enhancement.”38  This 
                                                            
36 Section 225.7303 of the 1999 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement authorizes firms to 
recover all costs associated with implementing offset contracts.  Additional evidence comes from 
statements made by industry executives and analysts.  Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group – 
where Joel Johnson, former VP of the aerospace industry’s largest trade group Aerospace Industries 
Association also works – told the Financial Times in a June 2010 interview, “There seems to be a massive 
confusion about who pays for offsets. It’s the buyer, not the seller.” Sylvia Pfeifer. “Overseas defence 
clients get tougher.” Financial Times. 10 June 2010.  
37 For information on South Africa’s exports to conflict zones see 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportid=87967.  Egypt’s only significant export markets were North 
Korea in the early 1980s; Iraq during its decade-long war with Iran; and potentially now Hamas in the Gaza 
Strip.  Likewise, Turkey is a major source of small arms shipments to regimes accused of grave human 
rights abuses, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Iraq and Pakistan.  
38 From Summit’s website: “The concept of Economic Enhancement as pioneered by Summit, is based upon 
deriving the maximum benefit from the enormous leverage over potential suppliers during the procurement 
process of large government contracts. The additional value created as a result of implementing Economic 
Enhancement policies needs to be closely aligned with existing government objectives and yet at the same 
time derive benefit from capabilities, expertise and contacts that the supplier is able to provide.” 
http://www.summitcs.com/backgrounder.html.  Accessed 26 October 2010.  
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last phrase was introduced by the offset services firm Summit Corporate Services (the 
forerunner to Blenheim Capital), which is briefly profiled later in this chapter.39 Such 
language not only highlights the partnership aspect – which is important to procuring 
regimes that want to demonstrate the presence of international firms in their domestic 
economies in order to encourage additional foreign investment – but downplays the 
source of the investment as well.  By affixing the adjective “industrial” the defense-
related origin of the offset project is minimized.  This language has proven quite 
persuasive, and some development agencies now promote offsets as a powerful force for 
economic growth.  For example, a paper issued by the Asian Development Bank 
characterized offsets as “an alternate means of financing infrastructure.”40  
 
Offsets in Context: Defense Industry Subsidies 
Offsets can also be understood within the larger context of a “race to the top” among 
governments seeking to subsidize defense exports.  In this sense offsets are just part of a 
broader package that includes loan guarantees, preferential financing, export subsidies, 
government-financed trade shows, diplomatic salesmanship and other methods for 
encouraging purchases by foreign countries in an increasingly competitive international 
market.  In the UK, for example, the Defense Export Services Organization (DESO) is a 
government department within the Ministry of Defense charged with promoting British 
                                                            
39 Interestingly, this language was also picked up by the Asian Development Bank to describe the ability of 




40 Geethanjali Nataraj. 27 Setpember 2007. “Infrastructure Challenges in South Asia: The Role of Public-
Private Partnerships.” Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBInstitute). Discussion Paper No: 80.  
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arms sales.  However, its members are drawn entirely from among acting defense 
industry executives, who retain their titles while serving at DESO.  In 2007, the 
organization had over 450 employees in 17 countries.  The Special Fraud Office, which is 
charged with prosecuting violations of anti-bribery laws committed by British 
corporations – including DESO members’ firms – only had 317 personnel.41   
These and other subsidies are partly driven by the concern of the military service 
branches that they cannot afford the purchases and upgrades they believe they need 
unless firms are able to achieve ever-increasing economies of scale by exporting their 
products – and the offsets that accompany them.  Studies conducted by service members 
suggest such economic imperatives have resulted in a shift from concerns over the 
proliferation of weapons and sensitive technologies to a concern with making sales – and 
that procurements specialists in each branch therefore view themselves less as guardians 
of American technological superiority than as agents for foreign buyers.42 
 
The confusion over exactly who pays for offsets – whether it is firms or procuring 
country governments – has been a useful tool for industry advocates, who argue that 
rising offset figures are indicative of competitive conditions in the global arms market, 
which necessitate additional subsidies.  According to the BIS, for example, 
Whether direct or indirect, offset transactions return funds to the purchasing 
country. The offset funds spent in the foreign country to fulfill offsets are, 
therefore, a means by which the foreign government redirects public expenditure 
back into its own country.43  
                                                            
41 http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/27429/lods%20departmental%20report%202007.pdf 
42 Major Isaiah Wilson. 20 April 2001. “The Commercialization of Foreign Military Sales Reform: 
Implications on U.S. Military Preparedness and Regional Security.” Paper presented at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Roundtable on the Geo-Economics of Military Preparedness. 
43 BIS 6th annual report. 2001, p9. 
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Yet, analysts periodically admit that procuring countries – not the arms exporting firms – 
are doling out the dough for offsets.  Richard Aboulafia of the aerospace industry 
analysis firm Teal Group, told the Financial Times in a June 2010 interview, “There 
seems to be a massive confusion about who pays for offsets. It’s the buyer, not the 
seller.”44 An Indian defense analyst made a analogous statement in an unpublished study, 
“offsets result in increased cost of equipment – though with no significant benefits for the 
purchasing country.”45 Conventional logic further confirms this.  Members of the EU 
recently passed a (voluntary) code of conduct on defense offsets, prohibiting member-
states from requiring offsets in excess of 100% of the contract value.  If the firms were 
financing these offsets themselves, they would be bankrupt.  Although a 2003 NYTimes 
article called offsets a “well-kept military secret,” the U.S. Government has formed 
numerous special commissions to investigate them, including one that was discontinued 
by the newly-elected President Bush – a move the GAO characterized as “a breach of 
duty.”46  Dozens of OMB and GAO reports have been commissioned to investigate the 
impact of offsets on numerous issue-areas: domestic employment; the sustainability of in-
house expertise in critical defense competencies; the transfer of sensitive technology; and 
the creation of competing defense industries.  
 
Continued Congressional opposition to offsets in the U.S. demonstrates this confusion.  If
                                                            
44 Sylvia Pfeifer. “Overseas defence clients get tougher.” Financial Times. 10 June 2010.   
45 Laxman Behera of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (India).  Cited in Sandeed Verma. 
Summer 2009. “Offset Contracts Under Defense Procurement Regulations in India: Evolutions, 
Challenges, and Prospects.” Journal of Contract Management, p17.  
46 Leslie Wayne.  “A Well-Kept Military Secret.” February 16, 2003.  New York Times.  Also see CTO 
Newsletter. 2004. 22(2).  
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procuring governments are in fact financing their own offsets – and this is not 
purposefully obfuscated by both the firms and the procuring governments – then why 
would such opposition persist?  Surely allowing firms to charge more for equipment they 
export would be viewed as beneficial by U.S. policy-makers.  Yet, the majority of 
reporting – in the media, by NGOs, think tanks, etc. – characterizes offsets as the 
outstanding financial obligations of the firms, not procuring country governments.47  The 
magnitude of outstanding offset obligations is large – estimated between $75 and $100 
billion as of 2009.48  Lockheed and Boeing reported outstanding offset obligations of $11 
billion and $10 billion, respectively, while BAE indicated it had obligations of “several 
billion pounds.”49 The perception of such large obligations can weaken the firms’ 
financial images, with all the secondary negative effects that entails.  This narrative 
provides a strong incentive for policy-makers in arms-exporting countries to continue 
devising new forms of subsidies for defense manufacturers and safeguarding those that 
already exist.  
 
The partnerships generated by offset obligations may also help firms obtain investment 
from various actors in the procuring country – a sort of ‘reverse offset.’ The UAE – the 
largest customer for Airbus’s A380 superjumbo jet – purchased a stake in Airbus’s parent 
company, EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), through the state-
                                                            
47 See aforementioned NYTimes article and FT article, also Daniel Pearl.  April 20, 2000. “Arms Dealers 
Get Creative with ‘Offsets.’” Wall Street Journal. 
48 Sylvia Pfeifer.  10 June, 2010.  “Overseas defence clients get tougher.” Financial Times.  
49 Sylvia Pfeifer.  10 June, 2010.  “Overseas defence clients get tougher.” Financial Times.  
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owned Dubai Investment Company in 2007.50  The UAE also reportedly considered a 
major investment into the Russian defense industry in 2002-03 as part of a $4 billion 
purchase of Antei-Antey surface-to-air missiles and air defense sensors that was later 
cancelled.51 In the past, the UAE cancelled Russian debts in exchange for 50 Pantsir S-1 
air defense units.  The UAE financed the process of redesigning the units to its 
specifications – boosting interoperability with western equipment and bolstering export 
prospects.  But the work was carried out in Russia.52 
 
This capital flow (both in type and direction) is especially interesting if we view the 
global economy in structural terms. These companies are representative of the forms of 
economic exchange that sociologist Jacques Delacroix predicted would prevail between 
rentier states and the industrial democracies in the decades after 1980: 
Rentier states’ investments must be concentrated in the old industrial countries in 
preference to the periphery where both entrepreneurial experience and large 
domestic markets may be lacking.  Core bourgeoisie must then either accept to be 
turned into partial managers of periphery rentier state capital or change the legal 
superstructure of capitalism [my italics].53   
 
This, Delacroix states, “involves the transformation of the industrial core into a partial 
macroproleteriate exploited (in the literal Marxist sense) by the rentier states.”54 Many 
                                                            
50 http://www.arabianbusiness.com/properties/article/495866-zabeel-says-part-of-eads-purchase.  Accessed 
1 November 2009.  
51 http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_399.shtml 
52 http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_399.shtml 
53 Jacques Delacroix.  Fall 1980. “The Distributive State in the World System.” Studies in Comparative 
International Development, p16.    
54 Delacroix is worth quoting just a bit more, since his theoretical ruminations seem to find a literal 
expression in the recent financial innovations and commercial tours de force of the United Arab Emirates. 
“Since new modes of production are apt to arise from the backwaters of an existing system, this 
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features of economic exchange between the rentiers and the ‘core’ Western states 
suggests that some of these changes have indeed been made in order to allow the capital 
concentration in the Gulf countries to benefit the ‘core’ states – for example Saudi 
Arabia’s commitment to peg its currency to the U.S. dollar.  However, perhaps most 
notable is the willingness of the Gulf States to serve as “the dumping grounds for surplus 
production” – in this case arms production – of the core countries.55   Although much of 
the industrial activity that gave the Western countries their ‘core’ designation has moved 
abroad, military industrial production remains an important (and protected) domestic 
industry.  Despite the economic power of the emerging economies, many of which are 
attracting significant investment from the Gulf countries, U.S. treasury bonds are still the 
likeliest destination of Gulf sovereign wealth fund dollars, and (as Delacroix predicted) 
the Western financial capitals are where ‘core bourgeoisie’ become ‘partial managers of 
periphery rentier state capital’ by establishing offset-related firms and funds. 
 
Evolution in Offset Design 
All the above changes: the evolution of bribery; the shift in global trading strategies; the 
growth in defense industry subsidies; and changing narratives of economic development, 
have been coincident with the growing complexity of offset arrangements.  This 
complexity is reflected in the proliferation of offsets varieties; the introduction of 
multipliers – which award firms additional fulfillment credits for offsets in areas deemed 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
transformation, rooted in the peculiarities of the distributive state, might be the principal motor of 
progressive change.  Thus might a new world economy emerge whereas, in paradoxical accordance with 
Lenin (1917), a part of the old periphery would turn itself into a new core through the medium of its capital 
export,” p16-17.  
55 Yates. The Rentier State in Africa, p27.  
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strategically important by procuring governments; offset banking and swapping; the 
advent of pre-performance offsets – where firms perform offsets as a requisite for 
participating in the bidding process; as well as the advent of a complementary industry 
composed of financial companies and consultants offering offset-related services to 
obligor firms and procuring governments.  Because these complementary companies 
must innovate – and add some value to the offset process – in order to survive, offsets 
themselves have become increasingly complex and tailored to specific country 
requirements.   
 
As with previous innovations in forms of economic exchange (such as the era of 
countertrade which saw the formation of numerous firms specializing in all types of 
barter) the proliferation of offset firms is dependent on, but most likely also contributes 
to, the dramatic increase and growing complexity of the offsets themselves.56 For 
example, Greece – a pioneer of indirect offsets – has been criticized by defense industry 
advocates for its “tortuous” offset demands, including guidelines that are considered “the 
most convoluted and detailed of any country.”57 Not surprisingly, the Greek capitol is 
home to Epicos – one of the largest and most successful offset service providers. The 
                                                            
56 In 1985, the U.S. International Trade Commission wrote in its report on countertrade and barter in the 
international economy that, “The increasing expertise and expanding contracts of countertraders (ie, trading 
houses specializing in countertrade, and the inhouse countertrade units of multinational corporations) may 
themselves have become a factor contributing to the growth of countertrade.”  New companies cited in the 
report include the Countertrade Data Center established by Batis International Business Services, which 
provided a “counter-purchase credit exchange” as well as “detailed economic and trading reports on those 
countries with countertrade policies.”  Banks such as CitiCorp (U.S.), Midland Lloyds (U.K.), Barclays 
(U.K.) and National Westminister (U.K.) all announced the establishment of countertrade specialists 
around this same time. See Gray, Frank.  24 October 1984. “Countertrade Data Centre Established in 
London.” Financial Times, p8. International Trading Certificates (ITCs) were also created around this time 
to facilitate countertrade.  See U.S. International Trade Commission. October 1985. “Assessment of the 
Effects of Barter and Countertrade Transactions on U.S. Industries.” Report on Investigation No. 332-185 
Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930.  Publication 1766, p45.  
57 CTO Newsletter. 9 June 2008. 26(11).  
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formation of these companies also creates another layer of private businessmen (and their 
allies within the regime, the military establishment and the domestic economy) who have 
a vested interest in the maintenance of defense offsets, and by extension, the large 
defense transactions upon which they depend.  The following section will investigate the 
dramatic evolution in offsets and the industry that has coalesced around them, and ask 
what implications this may have for politics in arms-importing countries. 
 
The Increasing Diversity of Offsets 
As stated previously, the earliest offsets were relatively straightforward arrangements 
between the U.S. and its European allies, which focused on reconstructing Europe’s 
defense base and enhancing interoperability.  However, in the mid-1980s, procuring 
countries began treating offsets as an economic tool rather than a strategic military one. 
For example, in 1984 three U.S. prime contractors financed a joint venture with the 
Greek government as part of an F-16 sale by General Dynamics.  The joint venture in 
turn invested in companies engaged in medical diagnostics, sportswear manufacture, 
computerized numerically controlled wire-bending machines, software systems for the 
financial services industry, and textiles.  This joint venture, the first of its kind, marked a 
watershed in the evolution of offsets; the category of “overseas investment” – which 
includes joint ventures, has increased three-fold since 1993.58  The diversity of offset 
types, combined with the large number of individual transactions – 8,660 separate offset 
transactions were reported by U.S. companies between 1993 and 200659 – makes them 
                                                            
58 From around $40 million in 1993 to nearly $120 million in 2006.  BIS 13th Annual Offset Report. 2009, 
p25.  1993 is the first year for which figures are available.   
59 BIS 12th Annual Offset Report.  2007, p5-1.  
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appealing vehicles for delivering favors and patronage, as they can be shaped to target 
specific sectors, industries or firms. This diversity has also encouraged contractors to 
spread out offset obligations among their suppliers and subsidiaries, which often have 
existing investments in the procuring country for raw materials and numerous other 
inputs.  This allows the company to gain offset credits for investments they would have 
made anyway – regardless of the offset commitment.60   
 
Defense Offset Multipliers 
‘Multipliers’ – mechanisms that allow procuring countries to give defense contractors 
additional credit (beyond the actual dollar amount invested) for investments they make in 
sectors the procuring country considers critical – are another innovation that has been 
facilitated by the increasing complexity of offsets and the growing number of secondary 
firms dedicated to facilitating them.  Multipliers allows firms to satisfy offset obligations 
more cheaply, and give the procuring country leverage to encourage offset investment in 
sectors that might otherwise be unattractive to the obligor firm.  For instance, if the UAE 
is particularly interested in establishing an offshore investment fund and would like the 
expertise of a US financial institution, it can offer a multiplier of 3 if the defense firm is 
able to convince the preferred financial institution to participate. So, if the cost of 
establishing the fund is $1 million the contractor gets credit for $1 million X 3 = $3 
million.  
 
The multiplier granted a procuring country is often extreme – suggesting that political,
                                                            
60 Interview. Verzariu.  
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rather than economic, incentives are driving this activity.  In 1999, South Africa awarded 
a Saab/BAE Consortium $2.4 billion in offset credits for a $10 million investment in a 
joint venture with the South African defense manufacturer Denel.61  The sale and the 
associated offset program – along with sales to the Czech Republic, Tanzania, and Saudi 
Arabia made during the same period – were investigated by both the UK’s Serious Fraud 
Office and the U.S. Department of Justice over alleged bribes paid to procuring country 
officials.  Both agencies settled out of court with BAE, which was fined around £300 
million.62  However, none of the courts in the procuring countries have succeeded in 
bringing charges against the firms or their own officials involved in the negotiations.  
Granting such large multipliers reduces the incentive for the seller firm to guard their 
investment with tools like the conduct of due diligence, which might have uncovered the 
personal and political connections between the South African officials who negotiated the 
sale and those entities that received the offset investment dollars.  
 
Previous BIS reports indicate that overseas investment garnered the highest multiplier of 
any type of offset transaction (average of 2.8), and in particular third party investment (ie, 
not investment into a subsidiary or joint venture, but into an unrelated domestic 
enterprise) got the overall largest multiplier.63 This may occur because many procuring 
countries have no industries or individual firms with which the obligor firm is willing to 
cooperate in a joint venture – suggesting that the domestic recipient of the offset-
                                                            
61 CTO Newsletter.  July 10, 2006. 24(13).  
62 “BAE Systems handed £286m criminal fines in UK and US.” 5 February 2010. BBC News. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8500535.stm?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter.  
63 “Offsets in Defense Trade.” Summer 2004.  The Disam Journal of International Security Assitance 
Management.  26(4): 33-53.  
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multiplier package is highly inefficient.  There is also an interesting relationship between 
multipliers and different distinctions in offset type.  Economists who study offsets tend to 
divide them into two groups according to the likelihood that the offset will minimize 
transaction costs.  One group – which includes subcontracting, licensed co-production 
and buyback – may minimize transaction costs because the obligor firm is compelled to 
purchase domestically-produced components for use in its own products, which forces 
the firm to bear some of the risk of the venture.  The other type – which includes 
technology transfer, foreign investment, training and education, countertrade, and 
marketing and managements services – expose the firm to no risk.64  This typology 
corresponds roughly to a distinction in the application of multipliers reported by the BIS, 
though not in the way that would indicate concern over costs on behalf of the procuring 
country.  Most of the offsets that could minimize transaction costs do not receive 
multipliers from procuring countries; while the offsets from the second group – 
technology transfer, foreign investment, etc. receive multipliers more often.65 This 
suggests that procuring countries are less interested in those arrangements that could 
compel obligor firms to increase efficiency and profitability in offset-related ventures.  
Instead, procuring countries grant more multipliers for offsets that are flexible in terms of 
the designated recipient.  
 
Additionally, offset obligors can (and frequently do) increase the credit they receive for
                                                            
64 Taylor, “Modeling Offset Policy in Government Procurement.”  
65 The BIS 12th Annual Report (2007) indicates that the author’s designated “Standard Instruments” 
receive the highest multipliers.   
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offset investments through leveraging – a sort of quasi-multiplier effect.66  That is, a firm 
can combine an initial investment of $1 million in capital with investments from third 
parties (foreign investors, domestic firms, etc.) and borrow against this investment, re-
investing the borrowed money to “multiply” their original investment.  And because 
defense firms have privileged access to loans, credit and other public subsidies, 
leveraging to increase offset credit is relatively easy.  Of course, attracting additional 
investment may be a genuine service the firm is providing to the procuring country (and 
suggests at least some level of confidence in the venture on behalf of domestic and 
foreign investors), but when this investment goes to entities chosen on the basis of 
political factors, it can be economically distorting.     
 
Offset Investment Funds 
Another novel development is the offset investment fund – designed to help absorb and 
expedite large offset obligations - frequently formed as a partnership between the defense 
firm and a sovereign wealth fund, or as a stand-alone fund established by the obligor 
firm67 or a consortium of multiple firms with individual offset obligations.68  Investment 
funds were first proposed by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s International Trade 
Administration in 1997 as a “convenient vehicle” to administer the large offset 
                                                            
66 CTO Newsletter. 15 January 2007. 25(2).  
67 Examples include the Gripen Investment Fund in Hungary (2002); Alfia Investment Fund in the UAE 
(2000); the Economic Enhancement Investment Fund in Libya; and several funds in Kuwait, where offset 
regulations currently require that firms invest in funds not managed by a government agency.  CTO 
Newsletter. 14 November 2005. 23(21) 
68 Consensus Business Group created an investment fund in 2007 in South Africa for defense contractors 
who had failed to meet their offset obligations. CTO Newsletter 25 December 2006. 24(24). 
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investments incurred by U.S. firms.69  Since then, however, BIS, has criticized the 
program for the same reason that Congressional offset critics have also rebuffed the idea 
– mainly that investment funds would facilitate a system of granting favors and 
delivering bribes to procurement officials because the financial regulatory and oversight 
apparatus present in many procuring countries is grossly inadequate.70  This is especially 
problematic in the Middle East, most notably in the Gulf, where royal family finances 
and state budgets are often indistinguishable, but also in the non-oil exporting states, 
where ‘sweetheart loans’ made to political cronies and corrupt privatization processes 
have left regime allies in control of much of the state’s financial infrastructure.   
One example of an offset fund is Lockheed Martin’s investment of $160 million in the 
petroleum-based investment portfolio of the UAE Offsets Group in 2000.71 These 
investment structures also tend to meet procuring country requirements for multipliers – 
which allows the defense firm to fulfill its obligation with the minimum dollar amount.72  
 
The Proliferation of Offset Service Firms and Brokers 
“One of the practices that had occurred in the past, there were several operators who 
would look at normal [i.e. non-defense] companies that imported a great deal, a Pier 
One, for example, find out what they were importing from a country like Thailand, and 
                                                            
69 Daniel Pearl.  April 20, 2000. “Arms Dealers Get Creative with ‘Offsets.’” Wall Street Journal.  
70 Daniel Pearl.  April 20, 2000. “Arms Dealers Get Creative with ‘Offsets.’” Wall Street Journal.  
71 Suk H. Kim and Seung Hee Kim. 2006. Global Corporate Finance: Text and Cases. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, p343-344.   
72 When Poland was considering establishing an investment fund as part of its offset for the purchase of 
multi-role combat planes for the Polish army in 2003, analysis done by an independent business consultant 
who specialized in the technology sector (where the Polish government sought to channel future 
investments) concluded, “due to the offset multiplier effect the real size of the offset fund will be 
significantly smaller than the offset credit awarded, the participation of the recognized fund sponsors 
should attract additional investors and co-investors [which should] in turn decrease the multiplier effect and 
increase the financial strength of the fund.” Maciej Janiec. 7 November 2002. “Critical Offset,” p5.  
 113 
[find out] who had an offset obligation in Thailand.  You would go to the company [with 
the offset obligation] and say, ‘for 2 or 3 percent, I can get you[r] large offset obligation 
liquidated.’  They would go to Pier One and say, ‘I can buy down what you are already 
doing for 1 percent,’ and basically nothing whatsoever would happen except that a 
company would get a lot of offset credit.” 
Joel Johnson, Vice-President of Aerospace Industries International, on the role of 
the complementary firm in the offset industry in his 1999 testimony to a House 
Subcommittee. 
 
Because offsets are such big business, an entire industry has coalesced around them, 
offering general industry news; country-specific reports on offset guidelines, contact 
points and past projects; advice on negotiation and implementation of offsets; legal 
counsel; offset design and fulfillment models; marketing advice and financial services 
such as venture capital; corporate credit, and investment banking for offset-generated 
funds.  It is nearly impossible to provide an accurate estimate of the number of companies 
operating in the arena of offset services, but numerous industry trade associations and 
private companies offer searchable databases that promise to link up defense firms with 
companies the specialize in offsets.73   
 
A similar trend prevailed during previous decades in relation to the countertrade activities 
described earlier in this chapter.  In 1985, the U.S. International Trade Commission wrote 
in its report on countertrade and barter in the international economy that, “The increasing 
expertise and expanding contracts of countertraders (ie, trading houses specializing in 
countertrade, and the inhouse countertrade units of multinational corporations) may 
themselves have become a factor contributing to the growth of countertrade.”  New 
companies cited in the report include the Countertrade Data Center established by Batis 
                                                            
73 One is the “Offset Service Providers Directory” offered by the publishers of the Countertrade and Offset 
Newsletter (CTO) 
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International Business Services, which provided a “counter-purchase credit exchange” as 
well as “detailed economic and trading reports on those countries with countertrade 
policies.”  Banks such as CitiCorp (U.S.), Midland Lloyds (U.K.), Barclays (U.K.) and 
National Westminister (U.K.) all announced the establishment of countertrade specialists 
around this same time.74  Although many of these entities have been dismantled due to 
WTO restrictions on countertrade activity, the number of individuals and firms that 
specialize in defense-related countertrade (ie, offsets) has only increased.  
 
A 2002 textbook on international business cites both high rates of entry into the offset 
services industry and high salaries for those employed in the sector, suggesting these 
businesses are very profitable.75  Both private firms and industry trade groups provide 
services to facilitate offsets: Epicos – a private firm based in Athens, Greece that bills 
itself as a “one-stop offset shop” – vets offset proposals submitted to them by offset 
service companies, and recommends them to obligor firms seeking assistance.76  Many of 
these companies are established in the countries where large offsets have traditionally 
taken place, such as Epicos and ALTAY Industrial Investments & Trade Inc. of Turkey.   
Trade groups have also emerged to promote the interests of their corporate membership.  
These include the U.S.-based Defense Industry Offset Association (DIOA) as well as the 
international Global Offset and Countertrade Association (GOCA).  GOCA offers its 
                                                            
74 See Gray, Frank.  24 October 1984. “Countertrade Data Centre Established in London.” Financial Times, 
p8. International Trading Certificates (ITCs) were also created around this time to facilitate countertrade.  
See U.S. International Trade Commission. October 1985. “Assessment of the Effects of Barter and 
Countertrade Transactions on U.S. Industries.” Report on Investigation No. 332-185 Under Section 332 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930.  Publication 1766, p45.  
75 See Contractor, Farok J. and Peter Lorange (eds). 2002. Cooperative Strategies in International Business: 
Joint Ventures and Technology Partnerships Between Firms.  Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd, p441n.   
76 CTO Newsletter.  April 28, 2008. 26(8).  
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100-plus members a sort of matchmaking service, allowing prime contractors to 
communicate anonymously and confidentially about the full range of offset activities 
from successfully implemented projects to trading offset credits.   
 
Many law firms also have units dedicated to offset-related legal issues.  Squire Sanders, 
whose clients include Northrop Grumman, Boeing and the offset offices of two unnamed 
foreign governments, advertises its “innovative solution” to offsets that “involves using 
our legal services to reform legislative and regulatory policies in various countries and 
using such projects to obtain offset credits for established clients.”  The newsletter 
continues,  
One of the appeals of this strategy is that the offset obligor may not need to 
employ the usual local “connected” [quotations in original] retired military 
official (with attendant risks and compliance issues) to generate the offset credit 
….An added feature of this strategy is the fact that the legal reform will be in 
areas that will help defense contractors in future business dealings in the host 
country…77   
 
Indeed, legal uncertainties appear to be a significant concern for many offset service 
firms.  The law firm Frost & Sullivan has its own ‘internal think tank’ dedicated to the 
legalities of defense offsets – and specializes in the Middle East and Asia.78  Blenheim 
Capital – one of the largest such firms – reports expending 35% of its annual budget on 
risk mitigation and risk management from outside counsel as a result of “instances of 
misconduct” in offset programs.79 The offset bureaucracies of individual countries also 
                                                            
77Accessed 18 October 2009.  newsletter available at: 
http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:rKg4ZzJ83SQJ:www.ssd.com/files/tbl_s29Publications/FileUpload5
689/9785/IT3Fall.pdf+FCPA+offsets&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a 
78 “Frost & Sullivan to present ‘top 20 global mega trends’ at GIL 2010.” 15 September 2010. Khaleej 
Times.  
79 CTO Newsletter. 24 May 2010. 28(10).  
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cater to this growth industry, often hosting their own conferences on offsets, such as the 
biennial Abu Dhabi International Offset Conference.  These conferences also frequently 
coincide with defense equipment exhibitions, allowing prime contractors and 
procurement officials to hold offset discussions in parallel with equipment 
demonstrations.  
 
A short profile of one particular firm – Blenheim Capital, founded as Summit Corporate 
Services in 1990 by an American named Grant Rogan – may help elucidate the range of 
activities these intermediary entities provide.80  Rogan got his start at Northrop Grumman 
helping Swiss companies identify investment opportunities in Saudi Arabia in order to 
fulfill an offset obligation incurred by Northrop for its sale of F-5E/F jets to the Swiss Air 
Force.81 Labeled ‘Mr. Fix-it’ by The National, one of the UAE’s more independent 
newspapers, Rogan advises not only private defense firms but also a number of 
governments including Libya,82 Kuwait, and the UAE.  Blenheim’s small staff of 16 
employees – including a retired U.S. Major General, a Knight of the British Empire, and 
a former U.S. Army helicopter pilot – has handled over $12 billion in offset projects for 
                                                            
80 Rogan’s firm was originally Summit Corporate Services, but became Blenheim Capital in 2006 when it 
formed a joint venture with Barclays Capital to form an “offset-based structured finance boutique.” But in 
October 2009 Summit bought out Barclays’s shares.  Shortly after, Rogan brought in Sir Nigel Knowles to 
serve as Blenheim’s Chairman, leaving himself as CEO.  Knowles is the managing director of DLA Piper – 
the world’s largest law firm.  Ivan Gale. “Mr. Fix-it.” The National (UAE). 
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100422/BUSINESS/704229925/1354.  Antonie 
Boessenkool.  “Small Firm, Big Player.” 14 June 2010.  DefenseNews 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4668082.  
81 Ivan Gale. “Mr. Fix-it.” The National (UAE). 
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100422/BUSINESS/704229925/1354 
82 CTO Newsletter. 22 May 2006. 24(10).  
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27 different defense clients since 1998.83 His low profile has meant that (in his words), 
“people won’t know that we have had to do with something.  We come in quiet, we do a 
bit and then we leave again.”84 Blenheim’s own evolution is a microcosm for the offset 
industry overall, and reflects the dense network of personal and corporate connections 
that have allowed the system to expand so quickly.   
 
Ironically, Summit Corporate Services was itself the product of an offset obligation, the 
capital to start the company came from a $160 million offset incurred by Lockheed 
Martin for an $8 billion sale of F-16s to the UAE.  The money went into the investment 
portfolio of the UAE Offsets Group (this fund would later become Mubadala), which 
used some of the funds to establish Summit, whose first task was to aid the UAE in 
purchasing a line of petrol stations owned by Shell in the UK.85  What appears to have 
started as a consultancy firm providing investment services to the UAE Offsets Group is 
now a fully-fledged “offset investment bank.”86 Instead of focusing solely on 
coordinating offset projects – interfacing with domestic partners and identifying suitable 
projects – the firm now performs other functions, including a service (called “off-balance 
                                                            
83 http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4668082.  See also Ivan Gale. “Mr. Fix-it.” The National 
(UAE). http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100422/BUSINESS/704229925/1354.  
Employee profiles taken from Blenheim newsletter. 14 July 2010. “Offsets Evolved.”  
84 Ivan Gale. “Mr. Fix-it.” The National (UAE). 
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100422/BUSINESS/704229925/1354 
85 DISAM Journal. Fall 2001, p101. The disclaimer at the beginning of this article (which runs from page 
77 through page 107) indicates that it is extracted from the 5th Annual BIS report on Offsets in the Defense 
Trade released in 2001.  However, on the BIS webpage, the link to the 2001 report takes you to a one-page 
document.  When I contacted an employee at BIS about this he told me the report available online was the 
full version of the report, although the DISAM report suggests this is not the case.  I think this must be true 
for several subsequent reports as well, which only run a few pages on the BIS site.   
86 This is Rogan’s terminology. Antonie Boessenkool.  “Small Firm, Big Player.” 14 June 2010.  
DefenseNews.  http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4668082.  
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sheet financing”) that leverages the potential returns of future offset projects to provide 
collateral to procuring countries, who can then secure a lower interest rate on debt they 
accrue for the purchase of additional defense equipment,87 as well as setting up structured 
investment vehicles to allocate offset dollars to domestic projects.88  
Some industry analysts contend that this extension of services presents a conflict of 
interest89 – since Blenheim is frequently on retainer from both the obligor and the 
procuring country.  Indeed, in at least one instance Blenheim partnered with a UAE 
company (Waha Capital, which itself was established with offset funds from BAE) in 
order to form an investment vehicle (Waha Financial Services) that was then used to 
finance the purchase of $3 billion in additional defense equipment in January 200990 - a 
deal that would have generated significant fees for the company, whose revenues 
increased nearly 37% from 2009-2010.91  In a global marketplace where large firms 
frequently partner together (Lockheed Martin and BAE on the Joint Strike Fighter; the 
partnership between Raytheon and France’s Thales – formerly Thomson CSF; and the 
EADS consortium that combines France’s Aerospatiale-Matra, Germany’s DASA and 
Spain’s CASA) offset obligors may in effect be financing future purchases of their own 
products.  A good business model for arms manufacturers, but hardly a fair deal for 
procuring governments.  However, Rogan claims that his firm’s dual operations structure 
                                                            
87 CTO Newsletter. 13 July 2009. 27(13).  This is especially ironic given the current international financial 
climate in which similarly exotic credit instruments based on over-leveraged assets set off a severe 
contraction in the global economy.   
88 CTO Newsletter.  9 November 2009. 27(21).  
89 CTO Newsletter. 22 September 2003. 21(18). 
90 CTO Newsletter. 9 March 2008. 27(5).  Also see Ivan Gale. 13 January 2010. “Waha Capital Builds on 
Strengths.” The National (UAE).  
91 Zawya Business profile. (subscription required). 
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will enhance transparency in what he readily admits is an “unregulated” industry.92  And 
like an investment bank, which manages not only its clients’ funds but also its own, 
Blenheim has itself become a shareholder in offset projects.93  
 
Although industry publications characterize Blenheim’s registration “in the UK” as 
“raising the bar”94 the firm is in fact registered with the Guernsey Financial Services 
Commission (Guernsey and the other British Channel Islands providing the etymological 
origins for the term “off-shore” tax haven) as a “non-regulated Financial Services 
Business.”95 Futhermore, the majority of its operating hubs are also in localities 
designated by the OECD as ‘tax-havens’ – including Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Malaysia 
(which has seen a boost in its tax haven status as the recession has encouraged 
governments to crack down on traditional locales like the Cayman Islands)96 and (soon 
in) Brunei.  Rogan says his company’s advantage has been their overhead, which is much 
lower than that of the major banks.  This is unsurprising given the firm’s total number of 
employees worldwide and the fact that, at least until now, it has been unburdened by 
compliance with legal regimes and due diligence requirements.  
 
But Grant Rogan was not the first “Mr. Fix-it,” in his family.  His father – Richard Grant
                                                            
92 Antonie Boessenkool.  “Small Firm, Big Player.” 14 June 2010.  DefenseNews 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4668082.   
93 Antonie Boessenkool.  “Small Firm, Big Player.” 14 June 2010.  DefenseNews 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4668082.   
94 CTO Newsletter.  9 November 2009. 27(21).  
95 Blenheim Newsletter.  “Offsets Evolved.”  14 July 2010.  
96 Richard C. Morais. 15 July 2009. “OutFront: The Hot Tax Haven.” Forbes Magazine.  
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Rogan – was Northrop Grumman’s ‘handler’ for the firm’s dealings with Adnan 
Khashoggi, the infamous intermediary who made billions in commissions for facilitating 
arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.97  Author Robert Kessler documents a 1971 
meeting between Khashoggi and the elder Rogan at the Mayfair Hotel in London during 
which Khashoggi advised Rogan to mislead a bribe-seeking (but low ranking) member of 
the Saudi royal family that Northrop was getting annoyed with Khashoggi’s demands.  
Since this family member’s request for a ‘cut’ would have to go through Khashoggi, who 
would later dispense payments from his single commission via a vast network of front 
companies, this was an indirect way of ensuring that more of the bribe money stayed in 
Khashoggi’s hands instead of trickling down through the vast Royal Family hierarchy.98   
 
However, the offset service industry is not just a case of savvy Westerners siphoning off 
capital from oil-rich monarchs (of which history provides endless examples). UAE 
private investors are also active in offset service provision, including through a fund 
named “Brainstart,” designed to invest in various start ups in procuring countries and 
then market those investments to foreign defense firms with offset obligations in those 
countries.99 Although Brainstart now appears to be defunct, it was originally a subsidiary 
                                                            
97 Grant Rogan’s brother – Dr. Eugene L. Rogan – is the Director of the Middle East Center at Oxford. 
Before its business partnership with Barclays, Grant’s firm Blenheim Capital was known as Summit 
Corporate Services.  According to a bi-weekly trade publication from the UK – The Countertrade & Offset 
Newsletter –the University of Oxford’s intellectual property and technology transfer arm ISIS Innovations 
Ltd., partnered with Summit Corporate Services to advise the Phillipine government on the development 
and management of business parks equipped with technologies and research resources transferred from 
defense firms with offset obligations in Manila. CTO Newsletter. 21(22): p3.  
98 Ronald Kessler.  1986. The Richest Man in the World: The Story of Adnan Khashoggi. New York: 
Warner Books, p76. 
99 CTO Newsletter. 27 January 2003. 21(2).  
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of Rotch Group, the UK’s largest property developer.100  Comprising some 600 
subsidiaries with assets worth several billion £’s, Rotch is registered in Panama and 
owned by the Tchenquiz brothers, who dabbled in the business of offsets through two 
joint ventures: the Global Trade Group, which would identify investment opportunities 
on the ground, and Consensus International, which would raise the necessary funds from 
investors through vehicles like Brainstart.101  It is possible that Rotch got into the offset 
game after partnering with the UK’s other largest property developer, London & 
Regional Properties, on a 2000 deal to buy 180 Shell gas stations, which were 
subsequently leased back to the oil company.102  The deal was developed by Rogan’s 
firm in 2000 (then still called Summit Corporate Services) and included an equity stake 
for the UAE’s Offset Program Bureau (then called the UAE Offset Group).  Summit and 
the UOG registered a new joint venture called “Octane Properties” in order to purchase a 
25% stake in the chain of gas stations.103  It is unclear which firm got the offset credit for 
the deal, and whether it was Blenheim’s advisory services or some of the financing for 
                                                            
100 CTO Newsletter. 27 January 2003. 21(2). 
101 CTO Newsletter. 27 January 2003. 21(2).  The Rotch Group owns some 800 properties in the UK, and 
each one worth more than a few million £’s will have its own entity – hence the large number of 
subsidiaries.  The financial crisis hit Rotch particularly hard, since the bulk of its investments were in real 
estate, and the firm was very highly leveraged (with loans from at least 60 financial institutions in the US 
alone).  The brothers are currently being investigated for their role in the bankruptcy of Iceland’s largest 
bank; Rotch was the bank’s largest client, with loans around £1.7 billion.  For information on Rotch and the 
Tchenguiz brothers see these two articles: Amanda Hall. 3 November 2002. “Inside the Empire of a 
mondern-day Genghis.” The Sunday Times (UK).  Also, Louise Armitstead. 11 March 2011. “Tchenguiz 
brothers on bail as police probe widens.” The Telegraph (UK).  
102 Report on the Dolphin Programme in Abu Dhabi.  22 January 2001. APS Review Downstream Trends 
(an oil industry newsletter).   
103 “Quiet Bothers Continue to Rock the Property World.” 8 October 2005. The Times (UK). The Times 
article makes no mention of either the UAE or Blenheim.  Also see: CTO Newsletter. 27 January 2003. 
21(2).  Also see: Daniel Pearl.  April 20, 2000.  “Arms Dealers Get Creative with ‘Offsets’.” Wall Street 
Journal, Eastern Edition. Both the CTO Newsletter and the Pearl article cited above mention the UAE and 
Blenheim, but this is likely only because both pieces focus specifically on defense offsets – and the gas 
station deal is only highlighted as an example of a defense offset.   
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the UAE’s equity purchase that fulfilled the obligation, but the UAE was able to buy into 
a substantial real estate deal without raising many eyebrows in the UK. Rotch and 
London & Regional Properties were cited as equal partners in the deal; the UAE’s 
participation largely escaped mention in the press.104   
 
Offset Swapping 
These offset-specific investment funds and banks have transformed offsets into 
standardized commodities that can be banked, traded or sold by procuring governments 
and firms in a process known as “offset swapping.”  For instance, if Raytheon (or one of 
its subsidiaries or an offset-services firm hired by Raytheon) completes an offset 
requirement in Oman that exceeds the original obligation (usually due to the application 
of multipliers) Raytheon can either bank these offset credits in anticipation of being 
awarded another sale by Oman; trade them with another contractor that has accrued offset 
obligations in Oman; or (in some cases) sell them to an offset broker working for a 
services firm.  A real world example might help illustrate the process.  BAE and Saab 
took over offset obligations incurred by South African defense firm Denel when the latter 
made a sale to the UAE and was unable to meet its offset obligations.  BAE and Saab 
‘swapped’ their outstanding obligations in South Africa in exchange for fulfilling Denel’s 
                                                            
104 The above article by Pearl is the only reference I could find in the press to the gas station deal. Rotch 
(via Consensus Business Group) appears to have done more offset business with Summit/Blenheim, 
including the establishment of some funds designed to finance technology transfers to Middle East states, 
with the resulting investment sold as credits to defense firms with offset obligations in those states.  Rotch 
was in talks to partner with the investment arms of several UK universities, including Oxford, where 
Blenheim founder Grant Rogan’s brother Eugene heads up the Middle East Studies Department. CTO 
Newsletter. 23 April 2007. 25(8).  
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obligations in the UAE.105  Here again we see the domestic defense industry benefiting 
from the increasing complexity of offsets.  Denel, which is a state-owned arms 
manufacturer, benefits from offloading its offset obligations in the UAE, while South 
Africa’s economy loses the offset business already paid for out of its public funds.  
Because the offsets that BAE and Saab incurred in South Africa might have been 
dedicated to business in the non-defense sector, this is a double-blow to any economic 
development rationale that might have been deployed during the contract negotiations.  It 
may be experiences like these that have led many countries (including Colombia, Turkey 
and India) to place limitations on offset swaps.   
 
Pre-Performance Offsets  
Pre-performance offsets are another recent innovation and a sign that offsets are 
increasingly central in the procurement decision-making process.  Traditionally, the 
obligor firm would present a number of options for offset fulfillment, and collaborate 
with the relevant government authorities to design a program to satisfy the purchasing 
country’s offset requirements after concluding the sale.  However, companies are 
increasingly performing offsets in countries in anticipation of receiving future contracts – 
and many countries now require offsets just in order for companies to bid on military 
contracts.106  Pre-performance offsets are usually financed through the marketing budgets 
of defense contractors since they are not associated with any particular sale – and critics 
consider them a particularly problematic arena in terms of corruption.  This is certainly a 
                                                            
105 Keith Campbell.  29 February 2008. “BAE Systems, Saab claim to have met 60% of offset obligations.” 
Creamer Media’s Engineering News (South Africa).  
106 Leon V. Sigal. (ed). 1999. The Changing Dynamics of US Defense Spending. Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, p198. 
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concern in the U.S. context, since contractors must only report offsets made in connection 
with actual defense contracts.  If those contracts never materialize, the reporting 
requirement is moot.  One such example is an $18 million investment made by 
McDonnell Douglas in the mid-1990s in a UAE petrochemical plant to facilitate the 
contractor’s consideration in a scheduled UAE fighter purchase.  Much to the surprise of 
industry analysts – and McDonnell Douglas – the UAE purchased 80 F-16s from 
Lockheed Martin instead.107  But because McDonnell Douglas did not secure the 
contract, the company never had to report the offset.   
 
In addition to the non-reporting of offsets there is also the false reporting of offsets that 
were never implemented.  Such was the case when three employees of the German 
defense firm Ferrostaal were indicted for passing off investments the firm had previously 
made in Greece and Portugal as new investments made to fulfill the offset obligations 
they incurred as part of a 2010 sale of submarines.108  In 2004 Libya communicated a 
pre-performance offset requirement to the private firm advising the government on its 
offset program, although the new guideline was to be communicated to the obligated firm 
“informally” rather than via written guidelines.109  Such informal requirements – often 
termed “best-effort” obligations – are especially prone to facilitating corrupt transactions 
                                                            
107 Leon V. Sigal. (ed). 1999. The Changing Dynamics of US Defense Spending. Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, p198. For information on the Lockheed sale see the company’s press release at 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/1998/UnitedArabEmiratesAnnouncesDecision.html.  
Accessed 10 November 2009.   
108 Valentina Pop. July 27, 2010. “Calls for EU to Halt Corrupt Defense Deals.” BusinessWeek. 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2010/gb20100727_597244.htm.  This is especially 
ironic given that the enormous EU bailout required to keep the debt crises in Greece and Portugal from 
threatening the Euro’s value was largely financed by German tax-payers.  
109 CTO. 8 November 2004. 22(21).  
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because they leave little (if any) paper trail.  When standards and benchmarks are 
nebulous (or completely absent) audits and periodic evaluations are not very useful.  
Relatedly, the long time that elapses between the signing of an offset contract and its 
fulfillment complicates the application of many laws regarding bribery of public officials, 
for which the statute of limitations is usually five years or less.110  By contrast, U.S. 
defense contractors report taking an average of six years to complete their offset 
obligations,111 and many individual offset programs stretch into decades.  The U.K.’s Al 
Yamamah offset program in Saudi Arabia is a good example.  Initiated in 1988, the 
British team is still proposing new projects for fulfillment of the existing obligation.  The 
latest effort was a $280 million petrochemical project launched in 2009.112  
 
Most Recent Innovations in Offsets 
Given the increasing scrutiny and condemnation of offsets, not only as market-distorting 
but in their general failure to yield any discernible economic benefits for procuring 
countries, serious efforts have been made to find new vehicles for facilitating the global 
defense trade while mitigating the negative impact of offsets.  Many industry analysts 
consider the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to be a model for this new method, as likely buyers 
are incorporated into the production process from the very beginning.  The process is 
similar to the extended supply chain that dominates civilian manufacturing – with final 
assembly taking place largely in the U.S.  The JSF has thus been termed an “international 
                                                            
110 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has a five year statute of limitations, and is probably the 
most rigorous national legal regime dealing with bribery of public officials.  
111 According to the 12th annual BIS report, U.S. companies average 76.8 months to fulfill offset 
obligations.   
112 CTO Newsletter. 23 March 2009. 27(6).   
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cooperative project,” and despite the fact that the structure of production operates in the 
same way as an offset, the U.S. Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security in 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, which has generally been critical of offsets, released 
a statement that “international cooperative projects should be encouraged because they 
currently do not include the use of offset contracts.”113 However, since production of the 
JSF is already being sourced in procuring countries, it is difficult to imagine any basis for 
the request of offsets.  One industry publication echoed the confusion over what many 
consider to be a false distinction, pointing out that the agency offered no explanation as to 
the practical difference between an ‘international cooperative project’ and an offset, and 
that if the aspect of cooperation in production was not available then an offset (or 
something very similar) would no doubt be implemented.114    
 
Global trends in direct vs. indirect offsets also appear to be shifting. According to the 
BIS, indirect offsets accounted for an average of 58% of the value of offset transactions 
between 1993 and 2008.  However, recent figures suggest this trend may be reversing, 
with direct offsets climbing to 49% and 48% of the value of offset transactions in 2007 
and 2008, respectively.  This is also reflected anecdotally in industry publications and 
scholarship on international security, which point out the increasing interest shown by 
procuring countries in establishing or further developing their indigenous defense 
capacity with the aid of offset programs.115  This trend has been particularly visible in the 
                                                            
113 CTO Newsletter. 14 June 2010. 28(11).  
114 CTO Newsletter. 14 June 2010. 28(11).  
115 Many countries that had no domestic defense industry during the 1990s and 2000s (Algeria, the Gulf 
States) are now demanding the construction of factories, technology transfer and training in defense 
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UAE and Saudi Arabia, where defense production was nonexistent even five years ago, 
but where plans for the domestic production of everything from naval patrol boats to the 
most advanced fighter jets are currently underway.116 
 
The remainder of this chapter will examine some of the incongruities of existing offset 
data.  Although this material demonstrates the challenges inherent in producing 
quantitative estimates, the primary goal of these sections is to draw some insight from the 
nature of these incongruities.  By comparing available figures, we can gain a more 
complete picture of the unique interests and institutional affiliations of their sources. 
 
Data Concerns and Discrepancies 
The following is excerpted from an exchange between Congressman John Tierney (D) 
from Massachusetts and Joel Johnson, Vice President of the Aerospace Industries 
Association, at a Subcommittee Hearing on the Impact of Defense Offsets held by the 
U.S. House of Representatives: 
 
Tierney: “Mr. Johnson, right now, as I understand it, U.S. companies are not 
required to provide copies of their [offset] transaction papers to the Commerce 
Department.  Is that accurate?” 
 
Johnson: “What we provide to the Commerce Department on an annual basis is a 
record of every transaction over $100,000 to help implement an offset 
agreement.” 
 
Tierney: “But you needn’t provide copies of those transaction papers.  It is just 
whatever you say it is in the form that you want?  So that none of the sales 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
production in exchange for weapons purchases.  Likewise, many countries that saw their domestic defense 
industries shrink during previous decades are using offsets to beef up production (Brazil, Indonesia). 
116 This is examined in detail in the chapter on offsets in the Gulf States. 
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contracts, none of the written offset agreements or the related paperwork ever 
goes to Commerce?” 
 
Johnson: “That is correct.”  
 
Because the available empirical data does point to significant inconsistencies, I will 
briefly lay out some of the most obvious examples to lend perspective.  This is not an 
effort to harp on the poor auditing standards of the agencies tasked with tracking offsets, 
rather it is undertaken to highlight the configuration of actors’ interests and how these are 
channeled through the relevant processes, institutions and relationships to give us these 
divergent figures.  To paraphrase the economist Edward Nell, it is the relations between 
variables (in this case, data points) rather than the variables themselves, which yield 
meaningful information.117  For example, a prime contractor has an interest in 
downplaying the value of its offset obligation in any given defense sale when it reports to 
the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), both because this may represent a 
transfer of technological know-how to the domestic defense industry of a foreign country 
and because it represents the possible loss of jobs for sub-contractors and suppliers based 
in the U.S.  Conversely, the prime contractor has an interest in inflating the offset value 
when dealing with the procuring government, which would like to point to large 
investments it secured as a result of the defense deal.  The divergent interests of actors 
involved in offsets nearly guarantees that information will be contested – it is these 
contestations that reveal many of the political and economic costs associated with 
incentive payments in arms sales, particularly because government accountability in 
many procuring countries is low, and the impetus to maintain defense subsidies in 
                                                            
117 Edward Nell. 1967. “Economic Relationships in the Decline of Feudalism: An Examination of 
Economic Interdependence and Social Change.” History and Theory. 6(3): p328.  
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exporting countries means that these allowances may override other pressing strategic 
and social concerns.   
 
Dollar Values and Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) Data Sources 
The most notable discrepancy in the quantitative data is quite simply the dollar value of 
defense offsets.  For example, a 2000 White House Panel estimated that offsets from US 
defense contractors equal about $3 billion per year,118 however aggregate numbers 
available from the annual reports of the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry 
and Security (BIS) yield estimates of about 1.5 times that, and a Treasury Department 
survey carried out in 1983 counted offset obligations of nearly $10 billion in that single 
year for the companies that completed the voluntary (and anonymous) questionnaire.119  
Numerous GAO reports have criticized the BIS offset database as well as the agency’s 
collection method, which relies on contractor submissions that detail their annual offset 
activity, without any accompanying documentation such as invoices, receipts, delivery 
schedules, or the offset contracts themselves – a shortcoming made plain in the preceding 
exchange between Joel Johnson and Congressmen Tierney.120  
 
GAO has also criticized the Department of Defense and the State Department, which (at 
least theoretically) have access to the actual offset contracts in Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS), respectively, for failure to consistently report 
                                                            
118 Phillips, E.H. “Offset Threat.” February 26, 2001.  Aviation Week and Space Technology.  154(9): p15.   
119 BIS Annual Report, 2009. U.S. Department of Commerce.  “Survey of Offset/Coproduction 
Requirements: A Survey.” U.S. Department of the Treasury Report.   
120 Government Accountability Office. 8 July 2004. “Defense Trade: Issues Concerning the Use of Offsets 
in International Defense Sales.” GAO/NSIAD-04-954T.  
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on offsets.121  The Office of Management and Budget, originally charged with collecting 
data on defense offsets, relinquished the responsibility in 1987 because they were unable 
to compel the relevant U.S. Government agencies to provide them with the necessary 
data.122  Arms trade historian Leon V. Sigal of the Social Science Research Council noted 
that the dollar figures provided to BIS by industry sources corresponds to an average 
offset of around 37 percent, even though the average for offsets documented by BIS are 
much higher – around 54 percent.  He suggests that this “may reflect incomplete 
reporting by companies involved in offset activities.”123  
 
Other than the BIS reports, the only other publicly-available USG documents that might 
include information on offsets are the Congressional notifications of pending sales issued 
by the DSCA.  But, because this information is subject to the knowledge of the relevant 
reporting authorities (DoD or State, depending on whether the sale was under FMS or 
DCS guidelines)124 who are not party to the offset contract and whose own contract 
officers are prohibited from discussing offsets with any entity but the private firm 
providing the equipment, the DSCA notification includes the statement, “There are no 
                                                            
121 One GAO report sites DoD and State as having reported that no offset contracts occurred during a 
specific reporting period, only to find later through its own independent investigation that numerous offset 
contracts has been signed during the time in question.  Government Accountability Office. “Defense 
Production Act: Agencies Lack Policies and Guidance for Use of Key Authorities.” 26 June 2008. (GAO–
08– 854). www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-854 
122 This obstacle is reported in a number of venues. Including a report issued by the consulting firm Grant 
Thornton, which states that “the Office of Management and Budget could not perform the role assigned to 
it because …there was neither the data nor the funding to support such [interagency] studies.” “The 
evolving state of offset arrangements in connection with military and other sales to foreign countries.” p1.  
123 Leon V. Sigal. (ed). 1999. The Changing Dynamics of US Defense Spending. Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, p198. 
124 Government Accountability Office. 26 October 2000. “Defense Trade: Data Collection and 
Coordination on Offsets.” GAO-01-83R, p3.  
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known offsets associated with this sale,” even for contracts with countries that as a rule 
require offsets.  
 
Although observers claim that offsets are nearly ubiquitous features of the arms trade and 
defense executives avoid expanded reporting requirements by pointing to excessive 
administrative burdens generated by the sheer number of offsets they discharge 
annually,125 most DSCA notifications report no offsets associated with specific sales – a 
phenomenon that seems to contradict all other sources of information.  Since these 
Congressional notifications (required by law) represent the only systematic and country-
specific source of offset data available to the public since regional and country figures 
were excised from the BIS reports, this severely constrains the ability of researchers or 
other interested groups to collect meaningful data.  Apparently I am not the only observer 
to notice this inconsistency.  A lawyer for General Dynamics (one of the largest US 
defense firms) noted the legal inconsistencies in a 2011 article published in the Public 
Contract Law Journal, 
This language [“there are no known offsets”] seems to imply that the U.S. 
Government, as the broker for the FMS case, has special insight into the 
transaction and is almost certifying that there are, in fact, no offsets.  Nothing 
could be further from the truth…[O]ffset discussions take place outside of 
government earshot…[A]nd the U.S. Government supposedly remains blissfully 
ignorant of their [offsets] existence.   
 
                                                            
125 When asked by the BIS to submit offset numbers according to new industrial codes, Lockheed Martin’s 
Director for Corporate Industrial Participation resisted, claiming that, “the sheer size in both count and 
volume of our offset obligations requires that we spend in excess of 100 hours collecting and formatting the 
data . . . the NAICS requirements will add a 33 percent burden.” CTO Newsletter. 27 July 2009. 27(14). 
This claim does not match up with the absence of reported offsets in the Congressional notification 
announcements collected by DSCA and posted on their website. http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-
b/36b_index.htm 
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The author recommends that, “Instead of presenting a false impression that an offset 
transaction is not taking place, DSCA should become actively involved in offset 
arrangements.”126  
 
To further complicate matters, current offset practice in the GCC countries is 
characterized by add-on investments and expansions of existing offset entities, meaning 
there are fewer “new” entities created, which makes pinpointing offset investment even 
more difficult.127  In 1995 – two years after BIS began to collect data on offsets – the 
DoD stopped asking contractors to indicate whether the foreign parts they used in 
assembling their own products were related to fulfillment of an offset obligation.128  DoD 
officials claimed that they discontinued the requirement because many firms did not 
report the information correctly, however, if DoD had continued to collect the data it 
would provide a useful measure against which to check BIS figures.   
 
These informational shortcomings are further complicated by successful industry efforts 
to have offset contracts classified as “proprietary,” which have resulted in the redaction 
of most of the quantitative data from the publicly available BIS annual reports on 
                                                            
126 Mark J. Nackman. Winter 2011. “A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense 
Procurements: Policy Options for the United States.” Public Contract Law Journal. 40(2), p526-7.  
127 From a presentation by John V. Lonsberg of the lawfirm Fulbright & Jaworski LLP.  “GIL 2010: Middle 
East: The Evolution of Defense Offsets in the Region: A Case Study-Saudi Arabia.” 6 October 2010. 
www.frost.com/prod/servlet/cpo/213016039. The presentation reports that current practice is in “further 
development of derivative investments and opportunities for existing offset entities.”  
128 Government Accountability Office. 26 October 2000. “Defense Trade: Data Collection and 
Coordination on Offsets.” GAO-01-83R, p4.  Also see GAO. 13 November 1998. “Defense Trade: 
Weaknesses Exist in DOD Foreign Subcontract Data.” GAO/NSIAD-99-8. 
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offsets.129  In 2001, a small group of Boeing shareholders put forth a proposal requiring 
the company to disclose the value of its offset agreements, claiming that the conclusion 
of private offset agreements with foreign governments amounted to the conduct of 
foreign policy, meaning Boeing forfeit the right to any proprietary claim.130  Not 
surprisingly, the proposal was unanimously voted down by the board of directors. These 
circumstances have resulted in significant discrepancies between official data and figures 
reported by defense industry trade groups, think tanks, NGOs and media outlets, as well 
as between reports issued by different U.S. Government agencies, such as a GAO report 
that cites $84 billion in offsets from US companies from the “mid-1980s” until 
publication of the report in 1996.131  Corresponding BIS reports give a figure of just $19 
billion for the five-year period beginning in 1993 (when the BIS initiated data collection) 
and including 1997.132  This divergence makes little sense if offsets have primarily been 
an outgrowth of an increasingly competitive defense export market, in which case the 
1980s would not have been a high-water mark for offset activity.  
 
Given that these same BIS reports indicate that offsets have continued to grow
                                                            
129 See Marshall, Shana.  November 2009.  “Money for Nothing?  Offsets in the US Middle East Defense 
Trade.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.  41(4).  Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
memo.  DSCA 00-01.  19 January 2000.  “Inclusion of Offset Costs in Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
(LOAs).”  The memo reports that, “Section 36(b)(1)(g) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) 
requires this information to be treated as “Confidential Information” in accordance with section 12(c) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2411(c)). This information is exempt from disclosure 
under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall not be published or disclosed without a 
determination that withholding is contrary to the national interest.” 
130 23 March 2001. “Shareholder Proposal on Offsets in Foreign Military Contracts.” 
www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/.../proposal2.html  
131 Government Accountability Office. 12 April 1996. “Military Exports: Offset Demands Continue to 
Grow.”  GAO/NSIAD-96-65.     
132 BIS annual report, 1999.   
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significantly ever since their introduction into the defense trade, it is difficult to 
harmonize these contradictory figures.  When U.S. agencies have attempted to reform the 
reporting process for offsets – in one case asking that defense firms use the revised 
industrial codes (from SIC to NAICS, first released in 1997) to report which sectors in 
procuring countries were benefiting from offset projects in order to facilitate analysis of 
the impact offsets have on U.S. trade and employment – Lockheed Martin’s Director for 
Corporate Industrial Participation complained that, “The sheer size in both count and 
volume of our offset obligations requires that we spend in excess of 100 hours collecting 
and formatting the data . . . the NAICS requirements will add a 33 percent burden.”133  
Furthermore, ‘willful’ violation of reporting requirements incurs a penalty of only 
$10,000.  Since those defense firms responsible for the majority of offsets have assets 
averaging $30 billion each, a fine of this size is irrelevant.   
 
Compiling independent calculations based on corporate earnings reports or SEC filings 
submitted by defense firms would likewise be nearly impossible given the intense merger 
and acquisition activity that has taken place in the defense sector since the introduction of 
offsets in the Middle East.  Even if we were to assume that offset outlays are consistently 
and accurately reported by the firms, such a task would require extraordinary accounting 
efforts.134  To take two examples, the Middle East Propulsion Company set up under the 
                                                            
133 CTO Newsletter. 27 July 2009. 27(14).  
134 Stephen Martin makes this observation in his book on page 235, stating that “A large amount of 
accounting effort would be needed to identify which programme should receive the offset credit for exports 
from these [Peace Shield] companies.”  In addition to the ownership changes in MEPC – AEC and AACC 
(also Peace Shield era companies) were also originally US offset companies that later acquired significant 
British investment during the Al Yamamah deal.  AEC produced systems that went into equipment sold to 
Saudi Arabia by the UK, and Al Salaam will most likely be doing the same under recently concluded offset 
agreements associated with the British sale of Typhoon aircraft to the Kingdom.  Likewise when an 
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Peace Shield offset in Saudi Arabia in 1992 originally involved U.S. contractors General 
Electric and Pratt&Whitney.  Later the British firm Rolls Royce invested in MEPC as 
part of the Al Yamamah offset program, but Pratt&Whitney is now part of United 
Technologies International, an American company.  Recently two additional defense 
contractors have invested in the company: the US firm Wamar International and the 
German firm MTU Aero.  The original Saudi institutional investors: the National 
Industrialization Corporation and the Saudi Advanced Industries Corporation also no 
longer appear on the roster of investors, and have been replaced by a company called 
Shomokh Al Hemam, which has no discernable presence in any non-offset companies or 
any web-accessible profile. Likewise, Allied Defense Group – the original partner for the 
KADDB’s ammunition plant (Jorammo) – was dissolved in 2010 after its executives 
were found guilty of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
 
Of course arms exporting countries have no monopoly on concealing data or publishing 
contradictory figures.  To take one example, the BIS puts U.S. offset agreements with 
Saudi Arabia at $1.4 billion between 1993 and 2005.135 In 1997, Prince Fahad bin 
Abdullah, then-Chairman of Saudi Arabia’s offset committee referred to $1.7 billion in 
U.S. offset obligations (with an additional $2 billion from the UK and $700 million from 
France).136  One business intelligence source published in 2007, citing the Secretary to 
the Saudi Economic Offset Committee Major General Hamad Al Sugair, gives an overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
American firm that was invested in AACC was taken over by another American firm, BAE stepped in and 
bought the newly available shares. The Economics of Defense Offsets, p235.  
135 BIS 11th Annual Offset Report, p4-3.  
136 Lieutenant Colonel Frank S. Petty. Summer 1999. “Defense Offsets: A Strategic Military Perspective.”  
The DISAM Journal, p75.  
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figure of 36 established joint venture companies (50 including those pending approval), 
with a capital value of $4.5 billion (which includes money from the defense obligor, state 
funding agencies and domestic investors) and exports of about $1.5 billion from these 
companies.137  One year later, Al Sugair provided this same publication with figures of 40 
companies, a capital value of almost $9 billion (twice as much as the previous figure) and 
exports of about $1.8 billion.138   
 
Figures calculated by economists and other researchers using various documents also 
vary widely.  M.A. Ramady, a professor of finance and economics at King Fahd 
University estimated that $25.5 billion in defense contracts signed by the Saudi monarchy 
as of 2002.  He further reasoned that a 35% offset requirement would yield offsets of 
nearly $9 billion.  However, the Saudi Ministry of Defense identified commitments of 
only $3.46 billion as of 2002,139 and if the value of projects undertaken (rather than 
merely committed to) is measured the figure is still lower – only $2.2 billion.  If we 
burrow down still further, separating the investment dollars provided by the offset obligor 
firm from the funds provided by domestic Saudi sources, then the total contribution of 
U.S., U.K., and French firms through 2002 is only $668 million.  This is roughly 30% of 
the total costs of the various offset projects, but represents an average of only 2.6% of the 
costs of the arms contracts themselves.  So, although Saudi Arabia has a policy requiring 
                                                            
137 CTO Newsletter. 12 March 2007. 25(5).  
138 CTO Newsletter. 9 June 2008. 26(11).  
139 M.A. Ramady. 2005.  The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges. New 
York: Springer, p285.  
 137 
that 35% of the contract cost be offset, in practice obligor firms appear to have ponied up 
less than 3%.140 
 
Contradictory Guidelines in Official Offset Policies 
Inconsistencies, gaps, and contradictions in official offset guidelines established by 
procuring countries also makes it nearly impossible to arrive at independent calculations 
– since each contract may be subject to quite different offset requirements.  The fact that 
specific offset guidelines are not well-established may reflect the shortcomings of state 
bureaucracies, but may also contain a strategic element as well.  A good deal of opacity 
can be beneficial, both from the procuring government’s perspective – since this 
facilitates their ability to negotiate better deals by mischaracterizing existing programs or 
previous offset projects – and from the perspective of the offsetting firm, which may be 
subject to oversight and pressure from their own political leaders and/or shareholders.  If 
guidelines are unclear and inconsistent, both firms and governments are able to avoid 
potential criticism. 
 
Let us take Saudi Arabia – where even the most fundamental features of offset policy are 
indeterminate – as an example.  Until 2008, there was no threshold price above which 
offsets would be required (it is now set at $107 million), instead this was decided on a 
‘case-by-case basis.’141  Neither is the percentage value of the offset clear: sometimes the 
mandatory value is set at 35% of the overall contract, and other times at 35% of the 
“technical content” of the project – therefore ruling out costs associated with service, 
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maintenance, administrative overhead, etc., even though these costs often exceed the 
actual equipment cost.142  For example the kingdom’s recent Typhoon purchase, 
estimated at about £20 billion for 72 planes, will likely include about £10 billion in 
maintenance, training and support, and another £5 billion for supplemental weapons 
systems.143   
 
Previously firms were given 10-12 years to identify feasible offset opportunities, but 
changes to the kingdom’s offset policy now requires that half of the 35% be invested 
within 5 years (although there are still no non-performance penalties).144  Guidelines state 
that 60% of the investment should be made in manufacturing, although recently the 
government has suggested that the pool of substantial manufacturing opportunities has 
been depleted by previous offsets.  The portion of investment that must be made in cash 
has been increasing, from 20% in previously published guidelines,145 to 25% most 
recently.146  Multipliers are now also restricted to ‘non-return’ activities (such as training 
Saudi nationals), although these multipliers can reach as high as 10 – securing the firm 
offset credits at 10 times their outlay.147  Despite these inconsistencies, at least official 
Saudi policy recognizes the existence of offsets; official rhetoric in both Egypt and 
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Jordan denies the existence of offsets despite the fact that co-production, buybacks, and 
other common forms of offset are clearly present in their purchase agreements. 
 
Number of Countries Receiving Offsets 
Another notable inconsistency concerns the number of countries with which U.S. 
contractors have offset obligations.  Although the most recent 2008 BIS report does not 
include any country-level data (for the “proprietary” reason stated above) previous 
reports include information for only around 40 countries.148  However, the US Treasury 
report referred to above cited US offset obligations in 130 different countries.149 
Although this numerical disparity may also be due simply to underreporting by firms it 
may also be that shifting legal definitions, trade regulations and bilateral agreements have 
truncated the universe of exchanges that are legally classified as offsets.  For example, a 
1997 DOD sale to the Government of Egypt included, 
coproduction of 50 M88A2 recovery vehicle kits, 53 M2 machine guns, 100 
AN/PVS-7B night vision goggles, spare and repair parts, contractor technical 
support, support and test equipment, ammunition, publications, program 
management, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and 
contractor technical and logistics services and other related elements of program 
support.150  [my italics]  
 
Despite the fact that the sale was stipulated on coproduction of the defense goods, it was 
not considered an offset – indeed the announcement of potential sale includes the 
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prevalence of offsets in defense sales, this is unlikely.    
149 Department of the Treasury Report.  “Survey of Offset/Coproduction Requirements,” p1.   
150 A copy of the announcement of potential sale is available through the DOD site: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1997/m11101997_m206-97.html.  Accessed 31 October 2009.  A 
later reference to the completed sale and an additional follow-up can be found: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/tank-200.htm.  Accessed 31 October 2009.   
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sentence, “There are no offset agreements proposed to be entered into in connection with 
this potential sale,” – and therefore would not be included in any aggregate data provided 
to the BIS by industry.  Nonetheless, the sale behaves exactly as a traditional offset, in 
the sense that it contributes to the military production capacity of the Egyptian security 
forces.151  Additionally, a 2009 BIS rule change also clarified that “U.S. firms are 
required to report on all offset transactions even if the offset transaction itself does not 
involve a defense article or service” suggesting that indirect offset transactions often went 
unreported because the transaction itself was in a non-defense sector.152  The rule also 
defines an offset as “any activity for which a firm claims credit for full or partial 
fulfillment of the offset agreement,” meaning that activities like pre-performance offsets 
meant to aid the firm in securing a future contract will most likely not be reported.   
 
Both possible sources of data inaccuracies (firm underreporting and changing definitions 
of offsets) are of concern: the first because accurate reporting is necessary to effectively 
evaluate the economic and political effects of offsets, and the second because offsets are 
a form of economic exchange whose political and economic effects remain regardless of 
attempts to frame them as something else.  The GAO has consistently claimed that it is 
impossible to estimate the impact of offsets on the U.S. economy because they represent 
such a small percentage of economic activity.  Perhaps more accurate figures would 
demonstrate that this is not the case.   
                                                            
151 Although specific offset contracts are not available to the public, Dr. Pompiliu Verzariu, former director 
of the Financial Services and Countertrade Division at the International Trade Administration (U.S. 
Department of Commerce) informed me during an interview that this sale would not be reported to the BIS 
as an offset and thus would not be included in the annual report figures.   
152 “Reporting of Offset Agreements in Sales of Weapon Systems or Defense-Related Items to Foreign 
Countries or Foreign Firms.” 29 April 2009.  Federal Register. 74(81): p19467.   
 141 
Region-Specific Data Discrepancies 
Although reliable information on offsets is difficult to obtain generally, the informational 
void seems particularly true with respect to official numbers on U.S. offsets in the Middle 
East.  This is partly due to the fact that Europe and Asia accounted for the majority of 
offset activity through the 1980s, consequently government agencies and other interested 
parties focused primarily on these two regions.  For example, prior to 2008 when the BIS 
stopped reporting any regional figures, the agency frequently left out numbers on the 
Middle East even though it included all the other regional categories.  The 9th through the 
12th editions of the BIS report (for periods 1993 through 2005) give us figures for 
European and Asian shares of offset contracts as a percentage of total U.S. offsets 
worldwide, but do not give us similar figures for the Middle East, despite the fact that the 
reports tell us the Middle East percentage exceeded that of Asia for several of the 
reporting years.  Figures are not attainable through calculations such as subtracting other 
regional percentages to find the unique figure for the Middle East because the fourth and 
final regional category “North/South America” is also frequently left out, though the 
authors point out that this region’s contribution to total offsets is minimal.   The reports 
often make statements devoid of actual quantitative value when referencing the Middle 
East.  For example, one edition of the report reads,  
In 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2005, contracts and agreements with the Middle East and 
Africa increased significantly from the proceeding years. In 2003 and again in 
2005, the Middle East/Africa share of annual offset defense system sales and 
associated agreements exceeded those of Asia.153  
 
                                                            
153 The BIS report only includes the Middle East/Africa share of offset “transactions” rather than offset 
contract values.  See BIS 11th Annual Report, page 4-4.   
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Yet the BIS report does not give us figures to inform such a comparison.  It does tell us 
that the Middle East/Africa received slightly less than $6 billion in offsets from U.S. 
companies for the twelve-year period between 1993 and 2005 (and only $3.1 billion as of 
1999).154  However, it is hard to reconcile this with other figures on regional offsets, 
including the figure of $30 billion in offsets in the Gulf States alone between 1990 and 
1998 provided by Jane’s Intelligence Review155 and the press releases and speeches made 
by many Arab regimes concerning the large investment inflows they have received in 
fulfillment of offset obligations.  For instance, Carlyle Group – the private-equity fund 
that advised the Saudi Offset Committee until shortly after 9/11 – reported that 
“outstanding” U.S. offset commitments to Saudi Arabia stood at $1.3 billion as early as 
1997.156 One year later, in 1998, Prince Fahad bin Abdullah, then-Chairman of Saudi 
Arabia’s offset committee referred to $1.7 billion in U.S. offsets (from the program’s 
inception in 1984),157 while Kuwait claims $1 billion from the U.S. as of 2007, and the 
UAE claims [$X].  Since the BIS figure of less than $6 billion also includes South Africa, 
Turkey and Israel – with the latter alone receiving $4.2 billion in offsets between 1993 
and 2006 – this figure seems far too small.158  
 
Industry estimates put the global value of offsets at about $70 billion between 2005 and
                                                            
154 BIS 6th Annual Report on Defense Offsets. 2001.  
155 “Military Offsets to Grow?” 1 December 1998. Janes Intelligence Review.  
156 “Workshop on the Offset Program: A Launchpad for Joint Ventures.” http://www.us-saudi-
business.org/p96ws2.htm.  Transcript of meeting between Saudi officials and The Carlyle Group. Accessed 
21 February 2010.  
157 with an additional $2 billion from the UK and $700 million from France 
158 BIS 12th annual report on offsets in the defense trade.  
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2010 and predict this figure will more than double to $150 billion over the next five 
years.159  Much of this increase is anticipated to come from the Gulf States, who are 
poised to purchase integrated air defense systems, C4ISR gear and other major 
equipment.160 For large firms, like BAE, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, offset 
commitments easily exceed $10 billion.161 Consequently, decision-making on offsets now 
frequently takes place at the boardroom level.162  Similarly, we know that a great many 
procurement decisions were made based not on equipment specifications or on cost, but 
on the proposed offset package – which is why South Africa and other countries have 
included “non-costed” options in their official procurement plans.  So offsets are central 
to both buyers and sellers.  Yet, offsets remain at best a peripheral concern to those who 
study defense, foreign policy and the arms trade, that is if they are aware of their 
existence in the first place.   Predictably, this much resembles the marginalization of 
studies of corruption in the defense trade, despite official estimates that this graft 
accounts for almost half of all corrupt resource transfers worldwide.163  As Roeber (2005) 
states,  
I was given the distinct impression that talk about corruption is faintly distasteful, 
even déclassé, servants tattle. Serious students of the industry, both friendly and 
unfriendly, concern themselves with strategy and materiel.  They share the 
comfortable assumption that bribery does not affect main procurement decisions... 
                                                            





163 Joe R. Roeber. 2005. “Parallel Markets: Corruption in the International Arms Trade.” Campaign Against 
the Arms Trade (UK). Roeber cites CIA sources, but estimates released by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce are similar.  
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[t]his is wrong, entirely wrong.  Corruption is not peripheral; it acts at the centre 
of procurement decision-making.164  
 
Like these ‘serious students’ who dismiss corruption, industry experts and officials 
likewise dismiss offsets as a mere nuisance, or at worst, the cost of doing business.  Yet 
the dismissal of such an integral part of the dynamics of the arms trade has potentially 
enormous implications.  Consider studies that examine whether reductions in defense 
spending produce beneficial economic results: if the contract prices under investigation 
are inflated because the selling firm has included offset costs this has serious implications 
for how we approach the question and evaluate the evidence.  Surely such a possibility is 
worth examining.   
 
Shortcomings in the data also make it difficult to discern patterns in offset activity that 
might overlap with exogenous forces such as shifts in geopolitical trends or increasing 
pressure from anti-corruption norms.  The responsibility for collecting and analyzing data 
was moved from the Executive-level agency Office of Management and Budget to the 
Bureau of Industry and Security in the late 1980s/early 1990s – just when shifts caused 
by the end of the Cold War might also be impacting offset trends.  The data collected by 
both agencies is incompatible – with different definitions, different source and collection 
methods and different measures – complicating any potential comparison.  Likewise, the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, which would represent the primary 
tool for prosecuting bribery and might have encouraged firms to transfer their kick-back 
activities into the more legitimate channel of offsets, was used an average of only two 
                                                            
164 Roeber quotes Donald Stokes, an industrial magnate hired by the UK Labor government in the mid-
1960s to advise the defense ministry on how to compete with the increasingly dominant US firms. “Parallel 
Markets: Corruption in the International Arms Trade,” p7.   
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times per year during the previous three decades.165  Therefore drawing any conclusions 
about the impact of a deterrent effect on offset activity is unlikely.  European and OECD 
rules on public corruption and offsets are substantially weaker: only two British firms 
have ever been prosecuted for bribing foreign officials (BAE being one of those two);166 
and in 2009 only four countries (the U.S., Germany, Norway and Switzerland) were 
recognized as “actively enforcing” the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by Transparency 
International.167  However, if oversight and legal prosecution are in fact responsible for 
some of the growth in offsets, we should expect to see huge jumps in the coming years.  
The U.S. Department of Justice brought more cases under the FCPA between 2005 and 
2010 than during the previous 28 years combined, and the UK parliament just passed the 
Bribery Act of 2010, updating its legislation (dating from 1906) to mirror – and in many 
ways exceed – the FCPA.168   
 
The following two case chapters will examine individual offset projects in two groups of 
cases: first, the wealthy oil-exporting states of the Arab Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
the UAE), and second, the more populous oil-importing states of Egypt, Jordan and 
Turkey.  Both groups demonstrate unique patterns in offset acquisition – the Gulf States 
                                                            
165 Jeffrey Cramer. 23 April 2010.  “Commentary: The FCPA Game Has Changed: Trends in 
Enforcement.” Main Justice: Politics, Policy and the Law (Website of the U.S. Department of Justice). 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/23/commentary-the-fcpa-game-has-changed-trends-in-enforcement/.  
166 The other, Mabey and Johnson is a building contractor that was fined $10.5 million in 2009. 
167 Transparency International. “Progress Report 2009: Enforcement of the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.” 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/oecd_pr_2009.  
168 The U.S. Department of Justice has pursued cases of bribery by European companies, but only has 
jurisdiction when these companies are either publicly traded on U.S. exchanges or when some of the bribe 
money is spent in the U.S.   
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overwhelming focus on indirect offsets aimed at promoting commercial ventures 
controlled by private business elites with close ties to the regime, while the oil-importing 
states have tended to use offsets to deliver particularistic benefits to the indigenous 
security establishment (the military and internal security forces) by exploiting both direct 
offset programs that steer industrial production to military-operated factories and by 
securing indirect offset packages that confer benefits on prominent military elites or 
programs such as military pension funds.  The analysis of these two case groups will 
inform our understanding of innovations in rent-seeking behavior among Arab 
authoritarian regimes – extending and strengthening the rentier state paradigm – and 
contribute to the dominant puzzle of contemporary Middle East studies: What factors lay 




Chapter 3: Defense Offsets in the Oil-Exporting States of the Gulf: 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates  
 
Despite the fact that defense offsets have been a central feature of the Middle East arms 
market for over two decades, there is precious little research on the topic. Political 
economists working in the field of the arms trade seldom mention offsets, focusing 
instead on the macro level impacts of defense spending, while those in the field of 
security studies examine offsets only when they include the transfer of military 
technologies, which has been rare in the Gulf.  As a result, academics have overlooked an 
entire system of exchange that supplies billions of dollars in subsidies to economic elites 
in the Arab Gulf.  The first half of this chapter will be spent detailing the features of 
defense offsets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait – the Gulf’s three largest arms-
importers – including the relevant policies and institutions that shape regional offset 
practices, as well as the economic elites that participate in them as domestic investment 
partners.  
 
The second half of this chapter will explore some more general observations about 
defense offsets in the Arab Gulf, including an exploration of defense offsets in the 
context of the regional arms trade; an examination of how offsets fit into the overall 
market strategy of defense firms and the role played by external institutions – such as 
offset consultants – in the expansion of defense offsets in the region; an examination of 
the characteristics of the Gulf economies that make offsets such an appealing source of 
political patronage; and a brief interrogation of the economic fundamentals of defense 
offsets in the Gulf.  This final section is important to the mechanics of my argument, as 
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the weight of evidence indicates that defense offsets are an inefficient means of 
subsidizing domestic development – the avowed goal of official offset policies. The Gulf 
region remains weak on measures of attracting FDI, figures on jobs generated by offsets 
are extremely low in relation to the overall costs borne by state budgets, and there is no 
evidence to suggest that defense offsets speed up the process of technology transfer or 
enable procuring countries to import technologies that are more desirable or suitable to 
their domestic economies. The primary area where defense offsets do have a discernable 
impact is on the investment portfolios of influential domestic elites, which, I argue, is the 
real driving force behind this new form of defense-generated investment. 
 
A Brief Historical Overview of Defense Offsets in the Gulf  
Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf State to request offsets in tandem with military 
procurement in 1984, followed by the UAE in 1991, Kuwait in 1994 and Oman in 1998.1  
Early offset agreements were concluded on an ad-hoc and largely informal basis, 
although today each state possesses formal agencies and sophisticated legislation 
pertaining to defense offsets.  Nonetheless, many aspects of individual offset agreements 
vary depending on the type of equipment sold, the firm doing the selling, and diplomatic 
relations between the importing and exporting countries.  Other features of specific offset 
agreements – such as Saudi Arabia’s “good faith” clause governing offsets with the U.S. 
– impart an arbitrary character to negotiations and resulting projects, making trends 
difficult to pinpoint.  Offsets in the Gulf have historically been “indirect,” meaning that 
                                                
1 Although Bahrain and Qatar have no formal offset policies, in practice Qatar has required offsets in the 
past and is currently drafting offset guidelines.  Meanwhile, Bahrain maintains a seat on the GCC-wide 
offset committee, sends delegates to make presentations on offset practices at regional conferences, and is 
host to an office of Blenheim Capital, the largest offset broker in the business.  
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the majority of investment has flowed into civilian business ventures  – and therefore 
seldom involved the transfer of technology or production facilities related to military 
hardware, as has been the case in the non-oil exporting states of the Middle East.2  
Official rationales have focused on increasing employment opportunities for Gulf 
nationals, attracting new technologies and foreign investment, and reducing the Gulf 
economies’ reliance on oil and gas exports through strategies of diversification and 
modernization.3  However, as I hope will be made clear in the following pages, these 
stated goals are illusory; the pursuit of defense offsets is fundamentally aimed at 
providing economic elites with subsidized investment opportunities. 
 
‘The Shield’ and ‘The Dove’: Defense Offsets in Saudi Arabia 
As of 2008, the Kingdom has signed ten offset agreements, each of which has yielded 
numerous individual projects.  These agreements were with Boeing in 1984; General 
Electric also in 1984 (these were part of the Peace Shield I deal); the British Government 
in 1988 (the Al Yamamah deal, Arabic for “the dove”); the French Government in 1990 
(the Al Sawari I and II deals, Arabic for “the masts” – these were large naval contracts); 
General Dynamics also in 1990; Hughes Aircraft Company (now Raytheon) in 1991 
(these were part of the Peace Shield II deal); McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) in 1993 
(also an extension of Peace Shield II); Lucent Technologies in 1994; United 
                                                
2 There is some evidence that the Gulf states are beginning to incorporate requests for direct (or military-
related) offsets into their negotiation strategies, although this has taken place only within the last few years. 
This trend is explored in a section later in this chapter. 
3 In a 2008 general assembly meeting, the Chairman of Kuwait’s offset committee stated that the objectives 
of the program were, “transferring and settling modern technology, creating job opportunities for Kuwaitis, 
and reinforcing training and education.” See “First General Assembly of (Kuwait) National Offset 
Committee Takes Place.” 16 April 2008. Kuwait NOC website.  Abu Dhabi’s 2030 plan also cited 
employment for nationals and technology transfer as the two key goals of the UAE’s new offset guidelines.   
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Technologies in 1995; and again with the British Government in 2008 (the Al Salaam 
deal, Arabic for “peace”).  Al Salaam was initially branded the Al Yamamah II deal, but 
due to the highly publicized allegations of corruption surrounding the previous Al 
Yamamah deal, officials renamed the project.  Additional offset contracts were signed 
between the period of 1995 and 2008, but Saudi officials reported that because some 
were “specific,” while others were more “general” in nature, they were appended to 
previous agreements concluded with obligor firms that already had active offset 
contracts.4 This has been an emerging trend among all the Gulf States – integrating new 
offset agreements into existing ones, and directing new investment to extant domestic 
firms – a phenomenon which further complicates the ability of researchers and industry 
observers to track regional offset activity. 
 
Saudi Arabia’s offset bureaucracy consists of three hierarchical agencies, which fall 
under the umbrella of the EOP (Economic Offset Program).  At the top is the Ministerial 
Committee, a sort of royal steering committee headed by Prince Sultan, who is also the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense & Aviation.5 Second is the Economic 
Offset Committee, headed by Prince Fahad bin Sultan, the Assistant Minister of Defense 
& Aviation, with representatives from the Public Investment Fund and SABIC (the Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation) and deputy ministers from both the Commerce & Industry 
                                                
4 CTO Newsletter 9 June 2008. 26(11). Yes, this is confusing, since “specific” and “general” have opposite 
meanings, it is hard to see why offsets of both types would be kept off the books.  However, the official 
that made the comment did so to the newsletter’s publisher, and when asked by him to elaborate, declined.   
5 Five other Ministers also sit on this committee, including the Minister of Commerce & Industry, the 
Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy & Planning and two Ministers of State with Cabinet Status 
(these positions are usually staffed by well-connected elites with significant technocratic credentials chosen 
to oversee important regulatory or planning bodies). 
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and Economy & Planning ministries; this committee provides final approval to individual 
offset proposals submitted by foreign obligors.6  Under these two agencies sits the 
Economic Offset Secretariat (EOS), in charge of administrative tasks and acting as a 
liaison between the Saudi government, foreign defense contractors and the domestic 
private sector.  The EOS is currently headed by Brigadier General Ibrahim Mishari, a 
former project officer for the U.S.-Saudi Peace Shield Deal.  Mishari’s experience is 
illustrative of the revolving door phenomenon that exists between the Saudi bureaucracy, 
foreign firms and the domestic private sector. When Mishari retired from the military in 
1999, he founded his own company called Aquad for Commerce, which currently owns 
large stakes in two offset-generated ventures: the Arabian Shrimp Company, in which 
Mishari owns18.3%, and the Saudi Communications Development Company, in which 
he owns 50%.  Mishari also owns a 45% stake in DevCorp, a private venture capital firm 
that manages a $35 million investment fund financed by offset obligations from the 
defense firms Raytheon and Thales.7   
 
There are other examples as well.  One is Abdulaziz Al Sugair, the chairman of a joint 
venture created under the Peace Shield deal,8 whose brother – Major General Hamad Al 
Sugair – is Secretary to the Saudi Economic Offset Committee, while another brother, 
                                                
6 Thompson, p3. The specific offices are the Secretary General of the Public Investment Fund, the Deputy 
Minister for Commerce & Industry, the Deputy Minister for Economy & Planning, the Vice Chairman of 
SABIC, and an advisor to the Minister of Commerce & Industry. 
7 This is the Saudi Offset Limited Partnership (SOLP), which is explored in more detail below. 
8 This company is Advanced Electronics Company, which has also benefited from subsequent procurement 
contracts with foreign companies; AEC became the primary subcontractor for AT&T (Lucent 
Technologies) when the latter incurred offset obligations as part of its $6 billion contract to overhaul the 
kingdom’s communications infrastructure.  AEC has also recently secured contracts to work on military 
aircraft sold to the kingdom by BAE. This is examined in more detail below.   
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Faisal Al Sugair, sits on the board of the Saudi British Bank Takaful (SABBT), which 
provides financing and coordination for the UK’s offset obligations in the Kingdom.  
Another is Khalid Al Gosaibi, who currently sits on Saudi Arabia’s Ministerial Offset 
Committee in his capacity as Minister of Economy and Planning,9 and whose family-
owned conglomerate (the Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi & Brothers Company) is the joint 
venture partner for at least two BAE offsets, including the Saudi British Electronics 
Institute and the Saudi Development and Training Company.10   
 
Although the Saudi government agencies involved in the state’s offset program primarily 
consist of representatives from ministries other than the MOD, the agencies and meetings 
are held under the authority of the MOD, which ultimately controls the program.11 This 
conclusion is backed up by the statements of those whose positions have brought them 
into sustained contact with Saudi Arabia’s offset bureaucracy – officials acting on behalf 
of BAE and the UK in discharging offset obligations under the Al Yamamah contract 
claim that the EOS has never responded to project proposals.12  It is more likely that 
individuals higher up in the bureaucratic hierarchy have already issued informal decisions 
                                                
9 The family featured prominently in the financial news during 2009-2010 due to a very public feud 
between its members over $10 billion of misappropriated funds.  Among the allegations (which were issued 
at proceedings in London, Geneva, New York, the Cayman Islands and throughout the Gulf) was misuse of 
corporate funds by a son-in-law, who allegedly kept the proceeds of billions in loans he had issued to 
imaginary entities through a Bahraini shell bank owned by the Al Gosaibi family.  “A Mystery in the Gulf: 
The bizarre mechanics of a huge financial scandal.” 18 February 2010. The Economist.  
10 CTO Newsletter. 8 August 2005. 13(15).  
11 Prince Sultan has held this post since 1962, and he and his associates have benefited a great deal from 
arms deals and the offsets associated with them.  The U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted Sultan’s son, 
Prince Bandar, for accepting bribes from BAE under the Al Yamamah deal, which allegedly amounted to 
some $2 billion. David Leigh and Rob Evans. 7 June 2007. “BAE accused of secretly paying £1bn to Saudi 
prince.” The Guardian (UK). The payments, made in increments of £30 million per quarter over ten years, 
were made via U.S. banks, which gave the DOJ jurisdiction under the FCPA.  
12 CTO Newsletter. 8 August 2005. 23(15).  
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regarding the nature of projects and appropriate domestic partners, making EOS’s actual 
participation unnecessary. 
 
Early offset initiatives in the kingdom centered on increasing state industrial capacity by 
requesting the provision of basic technologies, capital equipment and training.  Saudi 
Arabia’s first offset agreement – the U.S. brokered Peace Shield I signed in 1984 – 
resulted in the creation of six industrial firms: the Middle East Propulsion Company 
(MEPC), the Middle East Battery Company (MEBC), Al Salaam Aircraft Company (Al 
Salaam), the Aircraft Accessories and Components Company (AACC), the Advanced 
Electronics Company (AEC), and International Systems Engineering (ISE).13  Estimates 
of the cost of these projects vary widely, but they likely carried a price tag somewhere 
between $800 million14 and $1.4 billion.15  These projects necessitated sustained 
collaboration with the foreign defense obligor firms in order to ensure adequate access to 
technology and personnel training, a model that ultimately proved unsuccessful.16 As a 
                                                
13 The first Peace Shield deal created MEPC, MEBC, AlSalaam, AEC and AACC; while the second (with 
Hughes) created ISE.  See Efraim Inbar and Benzion Zilberfarb. 1998. The Politics and Economics of 
Defence Industries, p191.  The degree of consolidation in the defense industry means that many of the 
firms originally responsible for the creation of these ventures have been subsumed by competitors.  As a 
result, sources written at different times list different U.S. firms as offset partners.  The original partners 
included: Hughes Aircraft Company (now Raytheon), McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing), General Electric, 
Pratt & Whitney (now part of United Technologies), General Dynamics, and Rolls Royce.  
14 Inbar and Zilberfarb (sited above) give a figure of $600 million (in 1998) for four of the firms.  
15 This represents a 37.5% offset of the original $3.8 billion contract.  Matthews, 2002.  
16 One of the major problems was the absence of highly-skilled Saudi nationals, which necessitated the 
recruitment of foreign workers with all the associated delays in processing visas, permits, etc., as well as 
delays in constructing the necessary facilities.  Wilson, Peter and Douglas Graham. 1994. Saudi Arabia: the 
Coming Storm. New York: M.E. Sharpe, p218-220. Ownership of these firms has also been shuffled back-
and-forth.  Boeing was pulled from the projects by the Saudi government in 1991 and replaced with 
Hughes aircraft, whose eventual demise meant that the Saudi state was forced to assume a larger role in 
financing the operations.  Initially there were two nominally private Saudi firms involved: Saudi Amoudi 
(owned by the Al Amoudi family of Sudanese origin – the patriarch ranks as the fourth richest Arab in the 
world) and the Saudi Overhaul & Maintenance Co., which appears to have been owned by the Saudi Royal 
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result, these ventures struggled to maintain operations until subsequent offset agreements 
– many of them quite recent – compelled exporting firms from the U.S. and Europe to 
revive the companies with MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) contracts and other 
mechanisms designed to infuse capital into the companies.17  For instance Boeing, one of 
the primary contractors for a pending $60 billion U.S.-Saudi arms deal, has become a 
major shareholder in the Al Salaam Aircraft Company in recent years, and the latter’s 
new manufacturing facilities now produce several components for both civilian and 
military aircraft. 
  
The initial struggles encountered by the Peace Shield companies may have influenced 
successive Saudi offset plans, which sought partnerships with non-defense firms, under 
the patronage of the foreign defense obligor firms.  For example, under the UK’s Al-
Yamamah offset agreement, the prime contractor British Aerospace (BAE), brought in 
several large non-defense related European firms, including agribusiness giant Tate & 
Lyle and Glaxo Wellcome, which set up the United Sugar Co. refinery and a 
pharmaceutical plant, respectively.  The agreement also spawned two contracting 
                                                                                                                                            
Family, perhaps via their Unified Holdings company. Today there are a number of government entities 
invested in the Peace Shield companies, including the Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC); the state-owned 
Saudia Airlines; National Industrialization Company, in which several government entities hold shares; and 
the National Commercial Bank (NCB), which the Saudi government has bailed out on at least one 
occasion.  
17 Recent contracts – notably the huge Saudi purchase of Eurofighter Typhoons – have included co-
production elements.  This is striking for two reasons: first, it signals a break with the previous pattern that 
showed a preference for indirect offsets – something that will be addressed in the concluding section of this 
chapter – and second, it may explain the drop-off in offsets reported by the DSCA and DOD.  As with 
Egypt – where co-production in military hardware became a liability because U.S. grants were being used 
to fund overseas production facilities – it may be that government agencies and exporting firms are 
collaborating to camouflage offsets in the original contract.  This allows sales agreements with Egypt to 
bear the phrase, “there are no known offsets in relation to this sale,” a phrase that has also appeared on 
these most recent U.S.-Saudi arms deals, despite the fact that the primary contractors are directing 
significant business to the existing Peace Shield companies. See Al Salaam Horizons, a monthly company 
newsletter, which details some of these new contracts.  
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companies to provide personnel services for domestic firms,18 and seven petrochemical 
ventures.  Petrochemicals proved an ideal sector for offsets, since restrictions on foreign 
investment only applied to upstream petroleum activities like exploration and 
extraction.19 Petrochemical partners brought in by BAE and the UK government included 
British Petroleum, Honeywell UOP, Phenolchemie, Harlow Chemical, Flover, Bassel, 
Huntsman, and Davy Process Technology.20  These ventures included large-scale 
facilities that produced multiple petrochemicals for export as well as projects like 
Plastbau Saudi Arabia, which utilizes a specific petrochemical (polystyrene) in the 
production of trademarked building materials.21   
 
Despite the shifts in sectors targeted for offset investment, the practice of subsidizing 
Saudi economic elites has remained fairly consistent.  The domestic partners for the 
British sugar refinery mentioned above included Savola – a huge Saudi conglomerate 
owned by some of the wealthiest families in the region22 – and 13 individual Saudi sugar 
                                                
18 Ironically, much of the business of these two firms is performed by its foreign managers or outsourced to 
foreign firms.  One of the two companies – Saudi Development & Training Company – is managed by a 
cadre of British expatriates, and a recent deal outsourced SDT’s procurement to Xchanging, a UK-based 
‘procurement services provider.’ “Xchanging Wins a Two Year Outsourcing Contract with Saudi 
Development and Training Company (SDT).” 13 July 2010. Marketwire (UK).  
19 This is despite the fact that the decades-long negotiations on establishing bilateral FTAs between the EU 
and GCC have stalled due to EU insistence on protecting its own domestic petrochemical sector by 
blocking imports from the GCC States.  
20 Ramady, p284-6.  These offsets included the transfer of technology for a Cyclar plant operated by the 
SABIC, a Cumene manufacturing facility, Dhahran Harco Chemical Industries Ltd., Rezayat Flover, 
UNILUBE (a waste oil recycling facility), the Saudi Polyolephins Company, and the Gulf Advanced 
Chemical Company.   
21 Plastbau technology is registered to the Swiss company Plastedil, and involves pouring expanded 
polystyrene into concrete forms to produce insulated walls, which are then used in building construction. 
22 Board members include Ammar Al Khudairy; Ghassan Al Sulaiman (Ghassan Ahmad Al Sulaiman 
Development Company); Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al Issa; Yousef Alireza; and Mosa bin Omran 
Mohammed Al Omran. 
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traders.23  Likewise, the major shareholders of the U.S.-funded Middle East Propulsion 
and Battery Companies mentioned above included the uber-wealthy Al Jomaih, Al Zamil, 
Al Mutlaq, Al Issa and Bulabaid families,24 whose merchant histories predate the 
founding of the modern Saudi state.  
 
Offset projects resulting from French sales to the Kingdom followed the British model by 
avoiding the direct participation of the defense firms, which now served as deal-
facilitators and investors rather than technology partners, but followed the same 
precedents in terms of elite patronage.  French projects under the first Sawari deal 
included a gold refinery, a firm specializing in the construction of metering and 
measuring devices used in the mineral/mining sector, and two additional petrochemical 
companies, the Saudi French Chemical Company and Al Bilad Catalysts Company Ltd,25 
- all of which involved the Alireza family as primary shareholders.26  Several other 
pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies were also formed under subsequent 
agreements with U.S. and European firms.27  Other notable ventures include the Middle 
                                                
23 In addition to controlling nearly 2/3 of the Saudi market for sugar and edible oils, Savola operates in 
three additional sectors: retail – including a large grocery store chain; plastics; and real estate. It also has a 
franchising unit with exclusive rights to import a number of foreign brands. Savola Group, company 
webpage: http://www.savola.com/savolae/About_The_Savola_Group.php.  Accessed 4 January 2011.  
24 Ramady.  
25 This list of projects is taken from a textbook chapter on technology transfer in Saudi Arabia by M.A. 
Ramady. Ramady also identifies some of the individual investors (although, interestingly only in the 
unpublished manuscript version of the chapter).  Other investor information came from publications like 
Hoovers, BusinessWeek, Zawya and MEED, as mentioned above.  
26 This family’s merchant pedigree is aptly demonstrated by the commercial license number issued to them 
by the Saudi State: number 1.  
27 These include CAD Middle East pharmaceuticals, Deef Pharmaceuticals, Arabian Diagnostic & Medical 
Company, Olayan Baxter Company Ltd., and GE-El Seif Healthcare Arabia. 
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East Power Company, a joint venture with General Electric, and several vocational 
training centers with large defense-related maintenance and training programs.28 
 
Two Saudi merchant families in particular provide illustrative examples of the mechanics 
of offset programs: the Alireza and Zamil families.  The Alireza family29 was a domestic 
partner for at least two of the 11 projects generated by the UK’s Al-Yamamah offset in 
1986: the United Sugar Company (Yussef Alireza sits on the board of Savola, which 
owns 51% of the venture), and Rezayat Flover, a joint venture between the British 
electronics manufacturer Flover, and Rezayat Group, one of the Alireza family’s two 
conglomerate companies, which has a U.S. subsidiary – Rezayat America – and 19 other 
subsidiary companies operating in Saudi Arabia.30  Their activities stretch across the 
entire spectrum of the Saudi economy, from distribution of foreign imports, construction 
and real estate to tourism and telecommunications. The Alireza family was also the 
primary partner for a project implemented by the French under the Sawari II offset, 
which was linked to the $3.6 billion sale of 3 La Fayette F3000S frigates to the Royal 
Saudi Naval Forces concluded in 2002.31  This project was the creation of the Al Bilad 
                                                
28 Many of the largest defense firms – Boeing, BAE, Thales and United Technologies – have committed 
substantial funds to set up research facilities, finance scholarships, and fund exchange programs for Saudi 
students interested in careers in the defense industry.  Some of the institutions that have received the most 
funds include Dar Al Faisal University, King Saud University, King Abdulaziz University, the King 
Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology, and the King Abdullah University for Science & Technology.  
29 Like the Ghosaibi family, the Alireza family was powerful well before Ibn Saud managed to extend his 
rule over the peninsula.  They held important government posts under the Hashemite ruler in the Gulf – 
Sherif Ali – who reigned (rather feebly) under the protection of the British until it was clear that Ibn Saud 
and his Nejdi army were going to unseat him, at which time he promptly set sail on a British ship bound for 
Egypt. Field, p13-28.   
30 The two conglomerate companies are the Rezayat Group and the Haji Abdullah Alireza & Co. Ltd 
(HAACO).  
31 Like the earlier Saudi-UK deals, a portion (15%) of the price was paid in oil. Janes Defence Weekly.  
“Sawari II Offsets Well Underway.” 6 May 1995. 
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Catalyst Company, a petrochemical firm, in which the Alireza family held a 40% stake 
through two of its subsidiaries: 20% through its National Contracting Company, part of 
Rezayat Group, and another 20% through its Al Bilad Trading and Economic 
Establishment, an engineering and construction company. 
 
The Zamil Group has also been a key recipient of offset largesse, and has been intimately 
involved with the program since its inception; Abdul Rahman Al-Zamil – the family 
patriarch – was labeled “one of the real architects of the [Saudi] offset program,”32 in a 
1996 speech by Carlyle Group Chairman and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank 
Carlucci while the latter was serving as an offset advisor to the Saudi government.33  The 
Zamil Group is the domestic partner for the Gulf Advanced Chemical Industries 
Company (GACIC), one of the first (and largest) offset projects initiated under the UK’s 
Al Yamamah Offset program,34 and is also one of the primary shareholders in the Saudi 
International Petrochemical Company (SIPC or Sipchem), which is itself the product of 
an offset obligation incurred by the French defense firm Thales.  The cost of establishing 
Sipchem – and another firm Sahara Petrochemicals, also a Thales offset – is estimated at 
about $1.8 billion.35  Most recently (in 2007), Sipchem initiated a joint venture with Helm 
                                                
32 Speech by Frank Carlucci.  “Workshop on the Offset Program: A Launchpad for Joint Ventures.” 
http://www.us-saudi-business.org/p96ws2.htm.  The Carlyle Group made its name during the 1990s 
rehabilitating floundering defense companies and selling them to the largest firms.  The group was also the 
official advisor to the Saudi Offset Committee from 1992 until 2001.   
33 www.zamil.com. Company website. Accessed 14 January 2011.  
34 John Presley, Economic Advisor to the Saudi British Bank (SABB). Date unknown. “The Al Yamamah 
Economic Offset Programme: A Guide to Business Procedures in Saudi Arabia: Helping Business in Saudi 
Arabia Series.” The Saudi British Bank, p4.  The petrochemical company Huntsman Corporation (US) was 
one of the major foreign partners for this venture; investment startup costs (in 2002) were estimated at $220 
million.  The Al Yamamah arms sale was concluded in 1985, its offset program was launched in 1989.  
35 1 December 2005. “Saudi-French Economic Projects.” ArabNews.  
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Arabia, also the product of a previous French offset.36  Abdul Rahman Al-Zamil is also a 
former Deputy Minister of Commerce37 and a member of the Consultative Council (an 
appointed body of ‘notables’ which either transmits public opinion to the King or 
provides a scapegoat for disastrous royal decrees, depending on one’s viewpoint).38 In 
February 2010, Abdul Rahman Al-Zamil was given a spot on the newly created Central 
Committee for Local Industrialization.39  Comprised of business leaders and defense 
officials, the committee is part of a broader effort to encourage foreign defense firms with 
offset obligations to subcontract with Saudi manufacturers.   
 
If offset investment (like all patronage) is designed to reward loyal elites and co-opt 
potential dissenters, it appears to have served its purpose.  Both Abdul Rahman Al Zamil 
(chairman of Al Zamil Group) and the recently deceased Ghazi Al Gosaibi (former Labor 
Minister) were prominent leftist intellectuals on a collision course with the conservative 
rule of King Faisal before they were brought in and groomed for bureaucratic service by 
the younger and more liberal future ruler King Fahd.40  Zamil, for his part, lauded the 
                                                
36 Helm Arabia is jointly owned by the German Company Helm AG and the French defense firm Thales.  5 
June 2007. “Sipchem and HELM ARABIA sign joint venture agreements for acetyl projects.” 
http://www.helmag.com/de/news/sipchem-helm-arabia-joint-venture.html. Helm AG press release.  
37 Zamil held this post for 16 years.  
38 Champion. The Paradoxical Kingdom: p290-1.  
39 Reuters News Agency. 7 February 2010. “Saudi Arabia opens military supply to local firms.”  
40 Hertog. Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats, p99.  Gosaibi was an extremely popular literary figure, whose 
books remained banned in the Kingdom until shortly before his death in 2010.  Among his most well-
known works are a collection of poetry called “Battle without a Flag” and a novel titled “An Apartment 
Called Freedom.”  
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offset program as “not…only an investment instrument, but a program able to sell Saudi 
Arabia to the largest corporations in the world.”41  
 
A recent feature of GCC offset programs is the practice of allowing firms with offset 
obligations to capitalize new state-owned investment funds (a sort of sovereign wealth 
fund financed by foreign defense firms) rather than establish joint venture companies 
with domestic partners.  The UAE has vigorously pursued this avenue since the late 
1990s/early 2000s, and, for a time, it was also a key feature of Kuwait’s offset program.  
However, Saudi Arabia has only one such fund thus far, and does not appear eager to 
duplicate the experience. The Saudi Offset Limited Partnership (SOLP) is a fund set up 
by DevCorp International, a private equity firm incorporated in Bahrain, whose sole 
investment activity appears to be the implementation of offset projects on behalf of 
Raytheon and Thales, which provide the money for SOLP.42  Along with the 
aforementioned General Mishari of the EOS, who holds a 45% stake in DevCorp, the 
other shareholders are an American investor and the wife of a German man who was 
kidnapped in Kuwait by Iraqi invasion forces during the First Gulf War.43 Although 
previous references to DevCorp in financial publications listed SOLP’s assets at around 
$25 million44 (a paltry sum in any event given the billions that Saudi officials insisted 
would be forthcoming from their offset programs), industry trade publications revealed in 
                                                
41 Carlyle Group. Presentation to Saudi Arabia Economic Offset Committee.  1996. P11.  
42 70% of the investment comes from Raytheon; the other 30% from Thales.  
43 DevCorp is owned by Ibrahim Mishari (45.45%); James Lewis Greenberg (36.36%); and Suzan Jahnke 
(18.18%). Suzan’s husband Uwe was the one kidnapped by Iraqi forces.   
44 Pearl, Daniel. April 20, 2000.  “Arms Dealers Get Creative with ‘Offsets’.”  Wall Street Journal, Eastern 
Edition.  
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2007 that SOLP’s actual investments were in the range of only $3-4 million.45  Despite 
the small sum, both Raytheon and Thales have received substantial offset credits from the 
SOLP, principally due to offset multipliers.  DevCorp’s managing director boasts that the 
company aims for projects that garner credits equal to six to eight times the actual cash 
investment, and even ten times when possible.46 
 
The Al Yamamah Offset: Saudi Arabia, the UK, and British Aerospace (BAE) 
The dramatic allegations of corruption surrounding the British Al-Yamamah arms deal 
has resulted in a large body of published material, including leaked government 
documents and official testimonies, that are not available for most other offset programs. 
These materials provide substantial insight into the offset process, meriting a more in-
depth investigation here. Although the first phase of the Al-Yamamah offset was initiated 
in 1988 (three years after Saudi Arabia signed the original contract to purchase 72 
Tornado fighter-bombers, 30 Hawk trainers, PC-9 aircraft, naval vessels, associated 
equipment/services and airfield construction at a cost of $7.6 billion) the UK’s joint 
management team of MoD and BAE representatives is still implementing projects.47 The 
deal would eventually grow to more than £43 billion (almost $60 billion), making it 
Britain’s largest-ever defense export deal,48 and the offsets have been correspondingly 
extensive.  Although the British Offset Office – the UK MOD’s official offset liaison – 
                                                
45 CTO Newsletter. 15 January 2007. 25(2).  
46 Then-managing director Bill Barilka told the publisher of the CTO Newsletter, “We strive to get 
somewhere between six and eight times the actual cash investment [in credits].  Some projects can even 
enjoy a multiplier of 10 but each offset program is different.” CTO Newsletter. 15 January 2007. 25(2).  
47 The latest offset project was a $280 million petrochemical project. CTO Newsletter. 23 March 2009. 
27(6).   
48 “Saudis countdown to Typhoon service entry.” 13 May 2010.  Arabian Aerospace.  
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provided a figure of $2.6 billion in offset investment as of 2007,49 today these officials 
claim to have “a gentleman’s agreement” with the Kingdom that precludes any “talk 
about the value of offset credits” even as “the program will continue to run and run.” 50 It 
is worth noting briefly here that, unlike the UK and France, the US has no official offset 
agency.  Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, the US Government has explicitly prohibited the 
participation of any US Government employee in offset-related activities – whether 
through conducting negotiations, providing performance guarantees, or monitoring 
fulfillment of contracts, since offsets are considered private agreements between the firms 
and their overseas customers.  
 
Under the Al Yamamah contract, in order to beat out a competitive French tender the UK 
agreed to take payment for its arms in oil51 – roughly half a million barrels of it – which 
Saudi Arabia agreed to sell to the British firms BP and Royal Dutch Shell at a low fixed 
price.52  The firms then sold the oil on the international market, and after keeping some of 
the proceeds as payment for their intermediary services, the oil companies deposited the 
remaining funds into an escrow account in London, to which BAE and the UK MoD were 
                                                
49 CTO Newsletter. 9 April 2007. 25(7).  
50 Tony Smith, UK Ministry of Defense British Offset Office on the status of the Al Yamamah offset 
program, April 2007.  Reported in CTO Newsletter.  9 April 2007. 25(7).  
51 Frederic S. Pearson.  1988. “The priorities of arms importing states reviewed.” Contemporary Security 
Policy. 9(2), p179.  The French lost out to the British on the Saudi sale despite offering a loan at only 3% 
interest – compared to the 9-10% that is standard for OECD countries, p185.  Because US equipment is 
generally considered to be the most technologically advanced, the European producers often concentrate on 
offering better terms – such as low interest rates or oil-barter schemes – in order to compete.  
52 Chris Thompson.  1 September 1994. “Planned International Technology Transfer: The ‘Economic 
Offset’ Example in Saudi Arabia.” Digest of Middle East Studies. 3(1): p8. 
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signatories.53  All told, an estimated £15 billion in bribe money was paid to members of 
the Royal Family,54 which was facilitated by the fact that normal accounting and 
oversight procedures were not present, as the deal was concluded under treaty terms 
between the two governments rather than as an arms sale.55 Because most of the Al 
Yamamah projects brought in third party investors (pharmaceutical firms, petrochemical 
companies, construction firms, etc.) and involved a range of offset brokers and local 
“consultants” as well as Saudi and foreign financial institutions, the number of 
transactions involved in each project was greatly multiplied, as were the opportunities for 
corruption. Tellingly, one of the participants in the offset program, Rolls Royce, was the 
subject of a Saudi high court writ because of its failure to pay commissions at the 
‘contracted rate’ of 15-100%.56 
 
Like the earlier Peace Shield companies, the Al-Yamamah offsets met with a number of 
operational obstacles, including delay due to the 1991 Gulf War and a shortage of British 
investors willing to participate in joint ventures inside the kingdom.  The first project, 
worth only £1.8 million (in 2005 dollars) was not initiated until 1993 – nearly 8 years 
after the initial MoU was signed.57 This is despite a sizeable contingent of UK 
government employees working in the British Offset Office in Saudi Arabia, which 
                                                
53 Chris Thompson.  1 September 1994. “Planned International Technology Transfer: The ‘Economic 
Offset’ Example in Saudi Arabia.” Digest of Middle East Studies. 3(1): p8. 
54 CTO Newsletter. 14 August 2006. 24(15).  
55 CTO Newsletter. 27 April 2009. 27(8).  
56 Catherine Courtney.  “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade.” April 2002.  Policy Research Paper 001.  
Transparency International (UK).   
57 CTO 8 August 2005. 23(15).  
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sponsors investor conferences and boasts an extensive list of investment incentives 
available to those willing to invest – many of which are outlined in the section below on 
state subsidizes available to firms under the offset program.  Briefly, some of these 
include ‘soft loans,’58 $10 million worth of matching funds, duty exemptions, low cost 
utilities and rents, tariff free access to other GCC markets, free business consultant 
services, and other types of professional support like market research.59  Offset-generated 
joint ventures also qualify for tax holidays, unrestricted repatriation of profits, 
exemptions from import duties, and access to “reasonably-priced infrastructural 
amenities.”60 In 1989, the deputy head of procurement in the U.K.’s Ministry of Defense 
ordered an investigation of the Ministry’s handling of the Al Yamamah arms sale.  The 
country’s National Audit Office (Special Fraud Office) completed the report in 1992, but 
its findings were suppressed.  The official reason was the large number of defense jobs 
involved – Al-Yamamah alone accounted for more than 20% of U.K. arms export 
employment for over a decade61 – and the possibility of “upsetting” the Saudi royal 
family.62 Currently 27% of employees working for the UK’s official defense sales 
                                                
58 A soft loan here is defined as money lent at Sibor + 0.375 percent.  That is the rate at which Saudi banks 
lend to eachother (the Saudi Interbank Offered Rate) + 0.375 percent.  This is much lower than the rate a 
firm would get from pursuing a commercial loan through ordinary channels.  
59 CTO 8 August 2005. 23(15).  
60 Anuradha Mitra.  January 2009.  “A Survey of Successful Offset Experiences Worldwide.” Journal of 
Defence Studies (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, India).  3(1), p47.  
61 Transparency International, “Corruption in the Legal Arms Trade,” p35.   
62 Transparency International, “Corruption in the Legal Arms Trade,” p35.  The head of the Public 
Accounts Committee in the U.K. Parliament, Robert Sheldon, refused even to reveal the content of the 
report to the other members of the PAC.   
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agency, the Defense Export Services Organization, work for the “Saudi Armed Forces 
Project.”63  
 
Although an original offset target of £1 billion in investment was agreed to early on, that 
figure was surpassed in the late 1990s, according to a paper submitted to the Saudis by 
the British Offset Office.64 Although the paper never received an official response, 
unofficially the Saudi government insists the figure has not been met by British 
investment.65 This difference of opinion is facilitated by the fact that no actual offset 
contract was written, and therefore there are no penalty clauses, no milestone targets, no 
reporting requirements, no quotas, no fulfillment periods, and no arbitration clauses66  - 
just a “best endeavors” approach that, like the “good faith” commitment governing U.S. 
offsets in the Kingdom, provides little motivation for either side to pursue meaningful 
projects.67 And because there is no physical contract, the Saudis have not ‘signed off’ on 
the completion of any Al Yamamah projects.68  Yet, the investment trajectory continues.  
In 2007, an official in the UK Ministry of Defense stated that, 
We have had a directive from the Saudi government that the Al Yamamah 
economic program is to continue in parallel to the new [Al Salaam/Eurofighter 
Typhoon] deal.  The UK government has agreed to this [and] will continue to 
                                                
63  The employee count is 161 out of a total of 600. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/mar/09/freedomofinformation.armstrade.  
64 CTO Newsletter. 9 April 2007. 25(7).  
65 CTO Newsletter. 9 April 2007. 25(7). 
66 CTO 8 August 2005. 23(15).  
67 Ronald Matthews. “Saudi Arabia: Defense Offsets and Development.” P206 
68 CTO 8 August 2005. 23(15).  
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support the offset program, sees it as a cornerstone of the relationship between the 
two countries, and intends to run with it until the Saudis tell us to stop.69 
 
 
Distribution of Offset Investment in Saudi Arabia 
Although diversification is the stated goal of Saudi Arabia’s economic offset program, a 
large portion of offsets have went to the downstream petroleum sector, which already 
accounts for most of Saudi Arabia’s economic activity.  And if the kingdom did not have 
restrictions on foreign ownership on upstream activities (exploration and extraction), it is 
likely that more offsets would be directed toward exploiting the kingdom’s raw materials.  
A 2005 study conducted by a Saudi economist (using government reports issued in 2003) 
concluded that downstream oil enterprises and related manufacturing processes have 
received 54% of offset investment.70  The remaining 46% was distributed amongst: 
training and education programs for Saudi nationals (24%), import-substitution/export-
driven industries (15%), and the service sector (7%).71  A later report published in an 
offset industry newsletter and based on the data released by the Saudi Economic Offset 
Secretariat in 2008 confirmed the dominance of petrochemical investment, but found that 
far fewer offset resources were being directed toward training/education programs.  
According to these new figures downstream oil enterprises accounted for 56% of offset 
investment; followed by electronics and defense/aviation manufacturing (13% each); 
                                                
69 CTO.  9 April 2007. 15(7).  
70 Petrochemicals account for about $359 million out of a total of $667 million in offset investment. The 
figure of $667 million represents foreign share ownership.  When domestic investors are included, the 
projects equal $2.2 billion. Ramady (2005), p288.  
71 Data includes offset projects implemented as of 2002. Ramady (2005), p288.  
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food/drug processing (12%); and assembly/recycling and education/other services (3% 
each).72   
 
Tawazun (Balance) and Alfia (Goals): Defense Offsets in The United Arab Emirates 
Official figures from Abu Dhabi cite 40 offset projects as of 2010, valued at about $2.2 
billion. 73 The UAE’s early offset strategy avoided the large-scale industrial projects 
pursued by Saudi Arabia in favor of a broader mix of ventures, including luxury real 
estate development, leasing programs for aircraft, oil tankers and other ‘big-ticket’ items, 
agriculture and fish farming initiatives, a shipbuilding facility, waste management 
services, a district-wide air conditioning project, and agreements to acquire services from 
Western legal and financial firms regarding activities like establishing asset management 
vehicles and designing business regulations.74 The UAE’s population, which is sparse 
even by Gulf standards, meant that grand industrial initiatives were never viable 
options.75 Additionally, the dramatic shift in development narratives that transpired 
between the mid-1980s, when Saudi Arabia initiated its pursuit of offsets, and the early 
1990s when the UAE followed suit, made state support for indigenous industry an even 
less popular development scheme.   
 
                                                
72 CTO Newsletter 9 June 2008. 26(11).  
73http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20100613121641/UAE%20launches%20new%20offset%2
0policy 
74 The UAE is unarguably at the forefront of utilizing offset commitments to establish investment vehicles 
– it has several state-managed funds that invest offset dollars, including Mubadala, Tawazun, and the Alfia 
Fund, which will all be examined in greater detail below.    
75 The large-scale construction projects undertaken in the UAE do not contradict this general observation as 
those who work on these projects are poor migrants, not members of an indigenous workforce whose 
employment is a strategic objective of the government.   
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This sectoral diversity, however, has not been mirrored in the composition of the pool of 
domestic investors; shareholders and key executives are largely drawn from the 
wealthiest and most politically well-connected families, including the Al Ghosaibi, Al 
Suweidi, Al Nowais, Al Mazrouei, and Al Jaber families. A 2008 report released by the 
UAE-based investment bank The National Investor analyzed the board membership of 
582 companies to produce a list of the ten most powerful families in each of the GCC 
member states.76  Eight of the ten families listed for Abu Dhabi hold either significant 
shares and/or seats on the boards of an average of 3.8 companies that were either 
established under an offset commitment or received substantial investment via an offset 
agreement.77 These include the Suweidi, Dhaheri, Hajeri, Qassimi (rulers of Sharjah and 
Ras Al-Khaimah), Nahyan (rulers of Abu Dhabi), Otaiba, Mazrouei, and Sayegh families.  
Two families with a significant presence in offset-related ventures that are not on the TNI 
list include the Nowais family (which has interests in six offset-related ventures) and Al 
Jaber family (which has interests in four offset-related ventures).  Both patriarchs of these 
families are billionaires, and both earned their way onto a similar “power list” compiled 
in 2005 by the independent UAE-based newspaper The National.   
 
Other names with a noticeable presence in offset-related activities in the UAE – the 
Khoury, Mansoori, Mubarak, and Muhairi families – are all prominent families according 
to other indicators of influence, such as their political connections to the Royal Family, or 
                                                
76 “Power matters: A Survey of GCC Boards.” 13 May 2008. The National Investor.  The report covers 
3,493 individual board members occupying 4,254 board seats across 582 listed companies; with the board 
seats weighted according to the market capitalization of the company.  
77 The two families that made TNI’s list but did not have direct shareholdings in any offset-generated 
companies or hold seats on the boards of any offset-generated companies in the UAE were the Omran and 
Rostomani families.   
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their personal wealth.78 Several families with connections to the UAE Armed Forces have 
also benefited from offset-related investment, including the Al Ketbi, Al Kaabi, and 
Rumaithi families.79  
 
When the growing influence of emerging market economies put sovereign wealth funds 
squarely in the global economic spotlight Abu Dhabi seized the opportunity to use the 
resources generated by offset commitments to establish three new state-owned 
investment vehicles: Mubadala (“exchange”), which is now the Emirates’ third-largest 
state-owned fund after the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and the International 
Petroleum Investments Company; Tawazun (“balance”); and the Alfia (“goals”) Fund, 
which were all originally capitalized with money from offset obligors.  The two largest 
funds – Mubadala and Tawazun – are technically overseen by Emirati government 
officials, although in practice (like most SWFs) they are run by professional financial 
                                                
78 The Khoury and Muhairi families just missed the TNI top-10 list (they were numbers six and ten on the 
‘unweighted’ list, respectively); Sultan bin Saeed Al Mansoori is the UAE’s Minister of the Economy; 
Khaldoon Khalifa Mubarak is the CEO of Mubadala, and ranks 23 on ArabianBusiness’ list of the 500 
most influential Arabs.  
79 Obaid Al Ketbi, the Director of General Procurement for the UAE Armed Forces, also sits on the board 
of Abu Dhabi Ship Building, the result of an offset with Northrop Grumman; while Abdullah Darwish Al 
Ketbi is a principal shareholder in United Technical Services, which received investment from the French 
firm Dassault under an offset agreement. Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Mohammad 
Helal Al Kaabi is the Chairman of International Golden Group, which received substantial investment 
dollars from the Tawazun fund.  The Rumaithi family holds several high level posts in the UAE Armed 
Forces, including Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces (Hamad Mohammed Thani Al Rumaithi), Vice 
Chief of Staff (Saeed Al Rumaithi), and Chief of Logistics Staff (Dr. Khalifa Al Rumaithi); while Matar Al 
Rumaithi is a Director in the UAE’s Offset Program Bureau.  Thani Al Rumaithi holds a senior level 
management position in Tabreed (an offset-generated company); Abdullah Khalfan Al Rumaithi is a former 
board member of the real estate giant Aldar Properties, which received funds for specific development 
projects under offset agreements; and Saeed (the Vice Chief of Staff noted above) is a principal shareholder 
in a venture capital firm along with General Khaled Abu Ainnain, who has leveraged offset obligations to 
start at least five separate ventures.  Other individuals who have leveraged their military careers to gain 
assets through the offset program are the above-mentioned Abu Ainnain and Homaid Al Shemmari, a 
former Lieutenant Colonel in the UAE Armed Forces, who is now the Executive Director of Mubadala’s 
aerospace subsidiary and Chairman of Abu Dhabi Autonomous Systems Investments LLC, Abu Dhabi 
Aircraft Technologies, Advanced Military Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Centre, and a board member 
of Abu Dhabi Ship Building and Al Yah Satellite Communications Company.   
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managers, whereas Alfia is a $10 million private equity fund managed by the First Gulf 
Bank and incorporated in Mauritius.  Although such investment funds were first proposed 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration in 1997 as a 
“convenient vehicle” to administer the large offset commitments incurred by U.S. firms,80 
the UAE appears to be the only country that has enthusiastically adopted this model.81  
The boards of directors and senior executives of the funds are drawn from the upper 
echelons of the Emirati elite – and include significant overlapping membership.  
Mubadala’s board and senior executives include Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh 
Mohammed, Mohammad Ahmed Al Bowardi – the secretary general of the Abu Dhabi 
Executive Council – as well as members of the influential Suwaidi, Muhairi, and 
Mubarak families;82 Tawazun’s four-member board also includes Sheikh Mohammed and 
Mohammad Ahmed Al Bowardi, as well as members of the Sayegh and Mazrouei 
families – all of whom also sit on the board of the Offset Program Bureau, the UAE’s 
                                                
80 Since then, however, BIS, has criticized this method of offset fulfillment for the same reason that offset 
critics have in the U.S. Congress also rebuffed the idea – mainly that investment funds would facilitate a 
system of granting favors and delivering bribes to procurement officials because the financial regulatory 
and oversight apparatus present in many procuring countries is inadequate.  See Daniel Pearl.  April 20, 
2000. “Arms Dealers Get Creative with ‘Offsets.’” Wall Street Journal.  
81 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have also launched similar offset-financed investment funds, but to date these 
have not been used to establish ventures engaged in the production of defense material.     
82 These members are: Mohammed Ahmed Al Bowardi, Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi, Nasser Ahmed 
Khalifa Al Suwaidi, Abdulhamid Mohammed Saeed, Mahmoud Ibrahim Al Mahmoud, and Khaldoon 
Khalifa Al Mubarak. Other Mubadala executives include Homaid Al Shemmari – who is also the Chairman 
of Abu Dhabi Autonomous Systems Investments, a subsidiary of Tawazun; Suhail Mahmood Al Ansari, 
who is also chairman of the Imperial College London Diabetes Center, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Mubadala, and a director of Agility Abu Dhabi – the Abu Dhabi based operation of the Kuwaiti defense 
logistics company in which Mubadala recently purchased a large stake; Jassim Mohamed Al Zaabi, who is 
also the CEO of Yahsat, another Mubadala subsidiary; and Ali Eid Am Mehairi/Muhairi, who recently 
became Chairman of the UAE’s largest real estate developer Aldar Properties, which received an enormous 
infusion of capital from Mubadala after suffering major losses during the recent financial crisis.     
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official offset bureaucracy.  Abdulhamid Mohammed Saeed is on Mubadala’s board and 
is also managing director of the First Gulf Bank – which oversees the Alfia Fund.83  
 
Mubadala has been the source of some very large public infrastructure projects, including 
the $3.5 billion Dolphin Gas pipeline, which transports natural gas from Qatar to the 
UAE, as well as the Mubadala Oil & Gas Company, which has operations in the Middle 
East as well as Central and East Asia.84  By contrast, the Alfia Fund – established in 
2000, has been used to finance smaller projects.85  One company in which Alfia is 
invested is Mahaleel, a manufacturer of intravenous solutions (known as the National 
Medical Solutions company in English).  Mahaleel’s primary domestic shareholder is the 
Bin Nawi Group, chaired by the powerful and well-connected Mohammed Mubarak Al 
Mazrouei.  The Mazrouei family re-appears on the boards and as major shareholders in a 
number of offset-related entities, including Dolphin Energy; Mubadala Oil & Gas; the 
Abu Dhabi World Trade Centre; Tabreed (the National Central Cooling Company); Abu 
Dhabi Shipbuilding; German & Emirates Company Ltd.; the Bena/Bina Group (which is 
an investor in two projects financed by the Alfia Fund); on the Tawazun board; and in 
key executive positions in the UAE’s offset bureaucracy.86  
 
                                                
83 Saeed is also a former director (until 2006) of Al-Waha, one of the UAE’s largest offset-generated 
companies, and one of the first companies to be floated on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange.  
84 Mubadala Oil & Gas operates as Pearl Energy in Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, 
Bahrain, Kazakhstan and Malaysia; as Liwa Energy Ltd. in Libya;  
85 CTO 12 March 2007. 25(5). Also see UAE Yearbook. 
www.uaeinteract.com/uaeint_misc/pdf_2005/English_2005/eyb7.pdf.  Accessed May 4, 2009. 
86 Mohamed Saif Al Mazrouei is CEO of the UAE’s Offset Program Bureau. 
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An interesting trend is the increasing emphasis on using the Tawazun fund to finance 
projects with direct military applications.  Although there is not sufficient space to 
examine this shift here,87 there are a handful of Emirati military officers whose private 
business enterprises have benefited from this new investment trajectory, suggesting that 
the practice of utilizing offset investment to subsidize critical elite constituencies remains 
a robust observation.  Because this strategy has been employed for only a few years, it is 
difficult to characterize its causes or consequences with much certainty. However, in the 
author’s view, an increasing number of military officers are benefiting from offset-
generated investment not because the well-established elite merchant families see the 
military as an increasingly important avenue of influence, but because several extant 
factors have made military officers more elite.  These factors include the large sums spent 
on procurement; the increasing prevalence of military exchanges that bring foreign 
officers to train at U.S. and European military colleges; and the increased number of 
interactions between representatives of private industry and foreign procurement officials 
– all of which have created important economic opportunities for families traditionally 
associated with the military in the UAE.   
 
The funds are also used to offer financial guarantees to foreign firms in order to 
encourage them to enter into joint ventures with Emirati companies.  For example, the 
same month Tawazun purchased a 26% share in The International Golden Group – a 
                                                
87 I would point readers to a paper I recently wrote (forthcoming from the Kuwait Program at Sciences Po, 
Paris) titled “Emergent Trends in Gulf Security Policy: Offset Investment and Indigenous Defense 
Production in the Arab Gulf,” which specifically examines this question.   
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retail and distribution company owned by Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Major 
General Mohammed Helal Al Kaabi – it was also announced that IGG had signed an 
agreement with the South African defense firm Paramount to build a factory in the UAE 
where they would jointly produce armored vehicles for the domestic and export markets.  
Comments by Paramount executives emphasized the UAE’s aggressive industrial policy 
– primarily its emphasis on expanding manufacturing – as evidence of the feasibility of 
the venture, which executives suggested could be expanded through additional joint 
ventures with IGG in the future.88  Likewise, three years after Tawazun entered into a 
three-way venture with the private sector conglomerate Al Jaber Group and the German 
defense firm Rheinmetal Munitions to build a munitions factory in the UAE,89 Al Jaber 
Group was chosen to partner with the German defense firm Diehl to upgrade the UAE 
Armed Forces’ existing fleet of land vehicles,90 and was also given responsibility to 
oversee the acquisition of HETs (heavy equipment transporters) from U.S.-based 
Oshkosh Defense on behalf of the UAE’s Armed Forces, although it is unclear what 
service Al Jaber Group was to have provided in the scope of this contract.   
 
Foreign defense firms may also enter into joint ventures as a way of rewarding influential 
officials who may have aided the firm in landing previous contracts.  For example, 
Emirates Advanced Investments/EAI is a private company owned by retired Special 
Forces Colonel Hussain Ibrahim Al Hammadi, described in a State Department cable as 
                                                
88 “UAE armoured vehicle venture with Paramount.” 22 February 2011. Reuters. Also see Ivan Gale. 
“Capital targets military vehicles.” 10 April 2011.  The National (UAE) 
89 “UAE’s first munitions factory to be set up in Abu Dhabi.” 28 November 2007. Press release. 
90 “Al Jaber Group and Diehl Defense sign a Joint Venture during IDEX 2011.” 23 February 2011. Zawya.  
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having “close ties” to Abu Dhabi’s ruling family.91 In 2008 Raytheon agreed to partner 
with EAI to develop a laser-guidance kit for unguided helicopter rockets.92 The previous 
year Raytheon had landed a $76 million missile supply contract with Abu Dhabi Ship 
Building, where Hammadi is on the board of directors.93 Similarly, in 2009 two large 
European defense firms that had served as major suppliers to Abu Dhabi Ship Building 
established joint ventures with C4 Advanced Solutions, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Hammadi’s EAI.94 Since being formed in 2006, EAI has added about 12 subsidiaries, 
including Global Aerospace Logistics and Golden Advanced Land Systems, both of which 
are joint ventures with the above-mentioned International Golden Group.95 
 
The UAE’s offset funds have also been used to increase the government’s stake in 
ventures established by previous offset obligations – often by acquiring the outstanding 
shares still held by the original defense obligor firms.  This was the case with Eships 
                                                
91 9 January 2008. U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. “Blue Lantern Level 3: Pre-License End-Use Check on 
Application.”  
92 Staff Writers.  9 May 2008. “Raytheon Teams with Emirates Advanced Investments to Develop Laser 




93 The contract for missile launchers was signed with ADSB in January 2007. ADSB and Raytheon have 
subsequently launched a number of joint projects, including the construction of a regional missile 
maintenance depot at ADSB that would form the offset for a major missile procurement by the UAE 
government. Richard Scott. 26 February 2009.  “ADSB, Raytheon pitching RAM missile support plan.” 
Janes.com (cached site)  
94 These are the French firm Thales (which formed Thales Advanced Solutions/TAS) and the European 
consortium EADS Defence & Security (which formed Emiraje). See Emirates Advanced Investments Press 
Release page: http://www.eai.ae/eai/?page=pressrelease 
95 23 February 2009. “Golden Ventures” EADS press release.  
http://home.janes.com/events/exhibitions/sofex2010/sections/daily/golden-ventures.shtml GAL was formed 
in July 2007 and GALS in 2009.  Employee profiles suggest that some Raytheon personnel moved to GAL 
in 2007.  
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(formerly Combined Cargo UAE), one of the ventures set up by the state-owned French 
defense firm Giat in fulfillment of an offset obligation.96 Giat held 1/3 of the company 
via “General Investments FZE97,” its UAE-based holding company, but Giat’s share was 
acquired by Mubadala soon after the latter was established in 2002.  Eships is now 100% 
Emirati-owned, with equal shares held by Mubadala and the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Corporation (ADIC), a non-offset related sovereign wealth fund.98  
 
These funds – much like any sovereign wealth fund – have also been used to acquire the 
assets of foreign companies. Notable examples include the gun maker Merkel, as 
referenced above, but also the Leaseplan Corporation, a Dutch automobile company, in 
which Mubadala acquired 51% of shares.99  In at least one case some assets of a 
privately-owned Emirati company, the Adcom Munitions Factory, was acquired by 
Tawazun.  The factory was part of Adcom Systems, owned by Ali Al Dhaheri.  The 
Dhaheri family is also involved in several offset ventures in the UAE, including the Raha 
Beach Complex and the World Trade Centre-Abu Dhabi (both via the Dhaheri’s holdings 
in the National Corporation for Tourism and Hotels).100 The family was also the recipient 
                                                
96 Giat actually brought in the Norwegian company Torvald Klavness Group (a firm specializing in dry 
bulk shipment) to act as the foreign partner.  In 2002 Torvald owned 25% of the shipping company, but 
must have sold its shares back to Giat, which by 2004 owned 1/3 of shares through its holding company.   
97 FZE designates a firm operating in the UAE’s “free-zone,” where regulations pertaining to customs, 
taxation, immigration are relaxed.  
98 ADIC was (in 2010) the largest sovereign wealth fund, with assets of over $600 billion. 
99 Originally, Mubadala owned 25% of shares, along with the Saudi firm Olayan Investments, which owned 
another 25%.  Recently, Volkswagon bought out both these entities.  
100 The Dhaheri family of the UAE has some 25 members occupying senior positions in the government 
and the Emirate’s most influential companies: the family patriarch Dr Hadef bin Jua'an Al Dhaheri is the 
Minister of Justice, and sits – along with three of his relatives – on the board of the National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi, the Emriates’ largest bank and the one that conducts financial business for the government. See 
“UAE: Key Figures.” 7 October 2008. Country Background. The Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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of an offset granted by Boeing to a printing business owned by the Dhaheri’s company 
Emirates Computers; has a direct stake of over 3 percent in Tabreed, an air-conditioning 
company initially financed by Mubadala, that currently has over $2 billion in assets;101 
and holds executive level management positions in Dolphin Energy, which owns the 
above-mentioned pipeline.  Mubadala also acquired the assets of the nearly-defunct Gulf 
Aircraft Maintenance Company (GAMCO), which had previously received technology 
and some manufacturing equipment under an offset agreement with the defense firm 
Aerospatiale.102  GAMCO’s legacy of previous owners ranged from the young British 
aviator who founded the company as Gulf Aviation in 1950, to a consortium of Gulf 
governments (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE) that utilized the firm’s aircraft and 
maintenance facilities to operate their national carriers, before it finally became the sole 
property of Mubadala and was renamed Abu Dhabi Aircraft Technologies (ADAT).   
 
In addition to integrating defense offset obligations with sovereign wealth investment 
strategies, the extent to which the UAE has sought to make offset policy a high-profile 
component of its investment strategy is also unique.  Abu Dhabi holds an annual 
conference focused exclusively on defense offsets (the Abu Dhabi International Offset 
Conference/ADIOC), but the Offset Program Bureau is also a headline sponsor of the 
                                                
101 3% may sound like a small figure, but in addition to the Al Bitar family of Saudi Arabia, which holds 
3.8% of Tabreed shares, the other investors with holdings of over 3% are all institutional investors.  These 
include Mubadala, GOSI (social security agency), Giat’s General Investments FZE, HSBC Bank, and 
ADIC.  The Dhaheri family’s Tabreed shares are held by Sheikh Mohammed Bin Sultan Bin Suroor Al 
Dhaheri. Obeid Al Dhaheri is Senior Manager of Strategic & Corporate Planning at Dolphin Energy, and 
Salem bin Mohammed bin Salem Al Dhaheri sits on the board of the property developer Aldar, which has 
received financing for several projects through the Emriates’ offset program.  
102 The offset, dubbed GAM-AERO (a combination of the names GAMCO and Aerospatiale), provided 
technical maintenance services for equipment used in testing and repairing avionics material. WTO report 
on UAE Trade Policy.  
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International Defense Exhibition (IDEX), the region’s largest annual military trade fair, 
and recently launched a new conference called the Military Industry Partnership Summit, 
which brings government officials, contractors, third party brokerage firms and 
economists together to Abu Dhabi.  The UAE also dedicates more bureaucratic resources 
to managing offsets than its neighbors, and devotes significant PR resources to its offset 
program and existing offset ventures.103  This enhanced focus on offsets has been 
accompanied by efforts to implement policies that diverge rather dramatically from 
standard offset practices.  Notable among these is the requirement that credits only be 
granted to obligors based on the profits generated by offset ventures, rather than the 
capital used to initiate them.   Given the Emirates high requirement threshold of 60% - 
nearly double the requirement of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – this generated a great deal 
of skepticism from offset policy experts and handwringing from defense executives.  This 
figure is somewhat tempered, however, by the well-known regional practice of granting 
large multipliers.  In the UAE the largest multiplier (a figure of five) is granted for 
ventures that produce goods or services for export, which would significantly reduce the 
actual investment necessary to meet the 60% threshold.104 
 
Lastly, because the UAE is a federation – and the rulers of each emirate may have 
contradictory goals relating to the offset program – there is another layer of variation to 
examine.  Since the oil-rich Emirate of Abu Dhabi financed military procurement for the 
entire federation, it also exerted control over the offset program, and had wide leverage in 
                                                
103 The website ameinfo.com issues press releases on new offset ventures and regularly reports on offset 
success stories.  In addition to state-funded publications, the various offset agencies also frequently 
purchase space in reports published by companies like Oxford Business Group and Forbes. 
104 Newsletter from Epicos (a private sector offset service provider). 10 February 2011. 3(6): p17.   
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assigning benefits to whichever domestic elites and institutions it chose.105  By some 
accounts, the UAE offset program was initially envisioned as an Abu Dhabi-sponsored 
subsidy program meant to catalyze industrial investment and energy distribution in Dubai 
and the other relatively resource-poor Emirates – a sort of inter-Emirate development 
fund.106  Some of the early projects support this interpretation – the Dolphin project 
supplies cheap gas to Dubai, and Dubai’s share of Gulf Energy Maritime (GEM) exceeds 
the share owned by Abu Dhabi.107  Yet royal rivalry and the tendency of such programs 
to create personal fiefdoms for their overseers seem to have derailed this early approach.  
The spectacular implosion of an over-leveraged Dubai during the recent financial crisis – 
and the royal chastening signified by the renaming of the Burj Dubai108 – is reflected in 
the current trajectory of offset projects, as official entities (such as Abu Dhabi’s 
sovereign wealth funds) and private investors from Abu Dhabi overwhelming dominate 
new offset projects; investors from Dubai or the other Emirates are few and far between.  
Indeed, none of the families that made it onto the above-mentioned TNI list for Dubai are 
major shareholders or board members in UAE offset projects.109 
 
                                                
105 Dubai’s army was the last to be integrated in 1997.  
106 APS Review, Oil Market Trends. 2 June 2008.  
107 Abu Dhabi’s SWF International Petroleum Investment Corporation owns 30% (as does Oman’s state-
owned oil company), whereas Dubai’s state-owned oil company owns 25% of GEM shares.  The French 
defense firm Thales owns the remaining 5%.  Zawya.  
108 The Burj Dubai (Dubai Tower) was renamed the Burj Khalifa (Gulf Tower) after Abu Dhabi was forced 
to bail out Dubai during the recent financial crisis.  The Burj Khalifa – the tallest building in the world – 
seemed to symbolize all the reckless behavior and risky investments that had brought Dubai to near-ruin, 
making it the perfect project for a statement about royal responsibility.  
109 The one exception is the Mazrouei family – which is so powerful it made it onto the list for Abu Dhabi 
and the unweighted list for Dubai (the Mazrouei did not make it onto the unweighted list for Dubai). The 
other families on the Dubai list (weighted for market value) are Ghurair, Shamsi, Lootah, Shaibani, 
Ba’alawy, Alabbar, Matrooshi, Belhoul, Jawa, and Mohannadi.  
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The Bureaucratic Back-and-Forth: Defense Offsets in Kuwait 
According to Kuwait’s official offset agency, the National Offset Committee, the state 
has launched offset projects worth approximately $3.46 billion between 1992-2008,110 
with 31% of this total coming from U.S. companies, 29% from British firms, and 23% 
from French firms.111 The majority of this investment has been generated quite recently; 
NOC estimates for the period between 2006 and 2009 indicate about $2.75 billion in 
offset obligations, with about $1.23 billion of that total already satisfied. 112  
Like the UAE, Kuwait has a similarly diverse portfolio of offset-generated ventures, 
although their projects have tended to be more conservative – lacking the enormous scale 
of construction and complex financial vehicles that have become a hallmark of offset 
projects in the Emirates and the focus on petrochemicals that dominates the Saudi offset 
program. Despite its lower profile, Kuwait’s offset program has encountered more 
turbulence than those of its Gulf neighbors: in 1998 MoF officials threatened to blacklist 
a number of defense firms for failing to meet their obligations, and bureaucratic struggles 
over the program have been persistent and substantial.113  For most of its existence, 
Kuwait’s offset bureaucracy – the Offset Program Department (OPD) – operated within 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF), before the formation of the quasi-independent NOC.  In 
                                                
110 NOC Newsletter. Oct/Dec 2009. 2(4). According to a NOC presentation at the 2008 Defense Industry 
Partnerships Summit held in Abu Dhabi, this figure stood at $3 billion in 2007. 
111 Kuwait NOC Newsletter. December 2008. 1(3/4), p9.  
112 CTO Newsletter. 24 May 2010. 28(10).  Despite this relatively substantial figure, the magnitude of 
‘mutlipliers’ – the mechanisms that allow firms to meet their offset obligations by investing in strategic 
areas that garner credit in excess of the actual investment – has apparently been quite large.  The same 
NOC report that produced the figure of $1.23 billion also showed that only $201 million in actual 
investment had been made, indicating an average multiplier of 6. NOC newsletter. 2010. 3(1). 
113 In addition to threatening fines and blacklisting, Kuwait reportedly held up payments to some of these 
companies.  Lieutenant Colonel Frank S. Petty.  Summer 1999. “Defense Offsets: A Strategic Military 
Perspective.” DISAM Journal, p74. 
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2002 and again in 2005, the MoF invited a delegation from the World Bank and UNDP to 
study Kuwait’s offset program and provide recommendations, as the program was beset 
by major delinquencies on the part of offset obligors.114  The first report stated that “like 
the rest of the civil service of Kuwait, the Offset Programme Department (OPD) 
experiences difficulties in performing its delegated functions,” and recommended that an 
independent agency be put in charge of administering the offset program,115 but advised 
against transferring any offset responsibilities to the MoD,116 which in many other states 
share some of the administrative responsibility for the program. Thereafter ensued a 
struggle between the MoF and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) for control over the offset 
program, culminating in a yearlong suspension of all offset activity between 2004 and 
2005.   
 
During the suspension the MoF issued requests for recommendations from private sector 
offset experts, keeping MoD officials in the dark - presumably so their ministry could 
come forward with a comprehensive revised policy that the MoD would have no way of 
matching, giving MoF the advantage by default. 117  Indeed, the MoF ultimately 
announced that it would create a privately-run, government-owned company to 
administer the offset program – something supported by both the 2002 and 2005 World 
Bank/UNDP studies. The MoD resisted, with ministry officials claiming there was no 
                                                
114 CTO Newsletter. 28 March 2005. 23(6). 
115 CTO Newsletter. 28 March 2005. 23(6).  
116 CTO Newsletter. 27 June 2005. 23(12). 
117 This outside counsel was David Hew, a lawyer from Singapore and Director of the Asia Pacific 
Countertrade Association Pte Ltd.  CTO Newsletter 28 March 2005. 23(6).  The publisher of CTO spoke 
with officials from both the MoD and the MoF; defense officials had no knowledge of the WB delegation 
or the advice solicited from Hew, while MoF officials confirmed that they had requested the advice of both.  
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precedent for such an entity, that it would be of little use, and that instead responsibility 
for offsets should be transferred to the MoD.118  The ministerial wrangling over offsets 
was sufficiently intense that it reportedly led to delays in the delivery of military 
equipment from foreign firms, as some scheduled payments were held up and contractors 
insisted on clarification of official offset requirements.119   
 
One possible interpretation of these events is that the offset delinquencies triggered a 
degree of public and official scrutiny unforeseen by the MoF, whose members enjoyed 
the privileges associated with control over the program. The recommendation to create an 
independent (yet still state-owned) company to implement and monitor the offset 
program meant employing technocrats instead of bureaucrats.  Such a move would 
negatively impact both bureaucrats within the MoF – whose control over these patronage 
resources would be diminished – as well as the domestic investors and offset consultants 
who relied on their contacts with MoF officials to secure partnerships and contracts to 
provide their services to offset obligors.120  The recommendations also contained specific 
policy changes that would have undercut the need for intermediary activity.  These 
included policies designed to encourage firms to engage in less complex offset schemes 
such as buybacks, by subtracting the cost of equipment purchased from Kuwaiti 
companies directly from the offset obligation, a move that would grant more control over 
partnership to the defense firm and away from Kuwaiti bureaucrats.  Another change 
                                                
118 CTO Newsletter. 28 March 2005. 23(6). 
119 CTO Newsletter. 28 March 2005. 23(6). 
120 Interview with M.S. 27 January 2010. M.S. was part of the UNDP/WB delegation reviewing Kuwait’s 
offset policies in 2002 and 2005.  His estimation of the process included the observation that he and his 
team had “seriously underestimated the political clout of these people” [offset intermediaries]. 
 182 
would encourage offset obligor companies to work directly with the government ministry 
that had signed the original procurement contract (rather than go through the Kuwaiti 
offset bureaucracy within the MoF). This would have transferred considerable power not 
only to the MoD but also to other state ministries – such as the Ministry of the Interior – 
which are also eligible for reciprocal investment because Kuwait imposes offset 
requirements on large civil procurement contracts as well.121  The MoD saw the 
revelations of mismanagement as an opportunity to appropriate control over the program 
to its own members, sparking the MoF’s efforts to lead the overhaul (and hence maintain 
authority over) the distribution of offset programs.  Although the MOD has increased its 
input and influence over the program in recent years,122 the MoF ultimately prevailed, 
and today the National Offset Committee (NOC) remains housed within the MoF. 
In 2003, Kuwait and the UAE formed an impromptu “offset cooperation committee” 
composed of two representatives from each state.123  This meeting preceded a number of 
significant changes, including Kuwait’s experimentation with investment vehicles 
financed by offset obligations – much like the UAE’s Mubadala, Tawazun and Alfia 
funds. As of 2010 there were four such funds: the Kuwait Investment Opportunities Fund 
(KIOF), KAMKO, AL MARKAZ and Universal.124 In contrast to the UAE – where these 
funds are managed by government entities – in Kuwait the funds are fully managed by 
                                                
121 This is a very unique aspect of Kuwait’s offset program.  The only similar case in the Gulf was a $4 
billion Saudi contract with AT&T/Lucent Technologies in the mid-1990s.  The WTO prohibits offsets on 
civil (non-defense) procurement, but makes an exemption for developing countries.  Apparently Kuwait has 
been able to exploit this loophole, despite being the 11th richest country measured by GDP-per capita.  
122 CTO Newsletter. 24 January 2005. 23(2).  
123 This eventually grew to include representatives from all the GCC states, but other than vague statements 
promising closer collaboration, little has come of these region-wide offset plans. 
124 CTO Newsletter. 24 May 2010. 28(10).  
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the investment arms of private banks, although the new appointment of officials from 
Kuwait’s sovereign wealth fund (the Kuwait Investment Authority) may signal efforts to 
subject the funds to tighter government monitoring.125 At a general assembly meeting of 
the NOC, the institution’s chairman reported that about 1/3 of offset investment between 
2006 and 2007 went into these offset investment funds, making fund management a very 
lucrative enterprise.126 The $148 million KIOF fund is currently managed by NBK 
Capital, an arm of the National Bank of Kuwait that focuses on private equity 
investments. As with the military aircraft financing deals secured by Al-Waha, NBK 
increases its own shareholder profits by managing the fund, and the bank’s shareholders 
include some of the state’s wealthiest (and oldest) merchant families, including the 
Khorafi/Kharafi, the Al Sager, and the Al Bahar.127 It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia’s 
SOLP – mentioned above – is also an offset-related fund, but it is neither state-owned,128 
(as in Kuwait) nor is the fund even nominally managed by official state entities (as in the 
UAE).129  Instead, the Saudi Offset Limited Partnership (SOLP) is owned by the defense 
                                                
125 This includes the appointment of a new Board of Directors to oversee the NOC, all of whom are drawn 
from the KIA.  These include Chairman Anwar Abdul Rahman Al-Jawdar; Vice Chairman Mishal S. 
Otaibi; and Khalid H. Al-Omar.  CTO Newsletter. 9 August 2010. 28(15).  
126 The investment funds amounted to $108 million (out of a total offset obligation of $339 million).  These 
figures represented 21 agreements executed with 16 different foreign contractors during the period of 
September 2006 through December 2007.  “First general assembly of the National Offset Company takes 
place.” 16 April 2008. NOC Press Release. http://www.ameinfo.com/137815.html.  
127 The Alsagar (Al Sager) and Khorafi/Kharafi, are represented on the bank’s board of directors.  The 
patriarch of the Khorafi family (Nasser Al Khorafi) died in 2011, but was the richest Kuwaiti in the world 
according to ArabianBusiness, and the seventh richest Arab overall.  NBK’s two largest shareholders are Al 
Ahleia Insurance Company and the Kuwait Invest Holding Company (now International Finance Company 
or IFC).  The largest individual shareholder in Al Ahleia is the Bahar family (also on NBK’s board); the 
largest institutional shareholder is National Industries Group Holding, whose largest shareholder is the 
Kharafi family.  
128 SOLP is operated as a venture capital fund, owned by Raytheon and Thales, which put up 70% and 
30%, respectively, of the fund’s $35 million in capital.  
129 This is in line with Saudi Arabia’s historic reluctance to adopt the sovereign wealth fund investment 
strategy.  In fact, Saudi Arabia does not even have a sovereign wealth fund in the traditional sense, and 
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firms that put up its capital (Raytheon and Thales) and projects are managed by a private 
venture capital firm.  
 
Another recent shakeup in Kuwait hints at the continued impact of inter-bureaucratic 
struggles over the offset program.  In 2010, after years of repeated guideline revisions the 
NOC was placed under the management of a new Board of Directors appointed by the 
Council of Ministers.  These new directors all came from the Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA), the country’s largest (and the world’s oldest) sovereign wealth fund. 
The new directors made several statements critical of the NOC’s performance, including 
negative comments about transparency and openness, the weakness of Kuwait’s offset 
program relative to its Gulf neighbors,130 and the basic competence of the NOC’s 
previous administrators.131 Just a few weeks later, the NOC’s General Manager, Mazen 
Madooh, who had held the position since the NOC was created in 2006, resigned his post 
and left the NOC.132  The subsequent naming of an interim General Manager (Reem Al-
Khudur/Khader) suggests his exit was unexpected.133 The NOC’s stated focus shifted as 
well, with announcements made by Ms. Khudur that the organization would concentrate 
                                                                                                                                            
instead makes its foreign investments (mostly in treasuries) through its central bank, the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority.  In 2008/9 the Saudi government announced the formation of a SWF that would invest 
on behalf of the Public Investment Fund/General Organization for Social Insurance, but it is not yet 
operational.  
130 Review of NOC press conference.  NOC Newsletter.  September 2010. 3(3). 
131 In an interview with IFC Reports (a British PR firm that places supplementals in publications like the 
Economist and the Guardian newspaper), the new NOC chairman Anwar Abdul Rahman Al-Jawdar stated, 
“With all due respect for my colleagues – who worked in the company before me – it is important to know 
what the NOC is doing.” 26 January 2011. IFC Reports: Special Report on Kuwait.  
132 Madouh had previously sat on the board of directors of the Kuwait Investment Company, which is 
majority owned by the KIA (Kuwait’s sovereign wealth fund), but has interests in a large number of private 
sector companies throughout the Middle East.  
133 CTO Newsletter 25 October 2010. 28(20). 
 185 
on importing the management skills available via partnerships with international firms, 
because, in her words, “We don’t need the money, we need the management.”134 The new 
NOC chairman was likewise brusque in his characterization of Kuwaiti businessmen who 
had participated in the program, who [in his terms]  
want the investment the easy way – they want the obligor to invest for 3-4 years 
and that’s it…I ask the private sector why they are accepting obligors and their 
money, if then after 5 years they end the relationship and start with a new 
obligor.135  
 
This commentary makes explicit the patronage relationship that is otherwise hidden in the 
corporate profiles and shareholder listings of offset projects – mainly that domestic elites 
are able to extract significant financial benefits from offsets that ultimately contribute 
little or nothing to the overall economy.  
 
The most recent offset contracts concluded in Kuwait reflect the new trajectory adopted 
by the NOC, for example Raytheon’s latest program brought in Epicos (an offset services 
firm based in Greece) to provide marketing and other advisory services to high-tech 
companies operating in Kuwait’s private sector.136  Ms. Khudur also indicated that the 
use of offset funds – which had become increasingly popular among obligors as they 
necessitated little long-term participation or commitment – would be discouraged because 
the revenue streams they generated in the past were disappointing.137  This shift is indeed 
supported by the general absence of new information on the activities and performance of 
                                                
134 CTO Newsletter 25 October 2010. 28(20). 
135 IFC Reports. Interview with Jawdar. 26 January 2011. IFC Reports: Special Report on Kuwait. 
136 CTO Newsletter 25 October 2010. 28(20). 
137 CTO Newsletter 25 October 2010. 28(20). 
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these funds.  This shift may have come at the behest of the new directors, who likely saw 
the offset funds as competing with the institutional responsibilities and bureaucratic 
jurisdiction of the KIA.  Interestingly, Ms. Khudur also emphasized that “donations” to 
the Ministry of Defense would no longer qualify for offset credits.138 Much like the 
structured financing initiatives offered by offset service firms that leverage offset 
obligations as collateral to boost the defense budgets of procuring countries, such 
‘donations’ are a win-win for defense firms, which are essentially locking-in future 
contracts using their customers’ own funds!139 
 
Kuwait’s offset program diverges from those of its Gulf neighbors in a few important 
respects.  In addition to the presence of civil offsets, investment in the oil and gas sector 
(even downstream petrochemical processing) has been very limited.140  Also, before the 
latest installation of a new board of directors, officials involved in the program publicly 
eschewed “profitability” as a benchmark for project approval – in stark contrast to the 
UAE’s stated policy, which not only insists on profitability but gauges fulfillment 
according to the income generated by each project.141  This is despite the fact that credits 
were awarded to firms that invested in the country’s offset funds according to the profits 
                                                
138 CTO Newsletter 25 October 2010. 28(20).  This is indeed an interesting statement, and echoes the 
experience of defense contractors in Egypt, who report that “discounts” to the military and similar 
incentives are a large part of Egypt’s informal offset program.  The “donations” made in Kuwait may have 
been part of a compromise between the MOF and the MOD that allowed the MOF to maintain indirect 
responsibility for the offset program, while still allowing the MOD to enjoy its own range of institutional 
benefits.  
139 Blenheim is the first firm to offer this service, which founder Grant Rogan terms “off-balance sheet 
financing.” CTO Newsletter. 13 July 2009. 27(13). 
140 CTO Newsletter. 8 August 2005. 23(15).  
141 CTO Newsletter. 14 November 2005. 23(21).  
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generated by the investment – including investments made outside Kuwait – which seems 
in direct contradiction to goals related to employment and inward technology transfer.142  
Another unique aspect of Kuwaiti offset policy is the NOC’s decision to collect, evaluate, 
and publicize on their website “concept papers” – essentially business plans – submitted 
by local entrepreneurs hoping to partner with foreign firms.  If approved, these projects 
are presented to defense firms as potential ventures to discharge their obligations, and 
they run the gamut from industrial entities providing waste removal services to 
establishing schools to train Kuwaitis in technological skills acquisition and business 
management.143 This feature also seems likely to change, however, under the NOC’s new 
leadership, and Ms. Khudur has advised that the impetus for projects will no longer come 
from the Kuwaiti private sector, but will instead come from the obligors themselves, who 
should consult a list of large infrastructure and residential housing projects and seek out 
their own domestic business partner.144 
 
Despite periodic upsets caused by bureaucratic wrangling, the pipeline of privilege 
continues to benefit a select group of Kuwaiti elites.  The individual composition of the 
offset bureaucracy may shift, but because such a small number of families control so 
much of the economy, they are able to continue to exploit the offset program regardless. 
In 2003, Ziad Al-Sharhan of Kuwait’s Ministry of Finance traveled as part of a two 
member offset delegation to a meeting with UAE offset representatives to discuss the 
                                                
142 According to official offset guidelines, offset fund managers may place up to 40% of the funds capital in 
projects outside Kuwait, and this 40% threshold can be exceeded if the NOC issues a written approval. 
CTO Newsletter. 24 September 2007. 25(18). 
143 NOC Newsletter. June 2008. 1(2): p11.  
144 CTO Newsletter 25 October 2010. 28(20). 
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possible formation of a joint offset committee.145  Two years later the Australian College 
of Kuwait (ACK), a private, for-profit university chaired by a relative of Ziad’s 
(Abdullah Al Sharhan) received two offset-generated investments associated with 
Kuwait’s purchase of 16 Apache attack helicopters: an aviation maintenance and training 
platform from Boeing, and a marine simulator from Lockheed Martin, delivered in 
2009.146 Defense industry observers consider this offset potentially one of the largest 
offsets in Kuwait’s history in terms of dollar value.147  Abdullah also chairs Al-Safat Tec 
Holding Company –whose primary business includes the ownership and operation of 
educational institutions – where Ziad sits on the board of directors.148 Removing the 
Ministry of Finance from decision-making with regard to offsets could have presented a 
direct threat to such personalistic distributions of patronage, but judging by the offsets 
awarded to ACK both before and after the official creation of the NOC, bureaucratic 
influence survived official efforts at reorganization.  
 
The other families that benefited from offset investment are – as in the cases of Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE – the politically well-connected economic elite.  For example, in the 
same report published by the UAE-based bank The National Investor (cited above), the 
                                                
145 CTO Newsletter. 28 July 2003. 21(14).  
146 Press Release. 11 July 2005. “The Boeing Company and AMAS Group of Companies,owners of the 
Australian College of Kuwait sign an agreement.” Also see press release. 3 June 2009. “Lockheed Martin 
and Australian College of Kuwait Unveil New Simulation and Training Center.”  
147 The deal proved extremely expensive – and controversial.  Although the average per-unit cost of the 
AH-64D is about $18 million, Kuwait paid $2.1 billion for the 16 helicopters, yielding an average per-unit 
cost of more than $130 million. Observers noted that the associated offsets were likely to run in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars.  Opposition MPs and individuals from the Public Accounts Committee 
(Audit Bureau) criticized the high cost of the deal and the resulting potential for kickbacks.  See Michael 
Knights. 18 December 2003. “Future Development of GCC Air Forces; Part 2.” Air Combat Information 
Group (ACIG).  
148 Zawya profile. Also see profile on BusinessWeek.  
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Ghanim (Alghanim) family ranks as the seventh most powerful in Kuwait,149 and the 
patriarch of the family ranked among the top 50 wealthiest Arabs in 2009.150  The 
Alghanim family has been the partner for a number of offsets, including the very first 
project established under the offset program in 1996: the Gulf Industrial Technology 
Company, which was a 51%/49% split in share ownership between the Fouad Alghanim 
& Sons Group and Hughes Aircraft (now Raytheon), respectively.  They were also the 
recipients of additional offset investment two years later, when Gulf Stream Aerospace 
(now part of General Dynamics) set up Kuwait International Aircraft Leasing, which is 
today 100% owned by the Fouad Alghanim & Sons Group.  According to the company’s 
website, the leasing company is involved in a number of aviation-related projects inside 
and outside Kuwait.151  The Alghanim family continues to be the recipient of offset-
generated investment today.  Most recently, they were among the beneficiaries of the 
recent Al Tair project, which financed a marketing/management program for Wataniya 
Airways, in which Alghanim holds about 5% of shares.  
 
In fulfillment of its offset obligations, the Russian state arms exporting body 
Rosonboronexport facilitated a joint venture between Moscow’s state-owned oil 
company Gazprom, and the Kuwaiti investment bank Noor Financial, focused on oil and 
gas exploration.152  51% of Noor Financial is owned by National Industries Group 
                                                
149 This list is based on the families’ presence on the boards of 582 publicly-listed GCC companies, 
weighted by market value.  
150 The Alghanim family just missed the top 50 cut-off in 2010.   
151 http://www.fmtas-group.com/en/aviation-kial.html 
152 “Gazprom creates joint venture with Kuwait’s Noor.” 24 January 2011. Reuters.  
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Holding, in which Alghanim is a major shareholder.  Noor was also the primary domestic 
partner for another recent offset – a venture capital fund launched in cooperation with 
Consensus Business Group using offset financing from the European defense consortium 
EADS.153  Other major Noor shareholders include the Kharafi and Behbahani families, 
who rank #1 and #5, respectively, in the TNI rankings.    
 
Another influential family to have benefited from the offset program is the Al Wazzan 
(ranked #4 on TNI’s unweighted list of most powerful families), whose conglomerate Al 
Wazzan Holdings Group owns the Institute for Private Education & Training, which was 
established with financing from the British defense firm Tec.Quipment; the Al Wazzan 
also own shares in the Kuwaiti Catalyst Company, set up by a Japanese firm under the 
offset program; 154 and is the major shareholder in EYAS for Higher and Technical 
Education company, which owns the Gulf University of Science & Technology (GUST), 
which partnered with Raytheon to host a business training program for Kuwait’s civil 
aviation sector.  The ruling Al Sabah family also has offset-related interests – the Sabah-
owned firm Kuwait Dynamics Limited (owned via Action Group Holdings) was the 
recipient of offset-generated investment from Oerlikon Contraves, now part of the 
German defense firm Rheinmetall.155  
                                                
153 James Rossiter. “Vincent Tchenguiz links up with EADS for launch of €150 technology fund.” 14 April 
2007. Times Online (UK). See also Daniel Thomas. “The first ‘green billionaire’.” 13 April 2007. Building 
(UK). (a trade publication for the construction industry).  
154 Like many families, the Al Wazzan also own interests in offset-generated companies indirectly.  For 
example, the Al Wazzan Sons General Trading Company is a major shareholder in Global Investment 
House, which is in turn a major shareholder in National Industries Group Holding, which owns 51% of 
Noor Financial, which has been the recipient of several offset-generated investments.   
155 The Oerlikon investment went to form a joint venture with Kuwait Dynamics Limited, called the 
International Company for Logistics Project Firing Ranges.  
 191 
By measures of value and scope, the offset program in Kuwait has been less successful 
than the programs in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  No doubt this is partially due to 
Kuwait’s relatively smaller defense budget, and (relatedly) its more circumscribed 
political influence vis a vis foreign arms exporters.  However, according to indicators like 
the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, Kuwait is also 
the most corrupt state in the GCC, and recently the offset program has been the target of 
official inquiries and audits relating to corruption in military procurement,156 suggesting 
that the siphoning off of offset benefits may also be partly to blame.  One particularly 
interesting example is that of the U.S. defense firm ITT, which incurred substantial offset 
obligations relating to its sale of Sincgars (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 
System) to the Kuwaiti military.  According to court documents relating to a whistle-
blower complaint filed in Washington DC and the Northern District Court of Indiana 
(where ITT is headquartered), the legal obligations ITT faced under Kuwait law relating 
to the SINCGARS contract required that ITT set aside 30 percent of the contract value to 
pay a Kuwaiti offset company. In accordance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the 
offset company could not have any “connection with members of the Kuwait government 
and military who have any authority to approve or implement the contract.”157 According 
to an affidavit submitted by Nicolas Haddad, a former employee of ITT Corporation and 
the individual who filed the complaint, Colonel Ali Al-Sarraf (a 2005 graduate of the 
DOD-funded National Defense University, whose family owns the Sarraf International 
                                                
156 Abubaker A. Ibrahim. 6 July 2011. “Panel probes ‘offset irregularities.’” Arab Times. See also “National 
Audits Committee investigating bribes allegations.” 7 July 2011. Kuwait Times.  
157 Haddad vs. ITT Industries. 25 August 2005. Heard by District Judge Henry Kennedy.  United States 
District Court, District of Columbia. Also see Nicolas M. Haddad vs. ITT Industries Inc. US District Court, 
Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. Case No. 1:05-CV-370-TLS.  
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Group) informed one of Haddad’s co-workers that because he was being promoted within 
the Kuwaiti military, he [Sarraf] “was going to give ITT a lot of business, since the 
Colonel’s family owns part of the offset company with whom ITT has agreed to 
work.”158 After the meeting where this discussion took place, Haddad confronted Noble 
about the offset plan, which he believed to be illegal.”159  Haddad was ordered not to 
discuss any of the details of the deal outside company meetings, and was ultimately fired 
by ITT. Interestingly, after Haddad was fired, but before he filed a formal complaint in 
U.S. courts, Haddad was given a job at the National Company for Mechanical and 
Electrical Works, part of the Al Kharafi conglomerate.  The Al Kharafi family has also 
received substantial benefits from previous offset projects in Kuwait, and would certainly 
have an interest in convincing Haddad not to file a formal complaint – thus maintaining 
the sanctity of the offset program. 
 
The Provision of Privilege in the Gulf: Divergent Policies, Common Outcomes 
Despite differences in offset policy among Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the 
identity of the domestic recipients of these offset investments remains the same – mainly 
the large family-owned conglomerates that owe their competitive advantage to extended 
personal networks with royal decision-makers and privileged access to both information 
and capital.  The fact that these conglomerates have subsidiaries operating across the full 
spectrum of economic sectors – from industrial projects to real estate ventures to 
investment houses – means that changes in the nature of the offset projects themselves 
                                                
158 Haddad vs. ITT Industries. http://www.islerdare.com/documents/Haddad_v_ITT_Industries_Inc.pdf 
159 Haddad vs. ITT Industries. http://www.islerdare.com/documents/Haddad_v_ITT_Industries_Inc.pdf 
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does not prevent the procuring regimes from continuing to deliver economic privileges to 
the elites that form the bases of their political support networks.   
 
The provision of economic privileges through offset programs reflects the nature of 
economic patronage that existed during the state-building period and continues to 
dominate the region today.  Take, for example, the Algosaibi family of Saudi Arabia. 
Unlike many of the large merchant families, who used their wealth and social standing to 
support the consolidation of Ibn Saud’s rule, the Gosaibi family did not have any tribal 
pedigree or personal fortune to offer.  Instead, the early Gosaibi patriarchs provided 
intelligence on Turkish troop movements and clandestine courier services to Ibn Saud in 
his struggle to lay claim to ever-larger swaths of the Peninsula.160 However, the Gosaibi 
were never paid directly by Ibn Saud, instead they were encouraged to “reimburse” 
themselves by retaining portions of the subsidies (in cash or in goods) they delivered to 
Ibn Saud on behalf of the British Government, or else to keep larger portions of the profit 
margins from the payments they ferried between Ibn Saud and a network of regional 
traders.161 Defense offsets resemble the methods of reimbursement described above 
because they allow the state to provide privileges to loyal elites indirectly, that is, without 
disclosing the origins of the benefit – mainly the public purse.  Not only do close political 
linkages make the established families appealing to defense manufacturers who must 
court royal favor to increase their chances of securing contracts in the future, but defense 
                                                
160 Michael Field, The Merchants.   
161 As their wealth and business dealings expanded, they acquired additional privileges suited to those 
activities, like preferential tariff rates (they paid 2.5% on trade between Bahrain and the Kingdom, whereas 
other traders paid the full 5%).  Michael Field. 1984. The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf. New York: Overlook Press, p223-6.  
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offsets also adhere to the established practice of rewarding loyal elites – making them an 
ideal vehicle for all parties concerned.  
 
This remainder of this chapter will explore some of the broader themes and patterns that 
characterize defense offsets in the Gulf.  First, I will examine the features of Gulf 
economies that make the provision of defense offsets attractive to both foreign defense 
firms and the region’s monarchies.  These features include regional security dynamics 
and the nature of military institutions in the Gulf, the legacy of the agency system and 
high levels of wealth concentration, and the large capital reserves that allow Gulf 
monarchs to subsidize domestic investors participating under the offset umbrella.  
Second, I will highlight some of the particular institutions and economic dynamics – such 
as industry intermediaries and speculative investment – that have grown up around the 
provision of defense offsets.  
 
The Best Kind of Customer: The Gulf Arms Market and Defense Offsets  
 
Because their defense markets are highly coveted by weapons manufacturers, the Gulf 
States are in a uniquely powerful bargaining position vis a vis the provision of defense 
offsets. In addition to controlling a large portion of the global defense market (the GCC 
states are expected to import more than $120 billion in weapons between 2010 and 2015, 
with projected offsets of $54 billion),162 wealthy Gulf countries have historically been 
eager to acquire the most advanced equipment, presumably due to the perpetual arms race 
with Israel as well as periodic threats – real or perceived – from Iraq and Iran.  The 
                                                
162 CTO Newsletter. 24 May 2010. 28(10).   
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export of advanced equipment (even to allies) provides an additional incentive to design 
– and therefore provide government funding for – the next generation of weapons 
systems.  These research and development dollars represent an enormous subsidy granted 
to arms manufacturers, who subsequently export the newly redesigned system, starting 
the cycle anew.  In some rare cases the Gulf States have even financed the upfront R&D 
costs for new weapons systems, which promises significant financial benefits for the 
firm(s) involved.163   
 
Gulf countries are also favorite customers for defense companies because they lack the 
armament manufacturing facilities and skilled manpower of other major purchasers; 
typically these customers possess their own indigenous defense producers that must be 
placated with support or supply contracts from foreign firms. Gulf countries rarely 
request modifications of the equipment they purchase in order to install locally produced 
components or perform in-country maintenance – instead opting for indirect offsets that 
channel subsidies to non-defense businesses.  Evidence suggests that arms deals 
containing indirect offsets are more financially beneficial for the exporting firm, hence 
adding to the allure of Gulf arms deals.164 However, this evidence may stem from the fact 
                                                
163 Hasbani (March 2006). “The Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States.” Defense & 
Security Analysis. 22(1): p76-78. In at least one case (the UAE’s purchase of the F-16 E/F) the customer 
actually financed innovations and research for the equipment up front, and the resulting model was then 
exported to additional customers with no added cost born by the firm.   
164 Hasbani (March 2006). “The Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States.” Defense & 
Security Analysis. 22(1): p76-78.  Hasbani claims that it is the cost of equipment modifications that drive 
down the seller’s profit margin, although he does not appear to take into account the presence offset 
contracts.  Taylor (2003), whose explicit focus is the economic efficiency of defense offsets, comes to the 
same conclusion, although his analysis is conducted from the point of view of the procuring country.  He 
finds that offsets typically classified as indirect are less likely to provide any financial benefit to the 
purchaser, whereas offset typically classified as direct have the potential to mitigate the costs of arms 
acquisition.  I disagree with Taylor’s conclusion, which does not take into account the probability that the 
exporting firm prevents the procuring country from realizing any economic benefit precisely because the 
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that developing countries – which are less well-equipped to demand and monitor the 
offset commitments made by arms manufacturers – are responsible for the majority of 
indirect offsets, with most developed states opting for direct offsets. The Gulf States also 
offer “multipliers” in their offset contracts – which reduce the actual dollar investment 
required to satisfy the obligation – more frequently than other states: the BIS ranked the 
UAE and Kuwait in second and third place, respectively, in the frequency in which they 
granted multipliers among all countries where U.S. contractors have offset obligations.165  
Whatever the underlying relationship between offsets and firm profits, because defense 
firms are able to recover the costs they incur for implementing offset projects – and often 
an additional premium that makes offsets a potential source of revenue rather than an 
outlay166 – the large dollar values associated with the region’s arms deals, and the fact 
that they are overwhelmingly in the indirect category – make Gulf offsets an enticing 
add-on to weapons suppliers.   
 
The Arms Trade and Political Leverage 
More so than other states, the GCC countries also employ arms purchases for political 
purposes – often buying redundant systems from both U.S. and European firms, as 
                                                                                                                                            
cost of the offset is included up-front in the contract cost.  I do, however, agree with Taylor’s conclusion 
that direct offsets are the less of two evils, when judged purely on the basis of economic efficiency for the 
procuring country.     
165 Poland ranked first, offering multipliers 76.8% of the time, the UAE and Kuwait offered this incentive 
on 58% and 50% of contracts, respectively.  BIS 12th annual report on offsets in the defense trade.  
166 In addition to evidence gleaned from USG directives (the DSCA memo cited in Chapter 2) and 
comments by aerospace industry analysts, there are other indicators that suggest offsets are not only 
revenue neutral, but in fact present a source of potential earnings for defense firms.  For example, the 
French defense giant Thales has a subsidiary company that deals only with the firms offset contracts.  
According to its Hoover Business profile, Thales International Offsets has an average net revenue of 
several million dollars per year.  
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recently illustrated by Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of Lockheed Martin’s F-16 and 
enormous follow-on purchase of Eurofighter Typhoons, the latter is widely considered a 
less-capable version of the F-16.  Because the defense industry is one of the last 
remaining sources of high-paying manufacturing jobs in the U.S. and Europe, large 
export contracts such as these are important sources of political leverage for Gulf 
leaders.167  The leverage afforded by these contracts can translate into increased offset 
demands, a condition that has certainly characterized the regional arms trade in recent 
years.    
 
Defense procurement in the Gulf has traditionally been a means of consolidating and 
solidifying relations with Western military bureaucracies, which served as their patrons 
and security guarantors.  However, the control these patron states are able to exert over 
their armament industries is dwindling.  First, many functions previously performed 
within the official bureaucracy have been outsourced to private contractors, whose 
allegiance to official state policy is certainly weaker than that of public agencies.  
Second, the global expansion of the defense industry’s supply chain – precipitated by the 
overseas relocation of production facilities, the formation of joint ventures with foreign 
firms, the increase in the number of Foreign Sales Corporations that allow firms to move 
portions of their business activities overseas, and the establishment of foreign subsidiaries 
– means that to leaders in the Gulf and elsewhere, relationships with the firms themselves 
have become just as important (if not more so) than relationships with their original host 
                                                
167 The sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to Saudi Arabia (the Al-Salaam deal) allegedly hinged on the UK 
government’s agreement to suspend an ongoing bribery investigation that targeted high-ranking members 
of the Saudi Royal Family. The investigation was eventually suspended, and the Typhoon deal went 
through shortly after.  
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governments.  These shifts in the nature of the arms market make offset programs an 
increasingly important avenue for regimes seeking to secure political linkages with their 
suppliers, which are no longer the states – but the firms themselves.  The combined 
political force of procuring governments, exporting firms, industry trade advocates and 
the myriad other individuals and organizations that benefit from exports, may easily 
overwhelm those agitating against particular sales – even if those individuals hold 
political office within the exporting country’s government.  Establishing additional 
linkages and creating new vested interests through the provision of offset projects – such 
as offset brokerage firms and the domestic recipients of offset transactions in the 
procuring country – yields even more influence to those operating outside formal state 
institutions.  
 
The Arms Trade and Accountability & Authority 
The absence of effective oversight mechanisms – not to mention legitimate avenues of 
political contestation – within GCC States also means that expensive weapons purchases 
are unlikely to be derailed by opposition from official government bodies or non-state 
actors. Opponents of the arms trade in the Gulf lack effective means to block weapons 
purchases, as appropriations are not subject to approval or veto by any elected body.  
Some of the most vocal opposition has come from right-wing religious extremists, who 
point to the inability of regional governments to defend their states without extensive 
assistance from the U.S. and Europe despite decades of enormous weapons 
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expenditures.168  Similarly, analysts characterize the pursuit of offsets as an empty PR 
scheme designed to counter the view that too much of the GCC states’ resources end up 
flowing into foreign coffers.169  Gulf governments have effective tools to silence both 
forms of criticism: a nearly open-ended mandate to prosecute religious extremism, and 
considerable resources dedicated to convincing a skeptical public that offsets are 
economically beneficial.  This permissive domestic environment, along with the Gulf’s 
status as a group of “moderate allies” in an otherwise hostile and volatile region, makes 
the Gulf an attractive market for defense firms wishing to avoid the scrutiny and 
opposition that accompanies weapons sales to “rogue” states and other unpalatable actors.  
Offsets are likewise a convenient mechanism for Gulf States to divert criticism about 
excessive spending on foreign armaments.  
 
Defense offsets are also a preferred form of patronage precisely because they are difficult 
to track.  Even when working with just a single case, compiling a comprehensive list of 
offset projects, including defense firm sponsors, domestic partners, deal values, and other 
features is daunting.  Over time, defense firms may merge and form new conglomerates, 
break up and be absorbed piecemeal by other firms, or cease to exist entirely, so 
corporate profiles, financial records or public relations materials that might have 
contained information on specific offsets may have been transferred or destroyed.  Once 
the projects are identified, determining the identities of the domestic owners and 
                                                
168 This was a primary criticism lodged against the Saudi Royal Family by Osama Bin Laden, who pointed 
to the Saudi government’s inability to deter Saddam Hussein without stationing U.S. troops on the 
peninsula as a major failing.  
169 The 2008 Oxford Business Group Report on Kuwait states, “Some have claimed that the scheme was 
designed as a public relations exercise to help diffuse criticism that too much government money goes 
abroad,” p49.  “Investment, reprogrammed.” The Report: Kuwait 2008.  Oxford Business Group.  
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shareholders is also an arduous process, as offset companies are often private, and even if 
they are public, the region’s disclosure rules are weak and easy to evade. To further 
complicate matters, the association of each project with a specific weapons procurement 
deal adds another layer of secrecy.  There are no laws – either on the U.S. side or the 
GCC side – requiring the public release of information pertaining to specific projects, 
which gives both governments ample space to conceal unpalatable information. 
 
Breaking into the Offset Business: Influential Actors and Institutions in Gulf Offset 
Policies  
 
The absence of domestic mechanisms of accountability and transparency combined with 
the large capital bases of the region’s sovereign wealth funds and the dramatic expansion 
of new, unregulated financial products have lured foreign consultants with backgrounds 
in structured finance into the offset business as well.  Many of these individuals have 
wielded significant influence over the defense offsets policies of the GCC states – 
making millions for themselves in the process.  A brief examination of this handful of 
actors can provide interesting insight into both the political objectives of states pursuing 
defense offsets, as well as the economic incentives that have made defense offsets a 
particularly lucrative industry.  
 
The UAE’s offset policy has been heavily influenced by external actors, including some 
individual offset policy advisors. Dr. Amin Badr Al Din, a Jordanian citizen with an 
engineering PhD from Stanford, was the first Chairman of the UAE’s offset agency – 
then called the UAE Offsets Group (UOG) – and is credited with writing the agency’s 
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first guidelines.170 Al Din described the UOG as “a government think tank, an investment 
bank and an internal government consultancy.”171 His public business profile cites an 
offset strategy that emphasized venture capital, privatization and public-private 
partnerships.172  El Din held the top position in the UOG until 2000, when he was 
replaced by a three-member board including Mohamed Saif Al Mazrouei (as CEO), 
Mohamed Ahmed Al Bowardi and Ahmed Ali Al Sayegh. 173  El Din now operates his 
own investment bank, Chescor Capital, a boutique outfit incorporated in Mauritius that 
specializes in offset financing.174 Chescor also operates a $20 million venture capital fund 
on behalf of the OPB called the Chescor Capital Offset Fund.175 Although offsets were 
formally a part of UAE arms procurement as early as 1992, El Din elevated the profile of 
defense offsets within the Emirate’s economic development plans.  
 
Another central figure in the creation of the UAE’s offset apparatus is R. Grant Rogan, 
the son of a former Middle East sales executive for Northrop Grumman.176 Like Al-Din, 
                                                
170 El Din is also widely credited with creating the agency itself – although the relevant dates differ among 
competing sources.  The consensus seems to be that the UOG existed (at the latest) by 1992.  
171 “Qatar gets UOG Deals for Up to 85 MCM/D to Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Oman & Pakistan.” 26 June 2000. 
APS Review Gas Market Trends.  
172 Businessweek profile.  
173 In 2007, the UOG was re-named the Offset Program Bureau (OPB), with some re-shuffling among the 
management staff but no changes in the board of directors.  23 April 2007. “New identity reflects Offset’s 
core focus.” AMEinfo (government press release).  
174 Information on Chescor Capital ownership/incorporation from Zawya Business profile.  
175 Leslie Wayne.  “A Well-Kept Military Secret.” February 16, 2003.  New York Times. 
176 Rogan is the son of Northrop Grumman’s former Beirut chief Richard Grant Rogan, himself tasked with 
“handling” the famed Arab intermediary Adnan Khashoggi, who made billions skimming commissions 
from arms sales made to the Saudi monarchy.  Rogan Sr. spent several years defending himself in U.S. 
courts against violations of the FCPA.  Rogan Sr.’s contact with Khashoggi is laid out in Ronald Kessler’s 
1986 book, The Richest Man in the World: The Story of Adnan Khashoggi. New York: Warner Books, 
p76. According to a profile of Blenheim published in the industry outlet DefenseNews, the company also 
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Rogan was involved in an advisory capacity in the UAE as early as 1990,177 and 
according to a Wall Street Journal article by the late Daniel Pearl, Rogan’s firm Summit 
Corporate Services (renamed Blenheim Capital after briefly joining forces with Barclays 
Capital) was started with a portion of the $160 million offset investment made by 
Lockheed Martin in Mubadala, the UAE’s largest offset investment fund.178  One of 
Summit’s earliest deals was to help Mubadala buy into a chain of UK gas stations (Rogan 
is a British citizen and the company is registered offshore in the Channel Islands) as part 
of a strategy to diversify the UAE’s energy supply operations.179 Blenheim Capital is now 
one of the largest brokerage firms in the offset business, and certainly the most high-
profile one in the Middle East, where Rogan has been dubbed “Mr Fix-It” in the local 
press.180   
 
In addition to capturing a large chunk of the regional offset services market, Blenheim 
Capital has also pioneered the introduction of equipment leasing companies (or “asset 
management vehicles” in official jargon) into the offset portfolios of regional 
governments.  In the UAE, these leasing companies were designed to target regional 
customers (mostly state-owned airlines) whose budgets had contracted in the wake of the 
                                                                                                                                            
employs “an historian, who was asked to map out for the firm the family trees and backgrounds of 10 
prominent families in the Middle East and their investments.” Antonie Boessenkool.  “Small Firm, Big 
Player.” 14 June 2010.  DefenseNews. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4668082.  Although the 
article does not hint at the identity of the historian, Grant’s brother Eugene Rogan is the head of the Middle 
East studies department at Oxford University and author of the seminal text, The Arabs: A History.  
177 http://www.summitcs.com/backgrounder.html 
178 Daniel Pearl.  April 20, 2000. “Arms Dealers Get Creative with ‘Offsets.’” Wall Street Journal. 
179 Daniel Pearl.  April 20, 2000. “Arms Dealers Get Creative with ‘Offsets.’” Wall Street Journal.  
180 Ivan Gale. “Mr. Fix-it.” The National (UAE).  
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Gulf War and the drop in oil prices, since leasing equipment like oil tankers and aircraft 
is much cheaper (in the short term) than buying it outright. These projects included a $1.3 
billion deal developed by Blenheim181 in 2006 for the lease of 25 Airbus aircraft to Oasis 
International Leasing Company (OILC); the aircraft were in turn leased to regional 
airlines.  The profits from the leases went toward satisfying offset obligations for a 
number of U.S. and European defense firms.182 The company itself (OILC) was initially 
set up by BAE almost a decade earlier in order to fulfill its own offset obligation – a $20 
million capital infusion got the UK arms manufacturer a 15% stake in the leasing 
company.183   
 
After executing the $1.3 billion deal, Blenheim entered into its own joint venture with 
Oasis Leasing, the latter’s aircraft leasing operation was integrated into the new venture 
dubbed Al Waha Financial Services, which included the existing aircraft leasing 
operation and added a real estate investment arm, a leasing company for maritime 
equipment, and a structured finance arm – Blenheim’s area of expertise.184  Since then the 
UAE has added more leasing companies to its books through offset agreements: 
including Leaseplan Emirates, a joint venture with one of the largest vehicle and fleet 
management companies in the world, and the Emirates Ship Investment Company 
                                                
181 At this time – in 2006 – Blenheim Capital was called Summit Corporate Services.  The name Blenheim 
was adopted after Summit formed a joint venture with Barclays, but Summit’s founder Grant Rogan 
eventually bought out Barclays, although he kept the name Blenheim Capital.   
182 The deal was concluded in 2006, and involved EADS, Harris Corp., Textron, Eurocopter, and Rhode & 
Schwartz. CTO Newsletter. 13 February 2006. 24(3). 
183 Welt & Wilson. “Offsets in the Middle East.”  
184 Blenheim took a 40% share of the new company; Oasis retained the remaining 60% of shares.  
 204 
(Eships – formerly Combined Cargo UAE) which leases marine tankers.185  Equipment 
leasing ventures are also a feature of Kuwait’s offset program, which used aircraft assets 
transferred from Gulf Stream Aerospace (now part of General Dynamics) to establish the 
Kuwait International Aircraft Leasing Company in 1998, and again in 2010, when 
Raytheon transferred four turboprop jets to establish a privately-owned aircraft leasing 
company called Essence Group – a deal that was also developed by Blenheim Capital.186  
 
Predictably, the familiar pattern of elite ownership remains.  Although the identity of 
Essence Group’s shareholders is unclear, as mentioned above, the Kuwait International 
Aircraft Leasing Company set up by Gulf Stream Aerospace is part of the Fouad 
Alghanim & Sons group of companies. In the UAE, Hussein Nowais – a shareholder in 
several offset-generated projects – is the largest individual shareholder in the Al-Waha 
leasing conglomerate, second only to the Mubadala fund itself.187 Nowais’ other 
investments include a 5.72% share in Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding (ADSB), a Northrop 
Grumman offset; 100% ownership of Danway Fusion Glass, a project also developed by 
Blenheim for a consortium of German companies with offset obligations; and 100% 
ownership of the Gulf Solar Power Company, an offset from GEC-Marconi. Nowais’s 
offset-generated ventures have also benefited from subsequent government business, such 
as when Al-Waha was “mandated” to arrange and manage the financing to purchase $3 
                                                
185 Ivan Gale. 28 April 2010. “New Rules Expected for Offsets.” The National (UAE).  See also an image 
taken from the brochure of Blenheim Capital – an offset service firm – which suggests procuring countries 
can enjoy higher financial returns from offsets involving structured finance than from traditional forms like 
co-production and technology transfer (Appendix A).  
186 CTO Newsletter. 8 March 2010. 28(5)  
187 Mubadala holds 15% of shares, Nowais holds 8%. Zawya Business Profile. 
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billion in military aircraft for the UAE armed forces, which Nowais observed would 
“positively affect the company’s financial performance by raising shareholders’ equity, 
strengthening assets and raising profitability.”188   
 
Like Blenheim in the UAE and Kuwait, there have been prominent Western financial 
institutions involved in Saudi Arabia’s offset program as well.  The private equity firm 
Carlyle Group, made famous by its success in corporate buy-outs in the defense sector 
and the revolving door between its directors and high level posts in the U.S. Government, 
was the official advisor to the Saudi Offset Committee during its formative years: from 
1994 until just after 9/11.189 Carlyle’s former chairman explained the group’s role as a 
facilitator, singular in its ability to reach out: 
to some of the Carlyle companies, some of the former Carlyle companies, and 
other companies where we are well known, to convince them of the merits of 
investment in Saudi Arabia and to bring them together with Saudi partners.190  
 
Although U.S. officials conceded that the program has never been successful, at least one 
Saudi official characterized Carlyle’s efforts as “disastrous.”191  Despite this apparent 
                                                
188 Al-Waha press release.  http://www.wahacapital.ae/news/106/106/index.html/?nval=6&mode=1 
189 The revelation that Carlyle managed assets for Osama bin Laden’s estranged brother Shafiq probably 
encouraged both the Saudi government and Carlyle’s executives to sever all unnecessary ties in the wake of 
9/11 
190 Frank Carlucci. Carlyle Group presentation to Saudi Economic Offset Committee. 1996.  This would 
probably be a very large number of companies, since Carlyle Group is one of the largest private equity 
firms in the world.  It had some $90 billion under its management as of 2010.  
191 Robert Kaiser. 11 February 2002. “Enormous Wealth Spilled into American Coffers.” The Washington 
Post. The Saudi monarchy did, however, secure representation from the powerful law firm Baker & Botts 
when the U.S. Department of Justice launched inquiries into the financial dealings of some of its members.  
Baker & Botts is the law firm of James Baker, Secretary of State under the elder President Bush, who used 
the contacts he made in office to guide Carlyle’s lucrative series of corporate defense buyouts. Former 
defense secretary Frank Carlucci was also a senior advisor to Carlyle during this period, and instrumental in 
facilitating the company’s defense buyouts.  As of 2007, Carlyle operated in 21 countries worldwide, 
managing assets of $76 billion.   
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failure, Carlyle is still heavily involved in the business of offsets: Carlyle has large 
investments in Turkish military conglomerates, many of which originated through 
technology and equipment transfers from previous offsets with the U.S., and in 2007 
Carlyle secured a $1.35 billion investment from Mubadala – the UAE’s offset investment 
fund, which now owns nearly 10% of the firm.192  Carlyle also owned United Defense, 
subsequently acquired by BAE Systems, when the former signed a major coproduction 
deal (a direct offset) for armored vehicles and machine guns with the Egyptian 
government.193  Although this agreement consumed more U.S. aid dollars than a 
comparable ‘off-the-shelf’ purchase, given the industry practice of inflating the cost of 
such coordination up-front, United Defense (and therefore also Carlyle Group) gets paid 
regardless of such inefficiencies or cost overruns.  
 
Carlyle and other privately-held funds have also benefited immensely from high liquidity 
in Gulf markets, as Gulf investors were spurned from buying up the assets of publicly 
traded companies after 9/11, as illustrated by the Dubai Ports fiasco.194 2002-era 
estimates put the value of private Saudi investments abroad at about $1 trillion – with 
about ¾ of that invested with U.S. financial institutions – begging the question: why does 
the Saudi government need private equity firms to advise them on attracting foreign 
                                                
192 Camilla Hall and Zahraa Alkhalisi. 10 April 2011. “Mubadala Holds 9.35% of Carlyle, Agreed to Invest 
$600 million.” Bloomberg.  
193 “DOD Memorandum for Correspondents.  10 November 1997.  No 206-M.  U.S. Department of 
Defense.  http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1997_m11101997_m206-97.html.  (accessed on 17 July 
2009). 
194 Although the UAE state-investment vehicle owns significant assets in energy, heavy industry, 
telecommunications, infrastructure and aerospace in the Middle East, its efforts to increase ownership of 
similar assets overseas has met with significant public opposition.  Investments in private-equity funds 
facilitates its entry into these markets by maintaining low visibility.  
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investment (which is how they characterize offsets) when all the investment dollars they 
need are languishing abroad in foreign banks?195  
 
Defense Offsets and the Structure of Domestic Economies in the Gulf  
The Agency System  
 
The legacy of the agency system means that prevailing methods of doing business also 
conform well to standard models of offset provision. The agency system requires 
international firms to sell their products through local agents.196 As a result, many 
regional conglomerates are merely local purveyors of international brands rather than 
domestic producers of distinct products.197 Linking up with an individual businessman or 
family-owned firm in the Gulf is not only a de rigueur component of Gulf business 
culture, it also provides the firm with added security. Harry Stonecipher, then-President 
of McDonnell Douglas (and Boeing, once the two companies merged) explained the 
benefit to a gathering of Saudi officials and defense executives: 
 Why should you think about offset if no one forces you to? Because it is the best 
 way in the world to form a partnership.  Once you get the partnership formed, 
 then it is very difficult to be dislodged from that country.198 
                                                
195 One possible answer is that (much like a good deal of Gulf defense procurement) the purchase of such 
services is largely done as a political favor to Western allies.  A 2002 Washington Post article reported that 
a “well-placed Saudi source said that wealthy Saudis close to Prince Sultan, the Saudi defense minister, had 
been encouraged to put money into Carlyle as a favor to the elder Bush.” The fees Carlyle generated from 
more than five years advising Saudi officials on their offset program were perhaps a similar favor.  After 
9/11 Carlyle Group had to abandon the gains from a number of such favors: in addition to dropping its 
contract with the Saudi offset program the group also had to return a $2 million investment made by the 
Bin Laden family.  Robert G. Kaiser. 11 February 2002. “Enormous Wealth Spilled into American 
Coffers.” Washington Post.  
196 Investment laws usually require that the local partner be the majority shareholder, in practice his share is 
often 51%, except in the economic free zones, where ownership and investment laws are relaxed and the 
foreign partner may be a majority shareholder.  
197 “The Impact of Private Equity on the GCC.” June 2007.  Ithmar Capital, p11.    
198 “Workshop on the Offset Program: A Launchpad for Joint Ventures.” http://www.us-saudi-
business.org/p96ws2.htm.  The Carlyle Group, p9. 
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In short, offsets can solidify a firm’s presence in the procuring country, although it need 
not be the defense firm itself that gains a foothold. The defense firm can also meet its 
offset obligation by eliciting investment from a third-party company, which simply 
licenses the domestic sale of an existing product, a process closely resembling the way 
that Gulf merchants secure licenses to sell foreign goods outside the auspices of the 
defense offset system.  This formula was well-illustrated by the Congressional testimony 
of an industry lobbyist, which outlined the process whereby the licensed sale of foreign 
good can serve to fulfill offset obligations.199  Again, because the Gulf countries do not 
possess extensive indigenous defense sectors, the agreements that bring in third-party 
companies are typical of the offset process, which harmonizes well with the pre-existing 
agency system.   
 
In the UAE, the establishment of the Berlitz Language School in Abu Dhabi and the 
wholesale purchase of the German gun-manufacturer Merkel, which makes hunting rifles, 
are examples of offset transactions that follow the agency model, as is Saudi Arabia’s 
licensing of a Glaxo Wellcome pharmaceutical plant under the Al Yamamah arms 
deal.200  None of these firms provided goods or services that were part of the original 
weapons deals – they were brought in as investors by defense firms that had incurred 
offset obligations. Yet these agreements are distinct from the ordinary process of 
expansion in which multi-national corporations (MNCs) secure licenses to produce, 
                                                
199 See testimony of Joel Johnson, Chapter 2. 
200 Despite significant effort, I have not been able to determine the identity of the domestic partner for the 
Berlitz language school in Abu Dhabi.  The assets of Merkel – along with the other subsidiaries under the 
parent company Caracal International – were acquired by Tawazun, the investment fund of the UAE’s 
Offset Program Bureau. 
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distribute and market their wares abroad.  Not only do procuring countries “pay” up-front 
for the business generated by the MNC through inflated contract costs, they often provide 
extensive public financing for the new initiative and designate “suitable” domestic 
partners from within the private sector.  Such methods of support and control are more 
difficult to impart into non-defense transactions, especially if the relevant states are 
members of the WTO.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the domestic partners are typically drawn from among the procuring 
country’s economic elite.  According to Saudi government documents, the partner for the 
Glaxo Wellcome venture was the Saudi Imports Company (SIC), a subsidiary of the 
family-owned Banaja(h) Holdings (Ramady).201 The Banaja(h) family, whose patriarch 
ranked #31 on ArabianBusiness’s 2010 list of the world’s richest Arabs, is also a 
domestic partner for two other UK offsets in Saudi Arabia: DEEF pharmaceuticals, in 
which it is the majority shareholder, and the United Sugar Company, it which it holds a 
15% interest.  The identity of the owner of the Berlitz school in the UAE is not reported 
in any public documents, but various references to the “patronage of his Royal Highness” 
suggests that Crown Prince Mohammed may be the owner.  Tawazun – the investment 
arm of the UAE’s Offset Program Bureau – owns Merkel and its parent company Caracal 
International.  
 
The agency system is rooted in the peculiar development trajectory of the Gulf kingdoms;
                                                
201 Ramady records a 70% share ownership for SIC, but Zawya lists SIC with 51% and Glaxo the 
remaining 49%.  It may be that SIC subsequently sold some of its shares back to Glaxo, or that the 
government documents used by Ramady provided inaccurate figures.   
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it not only dominated early interstate relations, as European colonial administrators used 
economic ties to strengthen their preferred interlocutors, it also characterized relations 
between the nascent monarchies and their subjects.  As oil exports intensified, the wealth 
of the central governments in relation to the rest of their subjects also grew, and 
providing services to the state and/or the royal family became a quick and easy route to 
wealth.  The durability of the resulting ties, the scarcity of skilled labor and raw materials 
(other than oil and gas), and a lack of enthusiasm for industrialization among the region’s 
foreign patrons, hindered the establishment of industrial projects and the kind of 
economic diversification that might have allowed for the expansion of genuine domestic 
production, leaving demand to be met with foreign imports, which the U.S. and Europe 
were only too happy to supply.202  
 
The irony of the joint venture model within the context of defense offsets is that the 
challenges posed by patronage in general and the agency system in particular are 
exacerbated; while the potential benefits that policy-makers claim can be drawn from 
such ventures is minimized. Because the role of the domestic partner seldom extends 
beyond the realm of investment or distribution to more collaborative activities like 
licensed production or technological spillover, such ventures result in little (if any) 
meaningful cooperation between the domestic importer and the offset partner.  Likewise, 
because the offset partner is neither incorporating nor restructuring a pre-existing local 
venture, it is unlikely that such partnerships will have the purported effect of increasing 
                                                
202 A census in Saudi Arabia found that as late as 1967 nearly 50% of ‘manufacturing ventures’ employed 
no more than one person (the owner), and nearly 90% employed no more than four. Because there was no 
state regulation concerning the import of foreign commercial goods for many decades, a few families 
monopolized much of the import business. Niblock, Tim. 2007. The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia. 
New York: Routledge, p48-9.  
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efficiency or streamlining domestic business practices.  Yet, technology transfer and 
administrative and managerial knowhow are precisely the benefits that Gulf governments 
claim will be engendered through the sustained participation of international firms in 
regional offset projects. Even the process of WTO accession has done little to dislodge 
long-standing patronage networks and the ubiquity of the agency system; yet regional 
regimes continue to pay dearly for a system of foreign investment that is much less 
disruptive to traditional modes of doing business.203 
 
State Support for Indigenous Investors and Foreign Firms in Offset Ventures 
In addition to financing the defense firm’s participation in a domestic venture through 
payment of inflated contract costs, the Gulf States also provide significant financial 
incentives to domestic firms and third party foreign investors in order to encourage their 
participation – including interest free loans for up to 50% of the project cost; “non-
recourse” loans – which minimize risk for the foreign investor; below-market prices for 
raw materials; exemption from import duties; tariff-free access to neighboring markets 
(even before the introduction of the Arab Free Trade Area); unfettered repatriation of 
funds; fast-track licensing approval; “match-making” services to link up potential 
investors with domestic entrepreneurs; preferential treatment in subsequent government 
procurement decisions; bank guarantees; subsidized land, and a host of other 
incentives.204 In Kuwait, offset generated ventures are granted a 10-year tax holiday, and 
                                                
203 The UAE has done the most to relax some of the relevant laws, such as those governing foreign 
ownership of companies. Jack Kalpakian. “Economic Structures.” In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States 
Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Arab States. John A. Shoup and Sebastian Maisel (eds.) 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, p132.  
204 John Presley, Economic Advisor to the Saudi British Bank (SABB). Date unknown. “The Al Yamamah 
Economic Offset Programme: A Guide to Business Procedures in Saudi Arabia: Helping Business in Saudi 
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since many defense firms end up divesting from these projects after their obligation is 
fulfilled, this essentially exempts them from taxes altogether.205 Instances of granting 
preferential credit facilities are also visible in the UAE; for example, the Burkan 
Munitions factory – a joint venture between Al Jaber Group, Tawazun and Rheinmetall 
of Germany – got a nearly $300 million loan from First Gulf Bank, which also manages 
the Alfia Fund, “to continue its development to launch new products.”206 The loan was 
made at a very low rate, despite Al Jaber Group’s persistent debt troubles; one month 
before the loan was made the company asked 330 creditor banks to grant it a delay on 
payments of its $1.1 billion debt.207  
 
Typically, 50% of the capital used to launch an offset-generated venture is provided by 
the procuring state.208  In Saudi Arabia this generally comes from the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund or SIDF, which loans the capital at “nominal preferential rates”209 – 
which often means 0% for 15 years or more. Another 25% typically comes from 
commercial loans made by domestic banks, leaving 25% to be split between the domestic 
                                                                                                                                            
Arabia Series.” The Saudi British Bank, p5.  Although this document characterizes these incentives as 
being provided by the prime contractor for the Al Yamamah offset program (BAE) because BAE inflated 
the cost of the original arms contract by some 32%, it is really the Saudi government budget that is bearing 
the costs of these subsidies.  32% figure comes from D. Leigh and R. Evans. 28 October 2006. “The Secret 
Whitehall Telegram that Reveals Truth Behind Controversial Saudi Arms Deal.” The Guardian (UK).  
205 CTO Newsletter. 28 July 2003. 21(14).  
206 “Arms Industry to Help Boost Exports.” 11 January 2011. Offset Program Bureau press release.  
207 Camilla Hall and Zainab Fattah. 19 December 2010. “Al Jaber Group of Abu Dhabi Talks with Lenders 
About Altering Debt Terms.” Bloomberg.  
208 Stephen Martin. The Economics of Offsets, p234.  
209 25 November 1996. “Unichem/Herdilia for Saudi Cumene.” ICIS.com (chemical and energy industry 
publication).  
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partner and the defense firm.210  So for 12.5% of the initial investment, both the domestic 
merchant and the defense firm are entitled to split the profits – quite a good deal if the 
defense firm is inflating their costs up front (which they are).  Likewise a good deal for 
the domestic partner, since he frequently sits on the board of the domestic bank issuing 
the loan, he wins on both ends: easy-financing and profits from fees charged by the 
bank.211  The deal is even better for a foreign technology partner (such as a 
pharmaceutical firm or a petrochemical company – which was the model for BAE’s Al 
Yamamah program).  In the language of BAE’s Project Finance Initiative, “this means 
the foreign partner has all the benefits of a 50% shareholding in the joint venture 
company for just 6.25% investment,” since BAE and the Saudi state provide the bulk of 
funding, with the domestic investor claiming the remaining 50% of shares.212 If this is not 
sufficient incentive, the BAE brochure continues: “combined with competitively priced 
utilities and the SIDF interest-free loan, this powerful incentive package represents a 
unique low-cost opportunity to enter the developing Saudi market.”213  
 
Because of these allowances, a very small percentage of the overall dollar value of offset 
investment actually originates outside the procuring state.  A 2005 study conducted by a 
Saudi economist demonstrates why.  As of 2003, the Saudi Economic Offset Secretariat 
cited $1.4 billion in active offset projects undertaken by the UK corresponding to $7.6 
                                                
210 Stephen Martin. The Economics of Offsets, p234. 
211 In the annual reports of many GCC banks, the section on “related-party transactions” (ie, loans and other 
business conducted with the banks’ boards of directors and executives) is lengthy.  Although regional 
banks are notorious for making “sweetheart” loans to well-connected businessmen these sections carry the 
standard disclaimer that all these transactions were conducted at normal rates.   
212 “BAE Systems Project Finance Initiative 2.” See also Stephen Martin. The Economics of Offsets, p234. 
213 “BAE Systems Project Finance Initiative 2.” 
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billion in Saudi defense purchases.214  But, after accounting for the myriad incentives 
provided by the Saudi government, and the investment from domestic partners (which of 
course is also eligible for the same subsidies) the actual figure of UK investment in offset 
projects is only $361 million (or, 4.8%) of the total $7.6 billion price tag, meaning that 
nearly 95% of the financing for offsets comes either directly from the Saudi government, 
indirectly from the Saudi government via the inflated costs it pays to BAE which are then 
dispensed through the British Offset Office, or from individual Saudi investors.215   
 
Rates for US and French offset investment are even lower, at 2.9% and 0.9% of the 
overall sums spent on military procurement, respectively.216  Comparable breakdowns are 
not available for the UAE and Kuwaiti programs, although there is little reason to expect 
their offset programs to demonstrate substantially better returns. Comments made by 
Emirati officials indicate that they are well aware of the limited dollar amount of 
investment that originates with the obligor firm, and by extension the high cost borne by 
their governments to subsidize offset investment.217  The resistance Kuwait’s NOC has 
encountered in implementing a penalty for non-fulfillment of offset obligations equal to 
6% of the original procurement cost must also be sending red flags.  If defense firms 
                                                
214 Ramady. The Saudi Arabian Economy, p289. 
215 Ramady. The Saudi Arabian Economy, p289.  
216 Ramady. The Saudi Arabian Economy, p289.   
217 At a 2007 conference on offsets held in Abu Dhabi, an executive for the UAE Offset Program Bureau 
admitted to a room full of defense executives that his agency was aware of the practice of incorporating 
projected offset costs into the original equipment contracts (in effect ensuring that procuring countries 
would finance their own offset investments).  His full statement was, “If we look at the procurement and try 
to find the offset cost you will not find it.  There are a lot of ingenious ways to hide that cost. They are 
charging also for offset fees from countries that don’t have offsets for their procurements, just to take that 
extra money and try to invest it in a country that does have an offset program [my italics]. And we know 
that this is true.” Comments of Saif Al Hajeri, Director of the UAE’s Offset Venture Group at the 2007 
Middle East Regional Offset Conference held in Abu Dhabi. CTO Newsletter. 12 March 2007. 25(5). 
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object to possibly paying 6% of the overall contract cost, it must be because they are 
currently satisfying their offset obligations for substantially less than 6%.  One industry 
insider that contacted me estimated that, at most, firms end up parting with sums equal to 
3-4% of the contract cost.  
 
In addition to formal financing incentives, there are many “soft” incentives offered to 
third-party investors through the region’s offset programs, including preferential access 
to high-level decision-makers; the “status” derived from having one’s proposal 
administered on a government-to-government basis; banking advice; market research; 
contacts within various government bureaucracies – such as the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority, SAGIA; and, of course, “match-making services.”218      
The British handbook Doing Business in Saudi Arabia states that, 
Investing under the economic offset programmes offers the independent foreign 
investor a number of advantages.  The intergovernmental agreements provide for 
foreign shareholdings in ventures formed under the offset programmes to equal or 
exceed those of the Saudi partners and still to attract the full range of investment 
incentives.  Moreover, the Saudi Economic Offset Office, The British and French 
governments and BAe Systems retain advisers that are most willing to give advice 
and help to prospective investors, particularly over the choice of suitable partners 
for their enterprises.219 
 
The case of CAD Middle East Pharmaceuticals, a recent Saudi offset, is instructive.  
CAD is a joint venture, whose partners include Takamul Holding Company, the Arab 
                                                
218 These stated incentives are taken from numerous sources, including: (1) Spring 2000. “The Al 
Yamamah Economic Offset Programme.” RGBB News. (2) The website of the UK’s Middle East 
Association, which offers “informal advice on the selection and appointment of suitable Arab nationals and 
organisations necessary to represent your interests throughout the Middle East.” The Middle East 
Association (like the British Offset Office) is part of the UK Trade & Investment Authority.  
219 Anthony Shoult.  2006.  Doing Business with Saudi Arabia.  London: Global Market Briefings, p166.  
The selection continues: “BAe Systems operates a scheme that provides non-recourse loans to assist in 
offsetting risk associated with equity investment by the overseas technology partner.  There is always the 
possibility too, that one of the beneficiary companies of the defence supply projects might itself be willing 
to invest in a venture that is related to its business objectives and is seen to have good prospects.” 
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Company for Drug Industries and Medical Appliances (ACDIMA), Dishman 
Pharmaceuticals (an Indian company), and the Saudi Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Appliances Corporation (SPIMACO).  In addition to securing a $55 million soft loan 
from SIDF (which also happens to be the previous workplace of Takamul’s CEO Nizar 
Hariri) and funding from the British Offset Office, CAD also secured subsidized land 
from the Saudi government.220  Other Takamul executives have served in senior positions 
at SPIMACO and ACDIMA, which are both primarily state-owned enterprises, and will 
serve as the new venture’s largest customers. Officials involved in the offset bureaucracy 
also frequently hold positions in other government agencies that determine the incentives 
provided to foreign investors and their domestic partners, making political connections 
even more rewarding.  In Kuwait the Council of Ministers appointed the NOC’s General 
Manager to a simultaneous position on the Foreign Capital Investment Committee, which 
not only approves projects but also determines the allocation of incentives and certifies 
which projects meet relevant investment objectives.221 
 
Predictably, most of the promotional literature published by chambers of commerce, 
industry associations, banks and government agencies that outline the benefits available 
to potential investors willing to participate under the rubric of the offset program portray 
those subsidies as incentives financed by the defense firm. One particularly interesting 
example is a booklet written by an academic working as an economic advisor to the 
Saudi British Bank (SABB), which handled most of the financial transactions pertaining 
                                                
220 12 July 2006. “Dishman ropes in SPIMACO in Saudi Arabian JV.” The Economic Times (India).  
221 NOC Newsletter. September 2009. 2(3).  
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to the Al Yamamah offset program.  The booklet, titled “The Al Yamamah Economic 
Offset Programme: A Guide to Business Procedures in Saudi Arabia” is part of the 
Helping Business in Saudi Arabia Series, and is included in the chapter appendix for 
reference.  Although the text outlines all the various subsidies, it characterizes these 
incentives as being provided by BAE, the prime contractor for the Al Yamamah deal. Yet 
because BAE inflated the cost of the original arms contract by some 32% – according to 
government telegrams obtained by the UK’s Guardian newspaper – it is really the Saudi 
government budget that is bearing the cost of these subsidies.222  Nonetheless the booklet 
is an excellent example of the type of institutional literature that perpetuates the (crucial) 
misconception that defense firms are the ones bearing the costs of offsets.  Taken 
together, these materials form an important component of the dense web of 
misinformation that allows such economically perverse practices to continue.  
 
Defense Offsets and Wealth Concentration 
The features of Gulf economies that most influence the political and economic role of 
defense offsets in the region are the high degree of wealth concentration and the robust 
networks of state patronage that underpin it. The region’s private economy is dominated 
by a relatively small number of politically well-connected and highly-diversified 
conglomerates whose operations run the gamut from importing goods like coffee and 
construction equipment to operating shipping lines and travel agencies, currency 
exchanges, insurance brokerage firms, real estate development, tourism, light 
                                                
222 32% figure comes from D. Leigh and R. Evans. 28 October 2006. “The Secret Whitehall Telegram that 
Reveals Truth Behind Controversial Saudi Arms Deal.” The Guardian (UK). 
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manufacturing, financial services and telecommunications.223 This degree of ownership 
concentration not only ensures that obligor firms have domestic business partners with 
ready access to the subsidized infrastructure and cheap loans required to launch joint 
ventures, but also allows these firms to solidify their relationships with elites who have 
access to high-level decision-makers – the same ones who will determine the recipients 
of future military contracts.  
 
These conglomerates are remarkable not only for the magnitude of assets under their 
control, but also for the breadth of economic activities in which they engage.  As one 
author puts it: 
A merchant who has a string of shipping agencies and a normal run of other 
businesses will make sure that the shipping lines he represents will buy fuel from 
his bunkering service, air-tickets for relief crews through his travel agency, and 
will have their ships unloaded by his stevedoring company.  Where possible, 
cargoes will be insured through the merchant’s insurance business.  Any of the 
crew who have to spend a night or so ashore before flying home will likely find 
themselves booked into the merchant’s hotel.224  
 
Today, approximately 95% of businesses in the Gulf are family-owned; half of these have 
roots dating at least to the 1950’s, during the phase of intense state-consolidation and the 
incorporation of elite factions.225  This is not a coincidence, as oil money began to flow in 
earnest into Saudi Arabia in 1946 – and all the Gulf economies by the 1950s – laying the 
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groundwork for the massive expansion of public infrastructure and distributive 
institutions that would reach an apex during the 1970s hike in oil prices. 
 
One business intelligence publication reported that, “If foreign suppliers want their goods 
to be seriously considered they are urged to join forces with Saudi Arabia’s big merchant 
families.”226 Defense offsets provide a streamlined – and cheap – method for U.S. and 
European defense firms to do just that. Lastly, defense offsets are appealing to the 
region’s ruling families because they provide legitimate, institutionalized channels for 
transferring economic subsidies to loyal domestic elites while also obscuring the origin of 
the funding.  
 
The Economic Fundamentals of Defense Offsets in the Gulf: Official Narratives vs. 
Outcomes  
 
Although offset obligors bill their investment activities as innovative methods of 
fostering ‘industrial cooperation’ and ‘economic enhancement,’ the most striking feature 
of the economics of defense offsets – in the Gulf and elsewhere – is undoubtedly the high 
cost they impose on purchasers.227 Offsets frequently finance projects that generate large 
financial returns in a short period but provide little in the way of sustainable jobs or 
genuine economic diversification; a preference for these rapid return investments among 
foreign investors (here, the defense firms) is also associated with high levels of 
corruption.228  The proliferation of offset investment funds – which is most extensive in 
                                                
226 CTO Newsletter. 14 August 2006. 24(15).  
227 This phenomenon is examined in detail in Chapters 1 and 2.  
228 B.K. Smarzynska and S. Wei. 2000. “Corruption and the Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: 
Firm Level Evidence.” Working Paper 7969. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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the GCC – has been criticized by many, including those within the offset services 
industry.  David Hew, the founder of the Asia Pacific Countertrade Association (and 
former offset advisor to Kuwait) stated that: 
The essence of an offset program is to enable effective knowledge transfer and 
ensure job creation for nationals….[yet] some offset models in the GCC are based 
on venture capital models which strips the basic idea behind an offset program.229   
 
One particularly large project was the $2.1 billion offset (financed by a coalition of 
several obligor firms) that went to Abu Dhabi’s Aldar real-estate company to finance 
development of the Al-Raha Beach project – a 5 million square meter luxury residential 
and commercial space built on a platform of dredged sand.  Aldar – established in 2000 
by the UAE’s Offset Program Bureau – is the Emirate’s largest real estate developer; the 
company’s board of directors includes several of the UAE’s wealthiest merchant families 
that are invested in other offset projects or have served within the UAE’s offset 
bureaucracy, or both – including the Al Suwaidi, Al Jaber, Al Mazrouei and Al Sayegh 
families.230 It seems this project did not even meet the minimal standard of adding value 
to the Emirati economy, since the government was forced to bail out Aldar during the 
recent financial crisis.  In a moment of rare public candor, when pressed by a conference 
attendee Matar Al Romaithi of the UAE’s OPB admitted that “a few” of the OPB’s 
current projects could have been launched outside the framework of defense offsets.231  
 
                                                
229 Comments made at “Corporate Governance and its Role in Economic Development” conference in 
Oman.  8 June 2009. CTO Newsletter. 27(11).  
230 Ahmed Ali Al Sayegh is on both boards (Chairman of Aldar and a board member of the UAE Offsets 
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the Bin Jaber Group; the Al Jaber family has one spot on Aldar’s board and has been the joint venture 
partner for previous offsets in the UAE.   
231 CTO Newsletter. 9 March 2009. 27(5).  
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Offsets and Employment 
Official employment figures are difficult to square with the jobs rhetoric that permeates 
official pronouncements on offset programs. Major General Hamad Al Sugair, Secretary 
to the Saudi Economic Offset Committee, reported that about 6,500 jobs had been created 
by the offset program as of 2006, although only 56% of these are filled by Saudi 
nationals.232  Independent calculations based on documents from the Economic Offset 
Secretariat yield a figure of 2,251 jobs as of year’s end in 2001, 967 of them for Saudi 
citizens.233  These are a far cry from the projected figures provided by defense firms.  For 
example, Boeing and the other contractors associated with the 1985 Peace Shield contract 
promised the creation of 75,000 jobs;234 research conducted by Janes defense publications 
put the number of jobs at 3,540 (with the Saudi proportion unknown) as of 2009.235  
Similarly, recent statements made in the Saudi press cite the eventual creation of 15,000 
local jobs based on aircraft assembly work that is part of BAE’s most recent offset.236  
 
Yet, BAE, which has been in the kingdom in one form or another since 1973 and 
considers the kingdom one of its “home markets” (the others being the UK, US, 
Australia, South Africa and Sweden) currently employs only about 2,500 Saudi nationals. 
And despite the kingdom’s rhetoric on encouraging employment through offsets, UK 
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officials involved in the program report that the focus has shifted to technology, and that 
labor-intensive projects are actively discouraged.237 
 
Many industrial offset projects appear to employ more foreigners than nationals, but a 
large proportion of offset dollars also go to sectors not designed to generate any 
substantial employment opportunities at all.  One offset worth $2.1 billion – deemed 
“Project Alpha” by the offset service firm Blenheim Capital238 – went toward real estate 
development in the UAE: hardly the type of industry that provides sustainable 
employment for Gulf nationals or increases the economy’s productive capacity. The 
large-scale equipment leasing operations explored above are also projects that promise 
high financial returns – Al Waha claimed an after-tax profit of nearly $50 million in its 
first year239 – but provide little by way of employment or diversification. The high 
concentration of investment in sectors such as finance and energy also crowd out 
investment in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as such industries are seldom 
profitable on a reduced scale.  This is reflected in the low levels of regional lending for 
SMEs; only 2 percent of bank loans in the GCC go to SMEs.240  The absence of SMEs 
ensures that the region’s economies will be chiefly composed of two groups: wealthy 
state-sponsored business elites who depend on their privileged market access to survive, 
and a vast lower class similarly dependent on state-subsidized jobs, housing and 
education.  
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When regimes do make explicit attempts to indigenize the labor force involved in offset 
projects, obligor firms frequently resist.  For example, when the Saudi government 
pressured BAE to increase the “local content” of employment in the contractor’s 
domestic facilities, the firm warned that profits from extant offset ventures would be 
reduced.  Saudi Arabia fired back, hinting that if returns did indeed drop the kingdom 
might be forced to reduce the annual payment of £1 billion in oil it is obligated to make 
to the UK under the Al Yamamah contract.241 Yet for all this talk, offset-related 
employment figures in the Saudi Kingdom remain dismal.  Independent estimates place 
the cumulative number of offset-related jobs for Saudi citizens at less than 3,000 since 
the U.S. initiated its first offset program in 1985,242 yet firms involved in the offset 
business routinely offer much higher figures, often without providing evidence to back 
them up. Kuwait – by its own official estimates – fares even worse: reporting the creation 
of 50 offset-related jobs annually.243  There are also specific provisions in Kuwaiti offset 
policy allowing “permissible levels of foreign labour;” quite striking given the political 
salience of employment for nationals across the GCC States.244  Given the high cost of 
financing and subsidizing offset ventures, the pricetag for these jobs is enormous.  These 
figures suggest that employment generation is in fact not a key concern for either 
governments or obligor firms.  The absence of such genuine pressures provide firms and 
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policy-makers with more leeway in distributing offset projects – making them a prime 
channel for distributing patronage to the most powerful domestic business elites.245 
 
Offsets & Regime Prestige: Aquaculture, Academics and Aircraft  
Despite their poor economic record, offsets do succeed in creating the illusion of foreign 
investment, economic diversification, modernization, and official efforts to generate 
employment for Gulf nationals.  Because the state is able to obscure its role in 
subsidizing the foreign defense firm making the investment and its own role in choosing 
the domestic partner to participate in the project, the state appears to be both judicious in 
its procurement policy and a neutral arbiter in the process of administering the offset 
investment.  In Kuwait, the NOC retained the services of Epicos, an offset services firm 
based in Greece, to act as a third-party administrator and facilitator for the country’s 
offset program.246 The firm devised a project named “Empower the Private Sector in 
Kuwait,” and its official announcement of the program stated that the “main objective” of 
the NOC was,  
to support the development of the private sector in Kuwait through the transfer 
and settlement of appropriate modern technology, the creation of high-skill jobs 
for Kuwaiti nationals and advancement of education & training opportunities in 
Kuwait…[t]he Kuwaiti government is keen on decreasing Kuwait’s dependence 
on oil to fuel its economy by transforming it into an industrial and commercial 
                                                
245 Hertog cites the lack of historical populist mobilization in the Gulf as one of the key determinants for 
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hub for the region. Great effort has been made by the government in order to 
support the private sector’s growth.247 
 
Unlike their counterparts elsewhere in the Middle East – where the role of military aid 
and the legacy of military-dominated economies makes drawing linkages between 
defense spending and economic growth especially dubious – offset committees in the 
Gulf States spend enormous energies publicizing offset-generated ventures.  Regional 
media outlets routinely run stories on offset partnerships and showcase interviews with 
public officials involved in offset policy. Because the funds for the offset investment are 
financed by increases in the procurement cost but dispensed by the defense firm, they 
appear to be coming from the firm rather than the state budget.  This pretense is 
facilitated in a number of ways – including by advertising these newly created ventures as 
“Economic Offset Program Companies” – a phrase displayed prominently on the 
masthead of many Saudi company webpages. The advert insinuates a public-private 
partnership model – since the foreign defense firm’s participation is also publicized.   
 
Yet, as I hope the above examination of offset dynamics made clear, we know the firm’s 
participation and the participation of the domestic investor are both heavily subsidized by 
the procuring country’s public budget – making it less a partnership than a patronage 
mechanism.  Likewise, reports compiled by government agencies or state-allied media 
frequently highlight the role offsets play in the creation of public joint-stock companies – 
which are especially idealized because their “modern” organizational form is considered 
superior to the traditional familial partnerships or private LLCs that still characterize 
most economic ventures in the Gulf.  Yet this too is often a chimera, since in many cases 
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the only shareholders of these companies are the states’ sovereign wealth funds, quasi-
public banks, and the same family-owned conglomerates that dominate the rest of the 
economy. 
 
Many of the projects initiated in the Gulf under the auspices of offset programs are high-
profile ventures intended to depict the regions’ regimes as forward-thinking technocrats – 
in much the same way that ill-fated land reclamation projects provided earlier generations 
of Arab leaders with an opportunity to demonstrate their engineering prowess.  Such 
projects are what rentier-state theorist D.A. Yates termed “prestige-oriented 
industrialization” – the types of projects pursued by national governments whose aim 
may have more to do with demonstrating grandiose vision to a disenchanted population 
than with maximizing investment or responding to market incentives.248 One project that 
demonstrates the flawed economic logic of many offset ventures is the Arabian Shrimp 
Company, part of an extensive initiative to develop aquaculture that investors claim will 
be the “lynchpin” in the Saudi kingdom’s efforts to promote “economic diversity, 
national employment and import substitution.”249  
 
The Arabian Shrimp Company is a joint venture between AquaFarms and the Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership (SOLP), the latter of which is funded 70% by Raytheon, and 
30% by the French defense firm Thales.250  DevCorp, the fund manager of SOLP, 
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estimates the total cost of the project to be around $226 million, with 5,000 Saudis 
eventually employed in building, ice-making, transport and maintenance.251  Yet, the 
sustainability of such projects – in both financial and environmental terms – is 
questionable.   
 
A 2001 article from the journal Aquaculture Economics and Management found that of 
23 intensive fish farms they surveyed in Saudi Arabia, every single one was operating 
below the profit-maximizing point, and most were operating well below the minimum 
efficient scale despite interest-free loans and economic and feasibility studies provided 
free from the government.252  According to FAO Fishery statistics, the kingdom farmed 
about 18,500 tons of aquatic species in 2010, and in 2007 caught about 70,000 tons and 
imported another 60,000 tons.  The industry contributed only .04% of GDP in 2003 - 
providing just 18% of total fish production (the rest supplied by imports and wild 
catchings) despite its relatively long history.253   
 
Fish farms generally employ little labor - approximately 3,400 in Saudi Arabia as of 
2003, and most of these laborers are migrants from beyond the Gulf.  The authors of the 
2001 article also conclude that the lack of water would prevent any further expansion of 
the industry, as it depends heavily on already scarce underground water supplies.  So why 
pursue such ill-advised ventures? 
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In addition to their prestige (raising fish in the desert!), the resource-intensity of these 
large aquaculture projects provides another possible political benefit to the ruling family: 
they deplete the water supplies upon which many of the nomadic and peasant 
communities in the Kingdom rely – the same communities which have resisted 
incorporation into the central Saudi state for decades.254  Without access to these 
resources, such vulnerable populations will find themselves at the mercy of the official 
institutions they had previously defied.  An aquaculture project in the UAE has been 
similarly marked by poor performance.  The International Fish Farming Holding 
Company (Asmak), which was established through an offset with the French defense firm 
Dassault, abandoned aquaculture altogether in 2010 after its entire stock was decimated 
by an epidemic of red tide.  The firm now primarily acts as a broker for international 
seafood importers and is working to diversify into more traditional sectors in the UAE – 
notably construction, landscaping, infrastructure and labor camp management.255 
 
Like large aquaculture schemes, private (and frequently for-profit) universities have 
become a preferred destination for offset dollars.256 This has partially been fueled by a 
reverence for American-style educational institutions in a region where tight-control by 
political and religious bureaucracies has prevented existing educational establishments 
from producing skilled graduates.  However, as John Waterbury, former president of the 
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American University of Beirut has pointed out, these private institutions tend to raise 
their funds from “sectarian, ideological or” (as is the case with offset-funded universities) 
“programmatic supporters.”257  Consequently, institutions like Al Faisal University (the 
kingdom’s first private university) of which Boeing is a ‘founding member,’ train 
students in technologies necessary to operate and maintain the kingdom’s vast defense 
arsenal, creating another network in Saudi society interested in maintaining high defense 
spending and a strong relationship with Western defense firms.258 Al Faisal’s Vice 
President for Research, Maher A. Alodan, has expressed a desire to establish corporate-
sponsor scholarships to subsidize the university’s high admission’s cost as well as 
exchange programs between students and corporations that would bring in professionals 
to lead classes, workshops and conferences.259  The Dean of the College of Engineering, 
Ashraf M. AlKhairy, voiced similar hopes for “systems engineers at Boeing to come on 
site and teach and build internships into [the university’s programs].”260 Saudi Arabia’s 
assistant defense minister Prince Khaled bin Sultan recently identified the kingdom’s 
many scientific and research institutes as a necessary stepping stone to the long-term goal 
of achieving self-sufficiency in arms production.261  
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The Political Benefits of Defense Offsets in the Gulf – Delivering Patronage and 
Incorporating Elite Interests 
 
It is the claim of this research project that political benefits – not economic ones – drive 
the pursuit of defense offsets by Gulf regimes, and that these include the provision of 
patronage.262 The flip side of the patronage coin is the ability of Gulf regimes to utilize 
defense offsets to weave the economic interests of powerful elites more fully into the 
fabric of the state.  As of 2005, less than one-third of the region’s privately-held assets 
were deployed – and 75% of these are controlled by only 5,000 family businesses.263  
Although a good portion of these assets are held by the monarchs themselves, there are 
also many powerful families without royal blood, as well as marginal family members 
whose loyalty is dependent on their access to economic privileges. Such a large reservoir 
of uncommitted capital could serve as an economic weapon if the interests of the 
monarchies were to diverge substantially from those of their elite base and extended kin, 
and indeed relations with powerful merchant families and disgruntled kin has provided 
much of the historical script for struggles over regime consolidation. 
 
The political history of the Gulf is defined by the Royal Families’ efforts to incorporate 
influential families into the state apparatus, and, once there, provide those elites with 
access to new economic opportunities in exchange for exempting them from positions of 
political power. During the phase of state consolidation in the Gulf, would-be rulers and 
their erstwhile colonial patrons bestowed enormous privileges on family-based groups 
willing to lend their support to the struggling central authorities.  Those families whose 
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social prestige and economic strength pre-dated the era of oil often owed their influence 
to lineage (as the descendents of the prophet or his close companions), control over the 
pilgrimage and/or trade routes, or activities like pearling.264  As revenues from resource 
extraction increased, these loyal families (sometimes more or less distant kin of the ruling 
family) were rewarded with enormous state-largesse – often in the form of construction 
contracts or monopoly privileges for foreign imports – and subsequently developed into 
the family-owned conglomerates that dominate the region’s economy.265  Yet many of 
these same wealthy families hold considerable assets abroad in foreign banks and other 
investment vehicles that place them beyond the direct control of the state apparatus.  
 
Offsets can provide a partial solution to this by linking the financial assets of these 
powerful families directly to state-sponsored ventures whose success depends on the 
good will of the Royal Family, but also by fostering business partnerships between these 
families and members of the monarchy.  For example the Saudi regime must find 
investment outlets for its some 8,000 princes – often by coercing private businessmen to 
take the princes on as business ‘partners,’ or otherwise pay them substantial commissions 
or consulting fees. Indeed, a document obtained by Wikileaks cites the tendency of Saudi 
Arabia’s princes (and princesses) to forcibly expropriate land and other assets from 
wealthy businessmen as the key reason so much private Saudi money sits in overseas 
financial institutions.266  The most comprehensive study of the Saudi Royal Family’s 
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private investments shows that a large number of offset ventures involved numerous 
princes (and princesses) as minor shareholders alongside prominent investors (or investor 
consortia) without Royal blood.267 Offset ventures may be appealing to wealthy 
businessmen because they include significant subsidies and ties to many of the world’s 
top technology, finance and manufacturing firms, but access to these partnerships is also 
dependent on official sanction, which may necessitate a cut for the royals as the cost of 
doing business.268    
 
The next, chapter of this dissertation will examine defense offsets in the cases of Egypt 
and Jordan.  In contrast to the Gulf States dealt with in this chapter, offset investment in 
these two states has always concentrated on subsidizing production of military 
equipment.  The thesis of this project is that states alter their offset policies in order to 
direct resources to their most critical domestic political constituencies: in the Gulf, this is 
primarily the influential merchant families, whose conglomerate companies become the 
domestic investment partners for offset projects.  In Egypt and Jordan, the military has 
traditionally played a much more active role in politics, and is therefore a domestic 
institution that these regimes cannot afford to ignore. The resources generated through 
offset investment allow the militaries of these states to finance production facilities, 
employ rank-and-file recruits (or conscripts), and generate export earnings, while also 
creating the illusion of an economically-erudite and disciplined production force.  As in 
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the Gulf States, the real cost of offset-generated projects are externalized – and borne by 
the overall state budget, which incurs the added costs associated with offset agreements. 
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Chapter 4: Defense Offsets in Egypt and Jordan: Feeding the 
Military Machine 
 
“I would say that our major objectives of modernizing the Egyptian armed forces, 
maintaining a presence and access to the country, and enhancing Egypt's industrial base 
have either been accomplished, or are well on their way to being accomplished.” 
 
Major General William A. Fitzgerald, Commanding General 
U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, 1995 
 
Unlike the Gulf States, which have focused on indirect/commercial offsets, Egypt and 
Jordan have used their arms imports to generate additional investment in domestic 
military production via direct offsets.  In both cases, these direct offsets – the technology 
transferred, the facilities built to manufacture the military goods, the subsidies provided 
by the Egyptian and Jordanian governments, and the prestige accorded to domestic 
military firms engaged in producing the equipment of large multi-national defense firms 
– provide additional commercial benefits to military institutions and high-ranking 
officials, further amplifying their political leverage.   
 
Defense Offsets in Egypt & Jordan in the Context of Historical State Formation 
The political role of the military has long been a primary distinction that sets the oil-rich 
states of the Gulf apart from their more populous, resource poor neighbors.  The security 
forces (both military and police) of the GCC states have historically been weak political 
actors, often composed of foreign forces or marginalized groups without strong ties to the 
rest of the population, and therefore more loyal to their respective ruling families.1 By 
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contrast, the security forces of other Arab states have been central players in the major 
events shaping the histories of these states, from violent regime changes (coups d’état), to 
modernization projects (ISI and military-driven industrialization), and the management of 
extensive state programs of surveillance and repression.  
 
The survival of incumbent political elites in Egypt and Jordan has rested largely on their 
ability to maintain the support of their respective militaries, a dependency that dates to 
the earliest days of the current regimes.2 As Vatikiotis notes, the Jordanian army’s 
original role was not that of an offensive force – it was there to suppress potential rivals 
to the monarchy3  – and afterwards, to provide a source of employment. In the 1950s, the 
Jordanian military was the second largest employer – after the agricultural sector – and 
between 1961 and 1975 the number of those employed in the military increased threefold, 
accounting for one-fourth of the domestic labor force.4  Likewise, the leaders of the 
military coup that initiated the line of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periodically re-asserted 
                                                                                                                                            
approximately 40% of soldiers in Kuwait’s regular army, down from a high of 90% in the mid-1980s.  
Although Saudi Arabia has a larger number of citizen-nationals to draw from, the military is not viewed as 
a particularly good channel for achieving social mobility, and traditionally Pakistanis have provided much 
of the manpower for the Saudi armed forces.  Virtually all the members of the National Guard battalion that 
fought under the American Joint Forces Command during the 1990-91 Gulf War were Pakistani.  See N. 
Hasbani. March 2006. “The Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States.” Defense & Security 
Analysis. 22(1): 73-88. See also Ghanim Al-Najjar. “Challenges of Security Sector Governance in 
Kuwait.” Working Paper – no. 142. Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva.  
2 As Vatikiotis notes, the Jordanian army’s original role was not that of an offensive force – it was there to 
suppress potential rivals to the monarchy P.J. Vatikiotis. 1967. Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study 
of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957. New York: Praeger. Likewise, the leaders of the military coup that initiated 
the line of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periodically re-asserted themselves in Egyptian politics until their 
interests were sufficiently institutionalized that servicing them no longer required overt interference. 
3 P.J. Vatikiotis. 1967. Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957. New 
York: Praeger.  
4 A.M. Baylouny. Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East, p53.  Baylouny also cites Richard Antoun.  1972. 
Arab Village: A Social Structural Transformation of a Trans-Jordanian Peasant Community. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.   
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themselves in Egyptian politics until their interests were sufficiently institutionalized that 
servicing them no longer required overt interference.  In the immediate post-
independence period and during most of the Cold War, the Egyptian and Jordanian 
regimes were operating in an atmosphere of bureaucratic authoritarian politics 
characterized by populist and nationalist discourses focused on achieving economic 
independence, often by building indigenous defense capacity and using the military as an 
engine for economic development and social mobility. Unlike the Gulf States – where the 
colonial footprint was light by comparison – Egypt and Jordan (Transjordan as it was 
known until 1949) inherited extensive military, police and intelligence structures formed 
by colonial authorities, first to enforce their own rule, and later to mobilize the domestic 
population in support of the Allied war effort.5  
 
This trajectory of state formation has manifested itself in the pursuit of offset projects that 
directly benefit the regimes’ domestic security constituencies in a number of ways.  
Under licensed or co-production arrangements – the most frequent form of direct offset – 
procuring country militaries benefit from the construction of manufacturing facilities and 
related infrastructure like roads, power generation stations, worker housing, etc.; the 
transfer of technology and production techniques; the provision of employment for the 
vast pool of unskilled laborers among the armed forces – including conscripts in Egypt, 
as well as employment opportunities for the large number of engineers and trained 
managers that emerge from the region’s military-technical colleges; earnings generated 
                                                
5 For the legacy of colonial security policy see Martin Thomas (2008). Empires of Intelligence: Security 
Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914.  For the role that war mobilization played in the shaping of 
regional militaries and internal security forces see the many case-specific chapters of Steve Heydemann 
(ed). (2000). War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East.    
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by exports or buy-backs of co-produced weapons components; the ability to use the 
above-mentioned facilities and trained labor in the production of other non-military 
goods and services that the armed forces may market domestically or abroad; and the 
prestige associated with being ‘chosen’ to partner with multinational firms that produce 
technologically sophisticated products.  The provision of these offset-generated benefits 
is an extension of the preferential access that the military in Egypt and Jordan have 
always had to scarce public goods such as industrial materials (iron, steel); infrastructure 
(roads, factories, warehouses); land; and hard currency – and reflect the historical role 
played by these militaries in their respective economies.  
 
Defense Offsets in the Context of Economic Liberalization 
In both states the military has been one of the few institutions to emerge relatively 
unscathed from the neoliberal reform process – indeed their corporatist interests are 
consolidated in the economic structures of the state even more than before.  In Egypt, the 
military’s factories and service providers – which offer everything from tanks and 
exercise equipment to pasta and child care – were among the few public sector 
enterprises that did not go on the privatization chopping block, and some civilian-
operated public sector companies were even handed over to military management.6 The 
role of the major arms exporters (and their host governments) in this process cannot be 
ignored, since they were often at the forefront of efforts to pressure the international 
                                                
6 Robert Springborg. 12 February 2011. “The vast and complex military machine will decide its nation’s 
future.” The Independent (UK).  
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financial institutions to rescind demands for slashes in defense spending.7 It is illustrative 
that, although the US State Department has cut economic aid to Egypt (it fell below $500 
million in 2006, the lowest since the Camp David agreements in 1979), it recently 
announced a plan to lock in $13 billion in military aid over the next ten years, not 
counting the ‘cash flow financing’ option unique to key US-allies that allows them to 
spread out their payments for arms shipments over many years, or the Excess Defense 
Articles program that allows the Pentagon to transfer overstocks of combat material to 
allies free of charge.8  This uptick in military aid will likely include a parallel increase in 
offsets, supplying more unaccountable patronage resources to the Egyptian regime.   
 
In her study of Jordan’s economic liberalization program, A.M. Baylouny finds that, in 
the aftermath of structural adjustment, “the main group that continues to benefit from the 
state is the military,” whose subsidies, pensions and employment programs actually 
increased – as did the military’s overall budget – while budgetary allocations for social 
services delivered to non-military populations decreased.9  This growth was enabled by a 
range of specific policies undertaken in the early 1990s – including the granting of 
additional months salaries to all employees in the defense and security establishment, 
annual increases in pension expenditures, an increase in retiree benefits, and substantial 
                                                
7 See Gordon Adams. 1982. The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle. New Brunswick: 
Transaction, p24. 
8 Sean L. Yom. Spring 2008. “Washington’s New Arms Bazaar.” Middle East Report. No 246.  
9 A.M. Baylouny. Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East, p57-8.  
 239 
housing subsidies, as well as the maintenance of existing benefits – like public health 
insurance, free higher education for family members,10 and subsidized military co-ops.11  
 
Defense offsets represent a contemporary form of subsidization that follows the basic 
trajectory of these other privileges, but comports better with the liberal strictures against 
state intervention in the economy because offsets appear to be generated by the 
commitments of foreign manufacturers via market mechanisms like foreign direct 
investment and technology transfer.  Because offsets result in the construction of tangible 
facilities, coproduction ventures, and supply contracts for domestic producers, they 
provide a highly visible (if false) indicator of the military’s contribution to the national 
economy.  The employment opportunities these projects supposedly generate are also 
ephemeral – especially in the case of Egypt.  The endless supply of conscripts available 
to work on the military’s assembly lines means that those who have completed their 
service are unlikely to be retained as full employees as new classes of conscripts are 
always available – and the dearth of private sector manufacturing enterprises means the 
skills that conscripts gain during their employment in these factories is unlikely to land 
them a job once they leave the military.   
 
Likewise, since the investment appears to come from a private foreign firm it is classified 
as FDI (foreign direct investment), and therefore not only inflates perceptions of the 
efficiency of domestic military producers, but also obscures the cost incurred by the state 
                                                
10 Baylouny notes that this is achieved through a quota system, meaning that even if the number of potential 
enrollees increases and facilities remain static, the family members of army recruits are still guaranteed a 
spot.   
11 A.M. Baylouny. Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East, p57-8.  
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to subsidize these producers.12  In this sense, offsets provide a subsidy to the military in 
the same way as other common practices – such as the “recommendations” received by 
private sector business elites to hire veterans of the military and/or security services, and 
the similar practice of granting contracts to businesses owned by former officers in order 
to avoid more direct attempts at extortion such as kick-backs.13  The provision of 
economic benefits – through offsets and otherwise – are a critical component of the 
“coup-proofing” strategies employed with great success for decades by the region’s 
authoritarian leaders.  Although the content of the strategies employed by the Gulf States 
examined in the previous chapter may differ from those in Egypt and Jordan – in the type 
of offsets they seek and in the institutions they use to distribute offset-generated subsidies 
– their goals are the same: to harness patronage resources in order to consolidate and 
maintain the support of pivotal domestic constituencies. 
 
Although strategic independence and a thriving domestic manufacturing industry are still 
hallmarks of development, the liberalization of trade has made the ability to generate 
export earnings a central preoccupation of developing country governments, including 
those in Jordan and Egypt.  Military representatives often claim that production in 
Egyptian and Jordanian military ventures is profitable – a dubious claim that is used to 
generate public acquiescence to large military budgets and investment in military 
                                                
12 In Egypt for example, the last 6 months of a conscripts term is spent not in physical training or military 
education, but working in the military’s factories – a huge source of free labor for Egypt’s military 
industry.  In the Summer of 2010, eight employees of Military Factory 99 in Helwan were put on trial for 
“disclosing military secrets” and “illegally stopping production” after they organized a strike (disbanded by 
the military) demanding safer working conditions in the aftermath of a boiler explosion that killed one and 
injured six others.  They were eventually acquitted or given suspended sentences, but the trial demonstrated 
that the right to strike (provided under Egyptian law) did not extend to those working in military factories. 
“Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt.” NYTimes. 11 September 2010. 
13 “A Special Report on Egypt: No Paradise.” 15 July 2010. The Economist.  
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production.14  The Jordanian government has been particularly adept at generating 
positive reviews for its military industry.  One example can be viewed at 
www.marcopolis.net/Jordan-industry-sector.htm.  The site – which looks like a news 
aggregator, with the NYTimes, and International Herald Tribune mastheads running 
across the top of the page – is in fact operated by a French public relations firm that 
produces economic literature on behalf of Arab governments.  The particular report 
available at the above site labels the Jordanian military’s industrial arm – the King 
Abdullah Design and Development Bureau –one of the “greater success stories” of 
Jordan’s industrial sector, and cites a “turnover of $100 million,” per year as part of the 
bureau’s ability to “bring in value to the government.”  
 
Although neither state releases any statistical information on military budgets or military 
production that would substantiate or refute claims of profitability,15 it is clear that 
military-affiliated enterprises enjoy many advantages that non-military enterprises do not, 
including exemption from corporate taxation and regulation, a proscription against strikes 
and other union activities in their factories, and subsidized access to inputs and 
intermediate goods like land, raw materials and foreign imports.16  The additional 
                                                
14 The Jordanian government has been particularly adept at generating positive reviews of its military 
industry.  One example can be viewed at www.macropolis.net/Jordan-industry-sector.htm.  The site looks 
like a news aggregator (with the NYTimes, and International Herald Tribune mastheads running across the 
top of the page) but is in fact a private, for-profit public relations outfit hired by national governments to 
produce positive literature on various aspects of their economies.  This particular report labels the 
military’s KADDB one of the industrial sector’s “greater success stories.”  
15 Egypt ranks last (with scores of zero) on Global Integrity’s index measuring citizens’ access to 
information about the government.  Springborg (2011) states that domestic media reports on the nation’s 
military were more comprehensive and numerous in the 1980s than they are today.  
16 In Egypt, the last 6 months of a conscripts term is spent not in physical training or military education, but 
working in the military’s factories – a huge source of free labor for Egypt’s military industry.  In the 
Summer of 2010, eight employees of Military Factory 99 in Helwan were put on trial for “disclosing 
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investment in military enterprises generated by defense offsets is an important component 
of this system of benefits and helps promote the false narrative that the military’s 
entrepreneurial activities deserve to be supported because they provide an engine for 
economic growth, employment, industrial modernization, and export earnings.  
 
The next section of this chapter will provide empirical data on offset activity in Egypt 
and Jordan – identifying the co-production and technology transfer components of 
particular arms sales and aid-financed construction projects that have resulted in the 
expansion of the military’s economic footprint in both states. Although there are many 
similarities in the programs of Egypt and Jordan, there are likewise important differences.  
Among these is how the respective states have organized and managed their offset 
programs.  In Jordan, the military’s manufacturing operations are highly centralized 
around a single entity: the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau (KADDB).  
Established in 1999 by royal decree, the KADDB is characterized by the Jordanian 
government as “an independent government entity within the Jordan Armed Forces 
(JAF),” that “aims to be the globally preferred partner in designing and developing 
defense products and security solutions in the region.”17 Most of Jordan’s offset-related 
programs are administered under the umbrella of the KADDB – which allows for a more 
coherent and comprehensive examination of the impacts of defense offsets.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
military secrets” and “illegally stopping production” after they organized a strike (disbanded by the 
military) demanding safer working conditions in the aftermath of a boiler explosion that killed one and 
injured six others.  They were eventually acquitted or given suspended sentences, but the trial demonstrated 
that the right to strike (provided under Egyptian law) did not extend to those working in military factories. 
“Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt.” NYTimes. 11 September 2010.  
17 http://www.kaddb.com/Public/Main_English.aspx?site_id=1&page_id=308 
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By contrast, in Egypt – where the political power of individual military officers and 
factions within the various branches produced a gradual ratcheting up of the military’s 
economic operations over a long period – the military’s expansion into defense and 
commercial production has been more diffuse.  The result has been the multiplication of 
centers of production and a great deal of overlap, especially as the country’s successive 
presidents conferred additional privileges and economic benefits to the military in their 
constant efforts to maintain institutional loyalty.  For example, the National Service 
Products Organization (NSPO) was a relatively marginal player in the national economy 
until General Abu Ghazala expanded its mandate (and budget) in the mid-1980s, after 
which it became the dominant supplier of many agricultural goods and the primary 
vehicle for Egypt’s many land reclamation projects.18  Many of the privileges and benefits 
that accrued to the Egyptian military under its offset program did so through the expected 
channels – the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), the Ministry of Military 
Production (MMP), and the National Service Products Organization (NSPO), all entities 
that operate under the full control of the military.   
 
But many benefits were also channeled through the various military-controlled 
enterprises that officially fall under the authority of state-owned holding companies, as 
well as via private sector entities owned or operated by high-ranking military officers.  
This decentralization necessitates additional evidence, provided largely through the 
examination of corporate boards, shareholders, joint venture partners, and client and 
project lists, which introduces an additional degree of complexity and demands a more 
                                                
18 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p14. 
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judicious evaluation of some of the empirical material. With that caveat in mind, the 
proceeding sections will outline the projects that comprise Jordan and Egypt’s respective 
offset programs, illustrating how they generate benefits for military institutions and the 
officer corps, before turning to a discussion of how both governments seek to extract the 
maximum patronage benefit while downplaying not only the role played by foreign 
military aid, but also the excess cost these programs impose on their own budgets.  
 
Defense Offsets in Jordan: The King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau 
Although the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau (KADDB) has only been in 
operation for a little over a decade, it manufactures a wide range of military products – 
from MREs (pre-packaged field rations) and boots to backpack portable UAVs and 
armored vehicles. According to the bureau’s own promotional literature, these products 
result from joint venture partnerships with 26 different foreign defense companies.19 The 
KADDB’s website20 and joint press releases issued by offset partners show over 20 
different product lines being jointly manufactured with defense firms from Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the US, UK, and UAE, as well as a 
                                                
19 Zaina Steityeh. “Out of the Dusty Labs.” Jordan Business (corporate publication). My own research 
shows the following companies with joint ventures: Jankel Group (UK), SHP Motorsports (UK), CLS 
Systems (UK), Raytech (Austria), Seabird Aviation (Australia), Dewina Holdings (Malaysia), Daedalus 
Aviation (Netherlands), Aselsan (Turkey), Securitas (Sweden), SWESCO (Sweden), XS Design 
(Germany), NP Aerospace (UK), Hemaia Security (Saudi Arabia), Mechanology Design Bureau (South 
Africa), Paramount Logistics (South Africa), Hanwah Corporation (South Korea), Alliant TechSystems 
(US), Land Warfare Resources Corporation (US), Wildey Guns (US), RiverHawk (US), Bin Jabr Group 
(UAE), Selex Galileo (Italy), Zenair Ltd. (Canada), Oboronprom (Russia), Rosoboronexport (Russia), 
Allied Defense Group (US), MERCAR SA (Belgium). Other larger firms – like Raytheon, L3 
Communications, and General Dynamics have participated in individual MRO programs on specific land 
platforms, but may no longer be engaged in these projects, which necessarily end once the existing fleet of 
vehicles is upgraded (unless export orders are forthcoming).  
20 http://www.kaddbinvest.com; also see the KADDB industrial park website: http://www.kaddb-ipark.com.  
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project with a commercial firm from Malaysia.21 Most of these joint venture deals have 
been with smaller defense firms that primarily act as subcontractors or suppliers to the 
largest defense companies; the latter are often referred to as ‘Tier-One’ contractors or 
‘OEMs’ (original equipment manufacturers) and include firms like BAE, Lockheed 
Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Thales, Finmeccanica, etc.  Nonetheless, KADDB 
has been able to launch some collaborative projects with even the largest firms, including 
several major MRO programs that provided substantial manufacturing technologies and 
engineering expertise for KADDB’s factories and technicians.  Some of these contracts 
were clearly the result of Iraq’s defense procurement budget coming back on-line in the 
wake of the U.S. invasion, which makes Jordan an ideal location for a base of operations 
– a phenomenon explored in more detail below.  
 
KADDB’s collaborative production processes qualify as offsets because they are a quid 
pro quo for selling defense equipment to Jordan; that is, foreign firms must agree to shift 
some degree of technology and/or production to KADDB in order to qualify as a seller.  
Although codifying this requirement in law is problematic for both Jordan and Egypt, 
which draw the majority of their defense budgets from U.S. aid, and are therefore 
restricted from formally demanding offsets of American companies or paying premiums 
to co-produce with foreign firms, it has not impeded either states’ ability to grow their 
defense industrial base through collaborative ventures.  The tit-for-tat dynamic is visible 
in numerous cases – where firms that sell off-the-shelf items to Jordan are simultaneously 
                                                
21 The UAE partner is the Bin Jabr Group – a family-owned conglomerate partnering to build tactical 
vehicles with custom-cooling systems for use by the UAE Armed Forces.  The Malaysian company is 
Dewina Holdings, which partners with KADDB to produce “Arab Ready Meals” – pre-packaged meals for 
use by Jordanian soldiers.  
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engaged in co-production activities with KADDB.  In 2000, when CLS Systems (UK) 
signed an $8.8 million contract to supply 25 auxiliary power units to the Jordanian 
Armed Forces, it announced that the units would be built in Jordan; two years later CLS 
Jordan was established.22 The UK’s Jankel Group, which has a number of joint ventures 
with KADDB, also supplies finished products to the Jordanian Armed Forces, such as 
four Aigis 4X4 armored vehicles acquired by Jordan’s Special Operations Command in 
2000.23  
 
When Jordan began exploring options to acquire surplus F-16s from European fleets in 
early 2009, jets were ultimately purchased from Belgium and the Netherlands;24 that same 
year, Strategem, a logistics firm with offices in Belgium and the Netherlands, received a 
contract from the Dutch Agency for Economic Development to conduct feasibility 
studies for establishing an F-16 maintenance facility in Jordan,25 which is now currently 
being constructed by the Dutch company Daedalus Aviation.26  Likewise, three years 
after Jordan purchased six Russian-made KA-226 helicopters in 2003, the manufacturer 
Oboronprom signed an agreement with KADDB to establish an in-country production 
and maintenance facility for the helicopters.  These joint ventures are possible, in part, 
                                                
22 Steve Pain. 10 June 2000. “CLS manoeuvres into Jordanian battle tank contract.” Birmingham Post & 
Mail (UK).  
23 Ruper Pengelley. 2000. “Aigis special operations vehicle on order for Jordanian surveillance troops.” 
Jane’s Information Group.  
24 “More Belgian F-16s for Jordan.” 26 January 2009. Defense Industry Daily. 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/More-Belgian-F-16s-for-Jordan-05261/ 
25 “KADDB Inks Five Major Deals.” 19 November 2009. Jordan Times. 
http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=21735 
26 The final report recommended two joint ventures: one for MRO and another for technical training.  
http://www.stratagemgroup.nl/?page_id=832 
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because Jordan frequently purchases decommissioned or previous generation hardware 
on the global market (or receives it through the U.S. Excess Defense Articles program), 
which often means the armor, mounted weapons systems, electronics, etc. are quite old. 
This enables Jordan to focus on collaborating with the smaller subcontractors and 
suppliers that produce these systems individually (before they are integrated into the final 
product by Tier One firms). A joint venture that yields guaranteed future sales to the JAF, 
geographic proximity to other regional markets, and various subsidies – such as tax 
exemptions and free factory space – are significant incentives that many small defense 
manufacturers are eager to accept.  
 
KADDB’s scope and scale of activities has increased dramatically since operations began 
just over a decade ago. Initially, many projects were geared toward modifying and 
updating some of the large armored vehicles employed by regional governments by 
adding enhanced fire control systems, re-fitting tanks and other armored personnel 
carriers with more powerful artillery and larger engines, improving the mobility of 
equipment, and adding accessories like remote operating capability.27 Unlike the upgrade 
kit that Egypt developed and hoped to market for the M113 (see below) KADDB’s 
modifications have been successfully exported; as of 2011, KADDB subsidiary Jordan 
Light Vehicle Manufacturing (formed with UK’s Jankel Armouring Ltd.) has shipped 
upgraded armored vehicles to over 20 countries.  Recently, KADDB has expanded into 
the modification of aircraft and large naval vessels – a technological step up from land-
systems modification. Aircraft modification programs include the Alliant 
                                                
27 List and description of projects is available at: www.kaddb.com.  
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TechSystems/ATK-KADDB joint venture transforming old CASA-235 transport planes 
into light gunships,28 and a recent agreement to establish an MRO facility for the F-16 – 
designed to service not only the RJAF’s fleet but those from neighboring states as well.  
 
KADDB companies also produce many smaller-scale products, including helmets and 
clothing made with ‘Dyneema’ – a patented body armor plate produced by NP Aerospace 
Jordan (formed with NP Aerospace of the UK); several types of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), as well as unmanned patrol boats and robots designed to dismantle 
bombs and check for IEDs; grenade launchers; side arms; ammunition; boots; field 
rations; numerous types of defense electronics, including imaging equipment, sensors, 
radar, etc.; and security services for banks, critical infrastructure, and VIPs.  Like the 
Gulf States, Jordan has also capitalized on its technology partnerships to create academic 
linkages, such as the Prince Faisal Information Technology Center (in partnership with 
the UK’s Cranfield University Defence Academy), and the Center for Applied Industrial 
Research (in partnership with the UK’s Royal Scientific Society).  In addition to 
becoming important platforms for exchange between JAF soldiers and their foreign 
counterparts, these institutions also generate prestige for the KADDB, which is seen as 
augmenting its manufacturing activities with R&D (research & development) efforts, 
which are considered the highest rung on the latter of military-industrial development.29      
 
Regional Instability and Collaborative Arms Production in Jordan 
                                                
28 19 February 2011. “Jordan’s KADDB Awards Contract to ATK to Modify Two CASA-235 Military 
Transport Aircraft.” Barron’s. 
29 Krause (1992).  
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Regional instability and arms races have been a boon for KADDB’s business operations.  
A significant share of the bureau’s manufactured exports have gone to Iraq and the 
Coalition Provisional Authority,30 and several Tier-One defense firms have sought 
partnerships with KADDB in order to exploit Jordan’s proximity to Iraq.  A collaborative 
project between KADDB, ITT (US) and Thales (France) to overhaul Iraqi armored 
vehicles, is one clear case.31 In addition to this case, one year after the maritime defense 
firm RiverHawk set up its joint venture with KADDB, the Iraqi Navy issued a $70 
million tender for the same type of vessel.  The contract was immediately awarded to 
RiverHawk because the Iraqi government identified the firm as the only supplier whose 
equipment they were interested in purchasing.32 Additionally, several of KADDB’s 
partner firms were borne out of the post-war reconstruction boom, such as Terex Jordan 
– a firm that provides industrial construction services.  
 
Other KADDB partner firms are owned by Iraqis, and are therefore well placed to target 
Iraq’s new military as a major customer. Jordan Aerospace Industries (JAI), which 
launched a joint venture with KADDB in 2001 to design and manufacture military 
UAVs, is owned by the Al-Samaraee family of Iraq, whose patriarch is the grandson of 
                                                
30 documented exports to the CPA include 100 ‘modernized’ tanks in 2004 and an unspecified number of 
UAVs (un-manned aerial vehicles) called SEEKERS, also in 2004.  
31 Jomana Amara. 2006. “Military Industrialization and Economic Development: Jordan’s Defense 
Industry.” Defense Resource Management Institute (Naval Postgrad School); working paper series. 
According to the employment profile of Aref Samawi, who served as project manager for the overhaul 
operation, the KADDB plant was refurbishing vehicles at the rate of about 250/month. 
32 “Offshore Support Vessel for the Government of Iraq.” 16 November 2009. www.fbo.gov.  Solicitation 
Number: N0002410R2222.  Riverhawk’s announcement of the contract did not mention the sole-source 
contract, but did point out that the pending “turnover of security responsibilities to the Iraqi Government” 
made “expedited deliveries of these vessels of paramount importance.” http://rhfsf.com/2010/03/don-
award-released/ 
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the man who established Iraq’s first defense industrial projects in the early 20th Century.33  
Although the Iraqi and Jordanian Air Forces are currently the only customers of the 
firm’s small trainer/reconnaissance aircraft, the SAMA CH2000, JAI’s joint venture with 
KADDB (called Jordan Advanced Remote Systems) has now produced several prototype 
UAVs that look poised to yield significant export opportunities in the future.  
 
KADDB’s CEO Shadi Ramzi also has significant Iraqi contacts, primarily through his 
uncle Abdel Hadi Al Majali.  Abdel Hadi’s company MID Contracting (Shadi previously 
served as General Manager for MID’s Qatar office) has performed several projects in 
Iraq, including construction of hospitals, power stations, and lavish government ‘guest 
houses.’34  MID has also completed numerous contracts on behalf of the U.S. Army, as 
well as for the various Jordanian government ministries where Abdel Hadi has family 
connections.35  Abdel Hadi sits on the board of the enormous conglomerate General 
Mediterranean Holding/GMH, owned by the Iraqi-born billionaire Nadhmi Auchi.36  
                                                
33 http://www.sama-aircraft.com/al_samaraee/index.html 
34 A full list of MID projects is available here: http://www.mid-
contracting.com/pro_new?page=0%2C0%2C0%2C0 
35 Government entities that have awarded major construction contracts to MID include the Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone (where Shadi Ramzi is CEO of the Aqaba Development Corporation); Mawared (aka 
NARIDEC, for the National Resources Investment & Development Corporation), which was previously 
overseen by Abdel Hadi’s son Sahl Al Majali; as well as the Ministry for Housing & Public Works, where 
both Sahl and Abdel Hadi had previously served as Minister.   
36 Auchi’s dossier includes a long list of scandals and accusations too lengthy to enumerate here. They 
include accusations of being an arms broker with Italy on behalf of Saddam Hussein; implications in the 
oil-for-food scandal and a major kickback scheme involving Spanish and French oil companies (for which 
he was eventually found guilty). The dossiers of GMH’s board members are equally dubious, and include 
Lord David Steel, a board member of Heritage Oil & Gas.  Heritage was founded by Tony Buckingham 
and operated primarily in Angola. Buckingham formed the infamous private security firm Executive 
Outcomes with a number of retired mercenaries from South Africa in order to recover Heritage’s 
equipment after it was seized by UNITA rebels; the Angolan government subsequently hired Executive 
Outcomes to completely oust the rebels from Angolan territory.  Heritage recently landed a major 
concession to operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
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Although GMH has no direct subsidiaries in Iraq,37 it has granted numerous construction 
contracts to MID for other regional projects, including hotel construction in Jordan and 
Lebanon,38 and several construction projects in the UK on behalf of GMH subsidiaries.39  
 
Collaboration in regional military production is especially visible in the burgeoning 
defense relationship between the UAE and Jordan.  The Emirati conglomerate Bin Jabr 
Group and the Jordanian military co-own a production facility located in the Dulayl 
industrial park, where their joint venture Advanced Industries of Arabia (AIA) 
manufactures the NIMR (Tiger) tactical vehicle.40 One of KADDB’s earliest projects, 
commissioned by the UAE armed forces, was to overhaul tank-cooling systems to enable 
them to cope with the extreme temperatures of the Arabian Peninsula.  AIA modified 500 
such armored vehicles for the UAE in 2005, and, according to the Bin Jabr Group’s 
company website, it exported a number of the vehicles to Libya and Lebanon as well.41  
                                                
37 GMH has 87 subsidiaries, a large number of which are registered in tax havens, including 18 in 
Luxembourg, 13 in the British Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, etc.), 11 in Panama, 6 in the British 
Virgin Islands, 2 in Mauritius and 1 in Switzerland.  Auchi does have financial stakes in projects that are 
ongoing in Iraq (despite the fact that these do not show up on corporate account sheets), including his stake 
in Orascom, which was one of three mobile phone operators to be granted a license by the new Iraqi 
government.  
38 Le Royal Hotels & Resorts 
39 The GMH subsidiary that granted the UK projects to MID is Tucan Investments Plc. According to GMH 
Tucan has more than $200 million in property assets in the UK.  
40 The park is the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau (KADDB) Industrial Park, owned by the 
Jordanian Armed Forces.  Operations at the park receive a host of services and exemptions similar to those 
in any free trade zone.  The Bin Jabr Group also manufactures uniforms for the UAE Armed Forces 
through its company – Italian Textile Solutions – based in Zayed Military City; it also has a garment 
manufacturing plant in Jordan’s Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park called ‘Mediterranean Resources Apparel 
Industry,’ which primarily employs guest workers and has been cited numerous times by international 
human rights organizations for abuse of its workers. KADDB also operates several factories in Ad-Dulayl.  
41 KADDB is the manufacturing arm of the Jordanian military.  The vehicles will be assembled in Jordan 
and fitted with cooling systems provided by the Bin Jabr Group especially designed to withstand the 
Emirates’ temperature extremes.  
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In addition to the participation of the Bin Jabr Group, the UAE has assisted Jordan’s 
military in other ways.  The UAE’s Offset Program Bureau (the official Emirati state 
agency that deals with offset policy) dedicated some of its offset-generated resources to 
supplement the procurement of aircraft for the state-owned Royal Jordanian Airlines, in 
which the Jordanian Armed Force’s pension fund (the Development and Investment Fund 
for the Armed Forces and Security Services) is one of the five largest shareholders, 
although the UAE Government, members of the UAE Royal Family, and prominent 
Emirati elites are also major shareholders in some of Royal Jordanian’s subsidiary 
companies.42  Some big-ticket purchases by the JAF (including 50 armored personnel 
carriers from the Ukrainian company Malyshev in 2000) were also allegedly financed by 
the UAE government.  
 
This collaboration is largely in keeping with previous Gulf efforts to subsidize the 
Jordanian military, notably in the financing of equipment procurement and the 
construction of military housing.43  The Gulf States have also historically advocated for 
the sale of advanced U.S. weapons to Jordan.44  These types of Gulf support may actually 
have contributed indirectly to the Jordanian government’s efforts to diversify the 
military’s sources of income: Jordan faced a difficult situation in the mid-1980s when 
Saudi Arabia withdrew financial support that Amman had been using to pay its military 
                                                
42 The state-owned Dubai International Financial Center, SHUAA Capital, Abraaj Capital, and Nowais hold 
shares in the following Royal Jordanian subsidiaries: Abraaj Capital (in which Nowais, DIFC, and several 
members of the UAE Royal Family are shareholders) owns an 80% stake in Jordan Aircraft Maintenance 
Limited (JorAMCO); the Alpha Airports Group (100% owned by the state-owned Investment Corporation 
of Dubai, through its subsidiary Dnata) owns a 35.87% stake in Royal Jordanian’s flight catering company; 
and the Joramco Academy, a flight training company. Zawya Business Profiles.  
43 Laurie Brandt. Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations, p93.  
44 Laurie Brandt. Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations, p106. 
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officers.45  An indigenous, export-oriented defense sector can at least supplement the 
employment of officers and engineers, providing a degree of breathing room for a cash-
strapped state.   
 
Evidence of collaborative arms production in Egypt is less visible.  Notwithstanding 
recent Egyptian overtures to the AOI’s former Gulf partners, there are few contemporary 
cases of such regional cooperation with Egypt.  Two instances occurred in the late 
1980s/early 1990s involving joint Turkish-Egyptian manufacturing, one to manufacture 
components for the F-15s that would be assembled in Turkey and later sold back to the 
Egyptians using U.S. military aid – the so-called Peace Onyx Program.46 Another is the 
possible construction of an ordnance factory in Egypt by the Turkish firm The 
Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKEK) in the late 1980s.47  The only 
other signs suggest a rather limited collaboration between Egypt and the UAE.  Both 
countries have made similarly-timed purchases from two rather small defense firms: 
including Hamiltonjets/Teknicraft from New Zealand and Yonca Onuk of Turkey – both 
firms manufacture naval vessels.  Although the UAE has its own shipyards – and so 
would not necessarily gain any productive capacity by coordinating with Egypt – this 
might be an example of a financially-flush Gulf State using its market leverage to 
encourage private defense firms to intensify their collaboration with regional allies.48  
                                                
45 Laurie Brandt. Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations, p106. 
46 GAO. 22 June 1994. “Military Exports: Concerns Over Offsets Generated With U.S. Foreign Military 
Financing Program Funds.” GAO/NSIAD-94-127, p7.  
47 Omer Karasapan. January-February 1987. “Turkey’s Armaments Industries.” Middle East Report, p29.  
48 The waterjet powered fireboat (with 4X4 vehicle deployment ramp) built in 2004 by the Egyptian 
military’s Helwan Company for Machining & Equipment (Factory 999) is based on design technology and 
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Given the region’s political dynamics, equipment used for internal security/police 
purposes is particularly in demand, and many of KADDB’s companies cater directly to 
this market.  Much of the equipment KADDB markets is designed for internal security 
operations like riot control, peacekeeping, reconnaissance, and surveillance. Examples 
include the Stallion four-wheeled armored vehicle equipped with .50 caliber weapons 
stations, which KADDB classifies as a “peacekeeping, internal security and patrols,” 
vehicle, and SkyWatch, a surveillance vehicle that KADDB markets for:  
VIPs dignitary protection, outdoor activities such as concerts and sporting events, 
large prisons and correctional facilities, vehicle and equipment storage or parking 
lots, border entries, long range surveillance, [and] military activities such as 
deployment, transport and exercises.49  
 
Private Profit in Jordan’s Burgeoning Defense-Industrial Complex 
The involvement of private capital in Jordan’s indigenous defense industry has been 
relatively limited thus far – but current trends suggest that private sector entrepreneurs 
will gain an added foothold in Jordan’s defense sector in the next few years.  According 
to KADDB’s Chairman Shadi Ramzi al-Majali – a 12-year veteran officer of the 
Jordanian Armed Forces and a graduate of both the Military College of South Carolina 
(US) and the George Washington University (US) – the ultimate goal is indeed to 
                                                                                                                                            
materials provided by Teknicraft Design and the local Egyptian agent of Hamiltonjet (both of New 
Zealand). These companies (which are relatively small) have done lots of business with UAE entities.  
These include Nico International shipyard in Fujairah (UAE), which chose Teknicraft designs for its 19-
meter Nemo catamaran and its 30-meter Topaz catamaran (aluminum vessels used to service the offshore 
shipping fleet of oil tankers and container vessels). Teknicraft also designed ships for the Kanoo Group 
(KSA) also constructed at the Nico shipyard, and the New Zealand Trade and Enterprise office responsible 
for investment relations with Egypt and other Middle East and African countries is located in Dubai. Yonca 
Onuk (the Turkish firm) sold 34 fast interceptors to the UAE in 2009, and signed a coproduction agreement 
for four vessels with the Egyptian Navy in 2011.  
49 www.kaddb.com.  
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transform the group’s activities into a platform for a private sector defense industrial 
capacity,  
We always envisaged KADDB as being the catalyst for the creation of an 
independent, sustainable, defense industrial base…[t]he defense sector in 
advanced industrial countries is owned and managed by the private sector, and 
KADDB is adopting the same approach. Therefore, we are working closely with 
the private sector and encouraging it to invest in the defense sector…[o]ur 
strategy is that once a product is commercially viable, it is passed on to our joint 
venture companies for manufacturing. We offer our international partners a 
gateway to the Middle East, and for our Jordanian partners we provide access to 
programs, markets and international exposure that otherwise may not be 
available.50 
 
Shadi himself is the nephew of Abdel Hadi Al Majali, a former Army Chief of Staff who 
has held several other government positions, including Director General of Public 
Security and ambassador to the U.S.51  Abdel Hadi started some of Jordan’s very first 
private security ventures in the mid-1980s, including the Middle East Defense & Security 
Agency (MEDSA).52  Despite the central role KADDB plays in attracting investment and 
technology from foreign firms, regional private sector businessmen have taken a large 
role in some of KADDB’s operations, including several joint ventures with Jordan 
Aerospace Industries, owned by the Al-Samaraee family of Iraq, and Advanced 
Industries of Arabia, a JV with Al-Suwaidi’s Bin Jabr Group of the UAE. Jordanian 
nationals have also capitalized on KADDB’s investment activities, among them Yazan 
Al-Moufti, whose commercial telecom company Jordan Radio Paging (MIRSAL), 
formed a joint venture with KADDB called Applied Defence Systems to develop defense 
electronics.  In 2003 ADS was chosen to partner with a BAE-Finmeccanica consortium to 
                                                
50 Zaina Steityeh. “Out of the Dusty Labs.” Jordan Business (corporate publication). 
51 Other positions include House Speaker and Minister of Public Works & Housing (a position Abdel 
Hadi’s son Saleh held as well). 
52 Shadi sat on the board of MEDSA until 2003.  
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develop a high-frequency over-the-horizon system for Jordan’s IFF (identify-friend or 
foe) system, which was part of ADS’s portfolio.53  
 
Other examples are Majdi Al-Yacoub, whose company Orangeville Consultants received 
support from KADDB to build an assembly and maintenance facility for Russian 
helicopters, and Ziad Al-Yacoub, whose company Gravity Integrated Solutions is a re-
seller for many of the same items produced by KADDB, including ballistic resistant 
enclosures (BREs), vehicle armoring technology, engine kits and spare parts, and other 
“special forces supplies.”54 The current Chairman of Gravity Integrated Solutions, Aref 
Samawi, spent seven years working for KADDB, and twenty years before that in the 
Jordanian Armed Forces and the Royal Maintenance Corp.  These few cases suggest that 
the composition of private sector interests operating in the emergent military industrial 
complex may well correspond to the rough breakdown in other sectors, with Jordanians 
of Palestinian origin dominating much of the private sector component – including 
investment and ownership of joint operations, and those of East Bank origin providing 
the manpower and engineering expertise for KADDB and its subsidiaries.   
 
Although Jordan’s military budget is small in overall terms, it is a huge chunk of the 
Kingdom’s GDP (nearly 8%) – and represents a solid profit-making opportunity for 
foreign defense firms that produce inputs and provide intermediate services, since 
procurements for large items is comparatively rare.  It also gives these firms a foothold in 
                                                
53 “Coastal protection venture tabled, MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA.” 18 October 2002. Jane’s Defence 
Weekly. The venture was cancelled when the BAE-Finmeccanica partnership was dissolved in 2005.  
54 http://gravityjo.en.ec21.com/.  http://www.gravity-jo.com/.   
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the far more lucrative regional market, and having production facilities located closer to 
wealthy Gulf customers is an asset often cited by firms that enter into joint ventures with 
KADDB.  The Jordanian armed forces recognize this comparative advantage, and by 
requiring firms to establish joint production facilities as a condition of securing a sale to 
the Kingdom, the Jordanian Armed Forces has ensured a continued supply of jobs, export 
earnings and prestige for its members.  
 
Domestic Subsidies Provided to KADDB 
In addition to the promotional literature developed for KADDB (such as the marcopolis 
profile described above), the Jordanian state has also provided the organization with 
many of the same supplementary services and infrastructure accorded to the military-
industrial sector in the U.S. and Europe.  KADDB’s list of assets includes a commercial 
investment division staffed with finance experts (known as the KADDB Investment 
Group) that evaluate potential partnerships,55 its own industrial park with free-zone status, 
and SOFEX, an annual defense equipment exhibition held in Amman, which provides 
KADDB with a platform for advertising its products to private sector executives and 
government procurement officials from around the world.  SOFEX (Special Operations 
Forces Exhibition & Conference) is unique in that it focuses explicitly on equipment and 
new technologies applicable to special operations and homeland security – the same 
sectors in which most of KADDB’s manufacturing activity are concentrated.  KADDB 
also participates in other international defense exhibitions, including the 2011 DSEi 
Exhibition (Defense & Security Equipment International) in London – where KADDB 
                                                
55 The KADDB Investment Group (KIG) was established in 2010 to facilitate financing options for co-
production projects. 
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managers took pains to note they were the only Arab participants.56 KADDB also benefits 
from the services of its defense attaches – which promote the organization’s products and 
services overseas, as well as from its links to the government, which ensures that visiting 
defense officials and corporate executives get a tour of KADDB’s facilities.57 Lastly, 
KADDB has also been active in forming strategic partnerships with defense industry 
trade publications – notably IHS Insight, which owns Jane’s Defence Group, the most 
prominent collection of defense industry publications – which has further heightened 
KADDB’s profile.58   
 
In additional to these formal institutional benefits, KADDB enjoys a host of special 
economic privileges through the KADDB Industrial Park – the first free zone in the 
region to specialize in military production – which boasts:  
top quality infrastructure; reliable electricity and water; a network of paved and lit 
highways; storm sewers and sanitation networks; attractive landscaping; 
management services (cleaning, maintenance, security for the perimeter, public 
areas and road systems); assistance with registration and licensing of new 
businesses, ongoing support for issuance of documentation, invoice certification, 
[and] transfer of ownership of goods and other paperwork required for 
international trade.59  
 
The park’s other amenities include a ballistics missile lab and a “high security 
environment” all subsidized by the Jordanian government.  This last feature is probably 
provided by KADDB subsidiary JoSecure, which also has contracts to provide security at 
                                                
56 KADDB Investment Group Newsletter. August/September 2011.  
57 Zaina Steityeh. “Out of the Dusty Labs.” Jordan Business (corporate publication). 
58 KADDB Investment Group Newsletter. August/September 2011. 
59 KADDB Industrial Park website.  
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the Aqaba Special Economic Zone, Jordanian Customs, the Public Security Directorate, 
the General Intelligence Directorate, Greater Amman Municipality, and the Jordanian 
Petroleum Refinery Company, among others.60  In 2009 Josecure launched a JV with the 
Swiss security firm Securitas, which will provide services to the private sector, including 
leasing armoured vehicles and providing armed protection to cash-in-transit vehicles.61  
Even the 1,235-acre King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC), 
which was built with $99 million in U.S. aid and designed by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and prime contractor General Dynamics, is a profit-generating operation.62 The 
facility, which is 100% owned by KADDB and modeled on Blackwater’s training facility 
in North Carolina, is open for training of “coalition allies.” In 2010 the U.S.-led Multi-
National Security Transition Command in Iraq earmarked funds to send 20-30 elite 
members of the Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force to KASOTC for training.63 
 
KADDB executives (mostly retired officers) boast of significant profits for the armed 
forces from KADDB ventures; a recent estimate priced export income from the industrial 
                                                
60 Virginie Collombier. September 2011. “Private Security…Not a Business Like Any Other.” Arab 
Reform Initiative.   
61 The firm is called Al Sharika Al Mutafawwiqa li-Khadamat Al Amin wa Al Himaya (the Excellence 
Company for Security & Protection Services); Al Mutafawwiqa for short. 
62 According to the U.S. Army’s AL&T magazine, the KASOTC includes “multiple indoor and outdoor 
shooting ranges; bays for explosive, mechanical and ballistic breaching; a fully instrumented urban 
operations facility; a 5-story live fire “shoot house;” vehicle mock-ups; a driver’s range; classroom 
facilities; and an Airbus 300 aircraft on an airport tarmac complete with a control tower” (presumably to 
simulate high jacking situations).  LTC Rod Aleandre and SGM David Lanham. October-December 2009. 
“Training Center KASOTC Provides Capabilities for Coalition Forces.” Army AL&T Magazine, p64. Other 
contractors include Stanley Consultants and Archirodon (two of the largest contractors specializing in 
military construction; both have also worked on contracts in Egypt and the Gulf). KASOTC’s project 
director is Maher Halaseh.  
63 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” December 2009 Report to Congress in Accordance with the 
Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008.  Published 29 January 2010. P67.  
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park at nearly $400 million a year.  And although the salaries of KADDB’s workers are 
paid through the Jordanian Army budget, the revenues accrue to the books of the specific 
ventures, granting them significant financial independence. KADDB’s free zone status 
also exempts it from corporate income taxes, import fees and customs duties, as well as 
building and land taxes.64  Quasi state-owned companies also provide services to 
KADDB, including Orange Jordan, which penned an agreement this year to provide an 
integrated telecommunications infrastructure for KADDB and its affiliate companies.  
Although the contract is not public – and therefore, it is impossible to know for sure if 
these services are being provided at a discounted rate – the JAF pension fund is a partial 
shareholder in Orange Jordan, and the military’s long history of subsidized services 
would suggest that this partnership also comes with preferential terms.  KADDB’s 
operations may also be supplemented by MAWARED (the National Resources 
Development Company), which has some overlap in its leadership structure with 
KADDB.65 Like the Egyptian military, the JAF has significant holdings of very valuable 
land, and MAWARED generates profits for the armed forces partially through 
management of this land via commercial development, including by “selling land, doing 
master planning and managing real estate.”66  
 




65 While acting as MAWARED’s Managing Director, Moayyad Samman, was also the Chairman of 
KADDB. 
66 “KADDB Success Story.” Produced by Marcopolis (PR Agency specializing in business and tourism 
reports on emerging economies).  
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Because subsidies to the military – and in particular, the large percentage of GDP 
dedicated to the JAF – are politically sensitive issues, officials from KADDB focus more 
on the economic benefits of the program than its potential strategic advantages.  Unlike in 
Egypt and certain Gulf States, rhetoric from KADDB’s managers does not focus on 
developing an indigenous capacity to secure the domestic supply of defense material, but 
rather to export its products and services to neighboring states and therefore contribute to 
institutional revenues (making the JAF financially self-sufficient, not materially self-
sufficient). In one KADDB profile that appeared in a Jordanian promotional publication, 
the majority of the text deals not with military-readiness or national security, but with 
KADDB’s success at “providing vital linkages between Jordan’s public and private 
sectors…scores of employment opportunities for Jordanian graduates…[and] ongoing 
training schemes for Jordanian engineers and technicians.”67 At the 2010 annual SOFEX 
exhibition KADDB signed contracts for about $100 million worth of exports to Kenya, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.68  Its Desert Iris – an armored personnel carrier – has 
also been a popular regional seller.  In fact, the KADDB has become so successful it is 
now signing its own offset agreements – including a deal inked in 2011 to transfer 
technology for body armor to the Ministry of Defense & Industry in Azerbaijan, which 
will produce KADDB’s products in its own factories. 
 
Despite assertions by KADDB executives, extant scholarly research is nearly unanimous 
in demonstrating that indigenous military-industrial production is a net drain on 
                                                
67 Zaina Steityeh. “Out of the Dusty Labs.” Jordan Business (corporate publication). 
68 http://home.janes.com/events/exhibitions/sofex2010/sections/daily/day3/kaddb-signs-contracts.shtml 
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resources, both because of the enormous subsidies required to carry out productive 
operations and because similar levels of investment in non-military production yield 
greater gains in terms of export earnings and domestic employment.69  Proponents of 
military-industrial-driven development base their conclusions on potential spillover – 
backward linkages from military production that feed new technologies and skill sets into 
commercial industries – but because most of KADDB’s activities are based on modifying 
military platforms, it is unclear what spillover potential actually exists, and the substantial 
subsidies granted to KADDB may in fact draw both investment and skilled technicians 
away from non-military industries that do not receive similar levels of subsidization.70 
KADDB’s current manufacturing activities do not extend significantly into the provision 
of civilian goods or agricultural production as is the case in Egypt, although a small 
number of KADDB’s products have been used in civilian applications, including a 
number of UAVs utilized to monitor and map critical infrastructure, as well as the 
refurbishment of some automobile parts that are sold on the domestic market.71  Supply of 
both passenger vehicles and heavy construction vehicles has been a hallmark of the 
Egyptian military’s commercial economic ventures, and KADDB executives have 
likewise cited this sector as a key target for their own industrial expansion.72 
 
                                                
69 Brzoska, “World Military Expenditures.” Batchelor and Willet, Disarmament and Defence Industrial 
Adjustment in South Africa. Brauer, Arming the South.   
70 Batchelor and Willet, Disarmament and Defence Industrial Adjustment in South Africa.  Brauer, Arming 
the South.   




The benefits that KADDB’s activities have achieved for the Jordanian regime are not 
(nor were they meant to be) economic; they are political.  Because military service has 
traditionally been an avenue of social mobility for East Bank Jordanians, making more 
high-skilled technical jobs available within the military is an absolute necessity in the 
face of mounting demographic pressures.  Resentment over the allocation of scarce state 
resources to military pensions, healthcare systems, subsidized housing, and other 
perquisites is also somewhat attenuated by the perception – whether valid or not – that 
the military is ‘earning its keep’ by contributing to state revenues, hence the concerted 
effort to publicize KADDB’s partnerships with foreign firms and its exports.    
 
Defense Offsets in Egypt: Building the Army’s Empire 
Like KADDB, Egypt’s military factories began production with offset arrangements that 
provided technology, equipment, and facilities via joint production with Western arms 
manufacturers.  However, in Egypt the process began earlier (in the mid-1970s) and was 
primarily achieved through individual agreements for a discrete number of co-production 
runs or licensing agreements for particular components, rather than the joint venture 
model present in Jordan.73  Although KADDB’s joint venture model carries the 
connotation of a longer-term collaboration (when compared to a foreign firm’s 
                                                
73 This difference in approach (joint ventures vs. co-production) is more related to changes in the global 
defense industry than in strategic decisions taken by Egyptian and Jordanian military or political leaders.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, co-production was the prevailing form of coordinated defense production, whereas 
joint ventures are a relatively new practice.  JVs generally entail a longer-term commitment than co-
production, which can end once a specified number of weapons have been produced.  JVs are more 
common today because defense firms are more willing to enter into binding agreements in order to secure 
sales, and these joint projects are also much easier to execute – since global supply chains have expanded 
and many firms have administrators and executives based internationally.  Because Jordan had little or no 
domestic production capability until quite recently, it did not have pre-existing arrangements that favored 
the co-production model.  
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commitment to co-produce a pre-set number of weapons in Egypt under a single arms 
deal) in fact many of Egypt’s co-production projects have continued to operate for 
decades.  This longevity is largely the result of political imperatives, including the desire 
of the U.S. and its European partners to ensure regime stability in Egypt by securing the 
loyalty of the armed forces.  But it also underscores the political sensitivities to the 
outsourcing of defense production present in the domestic politics of donor countries, 
where military-industrial jobs are one of the last remaining sites of high-paying 
manufacturing jobs.  These sensitivities demand a less overt and more fluid provision of 
offsets in Egypt, achieved by dispersing co-production programs across numerous 
factories under the control of different military-entities.  
 
To date, the largest weapons projects in Egypt have included manufacturing tanks (the 
M1A1 Abrams)74 and armored recovery vehicles (M88A2); MRO (maintain, repair, 
overhaul) activities, including major modifications of armored personnel carriers 
(M113s) and the overhaul of engines for major weapons like tanks and aircraft; 
producing components for the F-16 under the Peace Vector IV program;75 and the 
                                                
74 The following parts of the M1A1 tank are produced in Egypt: road wheels, caterpillar track-links, beams 
and drive wheels, and the120-mm tank gun.  The following items are considered sensitive, and so are 
manufactured in the U.S. and shipped to Egypt for final assembly: the tank armor (depleted uranium), laser 
range-finder, armaments, gas turbine engine, transmission, fire control systems, and other electronics. 
75 The F-16 co-production scheme was actually facilitated by the US, but involved the participation of 
Egypt’s AOI factories in producing components for F-16s manufactured by Turkish Aerospace Industries 
(TAI), the state-owned company whose own F-16 production line was the result of a previous offset 
agreement with Lockheed Martin.  Although the Egyptians wanted F-16s manufactured in the US (their 
state concern was one of quality) the US needed Turkey’s cooperation in the first Gulf War, which was 
looming on the horizon.  The Turkish authorities asked US diplomats to convince the Egyptians to purchase 
their F-16s from TAI instead of from the U.S. – a purchase that was made using US military assistance 
funds. Procuring the planes from Turkey ultimately cost more (due to the co-production component), which 
resulted in a complaint being lodged by Lockheed Martin against the U.S. Government, when the latter 
tried to reject some of the additional expenses ($17 million), which would have reduced Lockheed’s profit 
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HAWK Missile rebuilding programs, as well as the domestic manufacturing of numerous 
smaller items like night vision equipment, machine guns, tank ammunition, and 
battlefield electronics that are also produced under license from foreign firms.76  Most 
recently, the Egyptian military has secured agreements to co-produce several additional 
weapons systems – including Chinese fighter jets, two types of naval vessels designed by 
U.S. and Turkish companies, and a pending deal to locally build Pakistani jet trainers – 
and continues to utilize US military aid to construct factories for maintaining and 
overhauling many components of its large weapons arsenal.77  Before we move on to the 
examination of these and other programs, I will provide a rough sketch of the Egyptian 
military’s economic holdings in order to provide some basic scaffolding for our 
discussion.  
 
The Structure of the Egyptian Military’s Economic Holdings 
Producing a comprehensive list of the Egyptian military’s economic holdings (in order to 
determine which operations have benefited directly from offsets) is virtually impossible, 
as both the military’s budget and its revenues from commercial operations are considered 
                                                                                                                                            
on the contract.  Lockheed eventually won the case.  Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (court 
documents).  Nos. 49530 and 50057.   
76 The two US firms with the most co-production activities in Egypt are General Dynamics and United 
Defense.  The earliest co-production agreement with the U.S. that I was able to find was for 105mm tank 
ammunition, produced at the Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries (Factory 81) and signed in 1979. 
“Status Report of Coproduction Programs.” 31 December 1993. United States Army Security Assistance 
Command. Although this report is compiled twice/year, this document is the only one available in the 
DOD’s FOIA reading room.  
77 The Pakistani agreement, still pending, is for local assembly of approximately 50 JF-17s (a joint Chinese-
Pakistani design) in one of AOI’s factories.  Chinese officials told a defense industry trade publication that 
if a customer made a commitment to purchase a “significant number of aircraft” they would be willing to 
set up an indigenous assembly plant. Siva Govindasamy. 19 July 2010. “Farnborough: Pakistan and China 
eye export JF-17 customers.” Flight Daily News (Singapore).  
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state secrets. Periodic attempts to subject the military’s manufacturing operations to 
customary auditing procedures have repeatedly failed, including efforts by opposition 
politicians in 1986 to bring military accounts under the jurisdiction of Egypt’s Central 
Auditing Organization, as well as current opposition to efforts by the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces to secure their budgetary immunity by enshrining it in Egypt’s new 
constitution.  Despite the absence of concrete information, many of the businesses 
operating under the military’s three main organizations – the Ministry of Military 
Production (MMP), the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), and the National 
Service Products Organization (NSPO) – have an online presence, and many are 
recorded in region-specific business intelligence databases such as Zawya (a subsidiary of 
Dow Jones that specializes in MENA corporations).  In addition to these databases, I 
have also used professional profiles and employment histories available online – through 
services like LinkedIn – to find the names of firms where individual Egyptians had 
fulfilled their military service requirements, which strongly suggests these firms fall 
under military jurisdiction.  I also include public-sector firms whose chairmen and boards 
are dominated by military officials, including the Holding Company for Maritime & Land 
Transport, whose many subsidiary operations are also managed by military officials. 
 
The Ministry of Military Production (MMP) operates 16 factories; The Arab 
Organization for Industrialization (AOI) – the only remnant of a failed attempt at regional 
coordination in arms production – operates another 10.78  Of these factories, at least six 
                                                
78 The AOI was housed outside the Ministry of Defense in the Ministry of Industry to encourage regional 
financial and technological support for its production ventures. 
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are currently coproducing defense equipment under U.S. license.79 Many more produce 
under license from (or using technologies transferred by) European manufacturers as well 
as firms from the ‘emerging economies,’ like China and Turkey,80 and post-Soviet states, 
including Ukraine.81  Lastly, The National Service Products Organization (NASPO), a 
subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense, is also active in both military and commercial 
production in Egypt. NASPO operates at least three companies: including Arab 
International Optronics (a 51/49 joint venture with the French defense firm Thales), 
which produces military goods like night vision goggles, periscopes and machine guns.82  
 
These military operations churn out a wide range of commercial goods that are produced 
on the same factory floors as military equipment, and either used as inputs for other 
military-owned operations, or sold on the domestic market.  These inputs include 
machining tools for use in textile factories, vehicle assembly plants, agriculture, and food 
                                                
79 Margaret Keshishian. “Egypt: Export Opportunities in the Security & Defense Sectors.” U.S. Dept of 
Commerce. Presentation slides from US Embassy in Cairo: Commercial Section. 2011.  These factories 
include the Tank Factory (Factory 200); Abu Zaabal Engineering Industries Company (Factory 100); Abu 
Zaabal Company for Specialty Chemicals (Factory 18); Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries 
(Factory 81); Helwan Engineering Industries (Factory 99); and Maasara Engineering Industries (Factory 
45). Embassy Cairo.  17 June 2009. “Egypt responds positively to End-Use Training.” 
80 The products manufactured under Chinese license include inter alia (the K-8 fighter; the Type 63 
multiple rocket launcher, known in Egypt as the RL812; the man-portable single rocket launcher, known in 
Egypt as the PRL-81).  Turkish collaborative production includes F-16 components (under the Peace Onyx 
program sponsored by the U.S.), the naval vessels mentioned above, and production of 105mm tank shells 
under license from the Turkish weapons firm MKEK. Omer Karasapan. January-February 1987. “Turkey’s 
Armaments Industries.” Middle East Report.  
81 Ukrspetseksport, Ukraine’s state-owned armaments company, signed a contract in 2009 to overhaul 200 
of Egypt’s T-62 tanks and another 200 amphibious tracked armored personnel carriers. In exchange, the 
Ukrainian manufacturer agreed to transfer technologies to the Abu Zaabal Tank Factory and the Kader 
Factory for Developed Industries. “Ukraine to upgrade Egyptian Soviet-era T-62 tanks.” 20 August 2010. 
UPI wire service.  
82 NASPO operations also include: El Nasr company for Services and Maintenance (aka, Queen Service) 
which markets services like childcare, pest control, and hotel administration; and El Nasr Company for 
Intermediate Chemicals, which manufactures fertilizers and household insecticides.  
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processing.83  Some of the end-use items produced in military facilities are passenger 
vehicles, fire trucks and construction vehicles, agricultural equipment, medical 
equipment, consumer electronics, kitchen appliances, pharmaceuticals, and even the 
voting booths used in Egypt’s most recent round of parliamentary elections.  The military 
also operates large chicken and dairy farms, meat processing plants, chemical factories, 
and tourism companies, as well as facilities that manufacture basic commodities and 
more simple items like cooking oil, bread, pasta, purified water, shoe polish, kitchen 
cutlery, and cosmetics.  The financing and technologies for a majority of these operations 
have derived from arms deals and foreign aid; as Robert Springborg puts it:  
Instead of military industries emerging from the civilian manufacturing sector, as 
in the industrialized countries, they spring to life in Egypt as a result of bilateral 
agreements between the Egyptian military and foreign arms manufacturers.84  
 
Major Weapons Co-Production Agreements in Egypt  
Although several of Egypt’s major coproduction agreements were signed in the 1980s 
and 1990s, many continue to operate today.  Some of the largest projects were for 
military aircraft, including the AlphaJet trainer/ground support fighter designed by a 
French consortium (Dassault, SNECMA and Thomson-CSF); assembly of Brazil’s Al-
Tucano training aircraft (Embraer); the Mirage 2000 designed by Dassault; British Lynx 
helicopters; and Aerospatiale Gazelle, Mi-8, and Mi-17 helicopters – which are still being 
repaired and overhauled at AOI’s Arab British Helicopter Company.85 AOI’s Aircraft 
                                                
83 http://www.enginefactory.com.eg/.  Under the section on “civil products” is a lengthy drop down menu 
of items produced by AOI.  
84 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p13.   
85 http://www.aoi.com.eg/aoieng/military/mil_pro.html 
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Factory also still builds component parts for Dassault and SNECMA,86 some of which are 
sold back to the firms and incorporated into the finished product sold to other buyers,87 as 
well as for the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority.88  Many missile systems are also 
locally upgraded under license conditions, including Hughes TOW antitank missile 
systems, the British-designed Swingfire antitank missile, and Matra Magic R-550 air-to-
air missiles designed by the French firm Matra.89 Although much of Egypt’s military 
procurement comes from U.S. companies (facilitated by military aid), the major 
European producers have managed to maintain a presence in the Egyptian defense market 
as well.  Often this is achieved through quasi-official channels, such as joint business 
associations and diplomatic channels.  For instance, the point of contact for the Cairo-
based division of EADS (the French-German-Spanish defense consortium) is the 
Egyptian-French Business Association.90  
 
The Ministry of Military Production and AOI also have numerous contracts to co-
produce and maintain military-grade vehicles (tanks, armored personnel carriers, 
recovery vehicles, etc.); many are designed to bear antitank weapons and rocket systems 
                                                
86 http://www.enginefactory.com.eg/english/pages/defense/spare%20parts/spare%20parts.html 
87 Jim Paul. February 1983. “The Egyptian Arms Industry.” Middle East Report.  
88 http://www.aoi.com.eg/aoiarab/aoi/aircraft_web/home_a.html 
89 These include the Russian-made AT-3 Sagger missile,  
90 the point of contact is mfarahat@cafe.org.eg.  (for the Club d'Affaires Franco-Egyptien).  This is an 
email address of the Egyptian-French Business Association.  http://www.egypt-
business.com/Association/details/Egyptian-French-Business-Association.  The Association is a division of 
the French Chamber of Commerce, and regularly hosts French elected officials in Cairo.   Here, Raymond 
Forni (while President of the French people’s assembly) delivers a speech to the CAFÉ: 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/presidence/discours/3eba0065-1.asp 
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that are also assembled in-country.91  These include three different models of military-
grade Chrysler Jeeps produced at MMP’s Arab American Vehicle factory (where they are 
also fitted with machine guns and rocket launchers)92; Diamler-Chrysler’s Mercedes Benz 
G-series SUVs built at the AOI’s Kader Factory for Developed Industries;93 the Russian-
designed Ural 4320 utility truck; and the MTT (medium tactical truck) from Oshkosh 
Defense, co-produced at the Tank Factory.94 In 2009, Oshkosh was awarded another $20 
million contract from the U.S. Government, this time to co-produce the M1070 tank 
transport and refueling vehicle – also at the Tank Factory.95 Benha (Banha) Electronic 
Industries produces a range of battlefield communications equipment under license from 
companies like Westinghouse, Plessey (UK) and Racal (UK), as well as electronics 
components for the aircraft and land vehicles produced in other AOI factories.96  
 
Other AOI factories also overhaul and repair a number of foreign-designed engines, 
including those made by Rolls Royce (UK), Snecma, Turbomeca, and Dassault, (France), 
General Electric (US), as well as Pratt & Whitney (Canada).  These engines are used in 
co-produced systems as well as systems that are imported fully assembled, including the 
                                                
91 Jim Paul. February 1983. “The Egyptian Arms Industry.” Middle East Report.  See also LTC Stephen H. 
Gotowicki, U.S. Army. 1997. “The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society.” See also 
GlobalSecurity.org Although the vehicles themselves are based on American designs, the features that 
weaponize them are based on equipment provided to the Egyptians by the Soviets during the 1970s.  
92 http://www.aoi.com.eg/aoieng/military/mil_pro.html. 
93 “Armoured personnel carriers (wheeled). 4 October 2007. Jane’s Armour and Artillery (part of Jane’s 
Defense Publications, UK).  
94 “Egypt orders FHTV Trucks as Armored Support.” 8 March 2010. Defense Industry Daily.  
95 http://www.oshkoshdefense.com/news/233/oshkosh-defense-awarded-20-million-contract-to-supply-
egypt-with-heavy-equipment-transporters# 
96 The jets include the Tucano, AlphaJet, Gazelle, and K8-E. 
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C-130 and Russian MiGs.97 Interestingly, the Chinese K-8 fighters produced in Cairo are 
outfitted with the Honeywell (US) TFE731 engine, which is also maintained and 
overhauled by Egyptian military technicians.98  Numerous guns and ammunitions are also 
produced locally under license from European and American firms, including pistols 
produced under license from Switzerland, variants of the Beretta produced under license 
from Italy, and machine guns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, and grenade launchers designed 
by Germany, the U.S., the Soviet Union and Belgium, as well as various types of military 
communications equipment from French and American companies.   
 
The Triumph of Patronage in Egypt’s Military-Industrial Production 
The high cost and duplication of capabilities inherent in Egypt’s co-production programs 
contradict the idea that strategic independence is a central goal for Egypt’s military and 
political leaders. Most of Egypt’s co-production continues to center on older technologies 
– owing partly to security sensitivities over releasing more advanced technology, but 
primarily due to political pressure from the vested interests that support these projects – 
whose logic is often expressed in outdated tactical arguments about the importance of 
numerical superiority rather than the modernization of equipment.99 Although it is 
difficult to determine if some of Egypt’s military factories are still producing certain 
items – government restrictions make current estimates difficult to come by – many 
                                                
97 http://www.enginefactory.com.eg/english/pages/defense/amra/amra.html 
98 The TFE731 is made by the US firm Garret Engines (now part of Honeywell Aerospace), which exported 
a large number of these engines to China in the early 1990s. The Honeywell engine may be used because 
the Russians have been reluctant to grant China the right to use its Klimov RD-93 engine in exports. 
99 Once the initial co-production agreement has been signed and the necessary technologies and facilities 
transferred, there is little incentive for any party to halt production.  For the Egyptians these programs 
provide important sources of jobs and prestige; for the contracting firm they provide an important source of 
revenue – often for product lines that have long since ceased in their host country. 
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weapons systems have now been co-produced for a decade or more.100  Many of the 
longest-running projects are for infantry vehicles like tanks and armored personnel 
carriers, in no small part because Egyptian Army officials have a great deal of control 
over the military budget and procurement process relative to the other branches.  
 
The Egyptian Tank Plant (Factory 200) is perhaps the largest military factory in the 
region.  U.S. financing for construction of the plant – which was built explicitly to co-
produce main battle tanks – was approved by the U.S. Defense Security Assistance 
Agency (DSAA)101 in 1984, four years before any agreement had been reached (or 
serious discussions initiated) between the U.S. and Egyptian governments over the actual 
co-production activities that would take place in the factory. Officials from both the State 
Department and DOD later complained (in a GAO report) that the construction of the 
factory duplicated capabilities already available in other Egyptian facilities (Workshop 
101), and railroaded the U.S. Government into approving the co-production component 
of the subsequent tank sale, without which the newly-constructed factory would have 
been useless. This demonstrates the primacy that patronage considerations have 
historically taken over concerns about the cost of weapons or their strategic utility.   
 
Because the factory construction was concluded as a commercial contract (rather than a 
government-to-government, or FMS, sale) neither DOD nor State had significant input 
into the agreement.  Furthermore, the U.S. Government retroactively granted approval to 
                                                
100 For example, SIPRI figures on Egyptian arms exports end in 1992.  The majority of exports recorded 
were for APCs (armored personnel carriers).  
101 This is now the Defense & Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  
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finance the factory construction (and in-country procurement of factory equipment for the 
plant102) with military aid – something very unusual for commercial contracts.103  The 
firm contracted by the Egyptians to construct the tank plant – General Dynamics Land 
Systems (GDLS) – was of course awarded the follow-on contract for tank co-production.  
Like the quid pro quo conditions cited for the Jordanian case above, these supplementary 
facilities and co-production elements ensure that foreign firms are able to act as suppliers 
to Egypt’s military.   Although Egypt possesses more tanks than all of Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa combined,104 since the first co-production run began in 1991 ten 
subsequent co-production phases have been added, most recently in 2011, when an 
additional sale was announced for 125 tank kits worth $1.3 billion.105 This is despite the 
fact that severe cost overruns in the program (of more than 70%) have been documented 
by the GAO since as early as 1993, limiting the amount of technology transferred to the 
Egyptian military and reducing the overall number of tanks produced – (although, it 
should be noted, not reducing the sums paid to GDLS).   
 
Not only did the Egyptian military acquire less advanced technology and fewer tanks 
(while expending more of its military assistance funds) due to increased program costs, 
but it also failed to meet the secondary economic goal that was purportedly the basis for 
                                                
102 Employment profile of Charles B. “Burt” Jackson (LinkedIn), who acted as Procurement & 
Subcontracts Manager for General Dynamics in Cairo, Egypt from February 1990 – December 1993. 
103 If FMF financing had not been approved, there is a very real possibility that Egypt would have simply 
refused to pay General Dynamics for the factory construction.  Bringing in FMF financing ensured that the 
US Government would pay General Dynamics directly.  
104 Keith Krause. 1992. Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade. Cambridge, 




pursuing co-production in the first place – mainly exporting tanks to neighboring states, 
which was cited by Egyptian military officials as a key goal in the original 1988 
negotiations.106 The only sign of pending export of the M1A1 tanks – nearly 20 years 
after coproduction began – is a possible sale of 140 units to Iraq.107 Likewise, the 
Egyptian Tank Plant is also engaged in the modification of Egypt’s arsenal of 2,650 
M113 armored personnel carriers.  Originally produced and sold to Egypt by United 
Defense, the modifications (which include upgrades of the engine, armor, and weapons 
systems) are done in collaboration with BAE Land Systems, which purchased United 
Defense in 2005.  Although both AOI and BAE advertise the Egyptian Infantry Fighting 
Vehicle (EIFV) as a stand-alone product, which can either be sold (by Egypt) as a 
modification kit to enable other countries to upgrade their M113 fleet, or exported as a 
new product108 – to date the project has generated no exports.   
 
Where the construction of the tank factory (and the successive co-production contracts) 
has succeeded, is in expanding the military’s production of commercial equipment that is 
sold on the domestic market.  Today the Egyptian military produces a number of 
components for the tank systems that are also commonly used in the production of 
                                                
106 GAO. “Tank Coproduction Raised Costs and May Not Meet Program Goals.” July 1993.  
107 Wikileaks cable.  Although Iraq under Saddam Hussein was Egypt’s biggest arms customer, this is most 
likely a sale engineered by the U.S. for political reasons (much like the U.S.-engineered sale of Turkish 
produced F-16s to Egypt in the run-up to the first Gulf War, despite the Egyptians insistence that they 
wanted planes produced in the U.S.).  It is unlikely that the U.S. could convince any other regional states to 
purchase advanced military equipment produced in Egypt unless the transaction is essentially a form of 
military aid (from the Gulf States) or concluded with a pariah state that cannot secure supplies produced 
elsewhere.  It is worth noting that Egypt has been unable to sell the M1A1s it assembles despite a lower 
sale price; I have seen military chat forums that quoted a price of $2.4 million for Cairo’s version, 
compared to about $4.8 million for the American-built tank.  
108 http://www.uniteddefense.com/www.m113.com/eifv.html. M88A2 Hercules armored vehicle conversion 
program. 
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construction vehicles (earth-movers, etc.), which are also built at the Tank Factory.  A 
1993 GAO document reviewing the tank coproduction program reported that the 
Egyptian Army had approached several U.S. corporations regarding the development of a 
construction vehicle assembly line, including General Electric, Westinghouse, FMC 
Corporation (today part of BAE Systems), General Motors, and Caterpillar, as well as 
firms from the UK, Germany, and Japan.109 Today, there are more than 50 separate U.S. 
contractors working on the project110 – which provides a lot of opportunities for new 
collaborations.  According to a profile posted by an employee of the tank plant on 
extrade.net (an export-import advertising site), the plant manufactures equipment under 
license from a number of firms.  These items include fire trucks designed by Pierce 
Manufacturing (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Oshkosh of Wisconsin); construction 
loaders designed by the now-bankrupt Hydra Mac Inc. of Minnesota; and machining 
equipment designed two firms: Ingersoll of Illinois and Noble & Lund of the UK.111 All 
these items – and a number of other products and industrial services listed without 
specific foreign manufacturer data – are available for purchase. According to 2007 
shipping manifestos the tank plant has also exported unknown goods to Hofmann-
Mondial of Virginia – a company that manufactures grenade launchers, wheeled combat 
vehicles and armor.112   
                                                
109 GAO. “Tank Coproduction Raised Costs and May Not Meet Program Goals.” July 1993. These 
American companies are the same ones that produced the various components used in the construction of 
the M1A1 tanks. Talks with the Japanese construction machinery firm Komatsu were apparently quite 
advanced.   
110 Employment Profile (LinkedIn) Doug Brimmer. Chief, Coproduction Field Office, US Army TACOM, 
Cairo.  
111 http://www.extrade.net/76/1807176.html 
112 importgenius.com (maritime shipping industry database).  
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The successive rounds of co-production have also increased the prestige of military 
producers in Egypt.  Today the Egyptian Military claims to perform 95% of the work on 
the M1A1 tank – up from around 80% in the late 1990s/early 2000s. However, the degree 
of technology that is actually transferred along with these production activities is difficult 
to estimate.  A 1998 source lists welding (for armor), mechanization, assembly, and 
inspection as the primary M1A1 activities that took place in Egypt.113  Even this far into 
the co-production program the fully-assembled tank is flown on a C-130 cargo plane 
from Egypt to the Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona (meant to mimic the conditions of 
North Africa) in order to undergo testing.114   
 
Other co-production agreements appear to have been similarly costly. The 2005 
agreement to co-produce 120 Chinese K-8E jet trainers at the AOI Aircraft Factory in 
Helwan115 had a price tag of $345 million.  This yields a per unit cost of about $4.3 
million, but the K-8E usually runs between $3-3.5 million.116  Although Egyptian 
officials marketed the K-8E to Cairo’s African neighbors, this project also failed to 
generate exports.117  However, the added cost appears to have secured two non-strategic 
goals for the military: first, the AOI factory assembling the planes claims that 94% of the 
                                                
113 Gil Feiler. 1998. “Military Industries in the Arab World in the 1990s.” In Efraim Inbar and Benzion 
Zilberfarb. The Politics and Economics of Defence Industries. London: Frank Cass, p172.  
114 Mark Schauer. 8 September 2009. Egyptian Tank Tested at YPG. Yuma Sun. 
115 CTO Newsletter. 2005. 23(17).  
116 CTO Newsletter. 2005. 23(17).  
117 African customers – including Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe – instead chose to purchase the K-8 
directly from China.  
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work will be performed in Egypt118 - which represents a substantial increase over the 
proportion of manufacturing work transferred under previous co-production 
arrangements, and second, the nearby MMP Factory 360 – the Helwan Metallic 
Appliances Company – now has a brand new production facility churning out Hisense (a 
Chinese state-owned company) air conditioning units under license.119  By contrast, the 
facility’s other assembly lines, which produce washing machines, gas stoves, 
refrigerators, and water heaters under license from Italian and American companies, are 
dilapidated, and do not appear to be manufacturing many units. In addition, the state-
owned Chinese oil company Sinopec recently launched a joint venture with one of the 
public sector companies in which MMP has significant holdings – Tharwa Petroleum 
Company.120  
 
The types of equipment that Egypt co-produces also belies the claim that they are 
strategic in nature, because Egypt’s real shortcomings are in communications systems 
and other high-technology components – and this shortage makes much of its heavy 
equipment less effective, not to mention incompatible with the advanced equipment of its 
regional allies. This was reflected in a cable made available by Wikileaks, in which 
Margaret Scobey, the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, summarizes recent diplomatic attempts 
to encourage Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi to shift the military’s focus away from 
arming for a conventional land battle in order to better combat border smuggling and 
other unconventional threats.  Although Scobey claims that smuggling is a looming threat 
                                                
118 http://www.aoi.com.eg/aoiarab/aoi/aircraft_web/home_a.html 
119 http://www.helwan360.com/assembly_lines.htm 
120 Tharwa also recently inked a joint venture deal with the Italian oil company Breda.   
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to Egypt’s national security, she laments that Tantawi is hesitant to take advantage of 
U.S. coordination due to his “concerns that FMF funds may be directed away from more 
high-profile programs like M1A1 tank coproduction.”121  This supports the theory that 
the continued viability of the military’s production portfolio and its related prestige is 
more important than having the most advanced weapons or technological capabilities.   
 
The Egyptian government continues to insist on the co-production method not only 
because of the jobs and prestige it bestows on the military, but also because the potential 
economic losses (in foregone technology transfer and increased expenditure from the 
Egyptian budget to compensate for the cost overruns) are irrelevant to the cost calculus of 
the most powerful political incumbents.  Despite heavy subsidies (and the general lack of 
                                                
121 Cable Cairo 000181. E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09.  Subject: Scenesetter for Admiral Mullen. 
Classified. Margaret Scobey. Like Jordan, the Egyptian military has also enriched itself through 
commercial development of its land-holdings.  Many of the most lavish residential suburbs and commercial 
complexes on the outskirts of Cairo were built by military developers or their close associates. They too 
benefited from ring roads, bridges and other costly infrastructure whose construction was heavily 
subsidized by the state.  Attracted by these heavy subsidies, investors (both foreign and domestic) 
gravitated toward real estate development, making it one of the top investment destinations in the Egyptian 
economy. Many economists fault these arrangements for encouraging speculative (ie, non-productive) 
investment that generates quick returns at the expense of manufacturing, which would generate jobs and 
export income.  And also like Jordan, the rank-and-file of the Egyptian armed forces enjoy privileges like 
free housing (which is often financed by US military aid, since the acquisition of major weapons systems 
requires constructing new bases to house these assets) as well as dining and recreational facilities and 
subsidized commissariats.  These enterprises provide much-needed jobs for the military’s rank-and-file – 
who as conscripts provide cheap labor to military producers – while an extensive network of high-end 
social clubs and generous retirement benefits ensure loyalty among the officer elite. As in Jordan, the 
Egyptian military’s capacity as an engine for manufacturing and economic growth is belied by the scant 
estimates that do exist.  Conservative estimates suggest that the Egyptian military’s economic operations 
account for between 10% and 15% of the national economy, while other analysts put the figure as high as 
30% or even 45%. But if the military is supposed to be a driver for industrialization and economic 
diversification, it has failed miserably.  The Egyptian state still exports fewer manufactured goods than 
Costa Rica, whose population is 1/16 the size, and Egypt’s military factories are most likely not a 
significant source of export earnings. Yet both institutions continue to elicit casual observations of 
efficiency, observations which seldom address the role that offsets and other subsidies play in facilitating 
output and enhancing the illusion of productivity.  This illusion further enhances the military’s economic 
prestige, which in turn encourages foreign investors and international firms to partner with the military – 
whether in real estate, service provision or manufacturing – crowding out potentially more efficient 
investment in enterprises not controlled by the military.  
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available information on military balance sheets) some military factories are known to be 
heavily in the red.122 Some estimates from the mid-1980s put revenues from Egyptian 
arms exports (primarily to Iraq) at between $800 million and $1 billion per year,123 while 
former Minister of Military Production Sayed Meshal reported income of about $350 
million/year.  Egypt did supply some used equipment (F-7s) and a large number of Sakr 
rocket-launchers to Iraq during the latter’s protracted war with Iran – which also kept 
feeder factories producing cartridges, shells, rockets, and spare parts running at near 
capacity – but this largely ended with the war itself.  Other sources indicate that some of 
this money was paid to Egypt because it was a transit point for shipping arms produced 
elsewhere, and for the sale of excess Soviet equipment to third parties, including T-55 
tanks sent to Iraq.124 The fact that the military budget is secret means that shortfalls can 
easily be mended without marring the military’s reputation for efficiency or eliciting 
public protest over diverting scarce public funds to military ventures.125 
 
In the Driver’s Seat: Defense Offsets and the Military’s Production of Passenger 
Vehicles 
 
The Egyptian military’s production of commercial passenger vehicles is an excellent case 
for demonstrating the central role that defense procurement has played in the military’s 
civilian industrial production.  The American firm Chrysler – which was the original 
                                                
122 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p10. 
123 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p9. 
124 Keith Krause. 1992. Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. P161. 
125 Egypt ranks last (with scores of zero) on Global Integrity’s index measuring citizens’ access to 
information about the government.  Springborg (2011) states that domestic media reports on the nation’s 
military were more comprehensive and numerous in the 1980s than they are today. 
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producer of the M1A1 tank (before the division was sold to General Dynamics in 1982) 
as well as the earlier M60 model, which Egypt acquired in large supply shortly after the 
Camp David Accords – also owns a 49% stake in the Arab American Vehicles Company 
(AAV), where the AOI produces military versions of the Jeep Cherokee and Jeep 
Wrangler, as well as civilian versions for commercial sale.126 In 2010, Egypt signed a new 
FMS contract with Chrysler for $33 million worth of unassembled jeeps, tools, and spare 
parts destined for the AAV factory.127  Two military models – the Jeep TJL and the Jeep 
J8 – are exclusively produced at the AAV factory, and have been exported to two-dozen 
countries, including Libya,128 where pro-government forces deployed the TJL during 
skirmishes with protestors in Tripoli.  But, as in the Gulf States, where US defense firms 
with offset obligations were the recipients of investment from Gulf conglomerates and 
state-owned funds, Chrysler also derived certain privileges in exchange for continuing its 
co-production efforts in Egypt.   
 
In the last two years, Chrysler’s parent company (Diamler-Benz)129 has agreed to pay 
nearly $200 million to settle charges that it bribed foreign officials, including Egyptian 
General Abdel Hamid Wasfi, the Chairman of AOI’s Kader Factory for Developed 
Industries (which builds the Mercedes Benz G320, known locally as the Kader-320), in 
                                                
126 These trucks include the AM720, and a number of other models. The company’s production history is 
available here: http://www.aav.com.eg/Pathtosuccess.html.  AAV also produces cars under license from the 
Chinese firm Jianghuai Automobile Co., Ltd. 
127 Aram Roston and David Rohde. 5 March 2011. “Egyptian Army’s Business Side Blurs Lines of U.S. 
Military Aid.” New York Times. 
128 http://www.aav.com.eg/export.html 
129 Chrysler is now owned by the Italian car manufacturer Fiat – but the activity in question occurred 
between 1998 and 2007, during the time that Chrysler was merged with Diamler.  
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exchange for guarantees that Wasfi’s factory would place orders for parts and supplies 
with Diamler-Benz instead of a competitor.130  
 
In addition to the Chrysler case, there are several examples of Egyptian military factories 
receiving civilian production technologies and equipment from the same firms that sell 
them military hardware.  The Helwan Aircraft Factory signed several technology transfer 
contracts with Sifle SRL, an Italian distributor of IVECO Military Vehicles – a division 
of Fiat Industrial.131 These contracts – signed sometime before 2008132 – included two 
CKD (complete knock-down) kits for the assembly of vehicle air conditioner production 
lines at AOI’s Helwan Aircraft Factory and El Nasr Automotive Factory; the construction 
of a hot-dip galvanizing plant (the galvanizing process prevents erosion of numerous 
metals) and the supply and construction of machinery for a furniture factory (both for the 
Helwan Aircraft Factory); as well as the supply of mobile ambulance units to the 
Ministry of Health.133  I was unable to determine whether the provision of these contracts 
was linked to any specific defense sales – but several late-model (nearly brand new) 
IVECO armored trucks were used in confrontations between state security forces and 
                                                
130 The factory is the Kader Factory for Development Industries in Heliopolis, which produces (or once 
produced) trainer aircraft, bombs, mortars, and armored vehicles. The bribes were delivered through a shell 
company that Daimler-Benz established called “Consulting Egypt.” 
131 Silfe (the acronym for Italian Company for Supplies & Works Abroad) focuses on the MENA 
geographical market. http://www.silfe-srl.com/ 
132 These contracts are listed on the cached version of Silfe’s website; which provided a list of all overseas 
contracts the company had concluded between 1990 and 2008.  There is no way to tell from this site when 
the particular contracts were concluded with Egypt.  
133 http://www.silfe-srl.com/references.xml. (cached site).   
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protestors during the recent uprisings.134  Also, AOI factories have produced Fiat 
passenger cars for sale on the domestic market in the past,135 and with the recent 
acquisition of Chrysler by Fiat, it is likely these factories may bring more Fiat models 
onto their production lines. 
 
Egypt also has a program to overhaul and maintain HMMWVs136 (military-grade 
Humvees) at one of the AOI factories. Like the M1A1 tank facility, the $7 million 
HMMWV MRO facility was also financed with US military aid, and its construction was 
overseen by the USACE.  Here the HMMWVs are fitted with anti armor weaponry, 
including TOW, Milan, Swingfire, and HOT missiles produced locally under license, as 
well as the Avenger low-altitude air defense system, which is made on local production 
lines by combining Stinger missiles (which Egypt acquired in 2009 and 2011) with .50 
caliber machine guns and adding sensors and tracking equipment.137   
 
Like the overlap in military/commercial production evident in the M1A1-Chrysler case, 
the HMMWV facility also appears to have generated some commercial opportunities for 
the Egyptian military. Predator Hummer Egypt – a private domestic distributor and 
service provider that appears to have links to the American company Predator 
                                                
134 http://milinme.wordpress.com/2011/01/28/army-intervention-in-egypt/.  For more evidence of the new 
IVECO acquisitions see Christopher Week’s self-published 2011 book Egyptian Police Vehicles.  IVECO 
Egypt (a local agency/distributor) was also the intermediary for IVECO trucks sold to Iraq in the late 
1990s/early 2000s while it was under a UN Arms Embargo.  www.justice.gov/opa/documents/fiat-iveco-
info.pdf.  
135 http://www.aav.com.eg/Pathtosuccess.html 
136 The prime contractor is AM General LLC of Indiana.  
137 6 October 2011. “Stingers for Egypt and Turkey.” Defense Industry Daily. 
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Motorsports Inc., which contracts with the U.S. military138 – claims to perform service on 
all models of the military-grade Humvee (HMWWV), and to “support the special 
forces.”139 According to a 2004 report from Middle East Newsline (a regional wire 
service), U.S. officials approved a Defense Department plan to “establish facilities 
required for the maintenance and repair of Egypt's fleet of high-mobility multipurpose 
wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)” in order to “help Egypt to expand its defense industry.”140 
Predator Egypt may be an outgrowth of this recent collaboration.141  Additional contracts 
have also been awarded for the construction of new facilities for depot-level maintenance 
of military vehicles (the most sophisticated form) as well as for the expansion of existing 
facilities, including a 2006 contract to expand Workshop 101 – the army facility where 
M60 tanks are repaired – and a 2011 contract to build a repair facility for Egypt’s 200-
plus tank transporter vehicles.142  
 
                                                
138 Predator Motorsports Inc. was founded by in 1998 by Ryan Wilson, and according to the company’s 
website, “weeks after 9/11 Predator was contracted to develop extended range system for HMMWV’s 
leading the war in Baghdad. Within hours prototype systems were developed and sent out for approval 
resulting in thousands of units being implemented for our armed forces.” http://www.predatorinc.com/the-
predator-crew/.  
139 http://www.predatoregypt.com/about.asp 
140 http://www.menewsline.com/article-17506-EGYPT-PLANS-TO-ESTABLISH-HMMWV-FA.aspx. The 
primary U.S. contractor was Accent Controls Inc.  
141 In personal communication with the author, Wilson stated that his firm did not have a formal 
relationship with the Egyptian company – although the latter has clearly copied elements of the US firm’s 
website for their own site, and using language that implies a formal relationship with the US firm.  The 
Egyptian firm lists address: 172 Joseph Tito Street, El–Nozha El–Gedida, Cairo, which is very close to the 
National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (located at 23 Joseph Tito Street, El–Nozha El–
Gedida, Cairo). This is past Ain Shams and about 20 km northeast of Cairo along the Cairo-Ismailiyya 
Desert Road.  
142 Both contracts went to the same company – the Advanced Technology Systems Company; 
http://www.atscva.com/news.html. The 2011 contract is cited here, the 2006 contract is available on the 
USACE webpage: http://www.tac.usace.army.mil/Contracting/contract_awards.html.  
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Resources provided through U.S. military aid are also used by the Egyptian Navy to 
secure its own corporatist benefits. Although the Navy has historically been much weaker 
politically than the other branches of the Egyptian military, because Cairo leases (rather 
than purchases) many of the big-ticket naval weapons systems in its arsenal, upgrades to 
maritime facilities are necessary to maintain the equipment according to the contract 
terms [functioning in much the same way as the Pacer Force program]. These leasing 
conditions ensure that the more hardware the Egyptian Navy acquires, the more resources 
must be directed to maritime maintenance and repair facilities. Some projects financed by 
the US include massive dry-docking facilities for ship repair.143 Timsah Shipbuilding 
Company (a subsidiary of the Suez Canal Authority, which is managed by Egyptian 
Naval Officers) advertises its repair and maintenance services for both Egyptian and 
foreign vessels using these dry-docking facilities installed previously by the USACE.144 
 
The issue of whether these aid-financed facilities directly contribute to the military’s 
commercial operations is particularly acute because in most cases commercial vehicles 
are produced on the same factory floors alongside military equipment, as in the case of 
                                                
143 Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus. 2009. Bricks, Sand and Marble: US Army Corps of 
Engineers: Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947-1991.  Washington DC: Center of 
Military History and Corps of Engineers, United States Army, p588.  Projects include: $14 million 
dredging project at Alexandria Harbor in the late 1980s, which included the provision of syncrolift 
equipment to move ships in/out of the dock to maintenance facilities and a further $40 million for new 
maintenance facilities, equipment and renovations; the construction of a $5 million torpedo maintenance 
facility in Alexandria in 1993/4, which included the construction of power stations, buildings and paved 
roads; a Harpoon Missile Weapons Station at King Maryut (Mariout) Harbor in Alexandria, which included 
$6 million for torpedo repair facilities, and $14 million for additional syncrolift equipment. See Also 
USAID, “A Feasibility Study for the Establishment of an Egyptian Ports Training Center.” Alexandria 
Ports Authority (now part of the Holding Company for Maritime and Land Transport).  February 1981. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAL704.pdf 
144 http://www.timsahshipbuildingoffshore.com/ship%20repair.html. Another $7 million syncrolift was just 
purchased by the Suez Canal Authority in 2001, primarily for repairing Nile River ferries near Luxor.  
http://www.rolls-royce.com/marine/news/2001/010110_syncrolift.jsp 
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the Chrysler military Jeeps, which are produced on assembly lines right next to the 
commercial Jeeps that the military sells on the domestic market, as well as the M1A1 
tanks, that are produced alongside construction vehicles that are also sold locally by the 
military.145 Under the U.S. Pacer Forge program, any Egyptian military facility 
(including factories and shipyards) housing US-made weapons would be built and 
maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers using US aid, which included the 
provision of things like water and sewage systems, housing for military conscripts and 
engineers staffing the factories, roads, and power generation stations.146  Because the 
military workers and factories that rely on these inputs are producing both military 
equipment and commercial goods, these aid programs directly supplement both 
production processes. 
 
One Degree of Separation: the Egyptian Military’s Interests in Private Sector Firms 
In addition to the formal operations of the MMP, AOI and NPSO, there are many other 
channels through which military firms and individual officers embed their interests in the 
domestic economy.  These channels include the purchase of shares in private sector 
companies by MMP and AOI (firms that frequently employ military-owned 
subcontractors and suppliers) as well as the practice of securing lucrative employment for 
officers and engineers on aid-financed military projects that are contracted to private 
sector construction conglomerates. This demonstrates a shift in the method employed by 
                                                
145 Charles Clover and Roula Khalaf. 28 February 2011. “Egypt military uneasy over business ties.” 
Financial Times. 
146 Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus. 2009. Bricks, Sand and Marble: US Army Corps of 
Engineers: Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947-1991.  Washington DC: Center of 
Military History and Corps of Engineers, United States Army, p588. 
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the military to extract benefits from large aid-financed construction projects and weapons 
acquisitions, a response to changing donor requirements and the prevailing discourse on 
economic development, which increasingly necessitates the incorporation of private 
sector investors and entrepreneurs. As mentioned previously, the Egyptian military has 
shareholdings in subsidiaries of other state-owned companies, such as Tharwa Petroleum 
Company and the Egyptian Satellite Company (Nilesat), but it also has joint ventures with 
private sector investors.  
 
The Kuwaiti group M. A. Kharafi and Sons—whose late patriarch ranked seventh on the 
2010 Rich List of the magazine Arabian Business—has proven a particularly eager 
partner. Since 2001, it has joined the Egyptian military in a number of ventures, including 
the Arab Company for Computer Manufacturing, Egypt’s only producer of computer 
hardware and laptops, in which Kharafi owns 71 percent of shares and the AOI and a 
Ministry of Military Production subsidiary each own 5 percent.147 The company, which 
draws on Aopen, a Taiwanese firm, for technology inputs, had start-up capital of $140 
million and produces 750,000 computers per year.148 Via a subsidiary, Kharafi controls 
approximately 60 percent of the International Pipe Industry Company, of which the 
Ministry of Military Production owns 10 percent. This company is the largest 
manufacturer of oil and gas piping in the region, reporting sales of $104 million in 2008, 
and former Minister of Military Production Sayyid Mish‘al has described it as a “model 
                                                
147 The Benha Electronic Industries company (a subsidiary of MMP) owns 5% of ACCM; while AOI owns 
another 5%. 
148 Daily News Egypt, 26 December 2005. 
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of cooperation” between the state and private sector.149  
 
The military and Kharafi also run an operation called Maxalto, which relies on 
technology from the German firm Schlumberger to manufacture smart cards. In addition, 
there are a number of joint ventures between Kharafi’s Egyptian subsidiaries and 
divisions of state-owned holding companies widely perceived to be under the army’s 
aegis. Lastly, the facility for the Arab Company for Computer Manufacturing is located 
at the Obour Factory northeast of Cairo, which is very near the site of the new state-
owned £3 billion EGP Mubarak Complex for the Defense Industry being constructed 
along the Belbeis Desert Road.150  
 
In addition to direct shareholdings by Egyptian military companies, private firms owned 
by former military officials have also benefited through securing numerous contracts with 
EMAK, the Egyptian subsidiary of the Kharafi Group. Several firms owned by retired 
Egyptian military engineers have acted as subcontractors and suppliers for EMAK, 
including MAST Group, which is owned by a former Egyptian military engineer provides 
and has provided industrial water services for three EMAK projects.151 The founder of 
TAB Company (the Engineering Company for Testing and Balancing Services) spent 12 
years in the Egyptian military (and 18 years in a military posting in Kuwait), and has 
likewise landed several contracts for EMAK facilities, as well as five contracts for 
                                                
149 Al-Ahram, April 2, 2005. 
150 24 August 2010. “Minister: Egypt’s annual military production reaches £2.7 billion EGP.” Al Masry Al 
Youm (English edition). “Dr. Ali Sabri: Military Production growth was 5% despite the country’s 
circumstances.” 23 October 2011. Al Ahram.  http://www.ahram.org.eg/Investigations/News/108501.aspx.  
151 http://mast-group.net/Team.html. These were two paper mills and a “smart card factory.” 
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USACE projects and a number of projects for MMP and AOI subsidiaries.152 TAB’s 
founder also started another industrial service company – MechaTronics – with other 
Egyptian military engineers,153 which also secured contracts with MMP and AOI 
subsidiaries.154  Some of the engineers working for TAB and MechaTronics had 
previously worked for firms controlled by Mamdouh Moukhtar, a Brigadier General in 
the Egyptian Army.155 
 
Many of the smaller subcontractors and equipment supply firms working with large 
private sector construction conglomerates are also owned and/or managed by former 
military officers.  One example is the Abou El Soud Group, whose Chairman Mohammed 
Hussein Abu Al Saud156 served as an Egyptian Army Officer for 15 years, as Assistant 
Secretary General for the Ismailia chapter of the ruling NDP, and also briefly acted as 
                                                
152 the EMAK facility is the Al Kharafi Factory for Advanced Technology in Obour City; the USACE 
projects include: Helwan Air Base, El Bassateen Logistics Depot, TOW Missile facility, Hook facility, and 
the Cairo West Air Base.  In addition TAB (known as ProServices until 2004) has also been a 
subcontractor for the Benha Electronics Institute (owned by MMP), and a number of different port facilities 
that operate under the HCMLT. http://www.tab.com.eg/pdf/TAB%20Company%20Profile.pdf.  The owner 
is Sherif Mohamed Noweir/Nowair; the General Manager, Tarek A. Omar, is also a member of the Society 
of American Military Engineers.  
153 Yousef Borhan worked as an engineer in one of the military’s factories in Helwan (Delta Steel), then 
went on to work for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and subsequently, Al-Kharafi.  
154 Mechatronics installed HVAC systems for Benha Electronics Industry (of MMP), and also for the 
military’s operations at the East Delta Flour Mill, which produces numerous types of pasta for the domestic 
market. http://www.mechatronics.com.qa/projects/project.html   
155 Moukhtar is the Chairman of Power Egypt Corporation, which produces refrigerators and air-
conditioners, and was the early domestic distributor for General Electric equipment.  
156 Different sources give Abu Al Saud different names: a Bloomberg profile of Ismailia Misr gives his 
name as Mohammed Al Afifi; while the Zawya profile of the company gives his name as Gamal Hasan 
Afifi Abou Al Saud; the parent company’s listing on the Egyptian stock exchange (Arab Gathering 
Investment) gives his name as Gamal Hassan Afifi: 
http://www.mubasher.info/portal/case/companyDetails.html?siteLanguage=en&companyId=1445&goToH
omePageParam=true;  as does his profile on the Egyptian Businessman’s Association page: 
http://www.eba.org.eg/Main/MemberDetails.aspx?mem_id=7.   Here he is listed as managing director of 
Dallah for Real Estate (a subsidiary of Dallah Al Baraka). There is also a General Mostafa Afifi, a former 
Governor of Sinai.  
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advisor to the Kuwaiti Defense Minister in the late-1980s.  (This is also when Kuwait 
placed an order for approximately 100 Egyptian-built Fahd armored vehicles – a 
particularly prestigious order, since other sales were restricted to Sub-Saharan African 
states or states under Western sanctions).  Al Saud’s firm Egyptian Company for 
Electronics & Training Equipment (aka, Misr Specialized Electronics & Training 
Equipment Company), was a subcontractor with the U.S. defense firm SAIC on a contract 
to establish a combat training facility – the Egyptian National Training Center.157  The 
Egyptian Company began in 1988 as a joint venture established within the Ministry of 
Military Production, and has since constructed shooting ranges for the Egyptian Ministry 
of the Interior, the private security force of Sheikh Mohammed of the UAE, and has 
exported equipment and provided training to security forces in Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.158  
 
In addition to developing shooting ranges, the company also provides services in land 
reclamation, HVAC, electromechanical engineering, water and sanitation, telecom, and 
investment banking.159  Al Saud is also a shareholder and board member for Ismailia Misr 
                                                
157 The National Training Center in Egypt is modeled on the one used by the US military in California (also 
designed/built by SAIC).  Egyptian Chief of Staff General Halaby was said to have been very impressed 
upon visiting the US facilities shortly after the first Gulf War – and expressed a desire to see a parallel 
facility in Egypt.  The initial contract for the National Training Center was signed in the mid-1990s, with 
the first phase completed around 2000. U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND: Logistics Oral History 
Interview with Major General William A. Fitzgerald; U.S. Army Security Assistance Command. 28 July 
1992 - 24 June 1994 
158 http://misr-shooting.com/english/about_us.php.  The factory is located in industrial zone A2 in Cairo.  
159 http://misr-shooting.com/english/about_us.php.   
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Refigeration,160 which has received sizeable loans from the state-owned Banque Misr.  
The biannual joint military exercise “Bright Stars” also funnels millions into the coffers 
of the Egyptian military and the domestic businesses they designate to provide supplies 
for the operation; both American and Egyptian officials critical of the military’s role in 
the economy have cited unusually high fees paid to these local businesses under the 
auspices of the exercise.161 
 
The military also issues tenders for its own projects to domestic private sector 
conglomerates, which in turn employ Egyptian military engineers and officers.  Initially, 
in the late 1970s when the USACE began implementing large construction projects in 
Egypt, the latter’s military played a direct role in construction, with the Egyptian Air 
Force and Army Engineers closely involved in the design, procurement, construction and 
management phases.  It was always the case that the military aid used to purchase 
weapons and construct military facilities must be spent with US companies – although 
Egyptian firms were usually joint venture partners in major construction projects, and 
some firms operating under the Ministry of Military Production also participated as 
subcontractors.162 These military firms included Mohktar Ibrahim, a subsidiary of the 
National Company for Construction & Development, which worked on Workshop 101, a 
                                                
160 Ismailia Misr Refigeration is a subsidiary of Ismailia Misr Poultry, which is owned by Arab Gathering 
Investment Company.  This firm is majority owned by Dallah Al Baraka, which is in turn owned by Saleh 
Kamel – widely believed to be a front for ownership by Saudi Prince Waleed Bin Talal.  
161 Charles Clover and Roula Khalaf. 28 February 2011. “Egypt military uneasy over business ties.” 
Financial Times. 
162 One example is El Nasr Building and Construction Company (formerly Egyptian Building Systems 
Company, or EGYCO, previous to the firm’s nationalization in 1964).  El Nasr is a subsidiary of the 
National Company for Construction and Development, and worked on the Computer Center that formed 
part of the Hawkeye Program.  
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facility that built armored vehicles before the construction of the M1A1 production line at 
Factory 200.  But over time this shifted – now firms affiliated with the Government of 
Egypt are explicitly prohibited from bidding on USACE contracts163 (although this does 
not appear to be a hard and fast rule, since Safi Water, owned by the Egyptian military’s 
National Service Products Organization, has a contract to supply purified water to US 
Central Command, which dispenses it to the thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the 
region).164 
 
Today, these large construction contracts are awarded to an array of large multinational 
construction firms, architectural design firms, and equipment suppliers165 including 
Contrack International, a subsidiary of Orascom, the Egyptian conglomerate owned by 
Naguib Sawiris.  Contrack International worked on a number of USACE contracts, 
including the Western Ammunition Workshops in El Haikstep, the Peace Vector IV Air 
                                                
163 Because the different branches of the U.S. Military conclude arms sales agreements under FMS terms 
with the Egyptian Government, in the past these branches were often responsible for hiring the architects, 
engineers and construction firms that built the associated facilities, and may themselves have been more 
likely to contract with firms affiliated with the Egyptian military.  However, the branches slowly 
transferred responsibility for construction projects (which account for a large chunk of US military aid to 
Egypt) to the USACE, which may have been less likely to rely on firms affiliated with the Egyptian 
military, accounting for some of this shift.  
164 Charles Clover and Roula Khalaf. 28 February 2011. “Egypt military uneasy over business ties.” 
Financial Times.  
165 These firms include: American International Contractors Inc./AICI, a subsidiary of the Greek 
conglomerate Archirodon; Sorenson Gross, which partnered with the Egyptian-owned construction firm 
Osman Group165 on a number of military projects; Encorp International; Wallace O’Conner; Metcalf & 
Eddy International; the Frank E. Basil Company; General Dynamics; Burns & McDonnell Engineering; 
Black & Veatch; Melley Energy Systems; Turner International Industries; Willbros Butler; Perini 
International; EBASCO Overseas Corporation; Taylor Woodrow Inc.; Morgan International; Allen & 
Hoshall; J.A. Jones Construction; Interdyne; Rolls Royce Naval Marine Inc.; Philip Holzmann; A.G. Jan 
De Nul; Washington Group International; General Electric; BMAR & Associates; Blue Tee Corp.; Terex 
Corporation; Oshkosh Corporation; Stafford Development Company; Caterpillar; Putzmeister America; 
Tesmec; International Truck & Engine Corp.; Thrustmaster of Texas; War Horse Companies; Techmaster 
Inc.; Stanley Consultants; Jacobs Engineering; Michael Baker Jr. Inc.; Tetra Tech; CH2M Hill; and Louis 
Berger Group. 
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Bases in Gianaclis and Sakara, the Peace Vector V Air Force Base in El Bassateen, the 
Peace Vector VI Main Operating Air Force Base in Fayed, the Al Maza Airfield Systems 
at Al Maza Airbase, the F-16 Air Force Base Depot Facilities in Helwan, the Pacer Forge 
Facility Support project at Abu Sueir Air Base, the Spare Parts Main Depots 63, the Pier 
7/8 Abu Qir Naval Base in Alexandria, and the C-130 Maintenance Hangar at West Air 
Base in Cairo.166 Although the interests of the Egyptian military in maintaining the 
economic viability of public sector companies has often been used as a foil for this 
broader trend toward economic liberalization, private sector magnates like Sawiris (and 
the Osman family, as well as the al-Kharafi family of Kuwait) operate business 
enterprises that are deeply involved with Egyptian military construction and supply 
contracts.  Although this looks like an example of private sector interests trumping the 
demands of the military, a very large number of Egyptian Army Engineers are employed 
by these contractors – often at greatly inflated salaries. 167   
 
Domestic Subsidies to the Egyptian Military  
Like Jordan’s KADDB, Egyptian military factories also receive substantial subsidies 
directly from their own government (ie, not through foreign military aid), including 
through the massive agricultural and food processing operations (operated primarily 
under the NSPO) that provide for its enormous conscript workforce and network of 
                                                
166 Although Contrack was originally an American company, Orascom bought 45% of the firm in 1998, and 
now owns all of the company.  Because Sawiris also holds U.S. citizenship, Contrack is eligible to bid on 
classified U.S. Government contracts as well, and the company – which has offices near the Pentagon in 
Virginia – has worked on various military installations overseas on behalf of the U.S. military in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Qatar. 
167 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p15. 
Also see “A Special Report on Egypt: No Paradise.” 15 July 2010. The Economist.  
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commissaries.168 This is also the case in the area of energy inputs.  Although many 
domestic manufacturers are able to skirt a law requiring that they pay the market rate for 
energy inputs, the military’s enterprises are universally exempted from the requirement – 
paying only about 25% of the market price for petroleum inputs and around 50% for 
electricity.169  
 
In addition to traditional subsidies, the Egyptian military has also been able to exploit its 
control over aid-financed infrastructure that is not immediately identifiable as military 
infrastructure, including transportation facilities and public health services, which 
enhance the military’s ability to subsidize its economic operations and generate profits 
for both the institution and high-ranking officers. One well-known case is the 
International Medical Center, which was equipped with state-of-the-art technology 
funded by $163 million dollars in US military aid.170  Although the facility was meant to 
provide free healthcare to the Egyptian military and their families, it is in fact being 
operated as a for-profit hospital, advertising its well-maintained facilities – including a 
“lavishly furnished Royal Suite” – and costly medical equipment to attract wealthy 
Egyptian civilians and international patients.171  The hospital was getting enormous 
subsidies (via US aid) to perform facility maintenance and purchase new equipment – 
allowing the military to pocket the proceeds from treating civilians. Although U.S. 
                                                
168 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p14.  
169 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p9. 
170 Charles Clover and Roula Khalaf. 28 February 2011. “Egypt military uneasy over business ties.” 
Financial Times. 
171 Aram Roston and David Rohde. 5 March 2011. “Egyptian Army’s Business Side Blurs Lines of U.S. 
Military Aid.” New York Times. 
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military officials in Egypt reported that financing for the hospital was cut off around 
2006, several contracts for new medical equipment have been granted since then, in 2008 
and again in 2010.172 
 
Yet another case is illustrated by the construction of a VIP airport at the Al Maza Air 
Force base, which was financed by US military aid and overseen by the USACE.  $300 
million in US military aid also paid for a fleet of Gulfstream jets (plus $10 million/year in 
fleet maintenance) that Egyptian military officials insisted would be used for mapping 
and surveying – but in fact were used for VIP junkets – and became a popular symbol of 
the government’s excesses.173  A number of private companies operate charters from the 
Al Maza airfield for VIP clients, oil & gas companies, and tourism companies, many of 
which employ Egyptian Air Force pilots – and Gulfstream jets. If the model of the profit-
making hospital venture is an indicator of the way aid translates into personal gain for 
high-ranking officials, then it is also likely that air transportation facilities and equipment 
are likewise used to generate revenues. 
 
Egyptian military firms may also be able to gain access to foreign equipment by 
executing purchases of items destined for military use under the authority of other 
government agencies.  One potential example was the recent procurement of equipment 
from the U.S.-based technology firm 3COM, which was made under a Ministry of 
                                                
172 Charles Clover and Roula Khalaf. 28 February 2011. “Egypt military uneasy over business ties.” 
Financial Times.  Also see the USACE’s Transatlantic Programs Center website, which lists past contracts 
granted under the US military’s aid program.  
173 Aram Roston and David Rohde. 5 March 2011. “Egyptian Army’s Business Side Blurs Lines of U.S. 
Military Aid.” New York Times.  
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Education initiative on e-learning, but 3COM’s partner was Arab International 
Optronics, a subsidiary of the military’s National Service Projects Organization. In a 
press release issued by the Egyptian Government, Optronics Chairman Major General 
Nabil Amer (the former Chairman of Helwan Iron Foundries, an MMP subsidiary) stated 
that his firm would also work in conjunction with 3COM on “other government 
initiatives.”174 Although it is impossible to determine from where the money to purchase 
the 3COM equipment came, the acquisition was likely financed by the Ministry of 
Education – with Optronics potentially tacking on its own list of desired equipment. 
3COM’s domestic distributor in Egypt (Almona) was one of 30 firms identified by the 
U.S. Embassy’s commercial attaché as a consultant for the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, 
and is owned by Seifallah Fahmy, a member of the political committee of the now 
defunct ruling party (the NDP).175 
 
The military’s control of maritime and inland transport, which have benefited from 
substantial USAID and USACE projects, also generates significant institutional benefits, 
since commercial shipping accounts for a significant portion of Egypt’s economic 
activity.  During the push to privatize state-owned enterprises, public sector firms were 
consolidated under the authority of state-owned holding companies, like the Holding 
Company for Textiles Industries, the Food Industries Holding Company, the Holding 
Company for Mining and Refractories, the Holding Company for Metallurgical 
                                                
174 7 November 2002. “3Com signs cooperation agreement with Arab International Optronics.” (Press 
release). www.ameinfo.com/11669.html - United Arab Emirates. 
175 http://www.almona.net/docs/index.html. Also see report compiled by US Department of State, 
Counselor for Commercial Affairs. Hammam Nasr.  1998. “Defense Trade Opportunities in Egypt – 
International Market Insight.”  
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Industries, etc.  Although these holding companies technically fall under the authority of 
the Ministry of Investment, The Holding Company for Maritime & Land Transport – 
which controls the country’s ports, container terminals, and shipbuilding companies – 
does not.  Two of the holding company’s three executive board members are Naval 
Admirals, as is the company’s president.176 Many of the constituent companies are also 
managed by military officials, including the Alexandria Shipyard,177 General Egyptian 
Warehouses Company,178 The Alexandria Container & Cargo Handling Company, which 
was founded by officers who formerly worked at the Alexandria Port Authority, which 
has been accused of monopolization of infrastructure and various other practices;179 the 
Egyptian Marine Supply & Contracting Company; Suez Mechanical Stevedoring;180 
Damietta Container & Cargo Handling Company;181 Port Said Container & Cargo 
Handling Company;182 the Nile Company for Goods Transport;183 and the National 
Navigation Company.184 Military officials also manage Egypt’s several Port Authorities 
(which have substantial influence over the operations of maritime transport firms – both 
public and private), and the military also owns some 52% of the barges shipping goods 
                                                
176 These are Atef Hassan Mohamed Marouni, Mansour El Helbawy, and Mohamed Ahmad Ibrahim 
Youssef.  
177 Admiral Hussein Mohamed Sinara 
178 Admiral Mohamed Zaki (joined Navy in 1972; became CEO in 2006) 
179 Robert Springborg. July/August 1987. “The President and the Field Marshal.” Middle East Report, p8.  
The Chairman of this company is Admiral Ahmed Mansour el Arabi.  
180 Rear Admiral Mounir Saad Abu Samra is Chairman of the Egyptian Marine Supply & Contracting 
Company and Vice-Chairman of Suez Mechanical Stevedoring.  
181 The Chairman is Rear Admiral Mohammed Saad Zaghloul. 
182 The Chairman is Rear Admiral Alaa Al Din Nada.  
183 The Chairman is Admiral Mohamed Khalil.  
184 The Chairman is Vice Admiral Tamer Abdel Alim. 
 297 
along the Nile River.185 The military recently founded a new river transport company 
National Nile for River Transport (known as Nile Cargo),186 which promptly received 
contracts to ship goods from several large state-owned conglomerates, and will benefit 
from a nearly $30 million planned investment in river transport infrastructure from the 
state.187  
 
The actual shipment of defense equipment also offers the opportunity to make substantial 
profit – and the military’s control over significant portions of Egypt’s maritime and 
inland transportation infrastructure ensures that benefits accrue to military balance sheets 
as well as influential officers.  Because the cost to ship the weapons is also financed by 
U.S. military aid (a perk for which few other military aid recipients qualify), there is little 
incentive for the state to impose any conditions to hold down costs, since the shipping 
contracts themselves are a form of patronage for military officers.  One such officer is 
Hussein Kamal Salem, a former military intelligence official who founded the Egyptian-
American Transport & Service Company (EATSCo) in 1979, just in time to benefit from 
the huge influx of U.S. weaponry facilitated by the Camp David Accords.  An 
investigation by the U.S. Government found that EATSCo – which was awarded an 
exclusive contract to arrange shipment for more than $3 billion worth of American 
military goods – submitted bills equal to four times the customary charge for a 
                                                
185 “Egypt: Transport & Logistics.” 25 May 2010. Capital Research, p18. 
186 In 2010, the Ministry of Defense & Military Production issued Decree No. 3 to establish the National 
Nile for River Transport Company. “Egypt: Transport & Logistics.” 25 May 2010. Capital Research, p18. 
187 “NRPMC Inaugurates its River Port in Tanash with Strategic Shipments of Wheat.” (Press release). 23 
February 2010. Zawya.com. 
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comparable shipment.188  Although Salem eventually pled guilty to overcharging the U.S. 
Government and paid a small fee,189 he went on to become a prominent businessman and 
close confidante of President Mubarak, who is now living out his exile in one of the 
many resort properties owned by Salem’s investment company HSK Capital.190  He is 
also on the board of a subsidiary of the influential telecommunications firm Alkan 
Group,191 which is listed in a U.S. State Department document as a consultant for the 
Egyptian military.  Another case is Admiral Mohamed Khalil, the Chairman of Nile 
Company for Goods Transport, an HCMLT subsidiary that provides freight forwarding 
and container services out of Alexandria.  Khalil also owns a much smaller company 
called New Mar Med, which also operates out of Dekheila Port in Alexandria, importing 
life rafts from China [likely aboard Nile Company vessels] and selling them to customers 
at the port.192  Several MMP ventures, such as Abu Kir Engineering Industries, also offer 
transportation and warehousing services for non-military commercial producers,193 and 
                                                
188 Al Kamen and Scott Armstrong. 1 October 1982. “Cost of Transporting Arms to Egypt Probed by 
Justice.” The Washington Post. Two CIA agents were also implicated in the deal as shareholders in 
EATSCo, which was incorporated in Virginia, since the arms contracts stipulated that US firms must be 
used to ship the material.  Both agents insist the deal was okayed by the Pentagon in an effort to solidify 
relations with Egypt by passing on bribes to then-President Sadat, as well as Mubarak.  Also see Joseph J. 
Trento. Chapter 26: The EATSCO Cover Up, p260-70. Prelude to Terror: Edwin P. Wilson and the Legacy 
of America’s Private Intelligence Network. New York: Avalon Publishing.  
189 The USG investigation found $8 million in overcharges, but only $3 million was repaid through the 
firm, and Salem himself was only charged $40,000.  
190 Avni Patel. 1 March 2011. “Where’s Mubarak’s Money? Ask ‘Front Man’ Hussein Salem.” ABC News.   
191 When Alkan Group lost to Orascom in a bid to takeover the state-owned MoboNil, the government 
issued a license for a second mobile phone operator to placate the group’s owners.  Timothy Mitchell. 
December 1999. “No Factories? No Problems: The Logic of Neo-Liberalism in Egypt.” Review of African 
Political Economy. 26(82): 455-468.  
192 http://www.made-in-china.com/traderoom/newmarmed 
193 Zawya Profile. 
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because the military has a large fleet of heavy trucks at its disposal, these operations also 
provide for money-making opportunities.    
 
Defense Offsets in Egypt and Jordan: Hiding in Plain View 
Because Egypt and Jordan rely primarily on foreign aid, loans, preferential credit terms, 
and other subsidies to finance their military procurement, their offset programs have 
often drawn criticism for alleged ‘double-dipping,’ that is getting their equipment for free 
and in turn requesting additional benefits from private firms – including those whose host 
governments are major aid donors.  The clearest evidence of this criticism was a major 
GAO report commissioned by the U.S. Congress in 1993-94 to look into offset programs 
in Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Greece – then the four largest recipients of U.S. military aid, 
and also some of the largest beneficiaries of defense offsets.194  Unfortunately, the years 
covered by the GAO study are also the years in which the U.S. Government collected no 
comprehensive data on defense offsets, since responsibility for data-gathering and 
compiling reports was transferred from the Office of Management & Budget (OMB) in 
the late 1980s, but not taken up by the Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) until 1995.  
However there is some anecdotal material that points to Egypt’s offset history, including 
the transcript of a speech delivered by then-OMB Director John H. Eisenhour to the 
Defense Industry Offset Association’s (DIOA) annual Spring meeting in 1989 which 
states that, “Egypt has also been authorized to use FMS financing for directed offsets.”195   
                                                
194 GAO. 22 June 1994. “Military Exports: Concerns over Offsets Generated with U.S. Foreign Military 
Financing Program Funds” GAO/NSIAD-94-127.   
 
195 “Offsets in Military Exports: US Government Policy.” John H. Eisenhour, Chief, International Security 
Affairs Branch, Office of Management and Budget.  Extract of Remarks presented to the Spring Meeting of 
the Defense Industry Offset Association in Scottsdale, Arizona.  9 May 1989.   
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In response to this criticism, Egypt adapted its offset techniques, and thus never appears 
in the BIS reports, even during the early period when figures were still being reported for 
individual countries.  Despite the fact that co-production (the earliest and still 
quintessential form of offset) is still a major component of Egyptian procurement, DSCA 
announcements on sales to Cairo always include the disclaimer: “There are no known 
offsets involved in this sale.” Since co-production is still technically included in the BIS 
working definition of defense offsets, it is unclear how this statement could be factually 
accurate.196  Periodic USG efforts to restrict the use of offsets in the defense trade – such 
as the creation of the Interagency Offset Steering Committee, which was tasked with 
convening talks with foreign governments on eliminating or reducing offsets – also 
include Egypt as a participant.  It is unclear why Egyptian officials would be invited to 
participate in these talks if there were no offset agreements concluded between U.S. firms 
and the Egyptian military.  Perhaps some Egyptian co-production activities – such as the 
M1A1 tanks – have been grandfathered in, and thus are not subject to U.S. regulations 
banning the provision of offsets in sales involving U.S. military aid funds – however new 
sales continue to be concluded with co-production requirements, including one with the 
U.S. firm United Defense in 2007.   
 
Epicos – an Athens-based business intelligence publication that serves clients in the 
offset industry – reports that due to political pressure the Egyptian military demands 
                                                
196 Announcement of talks appeared in Federal Register: http://fedgovcontracts.com/pe00-83.htm. A lawyer 
for General Dynamics (one of the largest US defense firms) also noted the legal inconsistencies implied by 
this statement in a 2011 article published in the Public Contract Law Journal, in which the author states, 
“This language [“there are no known offsets”] seems to imply that the U.S. Government, as the broker for 
the FMS case, has special insight into the transaction and is almost certifying that there are, in fact, no 
offsets.  Nothing could be further from the truth…[O]ffset discussions take place outside of government 
earshot…[A]nd the U.S. Government supposedly remains blissfully ignorant of their [offsets] existence.” 
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informal “concessions” and “discounts” in lieu of formal offset programs.197 Blenheim 
Capital – another offset consultancy firm – advised an audience at the 2009 Abu Dhabi 
International Offset Conference (ADIOC) that Egypt’s “increasing focus on industrial 
participation [offsets] as a competitive discriminator requires participating contractors to 
identify local beneficiaries.”198  However, the nature of these concessions is doubly 
opaque, because there is a complete information blackout on the side of the Egyptian 
government.  Ironically, the political sensitivities over Egyptian offsets – and the 
subsequent decision by U.S. policy makers to remove the American government from the 
equation – left the practice of offset provision largely in place, but transferred 
responsibility for the negotiation and implementation to Egyptian military officials and 
executives from U.S. defense firms.   
 
In fact, the 1994 GAO report referenced above appears to be the last serious official 
inquiry into the use of offsets in Egypt.  It states that “brokers” and “independent 
contractors” were employed by U.S. contractors to fulfill their offset obligations – which 
sounds significantly like the “fixers,” “agents” and “intermediaries” that have historically 
permeated the region’s arms trade.199 The result was that official channels disappeared, 
while relationships between individual Egyptian officers, their agents, and American 
executives became more important – and the Egyptian military became more 
                                                
197 “Core country offset reports: Egypt.” February 2009, Epicos.com (accessed 30 June 2009).  According 
to the GAO, “concessions” are “commercial compensation practices whereby capabilities and items are 
given free of charge to the procuring country.”  However, it is unclear if Epicos is using the term in the 
same sense as the GAO, since the term “concession” has a broad meaning in general usage.    
198 “Offsets in North Africa: Update of Activities.” Blenheim Capital Partners.  Report presented at the 
2009 Abu Dhabi International Offset Conference.   
199 GAO Report. 22 June 1994.  “Military Exports: Concerns Over Offsets Generated With U.S. Foreign 
Military Financing Program Funds.” GAO/NSIAD-94-127, p19.  
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economically independent.  The fact that the Egyptian army ultimately withheld its 
support for Mubarak during the recent uprisings may have been a reflection of this 
independence, since Egyptian military officials perceived (rightly or wrongly) that their 
commercial ties with U.S. defense firms had become independent of Mubarak’s 
presidency.  Judging by the continued flow of military equipment to Egypt – they may 
indeed have been correct.200  
 
Likewise, Jordan has also never appeared in a U.S. Government report on defense offsets, 
although this could be due to the fact that the BIS stopped reporting individual country 
figures around the same time that Jordan instituted its requirement that foreign sellers 
enter into joint ventures with KADDB.201 Although Jordanian officials claim that Jordan 
has no formal offset policy, they are careful to insist that they reap the benefits of the 
practice.  In an interview with the editor of the Countertrade and Offset Newsletter, an 
industry trade publication, the CEO of KADDB said:  
We encourage that whenever we do an important procurement part of it is 
manufactured in Jordan as much as possible.  Although it is not technically 
described as an offset, it is something that we would like to do because we would 
like to create jobs for our people. [my italics] 
 
Likewise, spokespersons for the foreign firms entering into joint venture partnerships 
with KADDB make it clear that access to the Jordanian market is dependent on co-
production.  The CEO of RiverHawk – the U.S. shipbuilding company co-producing 
                                                
 
200 See for example, a report on Egypt produced by the U.S. Department of Commerce, subtitled “Getting 
Back to Business,” which cites the “booming” import in security-related products in Egypt. Margaret 
Keshishian. “Egypt: Export Opportunities in the Security & Defense Sectors.” U.S. Dept of Commerce. 
Presentation slides from US Embassy in Cairo: Commercial Section. 2011. 
 
201 Joint ventures are also defined as a form of offset by U.S. Government agencies, including the BIS and 
the GAO.  
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patrol vessels with KADDB – stated that the joint partnership would enable RiverHawk 
to “exchange know-how with the Bureau” and market the vessels to both the Jordan 
Armed Forces and other militaries in the region.202 This is echoed by the country report 
produced by Epicos (the industry trade publication referred to above) which states that 
KADDB’s strategy is to form “limited liability joint venture operations – often enough in 
the context of unofficial offset requirements.” So, despite the economic pitfalls inherent 
in granting offsets in military contracts, it appears that the coordinated response of actors 
on all sides has been to tailor terminology and cutback on information-gathering rather 
than fundamentally reform the system. Tellingly, both states also deploy representatives 
to regional offset conferences – usually sponsored jointly by a consortium of defense 
producers, offset brokers and regional governments – but stop short of characterizing 
their own supplemental procurement activities as “offsets.” Defense offsets in Egypt and 
Jordan are also obscured in another way – primarily in terms of their budgetary impact. 
Part of the appeal of defense offsets as a form of domestic subsidy to militaries rests on 
the perception that they are ‘self-financing’ because the foreign partner is fronting the 
capital for the production activities.  Media reports help perpetuate this myth, as do 
statements issued by members of the indigenous military elite in procuring countries.  
 
The Intensification of Offset Activity and Military Production in Egypt  
Jordan’s defense industrial efforts are clearly intensifying, since a mere decade ago 
Amman had no military-industrial capacity at all, and the entry of private sector actors 
further suggests there are increasing opportunities available in that sector.  In contrast, 
                                                
202 “KADDB signs an agreement of joint venture with RiverHawk WorldWide LLC.” (press release). 18 
May 2009. http://www.ameinfo.com/196943.html 
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Egypt’s military-industrial production appears to be enjoying a revival under the current 
system of offset-driven incentives after leveling off somewhat during the late 1990s.  In 
addition to the Chinese and Pakistani co-production projects referenced above, there is 
evidence that the Egyptian military is intensifying its co-production and supply avenues 
to enhance its own defense production capacity.  This includes reports from the US 
Embassy in Cairo in 2010 that TPT (third party transfer) requests from the Egyptian 
Armament Authority had increased considerably, signaling an expansion in Egypt’s 
efforts to export weapons that contained technology of US-origin, including sales of 
M1A1 tanks to Iraq and ammunition to Saudi Arabia, as well as providing technical 
support for Turkey’s arsenal of Hawk Missiles.203 Egyptian military officials have also 
recently requested permission to give tours of the tank factory (where M1A1s are 
produced) to officials from Iraq and tours of other military-production facilities to 
Tunisian defense officials.204   
 
In 2008, the Pentagon announced that the American firm Swiftships (a subsidiary of 
Halter Marine) had signed a $13 million contract to sell four 28-metre patrol craft to 
Egypt, but in February 2011 the contract was modified to allow for an Egyptian shipyard 
to “assemble” two of the patrol craft and “co-produce” the other two – at an increased 
cost of $20 million.205  The same year Egypt signed a similar agreement with the Turkish 
                                                
203 Embassy Cairo. 28 February 2010. “TPT Blanket Approval for Non-technology Transfer Requests.”  
204 Embassy Cairo.  17 June 2009. “Egypt responds positively to End-Use Training.”  
205 According to the Pentagon announcement, the contract includes “two co-assembly kits and two co-
production kits to support the construction of the four 28-meter CPCs [coastal patrol crafts]. These kits, 
consisting of all material necessary for construction, will be shipped to Alexandria, Egypt, for construction 
by an Egyptian workforce, with oversight by Swiftships. US Department of Defense; issued 10 February 
2011. 
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company Yonca-Onuk JV to manufacture six Onuk MRTP-20 fast-intervention crafts 
“with technology transfer” at the military-owned Alexandria Shipyard.206 Industry trade 
publications have also reported that Northrop Grumman is in talks with the Egyptian 
Military to set up domestic facilities to replace the engines and navigation equipment in 
the country’s fleet of UAVs.207  The Egyptian Military branches also frequently supply 
GFP (Government Furnished Property) for certain weapons systems, such as the 
cryptographic, IFF (identification friend or foe technology), and refueling equipment the 
Egyptian Navy provided when it acquired several FAC (fast-attack craft) from Lockheed 
Martin in the early 2000s.208  
 
In 2003, an executive at AOI claimed that his organization’s diversification strategy and a 
jump in demand had allowed them to overcome the limitations imposed by the 
withdrawal of Gulf State financing in the early 1980s.   He also suggested that leaders in 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE should consider re-applying for membership, since 
AOI’s leaders always insisted the body would remain open for Egypt’s “Arab 
brothers.”209 These efforts suggest that we may see a further expansion in related 
commercial production in military factories as well – as was the case with the new 
Chrysler commercial co-production program and the Chinese air-conditioning assembly 
facility mentioned above. 
                                                
206 Ipek Yezdani. 19 September 2011. “Egypt eyes to buy Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles.” Hurriyet 
Daily News (Turkey).  
207 Peter La Franchi. 5 July 2007. “Egypt resumes Scarab UAV upgrade talks.” FlightGlobal. Egypt was 
actually one of the first countries in the region to employ UAVs; Teledyne Ryan developed the Model 324 
Scarab for sale to Egypt in the early 1980s, when Egypt also acquired a number of BAE’s SkyEye UAVs. 
208 http://www.amiinter.com/samples/egypt/EG1401.html 
209 “Egyptian defence giant invites former partners.” 18 March 2003. Asia Africa Intelligence Wire.  
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Defense Offsets as Innovation in Patronage Politics 
It is the argument of this project that defense offsets represent attempts by incumbent 
political elites to upgrade their patronage practices in order to take advantage of new 
opportunities (here, made possible by the region’s booming arms trade) and adapt to 
prevailing conditions that shape the opportunities available to these regimes.  Just as 
defense offsets in the Gulf mirror earlier forms of patronage, so do offsets in Egypt and 
Jordan build upon the system of privileges already available to the military: large 
equipment budgets, substantial negotiating leverage, sizeable subsidy programs, control 
of valuable assets like transportation infrastructure, raw materials, land, and labor, as well 
as the housing, education and pension programs they continue to enjoy even as the rest of 
the welfare state shrinks under the pressure of economic restructuring. Because regime 
authority in many Arab States is predicated on their allocation of economic privileges, 
ruling elites are compelled to generate resources that can be distributed to important 
constituencies.210 Defense offsets are one of these resources, and part of a comprehensive 
strategy designed to tap new sources of privilege that emerge from the economic 
exchanges that now dominate regional trade.   
 
Regional leaders have responded similarly to previous macro-shifts in regional political 
and economic realities that either obstructed access to existing sources of patronage or 
demonstrated the potential of new ones.  In the past, switching superpower allegiances 
was one method of attenuating such challenges.  In 1950s Jordan for example, growing 
political unrest over corruption led the British to demand political reform in exchange for 
                                                
210 Henry, Clement and Richard Springborg.  2001. Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East.  Cambridge University Press, p11. 
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continued aid.211  But instead of dismantling these aid-financed patronage institutions – 
which formed the very foundations of political support for the monarchy – King Hussein 
orchestrated even more unrest by firing his leftist prime minister and imposing martial 
law, quickly convincing the Americans that a substantial (and unconditional) aid package 
was necessary to counter the growing threat of Pan-Arab socialism.212  Similarly, 
President Sadat distanced his government from his erstwhile Soviet patrons by pursuing a 
rapprochement with the Americans, which ultimately supplied him with the economic aid 
he needed to lavish the military with new weapons,213 provide the politically powerful 
officer corps with privileged access to business opportunities in the nascent private sector 
economy, and renew many of the domestic subsidies that had prevailed under his 
predecessor.214  The Gulf States have demonstrated an analogous capability to adapt their 
distributional arrangements, primarily by expanding state patronage to incorporate groups 
of modernizing business elites and technocratic-minded civil servants in order to cultivate 
a buffer of support against anti-regime sentiment from radical Islamists, while also 
maintaining the system of privileges that binds the traditional merchant elites to their 
respective ruling families.   
                                                
211 Moore and Peters. “Beyond Boom and Bust,” p268.  
212 Peters argues that these same corrupt institutions persist today alongside parallel institutions financed 
largely by U.S. aid – the present-day legacy of the original aid package rushed through by President 
Eisenhower in 1957.  These donor-sponsored institutions provide public and social services to the 
Jordanian people, while the institutions administered by the regime operate as employment mills for key 
political constituencies.  
213 This new weaponry was especially significant because denials and delays in arms deliveries by the 
Soviets were widely blamed for Egypt’s abysmal performance in the 1967 war with Israel, when the 
equipment only arrived after the fighting was over.  See Keith Krause. September 1991. “Military 
Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships.” International 
Studies Quarterly. 35(3): P318-9.  
214 Marvin Weinbaum. April 1985. “Egypt’s ‘Infitah’ and the Politics of U.S. Economic Assistance.” 
Middle Eastern Studies. 21(2): 206-222.  
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Similar political and economic shifts continue to confront regional rulers, who realize 
they must innovate and update their patronage-distribution activities to conform to these 
new demands and capitalize on their niche positions (as oil exporters, important 
geostrategic allies, aid recipients, and major defense customers) in the global economy. 
Because defense goods and services account for an increasingly large proportion of 
regional trade, it is a convenient (and abundant) channel for the transfer of patronage.  
Between 2001 and 2008 the value of U.S. arms transfer agreements with the Middle East 
was equal to 25% of all U.S. goods and services exported to the region.215   The total 
stock of U.S. FDI in the Middle East as of 2004 was $28 billion (1.4% of global U.S. 
FDI).  A very conservative estimate of U.S. offsets as of 2004 is about $5.1 billion,216 
meaning offsets during that period accounted for 18% of all U.S. investment in the 
region, most of which is concentrated in holding companies and other investment 
vehicles operated by a small number of prominent families217 or in the oil and gas 
sector.218 
 
The course of economic liberalization in the region has also fundamentally altered both 
the composition of available patronage sources and the socioeconomic character of those 
                                                
215 According to the “Survey of Current Business” published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. exports of goods and services during the period 2001-2008 were equal 
to $235 billion.  During that same period, the Congressional Research Service reported arms transfer 
agreements between the U.S. and Middle East governments amounting to $59 billion.  “Conventional Arms 
Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2008.” p14. 
216 Figure from U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security annual offset report.  
217 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Financial Outflows Without Current Cost Adjustment, 2009. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. “International Economic Accounts: U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data. 
http://www.bea.gov/international/ 
218 “Middle East Free Trade Area: Progress Report.” July 3, 2006. Congressional Research Service. p6.  
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groups the regimes target for distribution.  The traditional realms of state largesse – such 
as employment in the bureaucracy – are no longer compatible with the strictures of the 
global economy (or the demands of the international institutions that shape it). Instead, 
rulers look toward arenas such as the international arms trade to supply rents.  The 
increasing prevalence of offset-generated joint ventures between domestic businessmen 
and defense firms are an excellent example, as are the partnerships that defense firms 
create with state-owned companies, which although nominally public entities, 
nonetheless become part of a private-public sector partnership, a favorite concept of 
development theorists and proponents of liberal reform.  
 
By granting privileged access to the mechanisms of commerce, these regimes can supply 
patronage while also (by all appearances) adhering to the dictates of economic 
liberalism.219  Likewise, the peasants, bureaucrats and urban poor that were the recipients 
of state oblations in the immediate post-independence period have been abandoned in 
favor of a more narrow pact that favors the military – including individual elite officers 
with extensive business interests of their own as well as the larger collective institution.  
These groups – the ‘winners’ able to exploit changes in regional economic policy – are 
now the elites that regional regimes must rely on for support.  The emphasis on 
                                                
219 It is interesting to note that, although directing offset-generated investment to domestic merchants and/or 
military producers does not violate liberal economic standards according to the behavior of the procuring 
state – since the investment is portrayed as a type of FDI that goes to the most viable sector in the domestic 
economy – the practice of granting offsets is certainly a violation of free-market principles according to the 
behavior of the exporting firm, since it is the differential/particularized investment that determines the 
competitiveness of the firms’ bids – not the quality or price of their products.  This double-standard: that 
the advanced industrial democracies should be able to subsidize their exports and engage in other non-
competitive activities, while the developing countries should stick to the principles of liberal economics, is 
present in nearly all sectors of the global economy, but remains most entrenched in the global arms trade, 
where sales and negotiations are exempted from global trade regimes.  
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transparency and good governance also means that the traditional methods of privileging 
loyal elites, such as “sweetheart loans,” no-bid government contracts and the sale of 
public land or state-owned factories for nominal fees, are highly contentious and 
increasingly visible – even poor peasants identify anecdotal cases of cronyism and 
associate these with their dire living conditions, as do opposition activists, small-business 
owners, the IMF and World Bank and countless local NGOs.220 This contributes to the 
utility of defense offsets, which are not only obscure, but also easier to characterize as 
either apolitical private sector investment or efforts to enhance military self-reliance.  
And the perks that accompany offsets – low interest loans, etc. – are justified on the basis 
that they are achieved through financing provided by foreign firms or that the 
manufactured output contributes to much-needed export earnings. 
 
Defense offsets may also factor into regime evaluations regarding internal security, since 
they provide access to sensitive technologies and weapons that can be used to repress 
internal opposition – even if exports of particular weapons systems cease, the facilities 
and capabilities transferred under offset programs remain.  Despite the existence of legal 
controls, contractors are routinely convicted of violations of laws governing exports.  In 
all, out of 18 coproduction programs examined by the GAO in 1989, five involved 
unauthorized technology transfer, and according to the authors of the report, “with few 
exceptions, no coproduction programs were directly monitored to ensure compliance with 
MOUs either by the responsible military services or by government personnel overseas.” 
Data on offset programs that include co-production of weapons systems is collected by 
                                                
220 “A Special Report on Egypt: No Paradise.” The Economist. 15 July 2010.  
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the Department of Defense’s Office of Foreign Contracting – and that data is, by GAO 
accounts, neither credible nor useful.221  A 1989 report by the GAO indicated that: 
DOD, State and other US government agencies do not directly manage or monitor 
coproduction programs to ensure compliance with agreement restrictions on 
production quantities and third-country sales. 
 
Another GAO report, referenced in the testimony of William R. Hawkins, Senior Fellow 
at the U.S. Business and Industry Council, states:  
The Office [of Foreign Contracting] has no mechanism for ensuring that 
contractors provide required foreign subcontract information, which contributes to 
the underrepresentation of foreign subcontract activity. Our review of selected 
subcontracts disclosed instances in which foreign subcontracts were not reported 
to the Office because contractors were unaware of the reporting requirement or 
misunderstood the criteria for reporting a foreign subcontract. The Office’s poor 
database management also compromises the credibility and usefulness of its 
foreign subcontract data.222 
 
It is likely that many of these same problems continue, and will be exacerbated as offset 
activity intensifies.  This could prove a significant problem in the Middle East, where 
companies working with US prime contractors have been convicted in US federal courts 
of exporting controlled items and technologies to regimes that routinely violate norms of 
human rights, including Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria.  Although Egypt and Jordan are 
comparatively more benign authoritarian states, the increased access they gain to 
                                                
221 For instance, the BIS report lists some countries in the Middle East that require offsets even though it 
does not provide relevant figures; but it also completely leaves out other countries that routinely require 
offsets, such as Jordan and Oman.  Testimony of William R. Hawkins, Senior Fellow, U.S. Business and 
Industry Council.  13 July 2007. “U.S.-China Commission Hearing on China’s Proliferation and the Impact 
of Trade Policy on Defense Industries in the United States and China.” Hawkins sites a GAO report that 
states, “The Office [of Foreign Contracting] has no mechanism for ensuring that contractors provide 
required foreign subcontract information, which contributes to the underrepresentation of foreign 
subcontract activity. Our review of selected subcontracts disclosed instances in which foreign subcontracts 
were not reported to the Office because contractors were unaware of the reporting requirement or 
misunderstood the criteria for reporting a foreign subcontract. The Office’s poor database management also 
compromises the credibility and usefulness of its foreign subcontract data.” 
222 Testimony of William R. Hawkins, Senior Fellow, U.S. Business and Industry Council. 13 July 2007. 
“U.S.-China Commission Hearing on China’s Proliferation and the Impact of Trade Policy on Defense 
Industries in the United States and China.”  
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sensitive technologies under coproduction arrangements will only enhance their ability to 
repress opposition, adding an enhanced coercive capacity to the existing structures of 
economic patronage that contribute to regime resilience.   
 
The next and final chapter of this project will reiterate some of the general conclusions of 
this research project and address some of its limitations. It will also explore how offset 
activity might inform our understanding of the current domestic uprisings, especially in 
the case of Egypt, as well as how a shift in defense offset activity in the Gulf may be a 
reflection of the rising political profile of regional militaries.  Because defense offsets 
have clear beneficiaries in all of the cases examined here, they provide a useful avenue 
for gauging the relative power of domestic constituencies, as well as the methods that 
regimes are likely to employ in order to maintain the support of critical groups during 
periods of intensified conflict (and enhance the distribution of patronage to groups that 
are increasing their levels of political influence).  The chapter will conclude by 
introducing some material on the defense offset activities of other developing countries to 
provide some comparative insights and draw out some of the unique features that 
characterize this form of patronage in the Arab World, before addressing some potential 
areas of future research.  
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Chapter 5: Loose Ends & Looking Forward 
 
This final chapter will address a number of issues.  First, I will briefly note what I believe 
are the limitations of the project and reiterate what added-value the project represents.  
Second, I will provide some broader context by explaining how defense offsets fit into 
larger trends in the global economy, including the globalization of military production, 
recent trends in financial innovation, and evolving norms regarding corruption and 
bribery in the defense trade.  I will also make some broad comparisons of defense offset 
programs in other countries, and address an emergent trend in Gulf State defense offset 
policy that suggests a renewed interest in indigenous arms production.  Lastly, in light of 
the dramatic changes seen in Egypt since the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, I 
will address some of the most recent collaborative military production activities in Egypt 
and outline what this may say about the shifting political role of the Egyptian Military.    
 
What this Project Does (and Does Not) Attempt to Accomplish 
The goals of this project have been threefold.  First, to explore and document a 
phenomenon that has not received critical scholarly attention; second, to incorporate this 
material into the general theoretical literature on Middle East Political Economy, 
specifically that which deals with the distributive state and the fiscal sociology approach.  
The third aim of this project has been to examine how defense offsets have been 
integrated into the patronage systems of regimes where clientelism and the discriminatory 
allocation of economic privileges comprises an important aspect of regime maintenance 
strategies.  With respect to this third goal, my intent has been to shed light on the 
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multiplicity of channels available to regimes seeking to secure the loyalty of domestic 
elites through the transfer of concrete economic privileges.   
 
My intent has not been to produce some quantifiable measure of regime loyalty secured 
through the provision of defense offsets in relation to other sources of patronage. To 
develop such a measure would demand a number of dubious theoretical and empirical 
assumptions.  For one thing, the internal calculus whereby these domestic elites ‘decide’ 
to grant their loyalty to the ruling regime is a complex one that is difficult (if not 
impossible) to observe, which leaves us to infer loyalty from their observed behavior 
(mainly their acquiescence or active support of regime authority).  In reality, this loyalty 
derives from a complex and heterogeneous blend of material interests, socialization, fear 
of repression, inertia, and a number of other factors that are both unique to individuals 
and non-static. Measuring the relative weight of offset-related benefits in the decision 
calculus of domestic elites would require that we develop a measure of the patronage 
value each elite actor or elite institution has received from the regime (expressed in dollar 
values or some other convertible unit) and attempt to discern some threshold of patronage 
that ensures loyalty to the incumbent regime.  Such an exercise is not only beyond the 
scope of this project, but also I believe, beyond the ability of scientists to develop.   
 
Second, although I have made every effort to evaluate the available numerical data on 
offsets and present the shortcomings inherent in the accuracy of these figures, they should 
not be used to gauge the relative weight of defense offsets compared with other sources 
of patronage (such as foreign aid or mineral rents) in order to determine which sources 
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are the most influential.  Both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 highlight some of the methods 
used by defense firms, offset brokers, and governments to inflate or minimize values 
associated with defense offsets, which makes the values too unreliable (and the biases too 
unpredictable) to be used in statistical analysis.  Third, operationalizing the concepts and 
processes examined in the previous chapters in order to undertake an analysis that would 
yield some numerical value of the variance in patronage attributable to defense offsets 
would require a modularization of these concepts and processes in order to compare 
quantitatively across cases.  I do not believe that such modularization would accurately 
reflect the behavior of these concepts and processes in practice, which is why this project 
has focused on qualitative comparisons.  
 
Although I do hope that this project represents a meaningful addition to scholarly 
understanding of patronage structures in the Middle East, it is also my hope that by 
elucidating the role of Western interests we can develop a more critical understanding of 
the functioning of the rentier state, specifically how beneficiaries on both sides of the 
defense offset system (and indeed, the systems of global oil markets and foreign aid as 
well) have shaped the exchange in order to derive particularistic benefits and ensure the 
growth and expansion of the exchange itself.   
 
Defense Offsets in the Context of the Global Economy 
 
Defense offsets are not only important indicators of change in the global arms trade.  
They also reflect deeper structural transformations, including the globalization of 
production, the ‘financialization’ of the global economy, and the evolving nature of 
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foreign direct investment – three important areas of global economic exchange that will 
be examined here.  As I hope to demonstrate below, concentrating our focus on one 
particular type of transaction (here, defense offsets) reveals a great deal about the 
contemporary workings of the global economy and how it impacts discrete economic 
actors, including political incumbents and their influential domestic allies.  
 
Defense Offsets and the Globalization of Military Production 
 
William I. Robinson and other critical political economists have suggested that the 
emergent globalization of production has fundamentally altered the world economy.  
Theorists of the globalization of production argue this new phase has resulted in a 
transnational division of labor and capital accumulation that no longer adheres to our 
conventional understanding of core economies engaged in complex manufacturing and 
service provision and peripheral economies supplying raw materials and simple inputs.  
Instead, contemporary economic relations are defined by a new hierarchy in which 
transnational corporations operate above state boundaries in a system of globalized 
production.   
 
The clearest examples of this phenomenon in the defense industry are systems like the 
JSF-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) and the ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) – both of 
which are collaborative projects with research and development (R&D), manufacturing, 
and testing facilities spread out across multiple countries.  Although these weapons were 
conceived as collaborative projects from the beginning, most of the defense systems 
currently assembled in multiple locations (often quite far from one-another) have evolved 
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over time into collaborative production projects.  The fact that new systems are being 
developed as joint projects from the outset (rather than slowly incorporating alternative 
sites for production) suggests that the trend of globalized production will intensify. The 
concept of globalized production provides a useful framework for understanding the 
phenomenon of offset-driven investment in commercial and defense enterprises in the 
Middle East. 
 
A number of trends have transformed defense firms into transnational entities 
increasingly independent from their original host states.  These include the practice of 
licensing production in overseas factories, building additional production facilities with 
domestic firms in major purchasing states, and forming strategic partnerships in order to 
qualify as a local producer or secure additional political support for the development of 
new weapons platforms.1 One good example of a joint venture created to allow a major 
foreign firm to qualify as a local producer is that of Emiraje.  Emiraje is a joint venture 
created in 2009 by the European defense consortium EADS and Emirates Advanced 
Investments, a company owned by a retired Emirati colonel.2  Despite Emiraje’s 
relatively short pedigree, it was awarded a $550 million C4I contract (command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence) from the UAE Government in early 2011.  
                                                
1 Cases of collaboration are increasingly common.  Some strategic partnerships include: Lockheed and 
Rafale (France); Northrop Grumman and Rafale; Northrop Grumman and EADS (EADS is a consortium of 
defense producers in France, Germany and Spain); Boeing and Alenia Marconi (Marconi was itself a 50/50 
JV between the UK’s BAE and Italy’s Finnmecanica); BAE and Saab (Sweden); Finnmecanica and Thales; 
and Finnmecanica and Raytheon.  See Mark A. Lorell, Julia Lowell, Richard M. Moore, Victoria 
Greenfield, and Katia Vlachos. 2002. “Going Global? U.S. Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace 
Industry.” Santa Monica, California: RAND. (report prepared for the United States Air Force).  
 
2 At least two of EAI’s subsidiaries are joint ventures with International Golden Group/IGG, another firm 
owned by a retired Emirati military official.  The state-owned (and offset-funded) Tawazun investment 
fund is a major shareholder in IGG, and so is also indirectly supporting EAI. 
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This was the largest contract signed with any company at Abu Dhabi’s annual 
international defense exhibition (IDEX).  In addition to Emiraje’s questionable capacity 
(given its brief existence) other evidence also suggests it is essentially a shell company 
designed to qualify EADS as a local vendor and provide its Emirati ‘owner’ with another 
income stream.  These include Emiraje’s efforts to recruit staff, which are all conducted 
by EADS’ through the latter’s website.3 Despite efforts to portray the formation of these 
companies as movements toward “Emiratization,” the management personnel of Emiraje 
(and most offset-related ventures) are primarily foreigners with long histories of working 
for Western defense contractors. 
 
As transnational entities, large defense firms actively disperse the supply chains, research 
facilities, and service depots that support their products. These processes not only transfer 
skilled Western technicians and financial managers into new joint venture divisions 
abroad, but also integrate domestic subcontractors and suppliers in the Arab World and 
elsewhere into the global system of military production.  The erstwhile “host states” of 
these firms (mostly the U.S. and Europe, but also many of the so-called emerging 
economies) have less and less control over their overseas defense production and research 
activities. Under-regulation of the global financial markets has also contributed to the 
geographical dispersion of these firms by facilitating their use of foreign sales 
corporations and offshore banking hubs. The growth of subsidiaries, foreign sales 
corporations, and joint ventures have made these firms truly transnational entities that are 
                                                
3 EAI has several subsidiaries that appear to exist for the sole purpose of providing international firms with 
a domestic agent.  Including Global Aerospace Logistics, which signed similar agreements with Honeywell 
Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, and Eurocopter in 2011, as well as GECI International (of France) in 2009. 
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increasingly independent of their original host states and the complex web of 
international trade and financial regulations meant to govern the global economy.  
 
Direct offsets are of course a key driver of the globalization of defense production. The 
resulting spread of military-industrial supply chains, service depots, research facilities, 
overseas distributors, influential shareholders, and collaborative training networks 
generate their own internal momentum by lowering the transaction costs of establishing 
additional overseas operations. As the necessary infrastructure and human capital are put 
in place through offset agreements, the number of overseas facilities equipped to engage 
in the production of defense material increases, which further adds to the momentum for 
direct offsets, and the cycle continues.  
 
This is illustrated by the example of Advanced Systems Integration (ASI), a company set 
up on behalf of the UAE’s offset program by the California-based firm Decision Sciences 
Corporation (DSC), which manufactures equipment used to detect the presence of 
nuclear and other hazardous material in cargo shipments.  Although the technology 
(known as muon tomography) was developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
which is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, DSC was granted an exclusive 
commercial license to manufacture the detection equipment internationally.4  Executives 
from DSC were promptly dispatched to Abu Dhabi (a major transit point for international 
cargo, and therefore a key market for the new technology) to set up a new outpost, which 
is now headed by Khalfan Al Shamsi, whose family is also involved in an offset venture 
                                                
4 This is according to a press release posted on DSC’s website. “Lab grants DSC exclusive commercial 
license for Muon Tomography.” 7 October 2008. http://www.decisionsciencescorp.com/news.aspx.  
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established by the French firm Dassault.5  In addition to landing a $815 million contract 
to provide security for all of Abu Dhabi’s critical infrastructure, ASI is now collaborating 
with the German Research Institute for Artificial Intelligence (a privately-owned non-
profit) on projects related to security robotics, civil security and crisis management.6 It is 
unlikely that ASI would be the chosen partner for such a venture, were it not for the 
firm’s previous good fortune in securing a partnership with DSC and a follow-on contract 
with the Emirati government. 
 
The globalization of military production has also been catalyzed by the persistent growth 
of state investment in arms development and production. Non-military manufacturing, in 
contrast, has contracted alongside global consumption, which has been reduced by the 
downward pressure on wages and ongoing reductions in state social spending.  This is 
reflected in a global shift away from indirect offsets in favor of direct offsets.  In the 
1980s and early 1990s, indirect offsets grew in popularity, accounting for an increasingly 
large share of offset activity.  This was driven in part by developing countries, which 
used indirect offsets to minimize the negative impact of defense expenditures on their 
current account balance sheets.  The promised flow of offset investment (much of which 
we now know never materialized) allowed these countries to inflate the asset side of their 
budgets, partially masking the cost of defense expenditures.  The intensification of the 
global economic downturn and the concomitant reduction in lending to commercial 
                                                
5 This is the International Fish Farming Company/ASMAK (an offset from the French defense firm 
Dassault) of which Hamad Khalfan Al Shamsi is a director.   
 
6 For information on the project with the German Research Institute see “Advanced Integrated Systems, 
German Research Institute for Artificial Intelligence announce strategic partnership.” 7 March 2010. Press 
release (available at AMEinfo.org). 
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economic ventures has simultaneously strengthened the relative financial position of 
defense manufacturers – which benefit from investor perceptions that governments will 
continue to subsidize arms production.  In short: military manufacturing can grow 
because state spending on defense is resilient, and defense manufacturers can relocate 
portions of their business activities overseas to take advantage of individual states’ 
military-industrial subsidies.  The lack of demand for civilian manufactured goods 
(driven by rising income inequality) drives investors toward the military-industrial sector. 
Robinson identifies this problem of surplus absorption as the key driver behind state-
sponsored military spending and the growth of global military industrial complexes – 
which are not subject to either the “race to the bottom” that has eviscerated 
manufacturing in the developed countries, or to the contraction in state budgets that has 
targeted all non-defense forms of state expenditure.7   
  
In this framework, states like Egypt and Jordan become important nodes in the global 
defense industry supply chain because they offer low labor costs, large defense budgets 
(which are also resilient because they are financed by U.S. aid commitments), and 
geographical proximity to large neighboring arms markets.  Although there are clear 
strategic implications involved in outsourcing defense production (the proliferation of 
sensitive technologies, etc.) much of what is produced in states like Egypt and Jordan is 
either utilized domestically, stored in a warehouse, or exported to other developing states.  
This aligns with the interest of defense firms because developing country customers are 
less discriminating than the wealthy Western or Gulf states in terms of the quality of 
                                                
7 William I. Robinson.  2007. “Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational 
State.” Societies Without Borders. 2: p20.  
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weapons systems (and therefore are more likely to purchase weapons produced in states 
like Egypt and Jordan).  Additionally, the proliferation of sensitive technologies – 
whether licit or illicit – contributes to the demand for the development of new more 
advanced weapons systems, and so promotes state sponsorship of industry through the 
provision of research and development funds.  Although collaborative production 
programs are most commonly framed as political imperatives that help cement important 
bilateral alliances, they are also reflections of these globalized relations of production.  
 
The wealthy states of the Gulf provide another set of benefits to defense firms with offset 
commitments, and the increasing diversity of offset projects in the region reflect the 
changing dynamics of the global economy and its productive processes.  Many of the 
earliest offsets functioned similarly to agency agreements, whereby a domestic business 
was established (or an existing business was granted a license) in order to import and 
distribute the goods of a particular foreign firm or engage in some trivial value-added 
manufacturing process that provided them with a new product to market domestically.  
But as financial markets in the Gulf grew more sophisticated, offsets were frequently 
discharged through investments in sovereign wealth funds; interest-rate swaps (as when 
the UAE utilized some of its offset benefits to provide the Jordanian government with a 
preferential interest rate in order to lease a new fleet of planes for the latter’s state-owned 
airline); and investment in private equity firms and hedge funds, which then invest the 
proceeds in a range of domestic and foreign projects.  Most recently, the Gulf’s 
expansion in investment for research & development facilities has made the region an 
attractive destination for defense firms facing reductions in such budgets in the Western 
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capitols. As a result, the GCC countries are also entering the defense industry supply 
chain – albeit at a different point in the production process than states like Egypt and 
Jordan.   
Defense Offsets and Financialization of the Global Economy 
The proliferation of offsets in the defense trade is also related to the growing dominance 
of finance over industrial and agricultural activities in the global economy – what others 
have characterized as the “financialization” of the economy – and the concomitant 
intensification of innovation in financial instruments.8 Although the defense sector has 
fared much better than other forms of manufacturing in the U.S., defense firms draw an 
increasingly large portion of their revenues from financial activities – including offset 
provision – but also other services like structured financing, leasing programs, and 
designing public-private finance partnerships. 9 For example, Boeing Capital 
Corporation – a division of Boeing founded in 2000 – provides all of these services, as 
well as business advice on the start-up of new commercial airlines.  Similarly, BAE has a 
division that markets services like real estate and facilities management; its portfolio 
includes some 1,000 properties (3.4 million square meters of buildings and 9,000 acres of 
land in the UK, the US and Australia) worth more than $1.6 billion.10  Many of BAE’s 
numerous property management contracts involve land remediation of former industrial 
                                                
8 The most straightforward definition I found of the process of financialization is that it occurs when 
“financial services are bolted on to a firm’s activity mix in an attempt to boost return on capital employed 
and wealth accumulation for shareholders.” Tord Andersson, Colin Haslam, Edward Lee, Nick Tsitsianis. 
December 2008. “Financialization Directing Strategy.” Accounting Forum. 32(4); p261. Offset provision 
adheres well to this understanding, since it employs finance professionals (accountants, corporate lawyers, 
offset design firms) to return capital to the defense firm.   
 
9 There is at least one academic study of the financialization of the defense industry.  Unfortunately it is in 
French – which I do not read.  Moura S. (2008). L’Impossible Banalisation de l’Industrie de la Defense.  





sites slated for residential development, including an old cotton mill and a former landfill 
site as well as decommissioned ordnance compounds.11  
Still other firms are diversifying into other non-defense realms where both state spending 
and private capital are expanding, such as healthcare administration.12  Both Lockheed 
Martin and General Dynamics have made major acquisitions of healthcare companies 
and launched their own divisions to market their new healthcare services to the federal 
government and other large organizations. These services provide an additional revenue 
stream to defense manufacturers, which, unlike manufacturing, cannot really be 
outsourced.  The similarity between these non-defense activities and the provision of 
defense offsets is that defense firms are dedicating more staff and resources to both – 
signaling their growing importance relative to traditional manufacturing. This new 
orientation may further catalyze the outsourcing of production and transfers of 
technology via offsets as the influence of business units responsible for manufacturing 
wanes relative to divisions tasked with expanding the firms’ activities in areas like 
finance and healthcare administration.  
 
Defense Offsets as Exotic Financial Instruments  
                                                
11 http://www.baesystems.co.uk/Businesses/SharedServices/Divisions/PropertyandEnvironmental/Contract 
CaseStudies/index.htm.  Munitions sites include factories belonging to Royal Ordnance, which was 
acquired by BAE Systems in 1987. This meant that local governments were essentially paying BAE to 
clean up manufacturing sites that were owned by BAE, some of which were subsequently also developed 
into residential and commercial properties by the defense firm.  In some cases BAE’s activities were 
criticized, such as when the company disposed of contaminated buildings by burning them (a method that 
was prohibited by the U.S. EPA in similar brownfield remediation cases).  Other sites remediated by BAE 
include the Naden Cotton Mill & Rubber Products Factory; Holton Heath National Nature Reserve (site of 
the decommissioned Royal Navy Cordite Factory); Buckshaw Village (site of the Royal Ordnance Factory 
Chorley); Pilling Lane in Chorley (a truck and tank manufacturing site of British Leyland, sold by the UK 
Government to BAE in 1988, and subsequently sold by BAE to the German auto company BMW).  
 
12 Although healthcare service provision is not a financial activity, these defense firms gained access to the 
healthcare industry by acquiring the assets of existing healthcare companies (a financial transaction).     
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Defense offsets should also be viewed in the context of the proliferation of new exotic 
financial instruments.  Similar to transferable tax credits and bundles of collateralized 
debt, offsets can be sold and swapped just like any other financial commodity.  As 
financial institutions and enterprising individuals create formal channels for the 
movement of these commodities, the number of firms and brokers offering offset-related 
services has also ballooned.  As outlined in chapter 2, an entire industry of offset brokers 
has emerged in order to take advantage of (and further extend) the use of offsets in the 
defense trade.  Just as the number of exotic securities on offer from investment banks has 
increased – things like collateralized debt obligations, auction-rate securities, and 
interest-rate swaps – the type of offsets packages on offer have also become increasingly 
diverse and sophisticated.   
 
Firms now market proprietary offset designs to procuring country customers – designing 
structured finance vehicles allowing governments to leverage predicted offset profits to 
finance additional defense purchases (similar to the “deferred-tax assets” that allow 
investment banks to write-off losses using predicted future earnings) or access credit to 
fund infrastructure projects.  The booming market for offset services has relied on the 
same sort of obfuscation and mind-numbing legalese that prevented government 
regulators from managing the proliferation of complex financial instruments.  And this is 
all to the better for defense firms, which have actively resisted government attempts to 
reign in offsets.  In the words of the American author David Foster Wallace, “abstruse 
dullness is actually a much more effective shield than is secrecy.” In the realm of defense 
corruption it is the suitcases full of cash and truckloads of illicit machine guns that 
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capture headlines – but the real money often moves in the fine print of offset agreements 
drafted in the offices of attorneys and accountants drafting offset contracts. 
 
Defense Offsets & Foreign Direct Investment 
Examining defense offsets in the context of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is also 
enlightening.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, FDI in the Middle East is very low compared 
to other regions.  According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the total 
stock of U.S. FDI in the Middle East as of 2010 was $54 billion, which accounts for less 
than 2% of global U.S. FDI.13  For purposes of classification, most governments consider 
defense offsets a subcategory of FDI, and money invested by foreign defense firms 
through the offset process is included in official FDI figures by both sides – that is, the 
arms exporting country and the procuring country.14 Public relations materials produced 
on behalf of regional governments also frequently refer to defense offsets within the 
context of FDI. An article published in the English-language daily ArabNews (which is 
majority-owned by members of the Saudi Royal Family) refers to defense offsets in the 
kingdom as “a special type of FDI.”15  The below excerpt from a publication produced by 
Global Gulf Consulting of Spain on behalf of the Saudi Commission for Tourism and 
Antiquities makes a similar connection: 
                                                
13 Total U.S. FDI in 2010 was $3.9 trillion.  This figure represents U.S. Direct Investment Abroad on a 
Historical-Cost Basis.  I calculated these figures by adding values for Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia 
(which are all categorized as ‘African’ countries for data-gathering purposes) to the BEA’s value for the 
Middle East category, which includes the states of the Gulf and Levant. 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=2&step=1 
 
14 Niblock, p27. 
15 ArabNews is owned by Saudi Research & Marketing Group, which is primarily owned by members of 
the Saudi Royal Family.  
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Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a major challenge for many 
developing countries.  But having the opportunity to make large government 
purchases abroad gives a country quite some leverage in the form of economic 
offset obligations it can impose on its suppliers.  This was the exact line of 
thinking behind KSA’s creation of the Economic Offset Program (EOP) in 
1984.16 
 
However, in contrast to traditional conceptualizations of the developmental impact of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), defense offsets are not assigned through an apolitical 
process characterized by market discipline.  This is made clear in the statements of an 
executive from the Carlyle Group, who spoke to Saudi government officials and 
businessmen at a meeting on the Kingdom’s offset program.  In response to a question 
posed about distributing information throughout the country to alert would-be investors 
to potential opportunities under the offset program, the advisor stated,  
We in Carlyle (Group) are trying to spread our network as best we can…[w]ith 
this kind of program, it does not do much good to put an ad in the paper. This 
kind of program is best developed by the kinds of sessions that we are having 
today, through word of mouth, people who have contact with key players in 
different industries or companies around the country.17 
 
Where defense offsets and FDI do seem to converge is in their impact on wealth 
concentration. Existing research on FDI in the region demonstrates a positive relationship 
between increased FDI inflows and growing income inequality in the Arab world,18 
because FDI transactions are fundamentally governed by political ties to the ruling elite – 
the same ties that determine the domestic partners chosen for offset projects.  Yet both 
                                                
16 FindMe in Saudi Magazine.  The “FindMe” publications are described as a “lifestyle and business 
investment guide.” This annual publication was commissioned by Prince Sultan and produced by the 
Global Gulf Consulting Group of Spain, which has produced similar reports for state entities in Bahrain, 
Qatar, and Jordan. M.A. Ramady. 30 October 2006. “Saudi Offset Program: A Golden Opportunity.” 
ArabNews.  
17 Speech by Frank Carlucci.  “Workshop on the Offset Program: A Launchpad for Joint Ventures.” P14. 
http://www.us-saudi-business.org/p96ws2.htm.  Session held by U.S.-Saudi Business Council.   
 
18 Ali Abdel Gadir Ali.  September 2003.  “Globalization and Inequality in the Arab Region.” Kuwait: Arab 
Planning Institute.  
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types of transactions (FDI and defense offsets) are also routinely used to demonstrate the 
positive investment climate of regional states, and more importantly, the efforts made by 
leaders to manage their respective states’ natural resource endowments and modernize 
and diversify their economies.   
 
Because figures of FDI in the Middle East are so low, the dollars from defense offsets 
possibly account for a significant portion of regional FDI.  If we extrapolate from defense 
offset figures provided by the U.S. Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) for the Middle 
East as of 2005 (the last years figures were made available), and assume that offsets 
increase in a linear fashion, then the value for total U.S. defense offset investment in the 
region as of 2010 is $7.3 billion.19  If we use the BEA data to calculate a 2010 cumulative 
FDI figure for the same states that BIS included in its Middle East category, we get a 
figure of $35.6 billion in U.S.-origin FDI.20 This suggests that as much as 20% of U.S. 
investment in the region is accounted for by defense offset agreements.  Furthermore, 
because we know that the money used to finance defense offsets comes from the 
procuring governments themselves (not the defense firms) the term ‘Foreign Direct 
Investment’ is ultimately a misnomer, since the resources come from the procuring 
state’s central budget.  Understanding defense offsets within the context of global 
economic phenomena such as FDI, the financialization of economic activity, and the 
globalization of production, shows them to be part of a much larger and more complex 
                                                
19 This is an overly simplistic calculation, but is based on a figure of $5.6 billion in offsets from 1993-2006 
(about $430 million/year).  $430 million/year for 2007-2010 = $1.7 billion.  These two figures together 
(5.6+1.7) = $7.3 billion in offsets as of 2010.  
20 The only states that BIS included were Israel, Kuwait, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.  So these are 
the only states that I include for a measure of U.S. FDI in the region.   
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system of global resource flows.21  It also demonstrates just how complex a task it is for 
researchers to divine a comprehensive understanding of how patronage operates, given 
the multitudinous channels through which it can be generated and distributed.   
 
Defense Offsets & Declining U.S. Geostrategic Power 
The declining geostrategic power of the United States is also contributing to the 
globalization of defense production and therefore also the intensification of defense offset 
activity.  Scholars have long noted the erosion of state power vis a vis market actors, but 
this has special implications for the state that is both the largest producer of weapons and 
the single most influential political actor in the international system. While the U.S. 
Government has a strategic interest in maintaining defense industrial capacity by 
restricting the ability of these firms to outsource production, the concerns of the firms’ 
executive leadership are quarterly earnings and short-term performance, not nebulous 
measures of the U.S. manufacturing base.  The fact that U.S. defense firms are 
increasingly forming strategic partnerships with European and non-European defense 
producers suggests that the U.S. Government is less able to constrain the behavior of 
defense firms or sufficiently subsidize their operations – leading them to seek 
partnerships outside their host country.22  
 
                                                
21 Although there is not sufficient space to explore this further, I expect that the arms-petrodollar cycle 
would be the best macroeconomic framework for understanding the genesis and evolution of defense 
offsets in the Middle East.   
22 See Mark A. Lorell, Julia Lowell, Richard M. Moore, Victoria Greenfield, and Katia Vlachos. 2002. 
“Going Global? U.S. Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace Industry.” Santa Monica, California: 
RAND. (report prepared for the United States Air Force). 
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As U.S. influence wanes, so too does the credibility of the security guarantee that has 
traditionally given U.S. arms producers an edge in exports.  This means that many 
foreign leaders are increasingly eager to diversify their weapons suppliers.  In the past, 
Gulf monarchs have hedged their bets by purchasing redundant systems from suppliers in 
Western Europe, Russia and China.  But owing to the globalization of production, 
diversification can now be achieved in other ways.  These include securing supplies from 
producer consortiums, whose member firms can apply pressure on multiple ‘host’ 
governments to approve export contracts. Diversification can also be realized through 
securing spots in the supply chains of individual firms or producer consortia or through 
forming joint ventures, often enough in the context of offset agreements.  
 
Thus, ensuring access to strategic weapons no longer hinges solely on relations with a 
single patron state (ie, the US) – but can be secured through good relations with 
secondary states where components of those weapons are also produced, since these 
states are under pressure to secure the sale on behalf of their own domestic military 
industrial complexes.  Consider a modern fighter jet – which can consist of parts 
manufactured by a dozen large contractors from the US, UK, France, Italy, and 
elsewhere, and each of which have numerous overseas production facilities and 
subsidiaries involved in joint ventures in countries like South Korea, Brazil, India, 
Poland, Turkey, Greece, Israel, South Africa, etc.  A RAND study commissioned by the 
US Air Force in 2002 found that traditional bilateral collaborative agreements were no 
longer viable because “collaboration with one country’s firm increasingly means 
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collaboration with many countries’ firms.”23  The speed with which new technologies are 
added to arsenals of multiple states has dramatically increased in recent years, partly 
because of this globalization of production.  Add to this the illegal proliferation of 
technology and the practice of ‘reverse engineering’ – both frequently preceded by legal 
forms of collaboration that lack sufficient monitoring or oversight – and the ability to 
secure supply becomes less dependent on bilateral political relations. 
 
Offsets in the Middle East and the Region’s Unique Economic Environment 
The Middle East is uniquely well suited as a site for defense industrial expansion for a 
number of reasons, including relatively low-levels of industrialization, high-levels of 
interstate conflict, and limited levels of government transparency and corporate 
accountability.  Limited industrialization has meant that state-subsidized investment in 
defense production more easily crowds out private investment in the production of 
civilian goods, which must compete with state-funded projects for access to the necessary 
infrastructure and skill base.  The active policy of de-industrialization pursued in the Gulf 
by the region’s European and American patrons, which were more interested in securing 
energy supply than in overseeing the diversification and modernization of Gulf 
economies, is partially responsible for this condition.  Likewise, the focus on military-
driven industrialization in Jordan and Egypt also created the conditions for contemporary 
defense industrial expansion.  Not only has regime stability been premised on the loyalty 
of the military, which demanded a large share of public revenues be spent on defense 
procurement and related construction, but American and European interests also 
                                                
23 Mark A. Lorell, Julia Lowell, Richard M. Moore, Victoria Greenfield, and Katia Vlachos. 2002. “Going 
Global? U.S. Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace Industry.” Santa Monica, California: RAND. 
(report prepared for the United States Air Force), pxxii.  
 332 
demanded a predictable political environment and a disciplined system of supply and 
logistics – first during WWII, and subsequently on behalf of global oil markets and other 
regional conflicts to which the U.S. and European countries have been parties.    
 
The increasing tendency for public financing to flow into military-related production is 
visible in several regional cases.  In Jordan, the KADDB has established the region’s first 
special economic zone dedicated solely to military production – complete with significant 
subsidies from the state.  In Egypt, the military is a major, although often undisclosed, 
partner in large public-private sector partnerships in construction, healthcare, wastewater 
management, and renewable energy projects.  The Gulf States appear poised to bypass 
widespread industrialization in favor of becoming a niche location for high-
technology/small-scale defense manufacturing.  This observation is supported by the 
UAE’s focus on providing financing and research facilities to develop next generation 
weapons systems (as it did for Raytheon’s Patriot missile system)24 and simultaneous 
efforts to become a global hub for the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry. Both of 
these efforts receive state funding and other forms of official support. The prevailing 
modes of official economic policy, which focus on the provision of special economic 
zones, export-driven production, and attracting FDI, have been extended to defense 
production in the Middle East, which makes it doubly more difficult for investment in 
civilian production to remain competitive.  
  
                                                
24 The 2008 sale of Patriot missiles to the UAE for $3.8 billion was Raytheon’s first sale of the system 
since 1999, when it was sold to Greece.  Since then, the missile production line had been solely tasked with 
building spare parts and conducting maintenance on existing systems.  The UAE financed a portion of the 
development costs to update the system.  Ivan Gale. 21 July 2010. “Raytheon Looks to Enter UAE Defence 
Market.” The National (UAE).  
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As illustrated in Chapter 4, foreign defense firms have found that setting up shop in 
places like Jordan yields better access to regional markets and expanded sales 
opportunities.  Although similar efforts in Egypt (such as BAE’s attempts to market the 
Egyptian Infantry Fighting Vehicle) have been less successful, evidence of potential 
contracts with the new governments in Iraq and Libya suggest that a base of operations in 
Cairo may well have been a wise investment.  The absence of mechanisms to ensure legal 
accountability and financial transparency have also been attractive inducements for 
defense firms to open up branches in the Gulf – as many have done.25 BAE, Boeing, 
Raytheon, and Thales, four of the world’s largest defense firms, all have divisions in 
Saudi Arabia, and Lockheed Martin has a regional office in the UAE.  Raytheon’s Saudi 
division is one-third owned by the U.S.-based parent company with the remaining 2/3 
shares owned by Prince Khaled Bin Abdullah Bin Abdulrahman Al Saud (brother-in-law 
of the late King Fahd) and Prince Khalid’s longtime friend, the Syrian-born billionaire 
arms broker Wafic Said.26  Said denies allegations that he amassed his fortune through 
commissions paid by Saudi Arabia’s arms suppliers – insisting his earnings came through 
                                                
25 All the largest (first tier) defense contractors have some sort of permanent presence in the region, but 
increasingly smaller firms do as well.  This is a sampling of the smaller defense firms with regional 
branches: Group 4 Securicor (Saudi Arabia, UAE); ARES Corporation (UAE); Erinys (UAE); Rolls Royce 
(UAE); Washington Group International (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq); Johnson Controls (Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Bahrain). Hughes Aircraft also had a division in Saudi Arabia until recently.  
 
26 Said owns 30% of shares through his firm First Saudi Investment Company; Prince Khaled owns 35% of 
shares through Mawarid Holding.  Khaled is married to Princess Jawhara, the favorite sister of Prince 
Sultan, the former Defense Minister. Said and Prince Khalid met in London when Said was operating a 
Kebab restaurant; Said later went on to act as a consultant in many large Saudi arms contracts, including 
the corruption-ridden Al Yamamah contracts, which resulted in several large construction contracts granted 
to firms he owned in Saudi Arabia.  Biography: Wafic Said. David Leigh and Rob Evans. 7 June 2007. The 
Guardian (UK).  
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the allocation of construction and other contracts to his network of firms based in Saudi 
Arabia as a result of various arms deals (that is…through offsets).27     
 
The Middle East is unique because its economic conditions conform to the requirements 
of the historical period of capitalism in which this expansion of defense production is 
occurring – that is, the relatively low levels of regional industrialization and high levels 
of conflict and instability facilitate the intensification of defense production.  The 
prevailing discourse of neoliberal economics does not threaten the spread of defense 
offsets, which are portrayed as either rational responses to global competition in the arms 
industry, or (at worst) unfortunate negative externalities that are intrinsic to trade in the 
defense sector.  Rarely, if ever, are offsets seen as mechanisms for the distribution of 
political patronage or as a sign of the increasing militarization of industrial output.  
 
Although the goal of this project has been to draw out the political and economic 
implications of defense offsets in a limited set of Arab countries, it is also worth noting 
that many of the dynamics present in these cases are not unique.  For example, the 
Egyptian Government subsidizes energy inputs for military-owned factories, but the U.S. 
government engages in identical behavior. Northrop Grumman, which specializes in 
shipbuilding and therefore utilizes a large amount of steel, has a contract with the U.S. 
government that protects the firm from rising steel prices – a privilege that commercial 
shipbuilders in the U.S. do not enjoy. 
                                                
27 Said relayed to another Syrian expat living in London that, in the expat’s words, he was “involved in 
arranging only the nonmilitary, commercial side of the [Al Yamamah] deal – the construction of schools 
and hospitals and that sort of thing.” See “The Saudi Invasion of American Banks.” New York Magazine. 1 
February 1993. P28. The Syrian expat is Ghassan Sakharia/Zakaria, whom the New York Magazine refers 
to as “editor of a gossipy Arab-language magazine that is published in London.” 
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Defense Offsets Beyond the Arab World 
This next section will briefly examine some other country cases to draw out patterns and 
provide a broader context for understanding the domestic political implications of 
procuring country offset policies.  Although most countries have some sort of offset 
policy regarding defense procurement, there are a few notable cases where these 
contracts have garnered significant attention from national governments as well as media 
outlets and defense watchdog organizations.  As I hope I have demonstrated in previous 
chapters, the design of offset policy is intended to benefit domestic groups that are 
politically and economically influential. In Egypt and Jordan this has been the military; in 
the Gulf States, this has primarily been commercial business elites.  As one would expect, 
this relationship appears to hold true outside the Middle East as well.  In Japan for 
instance, the government has adopted a policy that requires offset investment for 
purchases of civilian goods (like rail cars), but the offset goes to support defense 
applications.28  In this case, the major beneficiaries are the large diversified 
conglomerates that dominate the domestic economy, including the so-called “big six” 
(Mitsui, Misubishi, Sumimoto, Fuyo, Sanwa, and DKB) that produce equipment with 
dual-use applications.29 
                                                
28 Although demanding offsets for civilian procurement is technically illegal under WTO regulations (with 
exceptions for some of the least developed countries) clearly many states have found ways around this 
prohibition.  I was not able to find any documentation on how or why the Japanese Government was able to 
do this, but the process is probably similar to what takes place under the U.S. “Buy American” provision, 
which mandates that federal government spending must go to U.S. companies.    
 
29 “Defence Offsets: Addressing the risks of corruption & raising transparency.” Transparency International 
(UK), p9.  For details on the overlap between civilian and defense production in Japanese conglomerates 
see Albert Axelbank. 2011. “Chapter 2: The New Zaibatsu.” Black Star Over Japan: Rising Forces of 




Turkey and Israel are two very instructive cases.  Both built their modern defense 
industries using (mostly) U.S. offsets, and both benefited from offsets while 
simultaneously financing the majority of their procurement with U.S. military aid.  Both 
have developed formidable indigenous defense sectors whose exports now compete 
directly with U.S. manufacturers.30  Since the mid-1980s, when Turkey launched an 
ambitious program to expand its military-industrial base through partnerships with 
foreign firms, external investments in domestic arms production have averaged about 
$300 million per year,31 and offset pledges reached $6.1 billion as of 2007.32  One of 
Turkey’s earliest such projects was the $4.5 billion Peace Onyx program of 1983, which 
financed the transfer of technology and manufacturing equipment for the F-16 from 
Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics and resulted in the formation of Turkish 
Aerospace Industries, in which U.S. firms were significant shareholders.33 A subsequent 
local offset venture set up by Sikorsky (a subsidiary of United Technologies) to 
manufacture tail rotor drive shafts for helicopters eventually became the sole source of 
                                                
30 Jim Krane.  June 20, 2002.  “U.S. Aid to Israel Subsidizes a Potent Weapons Exporter.” Associated 
Press.  http://www.ifamericansknew.org/us_ints/p-krane.html.  Accessed on July 17, 2009.  Also see U.S. 
General Accounting Office. June 1994. “Military Exports: Concerns Over Offsets Generated with U.S. 
Foreign Military Financing Program Funds.” This report includes anonymous accounts of U.S. contractors 
and suppliers that ceased production of certain items after Israeli firms began producing them under offset 
agreements, p10-11.  
 
31 Janes Defence Weekly. 28 February 2001.  
 
32 Lale Sariibrahimoglu. 28 May 2007. “New offset policy to boost defense exports.” Today’s Zaman 
(Turkey).  
 
33 Hammond 1990. Lockheed Martin and General Electric became shareholders (42% and 7%, 
respectively).  United Defense (now part of BAE) also established a joint venture with Turkey’s NUROL 
Holdings to build armored vehicles.  The venture was named FNSS Savumna Sistemleri. In 2011 FNSS 
was awarded a $559 million contract to provide armored vehicles for the Malaysian Army. Other major co-
production programs in Turkey include attack helicopters; main battle tanks; airborne early warning aircraft 
(AWACs); UAVs; frigates; and armored vehicle upgrade programs. Burak Ege Bekdil. 8 May 2000. 
“Turkey to Reshuffle Defense Procurement/Civilian Agency’s Role to be Downgraded.” Defense News, p4.   
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the part, and Sikorsky’s U.S.-based production lines for that part were closed.34  This has 
not meant losses for Sikorsky, however, since Turkey has bought most subsequent 
tranches of attack helicopters from the company as well, including a $4 billion contract 
signed in 2011.   
 
In Israel, U.S. procurement policy has allowed for 25% of military assistance funds to be 
spent with domestic Israeli firms since 1991.35 The large dollar amount of annual military 
assistance to Israel guarantees continued high levels of military spending – and thus made 
it very lucrative for U.S. companies to establish subsidiaries in Israel.  In this manner 
private firms based in the U.S. can draw revenues both from exports of completed 
products and from the subcontracts granted to their joint venture operators and 
subsidiaries within Israel.36 Local firms in Israel also benefited from sustained levels of 
military spending and the technologies and manufacturing expertise these collaborations 
brought with them, but also from contract stipulations (unique to the Israeli case) that 
granted Israeli firms reciprocal rights to sell to the U.S. government.37 As in the cases of 
                                                
34 William Hawkins 31 March 2007. (Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and 
Industry Council). “Defense Offsets are Spreading Protectionism Across Commercial Sectors.” 
http://www.americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID=2729.  For detailed (although outdated) 
information on coproduction agreements with Turkey see Tamar Gabelnick, William D. Hartung, and 
Jennifer Washburn.  October 1999. “Arming Repression: U.S. Arms Sales to Turkey During the Clinton 
Administration.” Washington DC: Joint report of the World Policy Institute and the Federation of 
American Scientists. 
 
35 U.S. General Accounting Office. June 1994. “Military Exports: Concerns Over Offsets Generated with 
U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program Funds.”  
 
36 As Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler point out, “being in Israel helped them [U.S. military 
contractors] safeguard their own individual share of U.S. military assistance to that country, and 
occasionally win additional perks through joint ventures with local firms.” The Global Political Economy 
of Israel. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, P280.  
 
37 Nitzan and Bichler, p281.  
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Egypt and Jordan, retired Israeli military officers are frequently the owners of the local 
subsidiaries and subcontractors that reap the biggest benefits from collaborative 
agreements with U.S. firms.38  
 
Turkish and Israeli defense officials and military leaders have also demonstrated a 
willingness to sacrifice the efficiency and capabilities of their equipment in order to 
ensure higher degrees of domestic production – a dynamic that was also clearly visible in 
the Egyptian case.  Critics in Turkey contend that domestic producers are responsible for 
recurring procurement delays, and Ministry of Defense officials insist that “In our 
contract negotiations with foreign defense companies, the SSM always seeks to maximize 
local industry input, offsets, and technology transfer.”39 Similarly, Israeli defense 
officials refused to budge on their demand that local firms be provided with the necessary 
technology to maintain and repair the computer systems installed in Lockheed Martin’s 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35).40 Israeli leaders threatened to buy Boeing’s upgraded (and 
significantly cheaper) F-15 Eagle if they were not granted access to the F-35’s internal 
computer mainframe – despite the fact that the F-15 was considered more vulnerable to 
Iranian missile systems than the F-35.   
 
                                                
38 Nitzan and Bichler cite several examples.  See especially pages 281-283.  
39 Defense News. 10-12 December 2001.  
 
40 Although the U.S. would be supplying Israel with replacement computers that could be kept in local 
warehouses and switched-out with damaged units (which would then be returned to the U.S. for repair), 
Israeli officials insisted that “major operational constraints” meant their local manufacturers needed access 
to the computers’ internal mainframe. Yaakov Katz. 7 May 2009. “U.S. Denies Israel access to F-35 
computer.” The Jerusalem Post.   
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Both states have also incurred substantial offset obligations of their own. In a particularly 
convoluted example, Turkey paid an Egyptian military firm to produce components for 
F-16s; the components were then shipped to Turkey where they were incorporated into 
the jets, some of which were then sold back to Egypt.  Both countries financed their 
purchase of the jets using U.S. military assistance funds.41  The Turkish firm Yonca Onuk 
recently signed a collaborative production agreement with Egypt’s (military-owned) 
Alexandria Shipyard. Israel’s state-owned manufacturer Israel Military Industries was 
recently placed under a 10-year ban in India over alleged corruption connected to a deal 
to set up five ordnance factories to be operated by the Indian army.42 Both Turkey and 
Israel are also partners in the JSF program – the archetype model of the globalization of 
military production.  
 
Countries with large export-oriented industries that specialize in production of industrial 
inputs (but not complete systems) focus their energies on individual procurement 
contracts signed with industry heavyweights like Canada’s Airbus and Boeing.  China 
exemplifies this strategy. Although a large number of Chinese firms produce a wide 
range of aircraft components, no Chinese company produces an entirely indigenous 
civilian jet.  In an effort to advance along the path of aircraft production the Chinese 
Government deftly plays the largest firms against one another. Boeing currently buys 
                                                
41 U.S. General Accounting Office. June 1994. “Military Exports: Concerns Over Offsets Generated with 
U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program Funds.” 80 of the planes were financed by a $2.5 billion fund set 
up by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait in return for Turkey's cooperation in the first Gulf War.  Tamar 
Gabelnick, William D. Hartung, and Jennifer Washburn.  October 1999. “Arming Repression: U.S. Arms 
Sales to Turkey During the Clinton Administration.” Washington DC: Joint report of the World Policy 
Institute and the Federation of American Scientists. 
42 IMI and six other foreign firms were barred from bidding for Indian defense on suspicion of involvement 
in the corruption scandal centered on the former director general of the state-run Ordnance Factory Board 
Sudipta Ghosh. 9 March 2012. “Indian ban hits Israel’s defense industry.” UPI.  
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parts from seven local manufacturers – making the firm the largest customer of China’s 
aviation industry.  In return, China has bought more planes from Boeing than from any 
other manufacturer.  But, Airbus built an entire assembly facility in Tianjin in 2009 – a 
move that involves substantially more technology transfer.43 This collaboration, together 
with increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, has resulted in a jump in Chinese orders for 
Airbus planes.  But sustained collaboration between Canada’s Bombardier and the state-
backed Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China (COMAC), which are working to build the 
first jet constructed totally in China, as well as a large co-production run between another 
Chinese state-owned manufacturer and Brazil’s Embraer, may lead to yet another shift in 
Chinese procurement strategy.44  
 
In countries with the least accountable governments and large defense budgets, a 
significant portion of offset funds take a more direct route into the pockets of politicians 
and their cronies.  South Africa is an excellent case in point.  In 1999, the Ministry of 
Defense signed a $8 billion contract to procure jets and warships that came with offset 
commitments more than twice the value of the purchases.  One of the largest contractors, 
the German firm Ferrostaal, was found to have made almost $50 million in “questionable 
payments” to individual South Africans, and of the nearly $4 billion in offset credits 
                                                
43 The agreement with Airbus was signed with the Chinese government in 2007, and includes a 
commitment to manufacture 5% of the airframe locally.  Shareholders include Harbin Aircraft Industry 
Group Corporation Ltd, Hafei Aviation Industry Company Ltd, and AviChina Industry & Technology 
Company. “Airbus starts $350 million Harbin plant construction.” 1 July 2009. China Daily.  
44 Peder Andersen. February 2008. “China’s Growing Market for Large Civil Aircraft.” Washington DC: 
U.S. International Trade Commission,” p8.  
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eventually awarded to Ferrostaal, only $80 million was actually invested – much of it in 
enterprises that existed only on paper.45  
 
A brief investigation of India – where defense offsets have garnered significant domestic 
attention might also be worthwhile here.  It is similar to the Gulf States in some respects, 
it instituted formal offset requirements around the same time as the Gulf States (1992), 
and spends just a little less per year on defense than Saudi Arabia.  (The term formal is 
emphasized here because India did execute some counter-purchase agreements with 
suppliers in the past, as in 1987 when Aerospatiale was required to purchase raw 
materials equal to half the cost of the aircraft they sold to India).46  But India is different 
in some other key respects: official figures report about 5,000 Indian firms currently 
supply about 25% of the components required by the Defense Public Sector Units47 – a 
figure much higher than that of the Gulf States.48  India is also one of the only cases 
where both government officials and industry analysts are up-front about the method 
whereby the costs of offsets are included in the original contract price (although we also 
saw this in the statement of one UAE official, cited in Chapter 1).49   
                                                
45 Mike Bourne et. al. September 2004. “The impact of arms transfers on poverty and development.” Centre 
for International Cooperation and Security.  Also see Ivor Powell. 8 March 2012. “Arms deal offsets 
inquiry ruled out.” Cape Times (South Africa).  
46 Mike Bourne et. al. September 2004. “The impact of arms transfers on poverty and development.” Centre 
for International Cooperation and Security.  
 
47 “Investing in India’s Future: Keys to Success for India’s Defence Offset Policy.”  Booz&Co. 
 
48 One example is BAE’s Hawk Trainer, which is primarily built in India. The outsourcing of this 
manufacturing operation caused quite a headache for BAE, which had to lay-off about 3,000 workers in the 
UK when the production line was moved. John O’Doherty. “Local pressure on defence groups’ global 
sales.” 12 October 2011. Financial Times (UK).  
 
49 These cases include that of the Secretary for Civilian Aviation Ajay Prasad, who revealed that the state-
owned airline had paid about $50 million more for the same Airbus aircraft that was also acquired by a 
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New Delhi has also been slower to accept some of the new ‘innovations’ in offsets, such 
as provisions allowing firms to bank and trade offset credits.  It is also similar in some 
respects to Egypt.  After the conclusion of major hostilities with Pakistan in the late 
1940s, India’s military producers converted their facilities to produce some of the same 
consumer goods currently provided by Egypt’s military, including construction 
equipment, consumer electronics, and kitchen appliances.50 As with the cases examined 
in this study, estimates of offset values are all over the map.  The Confederation of Indian 
Industry (a business association) cited about $1.5 billion in offsets between 2006 and 
2008,51 similar to the figures released by the Ministry of Defense for the period 2007 to 
2009.52 However, in 2009 the Indian Defense Minister said there were offsets worth $9.7 
billion “in the pipeline,”53 and that an additional $10 billion worth of business 
opportunities would be generated for domestic firms over the next five years;54 while an 
independent report on India’s offset policy published in 2009 indicated that only three 
deals were made during that period.55 The variation in estimates is similar to what we see 
                                                                                                                                            
private Indian carrier due to the presence of offset requirements.  “Offsets Take Off.” 25 November 2009. 
The Business Standard (India). 
 
50 “Investing in India’s Future: Keys to Success for India’s Defence Offset Policy.”  Booz&Co. 
 
51 “Defence offsets policy makes encouraging impact: CII Survey.” 5 January 2010.  As reported in the 
newspaper, The Indian.  
52 “Offsets Take Off.” 25 November 2009. The Business Standard (India).  
 
53 “Defence Offset Proposals worth Rs 49,000 cr in pipeline.” 18 February 2010.  The Business Standard 
(India).  
 
54 Rianovosti. 19 December 2009. “India’s defense offsets policy to bring $10 billion in 5 years.”  
 
55 “Investing in India’s Future: Keys to Success for India’s Defence Offset Policy.”  Booz&Co.  
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in many other cases – and reflects both the complexity of offsets and the intentional 
obfuscation that often surrounds them.  
 
One of the most notable features of New Delhi’s offset policy is the recent shift in 
requirements relating to the character of domestic entities allowed to partner with foreign 
defense firms in the course of fulfilling the latters’ offset obligations.  Initially, the only 
suitable domestic partners were state-owned defense firms, and the minimum investment 
threshold was arbitrary and widely considered to be onerous by industry standards (and 
regarded as too large an amount to be absorbed by the state-owned firms).  The standard 
threshold has now been reduced to 30% of the contract value, although in some cases this 
requirement is raised, as with the recent $10 billion fighter jet procurement (for which the 
30% offset threshold was bumped to 50%).56 Foreign firms are now encouraged to form 
partnerships with domestic private sector companies to bid on defense contracts. These 
partnerships are facilitated by the government’s Defense Offset Facilitation Agency, 
which aims to fulfill the government’s stated goal of increasing the domestic share of 
defense production from current levels of about 25% to 70%.57 Similar incentives have 
also been granted to domestic firms engaged in defense production – including the 
extension of the same tax incentives given to export-oriented firms.   
 
Likewise, Indian business associations have lobbied for beneficial policies through the 
same organizational channels we see in other cases.  The Confederation of Indian 
                                                
56 N. Shivapriya. 19 November 2009. “Tech cos may seek govt help to win ‘offset’ deals.” The Economic 
Times (India).  
 
57 “Investing in India’s Future: Keys to Success for India’s Defence Offset Policy.”  Booz&Co. 
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Industries (the largest such business association in India) has been particularly proactive 
in reaching out to Indian defense officials and providing venues for networking with its 
membership – which is dominated by the country’s powerful internet technology (IT) 
industry. Several years of large defense expenditures by the Indian Government has 
raised awareness among the possible beneficiaries of offsets, resulting in a policy shift 
that promises to direct more offset-generated resources to this influential sector.  In 2005 
the Indian Government required that offsets go into military manufacturing (hardware), 
but subsequent policy changes “liberalized” the investment requirements – steering more 
of the funds into applications relating to homeland security, healthcare, and 
infrastructure, which leaves a great deal more room for participation by Indian IT 
companies.  This shift was partly facilitated by the claim that India’s military 
manufacturing base was too small to absorb the amounts of investment generated by its 
large defense procurement budget – a claim that primarily came from foreign defense 
firms and Western consultancy firms advising the Indian Government.58 The strength of 
India’s IT industry also means that this sector is strongly positioned to lobby for offset 
benefits.  A study of India’s offset program conducted by Booz&Co. estimated that this 
industry could increase revenues by about $700 million over a ten-year period by taking 
advantage of the country’s offset policies.59 
 
It is worth noting that such a shift has definite advantages not only for Indian IT 
companies, but also for foreign technology firms.  A significant chunk of India’s IT 
sector is comprised of multinational companies headquartered in the U.S. and Europe that 
                                                
58 Ajai Shukla. 14 December 2010. “Moment of Truth for Defence Offsets” Business Standard (India).  
59 “Investing in India’s Future: Keys to Success for India’s Defence Offset Policy.”  Booz&Co. 
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outsourced major chunks of their supply chains decades ago.  As far back as 1995, 
companies like Texas Instruments, IBM, Motorola, and Hewlett-Packard accounted for 
one-third of the companies operating in Bangalore (the so-called ‘Silicon Valley East’), 
and a lot of the software developed in India is incorporated into the products of these 
large transnational companies.60 Recent decades have seen an intensification of merger & 
acquisition activity between military contractors and technology firms – so what is good 
for the Indian IT sector is probably also good (or at least not bad) for the globe’s largest 
defense firms. 
 
Loose Ends: Shifting Trends in Gulf Defense Offsets and the Egyptian and 
Jordanian Armies Amidst the Arab Uprisings 
 
This final section will address some of the political and economic changes that have 
taken place since I began research for this project nearly five years ago.  This includes a 
noticeable shift in Gulf defense offset policy in favor of military-related investment – 
especially in the UAE. Such a volte-face initially seems to complicate my thesis, since 
Gulf militaries are not supposed to be politically influential, and therefore should not 
lobby for increased investment in arms production via direct offsets.  However, the 
increasing participation of Royal Family members in positions of military leadership, the 
increasing sophistication of regional arms procurement strategies and the officials that 
implement them, and the ability of non-Royal families with legacies of military service to 
gain influence within regional governments, have all combined to encourage a focus on 
direct offsets.  Although I will spend a few pages addressing this recent change here, I 
                                                
60 Dilip D’Souza. 1996. “Silicon Valley East.” The New Internationalist. 286: p25. Cited in William I. 
Robinson. 2003. Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization. New York: 
Verso Books, p31.  
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would point interested readers to a more thorough investigation laid out in a separate 
paper.61   
 
The second major shift that I will address in these final pages relates to the role of offset-
driven arms production in Egypt and Jordan in the context of the recent Arab uprisings.  
In both cases, the military served as an important guarantor of the incumbent regimes – 
that of the Hashemite Dynasty in Jordan and the now-deposed Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. 
While both regimes have also recently confronted significant domestic opposition from 
groups that have traditionally formed the basis of their support networks, only in Egypt 
did the military abandon its role as the regime’s praetorian guard.  This section will 
examine how external investment and collaboration with foreign defense firms differed in 
the two cases, and why the efforts of King Abdullah II to channel resources to the 
Jordanian Armed Forces through the KADDB may have been more effective in ensuring 
the military’s continued loyalty.  
 
Defense Offsets and the Growth of Arms Production in the Arab Gulf 
Since about 2007, there have been indications that the Gulf States are increasingly 
interested in utilizing offset obligations to promote domestic defense production.  This is 
pursued using many of the same methods employed by other states – requiring foreign 
defense firms to co-produce portions of their weapons systems in-country or establish 
maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facilities, and by requiring firms to launch new 
joint ventures or subcontract with existing domestic conglomerates.  But unlike many 
                                                
61 “Emergent Trends in the Middle East Arms Race: Foreign Investment and Indigenous Defense 
Production in the Arab Gulf.” The Kuwait Program: Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po - Paris). 
Available here: http://kuwaitprogram.sciences-po.fr/research-program/publications.html 
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other procuring countries, the Gulf States are also investing large sums in new high-tech 
laboratories and testing facilities, which has also encouraged firms to re-locate some 
components of their research and development (R&D) activities to the Gulf.  This 
regional trend toward utilizing offsets to enhance domestic military production has been 
observed by numerous outlets, including trade publications and defense industry analysts.  
As a 2010 briefing published by the Janes group of defense publications put it,  
Offset activities across both states [Saudi Arabia and the UAE] will include a 
wider focus on…the transfer of technology and the facilitation of defense export 
activity by means of establishing Tier One supply chain sources through joint 
venture relationships with established Tier One OEMs [original equipment 
manufacturers].62 
 
This shift is also visible across the spectrum from official rhetoric to concrete policy 
changes designed to encourage foreign arms manufacturers to relocate some components 
of their operations.  At the 2007 annual Abu Dhabi International Offset Conference 
(ADIOC) – a sort of offset-specific trade fair that brings together defense executives, 
offset brokers, industry analysts, and government officials – representatives from Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia issued formal statements expressing a preference for direct offsets in 
future contracts.  Although their request was criticized for being “eccentric” and short on 
details, it was perceived by conference attendees as signaling a major shift in regional 
offset policy.63 Private sector policy advisors working with the UAE’s official offset 
bureaucracy noted a similar change in approach, stating that the UAE would no longer 
                                                
62 See “Briefing: Offset politics of Saudi Arabia/UAE on course for major overhaul.” 22 April 2010. See 
also various issues of the Countertrade & Offset Newsletter and Ivan Gale. 1 July 2008. “Oil fuels fledgling 
defence industry.” The National (UAE).  Although Gale refers to oil in the article’s title, this piece is 
actually about the UAE’s offset-related activities.  
63 CTO Newsletter. 12 March 2007.  25(5).  
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“shy away” from defense-related offset projects as it had in the past, but would instead 
use defense industrial development to help meet the federation’s economic goals.64   
 
Formal policy changes in Saudi Arabia have been quite dramatic. Saudi law now requires 
that 50% of offset obligations must be in the “direct” category,65 and local suppliers are 
no longer shut out of the state’s defense procurement process.  During a February 2010 
meeting of the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, Colonel Attiyah Al-Maliki announced 
that local firms would now be allowed to bid to supply some 15,000 basic items used in 
defense construction – including piping, plastic composites, jet engine covers and 
batteries.66  Unnamed Saudi officials told the Reuters news agency that the move was 
initiated to encourage foreign suppliers to partner with Saudi firms, allowing them to 
qualify as indigenous producers, with the ultimate aim of establishing a domestic military 
industry.67 Colonel Maliki characterized the new policy as “just the beginning,” adding 
that, “nothing should prevent Saudi Arabia from making its own fighter jets.”68 The 
government also sponsored a trade fair in February 2010 (the Armed Forces Exhibition of 
Materials & Spare Parts), which officials characterized as part of a larger effort to 
                                                
64 Keri Wagstaff-Smith. 22 April 2010. “Briefing: Offset policies of Saudi Arabia/UAE on course for major 
overhaul.” Jane’s.   
 
65 formerly there was no minimum requirement for direct offsets.  
 
66 Souhail Karam. 7 February 2010. “Saudi Arabia opens military supply to local firms.” Reuters.  
 
67 Souhail Karam. 7 February 2010. “Saudi Arabia opens military supply to local firms.” Reuters. 
 
68 Souhail Karam. 7 February 2010. “Saudi Arabia opens military supply to local firms.” Reuters. 
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showcase the range of products available from domestic producers and familiarize local 
firms with the material requirements of the nation’s armed forces.69  
 
The Saudi defense ministry also recently created the Central Committee for Local 
Industrialization, comprised of representatives from the Saudi business community and 
Saudi defense officials.  The committee is chaired by Prince Khalid bin Sultan – 
Assistant Minister of Defense and the son of the late Defense Minister Prince Sultan – 
who told the Saudi-based Arab News in 2011 that private sector companies should 
eventually be capable of producing 70 percent of the Kingdom’s military equipment 
using technology transferred from abroad.70  Abdul Rahman Al-Zamil, former Deputy 
Minister of Commerce and member of the Consultative Council, was also given a spot on 
the new committee.71 Zamil called the new procurement policy “a breakthrough for local 
firms.”72 Not only has the Zamil Group been a domestic partner in many of the 
Kingdom’s previous non-military offset projects,73 but it also stands to gain significantly 
from expanded domestic military production, as it is one of the largest industrial 
                                                
69 Officials who spoke at the event include Lt. General Abdul-Rahman Bin Fahd Al-Faisal (Commander of 
the Royal Saudi Air Forces); Prince Khaled Bin Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz (Assistant Minister of Defense); Dr. 
Ebrahim Al-Assaf (Minister of Finance); and Dr. Khaled Al Suleiman (Undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry).    
 
70 P.K. Abdul Ghafour. 19 January 2011. “Kingdom to manufacture 70% of military hardware locally.” 
Arab News.  
 
71 Reuters News Agency. 7 February 2010. “Saudi Arabia opens military supply to local firms.”  
 
72 Souhail Karam. 7 February 2010. “Saudi Arabia opens military supply to local firms.” Reuters. 
 
73 Zamil Group holds direct shares in Middle East Battery Company (US Peace Shield); the Saudi-Indo 
Petrochemical Company (partial financing provided by the Saudi Offset Limited Partnership, a fund 
created by Raytheon and Thales to invest in offset projects); and the Arabian Amines Company (UK Al 
Yamamah).  Zamil Group is also the largest single shareholder in the Sahara Development Company and 
SIPCHEM, which have been the domestic partners for a large number of petrochemical ventures initiated 
primarily by BAE in fulfillment of its Al Yamamah offset obligations.   
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conglomerates in the Kingdom.  The Zamil Group’s 400-square meter booth space at the 
above-mentioned exhibition may be a good indicator of its potential share in this new 
market.74  
 
The UAE and Kuwait have instituted similar policy changes, including those designed to 
increase interaction between foreign defense executives, domestic entrepreneurs, and 
military officials and bureaucrats involved in offset policy-making. Both countries have 
relaxed foreign ownership restrictions in order to facilitate the creation of projects with 
military applications;75 previous ownership restrictions made foreign defense firms 
apprehensive about collaborative projects.  The UAE’s Offset Program Bureau recently 
announced plans to create the “Offset Committee,” a new institution designed to give 
military leaders more input in the offset policy-making process.76 Likewise, Kuwait’s 
National Offset Committee (NOC) has made repeated presentations to departments 
within the Ministry of Defense regarding offset policies and potential avenues for MOD 
participation,77 although bureaucratic turf wars between Kuwaiti defense officials and 
those from the Ministry of Finance – as well as persistent allegations of corruption within 
the offset program – have complicated offset-driven defense production in the near term. 
 
The Factors Underlying Renewed Interest in Military Production 
                                                
74 This 400 square meter figure comes from a press release available on the company’s website: 
www.zamiloffshore.com. 13 February 2010. “Riyadh Air Force Exhibition.”   
 
75 Keri Wagstaff-Smith. 22 April 2010. “Briefing: Offset policies of Saudi Arabia/UAE on course for major 
overhaul.” Jane’s. 
 
76 EPICOS industry newsletter. 10 February 2011; 3(6). Comments of Matar Ali Al Romaithi, Director of 
the Offset Unit at the OPB interviewed for newsletter. 
77 NOC Newsletter. June 2008, p6.  
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This shift in favor of direct offsets is the result of a number of factors, including the 
growing prestige of regional militaries and the concomitant rise in interest in military 
careers among Royal Family members and other influential elites. Military prestige has 
been enhanced through a number of avenues, including the increasing number of 
exchanges that bring Gulf military officers to train at U.S. and European military colleges 
and defense research institutes, and the large investments made in regional research 
centers.  Although many of these are designed to prevent local brain drain by providing 
better facilities and research resources for top-scoring students, they have also attracted 
foreign defense firms, which have poured money and personnel into defense-technology 
research programs housed in these new centers, along with the associated scholarships 
and internship programs that steer university students studying engineering and computer 
science into careers with regional defense subsidiaries.   
 
The Gulf States have seen some success in leveraging these advanced educational and 
research facilities in order to encourage foreign firms to set up research and 
manufacturing operations within their borders – and have even used offset obligations to 
finance and outfit these facilities.  Some components of the region’s most costly 
technology infrastructure – such as the UAE’s Tier 4 data center (one of only four in the 
world) and the world’s sixth largest supercomputer, housed at the King Abdullah 
University for Science & Technology (KAUST) – have been built under offset deals.78  
                                                
78 The UAE’s Tier 4 data center is operated by Injazat Data Systems, which was built by EDS Defense & 
Security (a US company that was subsequently acquired by HP) as an offset; many of Injazat’s clients are 
offset-generated ventures, both public and privately-owned. Many of the technologies and laboratories 
available at KAUST were transferred or built by foreign defense companies as part of long-term 
collaboration deals, which are increasingly replacing traditional offset deals, where each individual sale has 
a corresponding offset contract. Chris Thompson labeled the complex of facilities linking the 1984 defense 
offsets to Saudi Arabia’s nascent research institutions a “Silicon Oasis.” “Planned International Technology 
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The presence of these assets facilitates subsequent technology transfers and follow-on 
sales of advanced weapons because they provide the necessary physical infrastructure 
and human capital (technicians, maintenance specialists, researchers, etc.) to absorb new 
technologies and provide support for new systems. Many of the institutions where this 
infrastructure is housed also include large academic and vocational departments 
dedicated to defense-related research and training.79  Al Faisal University, which began 
offering courses in 2008, received an $11 million donation from Boeing, BAE, Thales and 
United Technologies, and some of these firms also offer scholarships to Saudi students 
majoring in defense and security-related areas.80   
 
Boeing also coordinates with other educational and research entities in Saudi Arabia, 
including King Saud University; King Abdulaziz University; and the King Abdulaziz 
City for Science and Technology (KACST), where the firm is establishing a Decision 
Support Center (DSC) to offer modeling, simulation and analysis services for defense and 
aerospace firms in the region.  Boeing is also collaborating with the aforementioned King 
Abdullah University of Science & Technology (KAUST), where the firm is financing 
projects to develop next generation composite materials for use in aircraft and the 
designing of new thin-film solar cell technology.81  French defense firms have also been 
active in establishing partnerships with the region’s largest research institutions; Dassault 
                                                                                                                                            
Transfer: The Economic Offset Example in Saudi Arabia.” Digest of Middle East Studies (DOMES). 1 
September 1994. 3(1), p1.  See also Asma Alsharif. 20 October 2008. “Saudi Supercomputer lures 
researchers.” Reuters.  
 
79 This include CERT in the UAE; Dar Al Faisal University and Knowledge Economic City, both in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
80 These include the Boeing Saudi Arabia Fellowship Program.  
81 Newsletter.  Boeing Frontiers.  (Boeing corporate publication) July 2011. 
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signed an agreement in 2011 to partner with KACST on digital design and engineering 
programs in the center’s Advanced Technology Institute – an expansion of Dassault’s 
existing collaboration with KACST’s National Satellite Technology Program,82 and the 
Italian firm Elettronica s.p.A. recently signed a collaborative agreement with the Prince 
Sultan Advanced Technologies Research Institute (PSATRI), which is part of King Saudi 
University, focusing on technology transfer and the conduct of basic and applied research 
in defense.83   
 
Both Boeing and BAE coordinate with the UAE’s Higher Colleges of Technology, 
regularly bringing executives to campus to talk to students about pursuing careers in the 
defense and aerospace industry,84 showcasing new product innovations to students in 
relevant disciplines,85 and offering internships.86  Northrop Grumman co-sponsors an 
annual competition to design unmanned aerial vehicles called the ‘Unmanned Systems 
Rodeo’, along with the UAE’s Higher Colleges of Technology and a firm owned by the 
retired Emirati air force general Abu Ainnain (mentioned in Chapter 3).87 Northrop 
Grumman pays for the winning student team to present their UAV design at the 
                                                
82 “Saudi Arabia: KACST, Dassault Systemes in deal at the Paris Air Show. 25 June 2011. The Saudi 
Gazette.  
 
83 King Saud University press releases list collaborative agreements with several international firms, 
including BAE Systems, Boeing, Swedish SAAB, Augusta Bell, Raytheon, and Agilent Technologies. 
“PSATRI signs agreement with Italian electronic defense equipment manufacturer Elettronica SpA.” 9 May 
2012. King Saud University News Portal. http://enews.ksu.edu.sa/2012/05/09/psatri-elettronica-spa/ 
84 Website of Boeing Middle East (boeing-me.com); corporate citizenship page.  
 
85 “BAE Systems Showcases Innovation and Future Technology to Students in the UAE.” 10 April 2011. 
Press release. 
 
86 These include the CERT Boeing Academic Excellence Awards, which provides for a one-month 
internship at Boeing’s facilities in the U.S. 
87 This firm is INEGMA, the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis.  INEGMA provides risk 
analysis and other products to the UAE government.  
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Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International Convention held annually in 
Washington, DC.88  Similar trends are visible in Kuwait, although these are much more 
limited in scale.  Here, offsets related to the sale of Apache helicopters involved the 
transfer of aircraft and marine vessel simulators (from Boeing and Lockheed Martin, 
respectively) to the Australian College of Kuwait for use by students training to maintain 
and operate military equipment.89  
 
The presence of these high-tech research facilities not only enhances the prestige of 
domestic military institutions and their leadership, but also aids in the recruitment of 
foreign engineers and technicians.  Peter Hoffman, Boeing’s Director of Global Research 
and Development, summarized this phenomenon in the Saudi context when he described 
the newly installed electron microscopes and magnetic resonating machines at KAUST as 
“a draw for bringing in great minds from around the world…and successfully attracting 
world-renowned scientists who are experts in key areas of interest to the kingdom.”90 The 
proliferation of extravagantly-staged arms fairs91 has also led to increased interactions 
between representatives of private industry, military officers, civilian procurement 
officials, and researchers engaged in defense applications.  The Gulf States play host to 
many of the largest such gatherings, including the annual Gulf Defense & Aerospace 
                                                
88 “HCT launches inaugural Unmanned Systems Rodeo competition at IDEX.” 22 February 2011. HCT 
press release.  
 
89 This offset was valued at “hundreds of millions of dollars,” according to Kuwaiti government 
spokesmen.  See Michael Knights. 18 December 2003. “Future Development of GCC Air Forces; Part 2.” 
Air Combat Information Group (ACIG).  
 
90 Newsletter.  Boeing Frontiers.  (Boeing corporate publication) July 2011. 
 
91 Participation in arms fairs has greatly increased in recent years.  DSEi, one of the large fairs held 
annually in the UK, drew 1,350 vendors in 2007 – almost 1/3 of them first-time participants. John Hilary. 
“Making a killing out of war.” 12 September 2007. Comment is free, weblog of The Guardian (UK) 
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Exhibition held since 2011 in Kuwait; the International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) held 
annually in Abu Dhabi since 2001; and the Doha International Maritime Defense 
Exhibition held in Qatar since 2008. 
 
This emphasis on building advanced facilities, networking with international firms, and 
attracting foreign talent is indicative of the fact that many offset-generated arms 
production ventures continue to rely heavily on the technical and management expertise 
of foreign personnel and subcontractors – which contradicts the image of a genuinely 
indigenous defense industry. A good example is Al Taif Technical Services, launched by 
the UAE’s Mubadala in 2007 to provide maintenance, repair and overhaul of military 
vehicles and other weapons systems for the UAE Armed Forces.  Although the UAE 
Armed Forces promptly named Al Taif the prime contractor in charge of servicing the 
army’s 17,000 ground vehicles, Al Taif just as quickly turned over almost all the 
associated activities to DynCorp, a U.S.-based private security contractor.  A Dyncorp 
press release stated that the company would provide “all services for the contract” 
including,  
personnel, equipment, tools, materials, supervision, and services necessary for 
GMD (the UAE Land Forces’ General Maintenance Directorate) operations.  This 
contract covers all types of military and commercial vehicles, including fighting 
platforms, tankers, transporters, buses, trucks, earth moving equipment, and all 
terrain 4X4 vehicles.92   
 
On paper, the establishment of Al Taif may seem to reflect a real advance in indigenous 
defense capabilities in the UAE, but under these contract terms it is hard to imagine 
exactly what operations will be left for Al Taif to perform.  Similarly, the CEOs of many 
                                                
92 21 December 2006. “Dyncorp International Awarded Maintenance Contract with UAE Land Forces.” 
Company Press Release.  
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of Mubadala’s defense-related subsidiaries are foreign nationals who came from previous 
defense careers in the U.S., Europe, and East Asia.93  
The quest for indigenous arms production in the Gulf is also driven by the increasing 
demand for small-scale, capital-intensive defense equipment whose production is more 
compatible with the structure of the Gulf’s industrial base – like electronic warfare 
systems, defense related ICT (internet & communications technology), and unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs).  Because the Gulf States are able to leverage large financial 
resources in order to construct advanced facilities and provide for large R&D budgets, 
they are magnets for skilled defense management experts and aerospace technicians from 
abroad, where cuts in the defense budgets of the advanced industrial states have caused 
defense firms to shrink their research departments and delay development of new 
weapons systems.  The large market for internal surveillance and policing equipment in 
neighboring Arab states has helped create a uniquely auspicious environment for reviving 
indigenous defense production in the Gulf, as has the demonstration effect of other 
countries’ pursuit of direct offsets.  The increasing scrutiny of defense offsets sparked by 
boondoggles like the Al Yamamah offset in Saudi Arabia have generated a large number 
of in-depth analyses by NGOs and industry consultants.  No doubt Gulf technocrats have 
read these reports, which demonstrate that the majority of rich, Western states demand 
direct offsets (not indirect ones), and that Turkey and Israel built their defense industries 
on the foundation of offset deals.  Since these states are presumably well-placed to 
                                                
93 The CEO of Strata, Mubadala’s manufacturing facility, is Ross Bradley, a former managing director of 
the Eurofighter program and founder of Farnborough Aerospace Consortium. The CEO of Abu Dhabi 
Aircraft Technologies (ADAT), another Mubadala subsidiary, is Jeremy Chan, who spent most of his 
career working for defense firms like Honeywell and ST Engineering. The CEO of Sanad Aero Solutions, 
another Mubadala subsidiary, is Troy Lambeth, a graduate of West Point and former VP in General 
Electric’s Capital Aviation Service division.  All three subsidiaries have recently signed large MRO 
contracts with foreign firms including United Technologies, Boeing and Airbus.  
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negotiate the best terms for offset deals – and have highly-developed and sophisticated 
procurement regimes in place – it stands to reason that their policies would be emulated 
by other states.  
Due in large part to the exchanges and networking fora described above, military officers 
and civilian defense bureaucrats in the Gulf are increasingly better aware of both the 
strategic needs of their states and the technological specifications of the defense 
equipment they purchase.  As the gap widens between the sophistication of these defense 
elite and the capabilities of their national defense industrial bases, they are likely to seek 
out channels through which the state can subsidize indigenous production and enhance 
the overall prestige of the nation’s military institutions. By the same token, the domestic 
industrialists and traders whose conglomerates would benefit from the formation of a 
western-style military-industrial complex are likely to lend their political support to 
efforts by these military elites to expand official investment in military production.  The 
same merchant conglomerates that made their fortunes by capitalizing on previous state 
spending sprees in infrastructure, tourism facilities, import-export networks, and oil 
industry support services, are now positioning themselves to serve as suppliers and 
subcontractors in the global defense industry supply chain because their respective 
governments are concentrating more public resources on indigenous defense production.  
Although the Gulf States import the vast majority of their military equipment94 this has 
not prevented the formation of a small contingent of powerful conglomerates with 
defense-related operations (often in Iraq), and many more are well-placed to exploit new 
                                                
94 N. Hasbani cites a figure of 99% in terms of the amount of military equipment that is imported by the 
GCC States as of 2006.  “The Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States.” Defense & Security 
Analysis. 22(1): p75.  
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defense-related opportunities, should they emerge.  Decades of large defense 
expenditures and numerous wars in the Middle East have not only enriched western arms 
manufacturers, but have also created numerous opportunities for wealthy domestic 
investors to establish defense-related operations.  For example, the Kuwaiti logistics firm 
Agility, controlled by the Sultan Al-Essa Family,95 was ranked #34 in the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s 2009 report of the 100 largest defense 
companies, with annual revenues of around $6 billion (it was #30 in 2008).96  Although 
most of the firm’s activities were in providing food and other services to U.S. military 
personnel in Iraq, in 2006, Agility acquired the American firm Taos Inc., which had been 
the primary contractor responsible for transporting weapons into Iraq on behalf of the 
U.S. military.97 The acquisition, which enabled Agility to bid on classified U.S. military 
contracts – not just logistics and vending – dramatically expanded the firm’s defense-
related service portfolio.  Companies like Agility would presumably benefit from an 
expansion of the region’s military-industrial infrastructure, which would require the same 
sophisticated supply chains and logistics services as their foreign counterparts.98 
                                                
95 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense John Negroponte is a major shareholder in Agility DGS Logistics – a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Agility. 
 
96 SIPRI defines ‘arms producing companies’ as those firms with “operational activities in the field of 
military goods and services.”  
 
97 Taos Inc. was originally founded in 1989 by retired foreign intelligence chief David Hogan, who ran the 
company out of the Putnam Industrial Park in Madison, Alabama, about a mile from the U.S. Army Missile 
Command base at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville.  Many of the weapons transported (primarily during 
Hogan’s ownership of the company) later went missing, and some were eventually seized from militants 
captured by coalition forces in Iraq.  Despite Taos’ contracts with companies like Aerocom (designated as 
an arms smuggler by the UN) and a ruling by an Italian court that eventually uncovered Taos’ complicity in 
losing track of shipments of Italian-made Berettas that militants later used to kill civilians in Iraq, the U.S. 
military continued to grant the company contracts into 2007.  See “Blood at the Crossroads: Making the 
Case for a Global Arms Trade Treaty.” 2008. Amnesty International.  Also see Pratap Chatterjee. 24 
September 2008. “How post-invasion Iraq came to be awash in ‘missing’ guns.” Inter Press Service.   
 
98 Kuwait does not have many examples of domestic firms engaged in defense-related production.  But one 
example is MidEast LTA, a company that provides logistics services for ‘operational aerostat systems’ 
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Similarly, the UAE’s Hydra Trading, owned by Royal Family member Sheikh Tahnoon, 
got its start as a distributor to the UAE Armed Forces, and recently launched a joint 
venture with an offset-generated company, possibly in an effort to retain business in what 
is predicted to be a burgeoning domestic defense sector.99  Retired UAE Air Force 
General Khaled Abdullah Abu-Ainnain has also launched six joint ventures with French 
and Italian defense firms through his investment company Baynuna(h) Aviation 
Technology (part of Baynunah/ Beinuna Group),100 all under the auspices of the UAE’s 
offset program, and all of which include the development of military equipment and/or 
services. Firms like these are part of what we might term a latent or ‘unrealized’ domestic 
military industrial complex – one that has formed over decades in response to peripheral 
opportunities resulting from enormous state military expenditure and the presence of 
persistent conflict in the Gulf and in neighboring Arab States, but is primarily engaged in 
logistics and service provision in support of foreign firms.  This sector could experience a 
dramatic expansion under the current trajectory of offset-generated investment in 
indigenous defense production.   
                                                                                                                                            
(unmanned surveillance blimps), that is the result of an offset with the U.S. firm TCOM. See MidEast 
LTA’s website: http://www.tcomlp.com/overview_LTA.html.  The offset was reported in the industry trade 
publication Countertrade & Offset Newsletter. 26 January 2004. 12(2).  
 
99 Sheikh Tahnoon is a member of the Royal Family and the governor of the Eastern region of Al-Ain.  The 
offset-generated firm with which Hydra formed a joint venture is Al Taif Technical Services.  
 
100 These include Baynunah Missile Technologies (with MBDA and BAE); Centuria Capital (with Groupe 
Financiere Centuria of France); DASBAT Aviation (Dassault); ELTBAT Electronic Systems (Elettronica 
SPA of Italy); SAGEMBAT Defense (Dassault, SNECMA and SAFRAN, all of France); and SNECBAT 
Engine Technologies (SNECMA and SAFRAN).  Abu Ainnain is also the Chairman of New Enterprises 
East Investment, a venture capital firm, and is on the board of 4C Controls, Inc. a defense firm registered in 
the U.S. but whose board of directors is primarily drawn from former executives in the French defense 
industry. 4C Controls Inc. recently launched a joint venture with Abu Ainnain’s firm Baynunah Aviation 
and Hydra Trading (owned by Sheikh Tahnoon of the UAE Royal Family) to build a satellite observation 
center using technologies supplied by the same French and Italian firms that serve as partners for Abu 
Ainnain’s numerous other joint ventures. 
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A Sampling of Current Arms Production in the Gulf 
The current trend toward direct offsets is not actually the Gulf region’s first experience
 361 
with efforts to cultivate a domestic military industrial capacity – but it is by far the most 
extensive.  As examined in Chapter 3, the U.S.-Saudi Peace Shield deal of 1984 resulted 
in the creation of six industrial firms that were meant to produce very basic parts or 
support services for some of the Kingdom’s arsenal of weapons (but subsequently 
languished due to a lack of investment), and in 1979 the GCC members briefly 
considered establishing a regional defense industrial center in the UAE to replace the 
Egypt-based Arab Organization for Industrialization.101  This dream of a regional military 
industrial center has been reinvigorated with new collaborative agreements generated by 
offset obligations – and the UAE is indeed the most advanced Gulf State in terms of 
military production.   
 
Some of the largest defense-related firms in the UAE include (1) Abu Dhabi Ship 
Building, a company set up under an offset obligation incurred by the U.S. defense firm 
Northrop Grumman (other shareholders include the government-owned Mubadala 
investment fund and private Emirati investors);102 (2) the Advanced Military 
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Centre (AMMROC), an offset company set up by 
Sikorsky (other shareholders include the government-owned Abu Dhabi Aircraft 
Technologies, and Lockheed Martin, which just recently bought an equity stake in the 
                                                
101 When the Gulf members withdrew from the Arab Organization for Industrialization in response to 
Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, the minutes of the GCC meetings show some interest in shifting their 
financing to the UAE.  Although this agenda item appears repeatedly, there was never any formal 
agreement.  International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Gulf Military Balance. Cited in Nader 
Entessar. Fall 1984. “External Involvement in the Persian Gulf Conflict.” Conflict Quarterly, p47. 
102 The largest share held by a private citizen is the 5.72% owned by Hussein Jassem Nasser Mohammad Al 
Nouwais, who also owns substantial shares in other offset-generated businesses, including 8% of the Al-
Waha leasing conglomerate, the result of a BAE offset obligation; 100% of Danway Fusion Glass, a project 
developed by a consortium of German companies with offset obligations; and 100% of the Gulf Solar 
Power Company, an offset from GEC-Marconi. 
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company); and (3) the Burkan Munitions Plant, which was constructed under an offset 
agreement with the German firm Rheinmetall Munitions (other shareholders include the 
government-owned investment fund Tawazun and the private conglomerate Al Jaber 
Group, which is also a major partner in several other offset-related enterprises).103  
 
The UAE’s defense-related sovereign wealth funds – outlined in Chapter 3 – have also 
increasingly focused their investments on defense applications. In addition to establishing 
joint ventures with foreign firms like GE and Advanced Micro Devices, the Mubadala 
fund has purchased substantial shares in European aircraft companies SR Technics 
(Switzerland) and Piaggio Aero Industries (Italy).  Mubadala also recently launched a 
joint venture with the Kuwaiti defense logistics firm Agility (referenced above),104 and 
owns a significant interest in the U.S.-based private equity firm Carlyle Group, made 
famous by its own acquisitions of small U.S. defense contractors in the 1990s.105  
Mubadala’s wholly-owned subsidiary Mubadala Aerospace has partnerships with the 
Italian defense giant Finmeccanica SpA and Airbus, is in talks to launch a partnership 
with Boeing, and recently constructed a $200 million facility to perform aircraft engine 
servicing.106  
 
                                                
103 These other firms include DAMTEC, a joint venture with the South African defense firm Denel; 
Safewater Chemicals, a partnership with Specialist Mechanical Engineers, another South African defense 
contractor; and Trakker ME, a partnership with a Pakistani company specializing in GPS and other tracking 
technologies.  
104 The venture, Agility Abu Dhabi, is owned by Mubadala, Agility of Kuwait, and Bateen Investment 
Company, part of the Al Ain Investment Group owned by Dhafer Al Ahbabi.  
 
105 Mubadala Development Company (Zawya Profile). In 2007, Mubadala purchased a 7.5% stake in 
Carlyle Group, and invested another $500 million in the firm in 2010. Shane McGinley. 16 December 
2010. “Mubadala invests further $500 million in US-based Carlyle Group.” ArabianBusiness. 
 
106 Bloomberg News. 29 March 2011. “Mubadala in talks with Boeing on parts contract.”  
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The Tawazun fund – wholly-owned by the UAE’s Offset Program Bureau (the successor 
to the UAE Offset Group, the Emirates’ official offset bureaucracy) – focuses solely on 
developing ventures with military applications.  Thus far, Tawazun has launched several 
such companies, including Abu Dhabi Autonomous Systems Investment (ADASI), which 
invests in UAV technologies, and Emirates Precision Industries, a research and 
engineering firm.  In some instances, Tawazun has used its funds to acquire existing 
companies, as was the case with its purchase of the German gun-maker Merkel.107 This 
acquisition eventually lead to the establishment of a pistol manufacturing facility in the 
UAE – which now provides the sidearm not only to the UAE security forces but also to 
the Bahrain National Guard and the Jordanian military, and the pistol is currently being 
reviewed for adoption by the Algerian military.108  Tawazun has also used its resources to 
launch strategic partnerships with domestic entities that have defense-related operations.  
In 2011, Tawazun purchased a 26% stake in International Golden Group (IGG), a 
domestic retailer that distributes equipment used by the UAE armed forces, as well as a 
munitions manufacturing facility previously owned by Ali Al Dhaheri’s Adcom Group.  
IGG’s CEO Fadil Al Kaabi cited Tawazun’s share acquisition as part of an “effort to 
support the long-term development of industrial capabilities in the UAE.”109 
 
Saudi Arabia’s strategy to increase defense production has focused more on building 
indigenous maintenance and support capabilities at a handful of very large ventures 
                                                
107 This type of activity, that is, the acquisition of existing assets rather than the creation of new ones, has 
long been a criticism levied against the managers of such funds – especially in countries where job 
opportunities, infrastructure and outlets for productive investment are limited.  
108 Ivan Gale. 2008 “Oil Fuels Fledgling Defence Industry.” The National (UAE). 
 




established under the Peace Shield deal in the mid-1980s, often housed in the kingdom’s 
universities (as described above). Saudi Arabia’s latest large-scale defense acquisition – 
72 Eurofighter Typhoons worth an estimated $40 billion – included a contract stipulation 
that 48 of the aircraft must be assembled inside Saudi Arabia (by the Peace Shield-era 
firm Alsalam), making it perhaps the most extensive transfer of defense technology in the 
region to date, outside Israel.110 The agreement also included language regarding the 
formation of a “regional defense industrial center” in Saudi Arabia.111  Interestingly, 
generating new offset business for existing companies may be doubly efficient in terms 
of expanding domestic defense production in cases where multiple foreign competitors 
may be contracting with the same domestic entity.  For example, the prime contractor on 
the Typhoon deal – BAE – recently announced plans to construct an entirely separate 
facility in the Eastern Province to house Alsalam’s Typhoon assembly lines112 – 
presumably because BAE’s primary competitor Boeing took a 60% controlling share of 
Alsalam in 2006, and conducts maintenance operations on its own aircraft in the Saudi 
firm’s existing facilities.  
 
Like Alsalam, other Peace Shield-era companies are also reaping the benefits of new (or 
anticipated) offset agreements. The Advanced Electronics Company has been chosen to 
                                                
110 Current talks may include another round of purchases, bringing the total Typhoon fleet to 200 aircraft by 
around 2015.  “Saudis countdown to Typhoon service entry.” 13 May 2010.  Arabian Aerospace.  
 
111 P.K. Abdul Ghafour. 19 January 2011. “Kingdom to manufacture 70% of military hardware locally.” 
Arab News 
112 Ironically, the largest shareholder in Alsalam is Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, via its Saudi 
subsidiary, the Boeing Industrial Technology Group.   
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partner with Alsalam to produce electronic components for the new Typhoons,113 while 
the Middle East Propulsion Company (MEPC) has seen its corporate profile heightened 
with significant share acquisitions by two foreign defense firms.  Executives from these 
firms – the U.S.-based Wamar International and Germany’s MTU Aeroengines – both 
cited MEPC’s projected work on the Kingdom’s burgeoning fleet of fighter aircraft as a 
major driver in their investment decisions.114   The kingdom’s recent contract with 
Boeing likewise included an agreement signed by Boeing’s Chairman to “jointly grow the 
aerospace sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”115  The French have similarly 
followed suit, with Thales, Dassault and Snecma, all announcing the formation of 
partnerships with Saudi firms formed under the U.S. Peace Shield offset program, 
including AEC, Alsalam, and MEPC, respectively.116  
 
In the UAE, defense firms are also placing new contracts with existing companies created 
by previous offset agreements.  Among these are Raytheon, which recently signed a 
contract with Abu Dhabi Ship Building (itself the product of a previous offset investment 
from Northrop Grumman) to construct a regional maintenance center to service the 
                                                
113 Robert Bailey. 14 May 2010. “Local arms manufacturing in the Middle East and North Africa region is 
set to grow.” Middle East Association. (the Middle East Association is a trade group that promotes trade 
between the UK and the Middle East, The British Offset office and UK Trade and Investment – both 
government-operated entities – are two of its primary sponsors). 
 
114 “Paris – MTU takes a stake in Saudi engine company.” 17 June 2009. ArabianAerospace.  These two 
companies now own a combined 28.6% of MEPC shares – a larger proportion than United Technologies, 
which represents the original consortium of US defense contractors that established MEPC in 1992. 
 
115 CTO Newsletter. 11 February 2008. 26(3).  




Raytheon-built missiles in use by the UAE and its Gulf neighbors.117 The center would 
satisfy the offset obligations Raytheon incurred for its latest sale of Rolling Airframe 
Missiles (RAMs) to the Emirates. Similarly, Tawazun Precision Industries has 
manufactured components for Airbus;118 Abu Dhabi Ship Building has coproduced 
corvette naval vessels with the French state-owned manufacturer Constructions 
Mecaniques De Normandie;119 and Abu Ainnain’s Baynunah (Beinuna) Group 
(examined in Chapter 3), formed a partnership with the French firm Thales.120 According 
to the press release, Baynunah will begin by providing logistics support services for the 
Mirage 2000-9 aircraft, but will eventually develop and produce those systems locally, 
“to help meet Thales’s offset obligations within the framework of any major future 
contracts.”121 
 
This recent shift toward direct offsets and indigenous arms production in the Gulf has 
potentially dramatic implications.  The rise of a regional military industrial capacity will 
impact not only the domestic political-economic dynamics of the Gulf States, whose 
                                                
117 There is currently no regional facility able to perform this maintenance, which needs to be conducted 
every seven years; on average these missiles have a 30-year lifespan, so each one would require 4 re-
certifications before being retired. Ivan Gale. 8 March 2009. “Abu Dhabi in defence hub talks.” The 
National (UAE).  
 
118 These components include Long Range Titanium Spars for the A330 and metallic detail parts for the 
Single Aisle (SA) and Long Range (LR) programs. EPICOS industry newsletter. 10 February 2011; 3(6). 
Comments of Matar Ali Al Romaithi, Director of the Offset Unit at the OPB interviewed for newsletter.  
Tawazun’s CEO, Saif Al Hajeri, called the Airbus agreement, “a historic moment” signaling the entry of 
“national products into large international markets for civilian and military aircrafts.” CTO 16 November 
2009. 27(22).  
 
119 CTO Newsletter. 10 November 2008. 26(21).  
 
120 The venture was named Thalbat: Thales+ ‘b-a-t’ the acronym for Baynuna Aviation Technologies.  
 
121 “Thales & Baynuna Aviation Technology into JV.” 16 November 2009. Al Defaiya (Arabian Defense & 
Aerospace Business).  
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leaders may find themselves facing new constraints from an increasingly influential 
coalition of military elites and domestic defense producers eager to further their own 
economic and political interests.  It will also have an impact on issues like regional 
security and human rights.  This next section will briefly address some of these possible 
concerns before finally moving on for some final thoughts on the balance of military 
interests and regime patronage in Egypt and Jordan. 
 
Defense Offsets, Indigenous Production, & The Potential Impact on Inter-State 
Conflict & Regional Arms Races 
 
A dramatic intensification of defense production anywhere in the Arab World is likely to 
raise security concerns in neighboring countries like Iran and Israel as well as within 
certain sub-state populations, such as Bahrain’s Shia community or the region’s stateless 
Kurdish populations.  The introduction of a new arms-producing state has implications 
for the human rights of national citizens and those in neighboring states, since their 
respective governments will have access to a new (presumably less scrupulous) supplier.  
There are several examples of regionally-produced weapons being sold to regimes 
engaged in violent repression of domestic opposition.    
 
In the years immediately preceding the uprising against Qaddafi, the UAE exported 120 
of its NIMR tactical vehicles (produced in collaboration with Jordan’s KADDB) to 
Libya, and KADDB exported a number of its Desert Iris tactical vehicles to both Libya 
and Bahrain in the early 2000s.122  Ratel infantry vehicles produced by KADDB in 
                                                
122 In Libya, some of the Desert Iris vehicles were captured by the rebel forces and used in skirmishes with 
pro-Qaddafi fighters.  
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collaboration with Paramount Group of South Africa also showed up in Yemen during 
the recent uprisings – despite the fact that no formal sales to Yemen ever took place 
(which indicates a violation of international law regarding arms transfers).123  Abu Dhabi 
Shipbuilding exported at least seven naval vessels to Bahrain since 2006, and the official 
sidearm of the Bahraini police is the above-mentioned Caracal semi-automatic pistol 
manufactured in the UAE. Most of the largest weapons suppliers issued embargoes for 
arms exports to Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen during the height of their respective uprisings 
– which would certainly benefit producers like Jordan and the UAE, whose large 
inventories of armored vehicles offer more accessible supply alternatives and whose lax 
regulatory environments could facilitate the movement of weapons under embargo 
conditions.124   
 
These collaborative projects also contribute to the ability of the military and security 
services to monitor and repress dissent within their own borders.  In 2008 the French 
defense giant Thales (which has a large joint venture with the Egyptian military)125 was 
awarded a contract to build and launch a communications satellite for the Egyptian 
                                                
123 A spokesman for South Africa’s Democratic Alliance Party David Maynier stated, "The Paramount 
Group, in co-operation with the King Abdullah Design and Development Bureau (KADDB), produced a 
converted version of the Ratel infantry vehicle in Jordan; and the infantry vehicle depicted in the photos 
appears to be the converted version of the Ratel infantry vehicle produced by the Paramount Group and 
KADDB in Jordan.” Wyndham Hartley. “SA Ratels turn up in Yemen Conflict.” BusinessDay (South 
Africa).  
 
124 The UAE is a major transit hub for all sorts of illicit goods, including sensitive defense technologies. In 
2011, nearly one-quarter of the businesses found guilty of violating U.S. export law sent their illicit 
shipments through the UAE.  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.  Annual 
Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 2011. Appendix C: Summaries and Tables of Closed Export 
Enforcement Cases and Criminal Cases, p27-32.   
 
125 Arab International Optronics is a joint operation with the military’s National Service Projects 
Organization, which produces night vision equipment and other defense goods. 
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operator Nilesat, in which the military’s AOI is the second largest shareholder.126 During 
the recent uprisings Nilesat blocked the Al Jazeera news station from using this satellite 
to broadcast images from the uprising.127  This raises the question of what forms of 
leverage these international firms have over their domestic business partners – and how 
they should use this influence in addressing concerns over human rights. 
 
Just as the 2003 rehabilitation of the Libyan regime provided new opportunities for arms 
exports, so has post-Saddam Iraq.  Both Libya and Iraq were under weapons sanctions for 
decades, which means their lists of requirements for upgrades and new equipment are 
lengthy.  As outlined in Chapter 4, this has been a major boon for Jordan, which has 
exported weapons to the new Iraqi government and the Coalition Provisional 
Authority.128  The KADDB even signed on as a ‘platinum’ sponsor (the highest-level 
sponsorship) for the inaugural session of an enormous trade show now held annually in 
Iraqi Kurdistan.  A KADDB spokesman said all participants in the show would “benefit 
greatly by meeting and networking with many Iraqi officials and the private sector from 
around Iraq.”129  
 
                                                
126 http://www.thalesinformations.com/Press_Releases/space_PressRelease_Nilesat_020608/?pid=1650.  
This was also the first new satellite commissioned by Nilesat since Thales took over the shares in Arab 
International Optronics from BAE Land Systems in 2001.  This suggests that Thales collaboration with the 
Egyptian military through Arab International Optronics helped the firm get the contract for construction 
and launching of the new satellite.  Previous satellites (Nilesat 101, 102, and 103) had been built by Matra 
Marconi Space (now Astrium) or had been leased from existing operators.  
 
127 http://advanced-television.com/index.php/2011/02/03/nilesat-problems-affect-jordan-media-city/ 
128 See the section titled “Regional Instability and Collaborative Arms Production in Jordan.” 
 
129 Press Release. Iraqi American Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  “Kurdistan DBX Trade Show and 
Conference.” 28 August 2005.  KADDB also send representatives to the International Rebuild Iraq 
Exhibitions held in Baghdad.  
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The growth in offset-driven defense production is occurring alongside the expansion of 
private firms offering security services, commonly referred to as private military security 
contractors (PMSCs).  Many PMSCs have regional divisions in the Gulf as well as Egypt 
and Jordan.  In the UAE, some of these firms include G4S, Securitas, Blue Sky Group, 
Britam, International Armored Group, SicuroGroup, Good Harbor, Kroll, Olive Group, 
SkyLink Arabia, Unity Resources Group, and Control Risks.  The first Chinese company 
to be listed on the Abu Dhabi stock exchange is a PMSC called China Security (CSST), 
which provides defense and security equipment, including surveillance materials.  In 
Kuwait such firms include Securiforce, Combat Support Associates, Crescent Security 
Group, and Global Strategies Group (which also has an office in Saudi Arabia). 130 So 
many of these firms entered the UAE in recent years that in 2006 the Ministry of Interior 
established the Private Security Business Department, which oversees the licensing of 
PMSCs.  Because at least 51% of shares in these operations must be held by UAE 
nationals, this provides a significant business opportunity for domestic elites to gain a 
foothold in the defense and security sector.131  
 
The Military’s Economic Interests in a Revolutionary Context 
 
The recent uprisings that have swept aside (or firmly shaken) the rule of authoritarian 
leaders in the region necessitate a brief, but focused, examination of the Egyptian case.  
Although offset agreements conferred very real and tangible benefits to the Egyptian 
                                                
130 Virginie Collombier. September 2011. “Private Security…Not a Business Like Any Other.” Arab 
Reform Initiative, p3-4.  Also see “Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity.” 
2008.  Report by Human Rights First.  
 
131 In contrast to the requirements for shareholdings, only 5% of the firms’ administrative and managerial 
posts must be held by UAE nationals. Federal Law Number 37 of 2006.  
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Military, the armed forces proved unwilling to act as the praetorian guard for President 
Hosni Mubarak, who was forced to resign in February 2011.  In Jordan, the relationship 
between King Abdullah II and the East Bank (Transjordanian) population that dominates 
the state bureaucracy has likewise grown increasingly strained.  In May 2010, the 
National Committee of Retired Servicemen issued a much-publicized ‘open letter’ to the 
King, citing concerns over corruption, economic mismanagement, and growing income 
inequality (alongside the perennial issue of the relative power and influence wielded by 
citizens of Palestinian origin).  Subsequent signs of discontent include sit-ins outside 
government offices to protest pay discrimination against retirees and the formation of a 
new political party, the Jordanian National Conference.132  Despite their relatively muted 
criticism thus far, memories of the 1974 “Zarqa Affair” – in which members of an elite 
tank division initiated a half-hearted mutiny against King Hussein – are likely to prompt 
similar efforts to placate discontent within the military.  The short-lived mutiny is 
especially poignant, since it occurred amidst a rising tide of Arab nationalism and 
economic turmoil that resembles current regional conditions. King Hussein’s first order 
of business following the 1974 rebellion was to institute a pay raise for the military – and 
periodic perquisites for the JAF have been a mainstay of monarchical policy ever since.  
 
Could this distinction be due in part to the Hashemite Monarch’s more effective use of 
offsets to deliver prestigious production contracts and more sustainable patronage to his 
                                                
132 Although this party was founded by the National Committee of Retired Servicemen, it also includes 
other elements of the public sector workforce – notably teachers and judges.  The party’s military founders 
have been keen to highlight the diversity of the organization’s membership.  However, their grievances are 
carefully couched in the language of concerns over Palestinian demographics within Jordan not explicit 
opposition to the authority of the Hashemite monarchy. “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle 




support base in the Armed Forces?  We know that Jordan has maintained most of its 
housing, education, and pension subsidies to the Armed Forces while slashing such safety 
nets for other populations.133  Even the figurehead of the National Committee of Retired 
Servicemen has been restrained in his public statements, as when he spoke of a “moral 
contract between the Jordanian people and the Hashemites” which recognized the king’s 
right to rule in exchange for the provision of security and freedom.134  Likewise, we 
know that important military families (such as the Majali) were effectively incorporated 
into the patronage infrastructure via KADDB, and the monarchy is explicitly linked with 
KADDB.  It is not the “Jordanian Design & Development Bureau” – and the only image 
included in the organization’s logo is the royal diadem.  However, contemporary 
scholarship on Egypt also suggests that the military retains access to important privileges 
and benefits – like commissaries, subsidized housing, free healthcare, subsidized 
university education for their children, pensions, etc.  Furthermore, the existence of 
mega-projects such as the £3 billion EGP Mubarak Complex for the Defense Industries 
appeared to demonstrate President Mubarak’s commitment to enhancing (or at least 
maintaining) many institutional privileges.135 So why did Mubarak fail to maintain the 
military’s support?  And is King Abdullah likely to suffer the same fate? 
 
                                                
133 A.M. Baylouny finds that, in the aftermath of structural adjustment, “the main group that continues to 
benefit from the state is the military,” whose subsidies, pensions and employment programs actually 
increased – as did the military’s overall budget – while budgetary allocations for social services delivered 
to non-military populations decreased. A.M. Baylouny. “Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East” p57-8. 
 
134 Tim Sullivan. 3 July 2011. “Jordan navigates warily in turmoil of Arab Spring.” Associated Press.  
 
135 24 August 2010. “Minister: Egypt’s annual military production reaches £2.7 billion EGP.” Al Masry Al 
Youm (English edition). “Dr. Ali Sabri: Military Production growth was 5% despite the country’s 
circumstances.” 23 October 2011. Al Ahram.  http://www.ahram.org.eg/Investigations/News/108501.aspx.  
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Defense offsets (and likewise other forms of patronage) should be seen as contributing to 
the political and economic influence of their recipients, which can translate into loyalty to 
the extant regime, depending on the degree to which the provision of such benefits relies 
on the continued rule of a particular regime or executive leader.  The military may not 
require the direct intervention of the regime on their behalf in order to secure the 
continued flow of benefits, as seems to be the case in Egypt.  The Egyptian Military’s 
relationships with foreign patrons and foreign firms, including those from the U.S. and 
Europe (and increasingly China), are not directly mediated through the office of the 
Egyptian President.  Decades of commercial and diplomatic exchange have fostered 
significant relationships between Egyptian military officers and the many actors involved 
in cooperative military production, including the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation, the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Army Tank-automotive and Armaments 
Command/TACOM, the Technical Assistance Field Teams, private sector Field Service 
Representatives, the foreign Commercial Attaches that liaise with defense executives and 
military officers, as well as organizations like the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Egypt and other semi-official bi-lateral business associations. These exchanges have 
created extensive linkages between foreign defense firms and Egyptian military officers, 
as have military exchange/training programs and intelligence cooperation. The military 
has also been highly successful in portraying itself as the institutional lynchpin in 
domestic and regional stability (especially in safeguarding the treaty with Israel), which 
has further added to the degree of independence the armed forces enjoy vis a vis Egypt’s 
other state institutions.   
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By contrast, the Jordanian military’s foray into manufacturing, and the linkages that are 
fostered through KADDB, is in its infancy.  Unlike President Mubarak, King Abdullah is 
consistently depicted as the catalyst for each of KADDB’s ventures; he is often present at 
ribbon-cuttings and other ceremonies and is frequently quoted in corporate literature 
produced on behalf of KADDB’s various enterprises.  Additionally, the military’s non-
defense related economic operations (such as Mawared – the army’s property 
development arm) are increasingly brought under the umbrella of KADDB, which further 
reinforces the association between the King and the army.   Lastly, we do not see the 
same degree of ‘outsourcing’ activity that characterizes the Egyptian Military’s use of 
state-financed facilities (such as operating military hospitals as for-profit private 
clinics).136  This is, of course, a double-edged sword.  Although KADDB initially 
received near-ubiquitous praise both within and outside Jordan, some of the Armed 
Forces’ disastrous real estate projects have sapped public enthusiasm for military 
entrepreneurship.  One notable example is a mixed-used development adjacent to 
KADDB’s corporate headquarters known as the Amman Living Wall, which one 
prominent Jordanian blogger referred to as a “manmade cavity” that represents the 
army’s “finest real estate misadventure” to date.  If the global economic downturn and 
strained state finances erode KADDB’s previous lustre, the organization may become 
more of a liability than an asset.   
 
                                                
136 This too, may be changing.  A UAE-based industrial glass company recently utilized KADDB testing 
facilities to gain a special industry certification required for glass used in defense and security applications.  
Perhaps the KADDB is diversifying its activities in order to generate income outside the parameters of its 
traditional collaborative manufacturing projects. “Lumiglass Industries LLC Receives UKAS Certification 
for Armour Glass Line.” 2 June 2012. Press Release. http://www.aeconline.ae/lumiglass-industries-llc-
receives-ukas-certification-for-armour-glass-line-37065/news.html 
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In Egypt and Jordan, the flow of offset benefits and other patronage depends on the 
military’s institutional leverage vis a vis the executive branch – after all, if it were a weak 
institution, it would not merit the provision of such privileges in the first place.  However, 
it also stands to reason that the military’s loyalty to the incumbent regime must be 
factored into the executive’s calculus.  Why subsidize a disloyal institution? (Or allow it 
to exert its own claims on state resources at the expense of other important 
constituencies)?  The question seems obvious, but is complicated by the fact that this 
particular institution is heavily armed. Even if the military’s loyalty to Mubarak was 
visibly eroding, rescinding the army’s access to long-standing privileges is another matter 
entirely.  Such relationships are inherently sticky and resistant to change.   
 
This points to two possibilities in the Egyptian case.  Either the privileges provided to the 
military were not as extensive as they appeared, or President Mubarak was not as 
essential to the delivery of those privileges as he appeared.  As Michael Wahid Hanna 
observed in the Cairo Review of International Affairs, Egypt under Mubarak 
witnessed the emergence of competing centers of authority, such as the Ministry 
of the Interior and the crony-capitalist elite associated with the president’s 
son…[f]urther, the armed forces were insulated from the practice of day-to-day 
repression. This allowed the Egyptian military to untether its own future from the 
fate of the president and his inner circle of civilian advisors.137 
 
This next section will look at some evidence of the Egyptian Military’s economic 
holdings in the late 1990s and early 2000s to see whether their economic privileges were 
actually eroding during the latter period of Mubarak’s rule, and evaluate whether the 
military was successful in partnering directly with foreign firms to access alternative 
                                                
137 Michael Wahid Hanna. “Egypt’s Search for Truth.” Cairo Review of International Affairs. 
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=90 
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sources of finance and technology, allowing them to circumvent Mubarak and eventually 
render his direct intervention on their behalf unnecessary. 
 
There is certainly evidence to suggest that the military can act independently in order to 
pursue institutional benefits associated with offset agreements. Major co-production 
agreements with the Egyptian Military were actually expanded amidst the uprising, both 
during the period of uncertainty over Mubarak’s intention to resign and subsequently 
under the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).  In 2008, the 
Pentagon announced that the American firm Swiftships (a subsidiary of Halter Marine) 
had signed a $13 million contract to sell four 28-metre patrol craft to Egypt, but in 
February 2011 – the very same month that Mubarak stepped down – the contract was 
modified to allow for an Egyptian shipyard to “assemble” two of the patrol craft and “co-
produce” the other two – at an increased cost of $20 million.138  Five months later in July, 
as violence against demonstrators intensified and hundreds of thousands of protestors 
returned to Tahrir Square, the U.S. announced the 11th installment of the $1.3 billion 
M1A1 tank co-production program.  If Mubarak was considered the centerpiece of any 
bilateral relationship with a major patron, surely it was the one between Egypt and the 
U.S.  Yet his ouster did little (if anything) to derail the continuation of this major 
contract. In September 2011, amidst continued demonstrations (including the storming of 
the Israeli Embassy in response to the shooting deaths of several Army officers near the 
                                                
138 According to the Pentagon announcement, the contract includes “two co-assembly kits and two co-
production kits to support the construction of the four 28-meter CPCs [coastal patrol crafts]. These kits, 
consisting of all material necessary for construction, will be shipped to Alexandria, Egypt, for construction 




Egyptian-Israeli border) and as the SCAF’s hold on power appeared increasingly tenuous, 
Egypt signed a co-production agreement with the Turkish company Yonca-Onuk JV to 
manufacture six Onuk MRTP-20 fast-intervention crafts “with technology transfer” at the 
military-owned Alexandria Shipyard.139  Prior to this agreement, collaborative arms 
production between Egypt and Turkey had been extremely rare.140  In the ten-month 
period from Mubarak’s resignation to the Fall of 2011 the Egyptian Military managed to 
sign more contracts with substantial collaborative components than during any other 10-
month period in the previous two decades.  Furthermore, the U.S. relinquished its only 
real source of leverage over Egypt’s Military the following Spring (March 2012) when 
the State Department unilaterally announced that Congressional inquiries into U.S. 
military aid to Egypt would be suspended and the funds would be dispersed as planned.  
 
This observation suggests two potential dynamics: that the previous government was 
placing at least some minimal restrictions on the ability of the military to engage in joint 
production (and the removal of Mubarak and his allies has strengthened the military’s 
negotiating leverage), or, now that Mubarak is gone, Egypt’s foreign allies are eager to 
placate the military in hopes of exercising influence in the post-revolutionary 
government.  Either way – the military has been able to increase the inward flow of 
benefits via co-production projects, technology transfer agreements, and the like, because 
of (or in spite of) Mubarak’s exit.  
                                                
139 Ipek Yezdani. 19 September 2011. “Egypt eyes to buy Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles.” Hurriyet 
Daily News (Turkey).  
 
140 The only cases of collaborative arms production of which I am aware are the Peace Onyx program of the 
late 1980s/early 1990s, in which Turkey produced F-16s jointly with U.S. firms and then sold the planes to 
Egypt (which produced some minor components for use in the jets); and possibly a late 1980s agreement 
that saw the Turkish firm MKEK build a facility in Egypt to produce 105mm tank rounds. Omer 
Karasapan. January-February 1987. “Turkey’s Armaments Industries.” Middle East Report, p29. 
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It may also have been the case that the persistent intensification of liberalization and 
privatization, combined with falling levels of state investment, was in fact chipping away 
at some of the economic interests of the military – which led the officer corps to abandon 
their support of President Mubarak (and by extension the possibility of Gamal Mubarak 
inheriting the presidency).  This observation meshes well with some of the actions taken 
by the military since the uprisings began in January 2011, including the prosecution of 
Gamal Mubarak’s cronies – whose business ventures and neoliberal policy platforms 
were perceived to be encroaching on the military’s economic operations.141  Gamal’s 
high-profile business associates were the first to be detained, banned from international 
travel and subjected to asset seizures following President Mubarak’s resignation.142 But 
the military’s economic managers had also been slowly diversifying their economic 
portfolio for a number of years leading up to the revolution – suggesting that the officer 
corps had predicted an eventual assault on their public sector economic operations, and 
had taken precautions to limit its impact on their financial independence.  (An 
independence, it should be noted, that allowed the SCAF to ‘loan’ the Egyptian Central 
Bank $1 billion in December and dole out monthly bonuses to mid-ranking army 
                                                
141 Hanna states, “The early moves to prosecute the associates of Gamal Mubarak, such as Ahmed Ezz, the 
steel magnate and former leading figure in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), are unsurprising in 
light of the military’s traditional antipathy for the neoliberal elite cultivated by the former president’s 
son…” “Egypt’s Search for Truth.” Cairo Review of International Affairs. 
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=90. A June 2012 IPS article 
states, “[p]rosecutors have targeted the coterie of Gamal Mubarak, the former president’s son and presumed 
successor, while passing over officials and businessmen with strong links to the ruling military council.” 
Cam McGrath. 26 June 2012. “Mubarak Cronies Find Comfort in Exile.” Inter-Press Service.  
 
142 High-profile associates of Gamal Mubarak that have been put on trial include steel magnate and former 
ruling-party chairman Ahmed Ezz, who currently sits in jail, and Hussein Salem, who was recently 
acquitted on charges relating to the bribe and illicit grants of state-owned land. Numerous other associates 
fled the country.    
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personnel throughout the period of upheaval).143 A quick look at the Egyptian Military’s 
holdings in the maritime transport sector might give us a better idea of whether or not the 
military really was losing out in the later years of Mubarak’s reign – and how they sought 
to mitigate their exposure.144 
 
Egypt’s Maritime Transport Sector as a Microcosm for the Military’s Economic 
Position 
 
Historically, the military has often validated its role in the economy and shielded its 
operations from privatization by highlighting the strategic nature of certain sectors, 
including maritime transport. In the late 1990s, Public-Sector Enterprise Minister ‘Atif 
‘Ubayd restricted privatization of shares in maritime companies to 10% after the Israeli 
ambassador revealed that Israeli companies were interested in purchasing one of Egypt’s 
state-owned (and army-run) stevedoring companies. Amid perceptions that Israeli owners 
would deliberately block the acquisition of new technologies in order to keep Egypt 
underdeveloped, the military was able to pose as guarantor of vital national assets. 
Ultimately, the government decided to postpone privatization of maritime transport 
altogether.145  
 
But renewed pressure from World Trade Organization members with major shipping 
interests led the Egyptian Government to adopt a master plan (2001-2017) to extend the 
                                                
143 Jack Shenker. 28 December 2011. “Egyptian army officer’s diary of military life in a revolution.” The 
Guardian (UK). These bonuses were bout 2,400 Egyptian pounds, or $400. 
 
144 This material also appeared in an article I co-authored with Joshua Stacher of Kent University.  See 
“Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital.” Spring 2012. Middle East Report, 262. 
145 Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Egyptian Privatization: New Challenges for the Left,” Middle East Report 
210 (Spring 1999), p. 39. 
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liberalization of maritime activities. This plan included the introduction of the “landlord 
model,” whereby private-sector firms fulfill many port functions, but remain under the 
supervision of “independent,” profit-oriented (but still state-owned) entities.146 The 
adoption of this model resulted in what a 2008 USAID report termed an “investment 
stampede”147 that ultimately brought in four of the world’s largest maritime shipping 
conglomerates, including the Danish Moeller-Maersk, the French CMA CGM, and Cosco 
Pacific and Hutchison Port Holdings, both of Hong Kong. 148 Although such overseas 
firms now hold majority shares in new Egyptian maritime companies, and their 
operations immediately cut into the market shares of the three large military-controlled 
container & cargo companies, the military has been able to secure significant minority 
stakes in the new operations as well as top executive posts for high-ranking officers.  This 
is primarily achieved through the state-owned Holding Company for Maritime and Land 
Transport (HCMLT), the various port authorities, the Ministry of Maritime Transport, 
and other parastatals involved in maritime shipping, such as the Arab Federation of 
Chambers of Shipping, all of which are heavily staffed by naval and other military 
officers.149 
 
                                                
146 “Maritime Transport and Related Logistics Services in Egypt,” ICTSD Program on Trade in Services 
and Sustainable Development (December 2007), pp. ix, 8. 
 
147 USAID/Technical Assistance for Policy Reform. July 2008. “Port Sector Regulation: Establishing a Port 
Regulator in Egypt.” p6-7. 
 
148 The shipping conglomerates invested in Egypt, ranked by market share, include: the Danish A.P. 
Moeller-Maersk Group (1st  largest); the French CMA CGM (3rd largest); and Hong Kong’s COSCO Pacific 
(4th largest); and Hutchison Port Holdings (also of Hong Kong), the world’s largest operator of container 
terminals. 
 
149 The Arab Federation of Chambers of Shipping is chaired by Admiral Hatim al-Qadi. See subsequent 
footnotes for other entities chaired by military officers.  
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These joint ventures represent tens of billions of dollars in investment from foreign firms, 
state banks and international lenders; even the military’s minority shares in these 
companies represent substantial assets. The new port operators include Damietta 
International Port Company, in which private French, Kuwaiti and Chinese firms own a 
combined 70% alongside an unknown holding by the United Arab Shipping Company (a 
roughly 50-50 joint venture between the military-dominated HCMLT and the Kuwaiti 
government) and a 5% holding by the Damietta Port Authority, whose chairman is also a 
military officer.150 Likewise, the Suez Canal Authority—headed by Adm. Ahmad ‘Ali al-
Fadil—owns 12 percent of the shares in the Suez Canal Container Terminal Company, 
which began operations in 2004, and whose other shareholders include Maersk and 
Cosco Pacific.  
 
The Alexandria International Container Terminal/AICT is a prime example of the 
military’s ability to mitigate the financial impact of privatization by maintaining shares 
and lucrative executive positions in new joint venture companies.  When Hutchinson Port 
Holdings established AICT in 2007, its military-owned competitor, Alexandria Container 
and Cargo Handling Company/ACCHC151 saw its share of traffic fall from 92 percent to 
70 percent in just one year.152 This was a major blow – since the ACCHC had long been 
considered the “cash cow” that would make up for shortfalls in other operations owned 
                                                
150 “Major Lines Join Damietta Project,” Lloyds List (via NewsEdge Corporation), December 7, 2007. 
 
151 ACCHC is owned by the HCMLT and the Alexandria Port Authority. The Holding Company for 
Maritime & Land Transport Chairman is Captain Atef Hassan; the Chairman of the Alexandria Ports 
Authority is Admiral Mohamed Youssef.  
 
152 Egyptian Maritime Transport Industry. 14 July 2009. Capital Research.  
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by the Holding Company for Maritime and Land Transport.153 However, the military 
managed to secure a measure of ownership (5 percent) in the new joint venture with 
Hutchinson through the Alexandria Port Authority. The port authority’s chairman, 
Admiral Muhammad Yusuf, praised the introduction of foreign shipping interests, stating 
that the government’s policy to “attract foreign direct investment by partnering with 
multinational companies” will benefit the transport sector through the transfer of 
“management expertise and best practices,” as well as the introduction of new technology 
and more container traffic.154 The new joint venture was actually inaugurated under 
General ‘Abd al-Salam Mahgoub, a former chief intelligence officer who became a vocal 
advocate of coordination between the state and private sectors after being appointed 
governor of Alexandria in the late 1990s.155  
 
Similarly, the Suez Canal Container Terminal Company/SCCT – majority owned by the 
Dutch company APM Terminals and COSCO Pacific of Hong Kong – has taken 
significant business away from the Port Said Container & Cargo Company,156 whose 
board of directors is primarily composed of Egyptian Naval officers.157 However, both the 
                                                
153 Minutes from meeting between USAID contractor International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. 
and Egyptian authorities from the Holding Company. “Investment Banking Services for Egypt-MPE/PEO.” 
pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACJ009.pdf 
 
154 “Contract for a New Company to Upgrade Container Terminal Quays at the Ports of Alexandria and El 
Dekhelia,” March 13, 2005.  
 
155 Samer Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 88-
89. 
 
156 USAID/Technical Assistance for Policy Reform. July 2008. “Port Sector Regulation: Establishing a Port 
Regulator in Egypt.” p6-7.  When APM first invested (in 1997) shares in the company were 50/50 between 





Suez Canal Authority and the state-owned National Bank of Egypt secured minority 
stakes in SCCT. Likewise, the state-owned Damietta Cargo & Handling Company is 
expected to face fierce competition from an investor consortium that was recently 
awarded a BOT contract to build a new container terminal that would directly compete 
with Damietta Cargo.158 In this case as well, all the relevant state-controlled port 
authorities (the Alexandria Port Authority, the Suez Canal Authority, and the Port Said 
Authority) have some stake in this new venture.   
 
Furthermore, the Egyptian Government still covers the losses incurred by military-owned 
operations, allowing the latter to keep its foreign currency earnings despite major 
losses.159  This is because the holding companies themselves (in this case, the Holding 
Company for Maritime and Land Transport/HCMLT) cover the losses of their constituent 
operators, and the Holding Companies are under the authority of the Ministry of 
Investment160 – a fact not lost on investment analysts in the region, who highlight the “full 
support of the HCLMT” as a factor affecting possible investment decisions in the 
HCLMT’s subsidiaries.161  Even the “joint ventures” and “publicly-traded” companies 
                                                
158 the investor consortium includes firms from Kuwait, China and the US. USAID/Technical Assistance 
for Policy Reform. July 2008. “Port Sector Regulation: Establishing a Port Regulator in Egypt.” p6-7. 
159 profits of HCMLT and its subsidiaries are estimated at around $83 million in 2008. March 2009. 
“Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on Egyptian Workers.” Center for Trade Union and Workers 
Services (CTUWS), P4.  
 
160 December 2005.  “Impact of Liberalization of Trade in Services: banking, Telecommunications and 
Maritime Transport in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.” Bilkent University (Turkey): Centre for 
International Economics and Cairo University: Faculty of Economics & Political Science, p301.  Study 
partially funded by the European Commission.  
 
161 Egyptian Maritime Transport Industry. 14 July 2009. Capital Research. 
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that appear to reflect the liberalization of military-owned companies are often 
partnerships with other military-owned companies.162 
 
The various port authorities also have shares in individual maritime infrastructure 
projects and complementary sectors (such as shipping insurance) alongside foreign 
investors. One such project is a dredger assembly deal with the Dutch company Damen 
Group; another is Suez Canal Insurance, which is now majority-owned by Green Oasis 
Investments, a joint Chinese-Egyptian investment fund. The military stands to benefit 
handsomely from this influx of investment, equipment and technology, not only because 
it controls shares in both the joint venture companies and their state-owned competitors, 
but also because it exerts substantial control over complementary industries. For instance, 
the military (via the AOI’s General Egyptian Company for Railway Wagons and 
Coaches) provides much of the hardware and labor for Egypt’s rail construction, which is 
being expanded in order to link new maritime port terminals with inland rail networks, 
which in turn will increase the volume of business for the joint venture port operators. 
The revenue the military generates from the maritime sector may also explain the degree 
of violence meted out to strikers and other protesters around Egypt’s ports, which are 
often incorporated into “special economic zones” where regulation is minimal and tax 
incentives are high. 
 
The collaboration we see between Egypt’s Armed Forces and foreign conglomerates in 
the maritime sector provides the military with the best of both worlds.  They maintain 
                                                
162 For example, the Holding Company for Maritime and Land Transport/HCMLT, boasts five “private, 
joint stock companies,” however these are primarily owned by consortia of other HCMLT subsidiaries and 
government agencies. 
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absolute control over their pre-existing maritime companies and secure shares in new, 
more lucrative ventures that also get the stamp of approval from international financial 
institutions focused on privatizing state-owned enterprises.  Despite the introduction of 
new competition, the military’s old maritime companies will still attract business from 
shipping interests that place a premium on the military’s near-monopoly control over 
customs and other complementary services, which have not been the site of similar 
foreign investment. 163 Indeed, shipping agency operations are especially well-suited to 
military management because they entail intermediation with state agencies – notably 
customs/immigration agencies, port authorities, tax authorities, inspection/safety 
agencies, etc. – and shipping companies recognize that employing a liaison with authority 
over these matters can greatly expedite the process and cut costs.164 Judging by an 
examination of this single sector – which represents a great deal of commercial activity in 
Egypt, and therefore also a sizeable chunk of the military’s revenue stream – the 
military’s economic planners have been able to successfully hedge against the rising tide 
of privatization.  The fact that businessmen and investment firms known to be associated 
with Gamal Mubarak do not appear on the shareholder rosters of these operations also 
suggests some degree of independence from the regime.  This could indicate that the 
economic leverage of both groups (the military and the new generation of crony 
                                                
163 These include Assiut Shipping Agency, Aswan Shipping Agency; Damanhour Shipping Agency; and El 
Menia Shipping Agency.  The Canal Shipping Agencies Company – which is 95% owned by the 
Government (through HCMLT and Port Said Engineering Works) – owns 100% of these shipping agency 
operations, which are listed as “private” and “corporate” entities. 
164 Agency services include things like berthing arrangements with port authorities; repair resources and 
marine equipment information; arrival, departure and cargo information; liaising with 
customs/immigration, revenue/tax authorities, health and agriculture departments, and state transportation 
agencies; licensing arrangements; shipment documentation (dock receipts, bills of lading, export 




capitalists) was mutually exclusive – and the military saw the end of Mubarak’s reign as 
an opportunity to clear the field of competitors.  
 
Future Research Agenda   
This project has argued that defense offsets represent an emergent form of patronage that 
reveals the unique strategies adopted by ruling elites in the Arab World to secure the 
support of powerful domestic constituencies.  Because regime authority in many states is 
predicated on the allocation of economic privileges, ruling elites are compelled to 
generate resources that can be distributed to important domestic constituencies.165 But 
they must do so under changing conditions – including global norms regarding the 
desirability of economic liberalization and the containment of official corruption, as well 
as shifts in the magnitude of certain forms of economic exchange, notably the arms trade.  
Although the uprisings in the Arab World have produced a litany of new theoretical and 
empirical puzzles – such as the role of social media, revolutionary tipping points, and 
demographic pressures – the structural conditions that formed the basis for 
demonstrators’ grievances are not new.  Principle among these was the use of public 
assets to subsidize the groups that provided support to the regime – including the military 
and crony business elites.  And despite the removal of some regional leaders and serious 
challenges posed to the legitimacy of others, many of the domestic power brokers whose 
support enabled these regimes to cling to power for decades have likewise been able to 
prevent the erosion of their own influence and political leverage.  Their persistence rests 
– at least in part – on the robust system of institutionalized privileges they accumulated in 
                                                
165 Henry, Clement. M and Richard Springborg.  2001. Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East.  Cambridge University Press, p11. 
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exchange for their political loyalty.  This allegiance enabled them to accumulate the 
necessary resources (both tangible and intangible) to secure a position atop the domestic 
power hierarchy, retaining their individual or institutional leverage over political and 
economic decision-making. This resilience suggests the need for more systematic 
investigations of patronage systems in the region, especially studies that move beyond 
examinations of oil revenues and foreign aid, which have traditionally been the scholarly 
focus in investigations of state largesse. This paper has examined an obscure but 
increasingly influential component of this system of patronage and their role in sustaining 
institutions of clientelism in the Arab World. 
 
The single largest limitation to this project has been the reliability of the data – which has 
come from multiple sources, none of which are comprehensive. Analysis is plagued by 
intentional obfuscation on the part of numerous parties, the complexity of the offset 
agreements themselves, and the ability of the governments examined here to swiftly 
implement dramatic shifts in their offset policies (as we saw in the Gulf States above).  
The ever-changing body of empirical information on which the analysis is based also 
presents major drawbacks.  New offset agreements are signed frequently, so identifying 
emerging patterns in ‘real time’ is difficult.  Nonetheless, I believe that examining the 
content of individual defense offset contracts and identifying their intended recipients 
gives us an important insight into how patronage-based politics really function – and how 
structural features of the global economy (such as the growth in the arms trade and the 




In terms of future research, this project can be fruitfully expanded in a number of 
directions. One potential project might examine the relationships between actors involved 
in the provision of offset-generated projects using network analysis in order to explore 
how transnational elite networks are embedded in the global arms trade.  Several large 
and high profile economic ventures in the United Arab Emirates were launched under the 
auspices of Abu Dhabi’s defense offset program.  Several of the joint ventures that 
resulted from these offset agreements are now managed by former executives from 
Western defense firms or by retired U.S. and European military personnel, and frequently 
defense firms that originally incurred obligations to invest in the Emirati economy are the 
recipients of subsequent investment from private-sector conglomerates and state-owned 
investment vehicles based in the UAE.  Research by scholars such as Thomas Chaney 
(2010) and J.B. Glattfelder and S. Battiston (2009) demonstrates the utility of network 
analysis for locating and measuring concentrations of power in structures previously 
thought to rest on an impossibly complex system of overlapping ties. Using network 
analysis to evaluate the nature and intensity of these ties will yield a graphic 
demonstration of the influence that the arms trade can have in the domestic political 
economies of procuring countries (and vice versa). 
 
Another project might use material from these case studies to examine the ways foreign 
governments use offset-generated projects and investments to create a façade of 
economic and political reform.  Documenting how offset projects are used to channel 
states funds into the private ventures of crony elites would show how ostensibly “good” 
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things like FDI and public-private sector partnerships can in fact reinforce the hegemony 
of incumbent elites while also shedding light on how inadequate attention to the 
situational variability of concepts such as ‘public’ and ‘private’ contribute to this flawed 
understanding. Deployed in the service of vested interests, this false demarcation has 
obscured the line between public funds and the privy purse and facilitated the transfer of 
collective resources to powerful individuals and institutions with close ties to ruling 
elites.   
 
Likewise, this conceptual obfuscation allows arms manufacturers in Europe and the U.S. 
to cite huge offset-related costs in order to claim subsidies from their own governments, 
despite the fact that they ultimately recover the full cost of offset provisions – and an 
additional premium as well. Defense offsets are an excellent device for examining how 
the boundary between such concepts is deployed strategically, as both the rhetoric and the 
tangible processes reflect deliberate efforts to define the relevant categories according to 
the demands of powerful interest groups. This concentration of resources has had a 
dramatic impact on the Middle East, and cannot be completely disassociated from similar 
trends in the U.S., including the decline of the public sector, the erosion in provision of 
public infrastructure, weakened trade unions, the widening income gap and the enormous 
subsidies provided to a small number of highly-influential economic actors.  By 
combining empirical and conceptual approaches, these two projects could complement 
one another and contribute to broad discussions concerning the importance of reforming 
the economic regulations governing the global arms trade. 
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Other avenues could include a comprehensive comparative analysis of defense offsets in 
other countries – notably Turkey and Israel, whose military industrial bases owe much of 
their expansion to offset agreements.  Another option would be a systematic examination 
of the evolution of incentives in the global arms trade, tracking parallel developments in 
bribery incidents and offset arrangements within the context of the globalization of arms 
production.  This project would address interesting questions regarding global flows of 
financial resources taking place within the worldwide arms market – ranging from FDI 
(which we know is woven in with offset-generated investment) to formal offset 
agreements to cases of traditional bribery.  Defense offsets and the broader evolution of 
the global arms trade is a substantive issue area that incorporates many aspects of 
governance initiatives being pursued in the developing world and the post-industrial 
welfare states of the U.S. and Western Europe, including those dealing with public 
corruption, corporate responsibility, the sustainability of defense budgets, the efficacy of 
global legal and regulatory regimes, political patronage, financial innovation, and 
transparency and accountability in the implementation of economic liberalization and 
privatization programs.  The cast of characters involved in the offset business reads like a 
‘Who’s Who’ of bribery scandals: former intermediaries that operated on the fringes of 
the law have now found legal employment as offset brokers, and many multinational 
banks, private equity firms, accounting service firms and law firms implicated in 
corruption and bribery scandals have formed dedicated offset desks to assist defense 
firms in fulfilling their contractual obligations.  All of these possible research projects 
would help put defense offsets in broader perspective, highlighting their origins, their 
evolutionary trajectory, how they fit into larger structures, and how researchers can 
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utilize discrete (sometimes obscure) transactions to inform our understanding of much 
larger and more consequential political and economic relationships.     
 
Appendix A: Defense Offsets in Egypt, 1980-Present 
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Offset Project Partners Notes 
M1A1 Tank Coproduction General Dynamics (US) 
Egyptian Tank 
Plant/Factory 200 (Ministry 
of Military Production) 
The military produces 
several items used in the 
tanks, including road 
wheels, caterpillar track-
links, beams and drive 
wheels, and 120-mm tank 
gun.1  
M60 Upgrade General Dynamics (US) 
Army Workshop 101 
 
M88A2  United Defense (US) 
BAE Land Systems (UK) 
 
M113 Modifications 
(Egyptian Infantry Fighting 
Vehicle) 
BAE Land Systems (UK) Modification involved 
additional armor, improved 
engine, and new turret 
F-16 Peace Onyx Program Lockheed Martin (US) 
Turkish Aerospace 
Industries/TAI  
Arab Organization for 
Industrialization/AOI 
 
HAWK Missile Rebuild   
105mm tank rounds 
coproduction 
Possibly joint US-Turkish 
program (with MKEK of 
Turkey) 




program on record, began in 
1979 
JF-17 aircraft coproduction Pakistan Aeronautical 
Complex/PAC  
Chengdu Aircraft Industries 
Corporation/CAC (China) 
Arab Organization for 
Industrialization/AOI 









                                                
1 The following items are considered sensitive, and so are manufactured in the U.S. and shipped to Egypt 
for final assembly: the tank armor (depleted uranium), laser range-finder, armaments, gas turbine engine, 
transmission, fire control systems, and some other electronics.  The military also uses the tank facility to 
build civilian products, including construction vehicles. 
Appendix A: Defense Offsets in Egypt, 1980-Present 
 
 392 
Offset Project Partners Notes 
RL812 multiple rocket 
launcher licensed 
production 
Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army 
Helwan Machinery and 
Equipment/Factory 999 
Also built in Iran and 
Turkey; designed in early 
1960s 
PRL-81 man-portable single 
rocket launcher licensed 
production 
China North Industries 
Corporation/Norinco  
Helwan Machinery and 
Equipment/Factory 999 
Also built in Iran, Iraq and 
Turkey;2 designed in late 
1950s 
T-62 Tank Upgrade Ukrspetseksport (Ukraine) 
Abu Zaabal Tank Factory 
(MMP) 
Kader Factory for 
Developed Industries (AOI) 
Ukrspetseksport awarded 
contract to reform tank 
upgrade in exchange for 
technology transfer to these 




National Service Projects 
Organization  
Co-produces items like 
night vision goggles, 









Embraer (Brazil)  
Mirage 2000 aircraft 
coproduction  
Dassault (France) 
AOI Aircraft Factory 
 






AOI Aircraft Factory 
 
Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopter 
coproduction  
(Russia) 
Arab British Helicopter 
Company (AOI) 
 
Swingfire antitank missile 
licensed production 
Fairey Engineering and 
British Aircraft Corp. (UK) 
 
Hughes TOW antitank 
missile licensed production 
Hughes Aircraft Co. (US)  
Matra Magic R-550 air-to-
air missile local upgrade 
(France)  
AT-3 Sagger Missile local 
upgrade 
(Russia)  
                                                
2 Iranian-built rocket launchers were used against US troops in Iraq in 2007 
 
3 originally this was a joint venture with United Scientific Holdings of the UK, which was acquired by 
Alvis Plc (also UK), then was sold to BAE Land Systems.  BAE subsequently sold the optronics division to 
Thales. 
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Offset Project Partners Notes 
FROG-7 battlefield range 
ballistic missile licensed 
production 
(Russia) 9K52 Luna-M (Soviet 
designation)  
122mm howitzer licensed 
production 
(Russia)  
155 GH 52 auxiliary power 
unit  
Patria Vammas (Finland)   





Jeep TJ and Jeep J8 Chrysler (US) 
Arab American Vehicles 
Factory  
New militarized version of 
Jeep Wrangler4 
Mercedes-Benz G-Series  Diamler-Benz (Germany) 
Kader Factory for 
Developed Industries (AOI) 
The armored version 
(G320) is used as an 
armored utility vehicle and 
as a military ambulance 
Ural 4320 Utility Truck Ural Automotive (Russia)  




Plant/Factory 200 (Ministry 
of Military Production) 




under license  
Westinghouse (US)  
Plessey (UK) 
Racal (UK) 
Benha Electronic Industries 
(Ministry of Military 
Production) 
 




General Electric (US) 
Honeywell (US) 
Pratt & Whitney (Canada) 
AOI Engine Factory  
These engines are used in 
numerous aircraft flown by 
the Egyptian Army, 
including C-130s (US), K-
8s (China), and MiGs 
(Russia) 
                                                
4 The J8 is produced only by overseas factories (it does not meet US/European emissions standards); the J8 
may serve as replacement for other military vehicles used by US Special Forces on overseas missions 
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Offset Project Partners Notes 





Al Maadi Engineering 
Industries (MMP)  
Beretta M 92 (Italy); 
Beretta M 1951 (Italy); 
AKM rifle (Russia); RPD 
(Russia); FN Minimi 
(Belgium); FN MAG 
(Belgium); MK-19 grenade 
launcher (US)5; Maadi GL 
(US);6 RPG-7; several 
Chinese and Russian 
mortars7 
HMMWV modifications   AOI Modification includes 
addition of anti armor 
weaponry 
Tiger Kader-120 IVECO (Italy) This is variant of Iveco VM 
90 
 
                                                
5 Produced by company now known as General Dynamics 
 
6 this is the M203 grenade launcher, originally produced by Colt 
 
7 These include Helwan UK-2 (M-43 120mm Russian-built mortar); Helwan M-69 (M-37 82mm Russian-
built mortar); Helwan 60 (63-1 60mm Chinese-built mortar) 




1 based on Russian Tiger Jeeps 
 
2 Chairman of Jordan Radio Paging (MIRSAL) 
 
3 Jane’s Defence Weekly.  18 October 2002. “Coastal Protection Venture tabled, Middle East/Africa.” 
AMS (Alenia Marconi Systems) was JV between BAE and Finmeccanica, dissolved in 2005 
 
4 division of CLS Group (UK) 
 
5 King’s Uncle has honorary degree from here; W. Andrew Terrill, former Reserve Lieutenant 
Colonel/Foreign Area Officer (ME) and former faculty at Old Dominion; specializes in Jordan, Iraq  
Offset Project Partners Notes 
Advanced Industries of 
Arabia 
Bin Jabr Group (UAE) 
KADDB 
NIMR (Tiger)1 Tactical 
Vehicles; 2001; 1,500 for 
JAF; also exported to UAE 




Applied Defence Systems KADDB 34% 
Yazan Moufti2 33% 
Amin Bader 33% (is this 
Amin Badr Al-Din)? 
Defense electronics; IFF 
technology; potential JV 
with AMS (an Italian-UK 
JV) in 2002 to develop 
high-frequency over-the-
horizon system using 
ADS’s IFF system3 




Center for Applied 
Industrial Research (CAIR) 




CLS Jordan  CLS Systems4 (UK) 51.5% 
KADDB 48.5% 
2002; Refurbishes 
automotive & electrical 
parts for sale locally; also 
worked on Temsah combat 
vehicle; CLS (UK) 
Electronic Systems Group KADDB 
Old Dominion University5 
2006;  
Hemaia (Jordan Security for 
Money Transfer) 
Hemaia Security (Saudi 
Arabia) 
2007; Armored vehicle 
transport fleet; Saudi 
company is a joint venture 
with FBII (subsidiary of 
Honeywell)  




6 “The King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau to establish joint venture with European firm in 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone.” 1 August 2002. Jordan Times. 
7 Sama Aircraft Industries (subsidiary of JAI, Al-Samaraee Family), 2004; Mounting of camera on locally-
produced Sama Aircraft (CH2000); battlefield reconnaissance, training; in service with Iraqi Air Force; 
CH2000 based on Zenair Ltd. (Canada) design. 
8 JLVM products in service in 28 countries.  Kaddbinvest.com  
Offset Project Partners Notes 
Hurricane Engineering  European Technologies & 
Industries 
KADDB 
2002; Production of 
Hurricane Fast Marine 
Patrol Boat6 
JORAMMO Allied Defense Group (US) 
MERCAR SA (Belgium) 





KADDB 100% precision manufacturing; 
2007;  
Jordan Advanced Remote 
Systems 
Selex Galileo (Italy) 
Jordan Aerospace Industries 
(JAI)7 
KADDB 
2009; Falco UAV (uses 
Selex technology); Silent 
Eye, backpack portable 
UAV; I-Wing, mini-UAV; 
Jordan Arrow, UAV aerial 
target system for training  
Jordan Armaments & 
Weapons Systems (JAWS) 
KADDB 100% 
Wildey Guns (US) 
Viper Multi-caliber pistol; 
now solely manufactured in 
Jordan  





2004; R&D; lynx robot; 
unmanned patrol boats; 
Igla-S sensor kit for STA 





2010; night-vision & 
thermal imaging; tech 
transfer, production & 
marketing 
Jordan Light Vehicle 
Manufacturing (JLVM)8 
Jankel (UK): 25.5% 








9 One year after joint venture in Jordan was established, RiverHawk announced a sale to Iraq 
 
10 Involves consortium of state-owned and private Russian defense companies: KBP Instrument Design 
Bureau; KBM (Kolomna Machine Building); Russian Technologies State Corporation (holding company); 
Bazalt 
Offset Project Partners Notes 
Jordan Manufacturing & 
Services Solutions/JMSS 




Technology Partners: Jankel 
Group (UK) and SHP 
Motorsports (UK) 
Desert Iris; used by JAF in 
Peacekeeping Operations; 
exported to Libya, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE; also MRO 
Jordan RiverHawk 





platform vessels (AMP); 
coastal patrol boats; full co-
production; export to Iraq?9 




Company for Electronic 
Services (KADDB) 
Rosoboronexport10 (Russia) 
Portable grenade launcher 
(RPG-32 “Hashim”); 2005; 






Personal and critical site 
security; est. 2003; has 
agreement with Indian firm 
Umniah to provide security 
in exchange for software  
KADDB Industrial Park KADDB 100%  
KADDB Special Operations 
Training Center (KASOTC) 
KADDB 100%  
Licensed Production of 
various small arms 
Land Warfare Resources 
Corporation/LWRC (US) 
KADDB 
Manufacture of 6.8mm PSD 
(personal security detail) 
weapons in KADDB 
factory; 2010 
Mechanology Jordan  Mechanology (South 
Africa) 10% 
The Virlean Initiative 41% 
KADDB 49% 
Manufacture & sale of 
military & commercial 
products; Temsah combat 
vehicle 




11 Located in Aqaba special economic zone 
 
12 100% owned by Jordanian Air Force, but operates as private commercial company; initially (in 2000) 
established as Marshall Jordan Ltd, a JV with Marshall Aerospace of Cambridge (UK); did MRO on all 
JAF planes, addition of Daedalus enables them to complete MRO on F-16s as well  
 
13 USAF has maintenance officer exchange program, takes place at Shaheed Mufaq Salti Air Base in Azraq 
 
14 Full name: Al Sharika Al Mutafawwiqa li-Khadamat Al Amin wa Al Himaya.  Securitas agreed to 
acquire 51% of shares in Mutafawwiqa in June 2011 (at behest of Josecure). Mutafawwiq has annual sales 
of 2.2 million Jordanian Dinars.   
Offset Project Partners Notes 
Middle East Defense 
Systems (MDS)11 
KADDB  
Paramount Logistics Group 
(South Africa) 
2006; Jordan Manufacturing 
& Services Solutions 
Company (KADDB), also 
partner on these projects; 
Ratel Mark III, Marauder, 
Matador, RG12 vehicle; Al-
Qastal (free zone)  
Military Aviation Repair & 









Systems Company (JAC)12 
2011; DOD assistance for 
repair of F100-PW-220E 
engine; 13 
Al Mutafawika (the 
Excellence Company for 
Security & Protection 
Services)14 
JoSecure 49% 
Securitas (Sweden) 51% 
Est. 2009; lease armoured 
vehicles and provide armed 
protection to cash-in-transit 




KADDB 100% Security services; military 
site development; real estate 
National Halons Company 
Ltd. 
KADDB Collection & recycling of 
CFC refrigerants (financed 
by Multilateral Fund for 
Montreal Protocol); 2010 




15 Subsidiary of Morgan Crucible Co. 
 
16 Located in Aqaba special economic zone 
Offset Project Partners Notes 
NP Aerospace Jordan NP Aerospace (UK)15 51% 
KADDB 49% 
Helmuts & Body Armor; 
‘Dyneema’ ballistic plates; 
now transferred technology 
to Azerbaijan 
Oboronprom Middle East Oboronprom (Russia) 51% 
Orangeville Consultants 
(Jordan) 49%  
2006; Production, MRO, 
and export of KA-226 
helicopter; located at Queen 
Alia International Airport 
Prince Faisal Information 
Technology Center 
KADDB 20% 
Yarmouk University 40% 
Park Controls 40% 
IT and Software Education; 
partnership with Cranfield 
University Defence 
Academy (UK) 
Raytech Jordan  CLS Middle East 33.3% 




Seabird Aviation Jordan Seabird Aviation (Australia) 
50.5% 
KADDB 49.5% 
Light aircraft; UAVs 
(Seeker SB7L-360); 
KADDB took majority 
control in 2003; exported 
Seekers to Coalition 
Provisional Authority, Iraqi 
Air Force 
Sofex Jordan (Special 
Operations Forces 
Exhibition & Conference) 




Al Tadweer Waste 
Treatment (UAE)? 
Remediation & Waste 
Management; Abu Baker 
family of Jordan (?) 
Ultimate Building Machines 
Investment & Development 
(SWESCO Jordan) 
SWESCO (Sweden) 
XS Design (Germany) 
KADDB 100% 
 
Steel fabrication & mobile 
hangar construction; LISCO 
lightweight armoring 
composite; 200216  





17 with Wild Things Tactical (US); 2011; WT Tactical CEO and King Abdullah both attended Deerfield 
Academy together in Massachusetts, graduated in 1980 
18 Frasson (Italy), USM Corporation (US), Josef Heinen (Germany), Vibram Boots (US), Mark Boots 
(Canada) 
Offset Project Partners Notes 
Terex of Jordan (formerly 
Trans World for Heavy & 
Construction Equipment) 
KADDB (via Mawared) 
 







(JV with WT Tactical)17 
2008; lots of tech partners;18  
United Jordanian for 
Technical Consultancy  
KADDB 100% Consulting services 
United Jordanian Telecom 
Networks 
KADDB 100% Technical Services  
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Unknown  BAE (UK) $28 million (≈ 1998) 
Unknown China One each of direct and 
indirect offset 
Unknown Denel (South Africa) Offset services firm Rotch 
assisted in designing offset 
package, formed Consensus 
International 
Unknown General Dynamics (US) $300 million; contract for 
M1A2 tanks (≈ 1998) 
Unknown ITT Industries (US) 
Al Sarraf Group; (Colonel 
Ali Al Sarraf) 
$7.8 million (≈ 1998) 
SINCGARS radio 
communication system 
Unknown Rosvoorouzhenie (Russia)  
Unknown Simmel Difesa (Italy)  






$144 million; one-time 
survey (probably mapping 
mineral resources) 
Aluminum Smelter  Raytheon (US) $98 million; Patriot air 
defense missile; announced 
in 1996 
American Academies & 
International Institute of 
Management  
Thales (France) 
Chemring (UK)  
Mecar (Belgium) 
 
Ammunition Factory   Related to pending purchase 
of French Rafale fighter jets 
or Hercules transport 
vehicles from US (?) 
Australian College of 
Kuwait aviation training 
platform 
Boeing (US) 
AMAS Group of 
Companies (Sharhan)  
Sale of 16 Boeing AH- 64D 
Apache Longbow 
helicopters 
Australian College of 
Kuwait marine simulator  
Lockheed Martin (US) 
AMAS Group of 
Companies (Sharhan) 
Sale of 16 Boeing AH- 64D 
Apache Longbow 
helicopters 
Australian College of 
Kuwait maritime training 
vessel (ACK I)  
DCI Cofras (France) 
AMAS Group of 
Companies (Sharhan) 
MOD procurement 
British Council  GKN (UK) 19942 
                                                
1 CMN builds the Baynunah corvette, and has a large co-production agreement with Abu Dhabi Ship 
Building 
 
2 part of $292 million total offset provided by GKN (includes British Council project and industrial water-
proofing facility)  
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Deep Oil Processing Project 
(feasibility and market 
research) 
Noor Financial3: 51% 
Gazprom (Russia): 29% 
Cilant4ro Holding (Cyprus): 
20% 




EBOMAC5  CMN International (France) 
Hasan Bahjat/Bahzad and 
Waleed Al Mahdi6 
$144 million 
Energy solutions and 
facility management  
Asea, Brown Boveri/ABB 
Group (Switzerland) 
Ministry of Energy & Water 
Epicos Private Sector 
Project7  
Raytheon (US) 
National Real Estate 
Company/NREC8 (Al-Essa 
Family) 
For sale of TOW missiles; 
4-year program began 2010; 
services include marketing 
and business consultancy, 
construct facility database 
for private sector 
companies; Focus 
Marketing Consultancy Ltd 
manages project database 
(affiliated with Otaibi 
family) 
Essence Group9  Raytheon (US) 
Possibly through Union of 
Investment Companies 
(UIC)  
Fouad Alghanim & Sons 
Aircraft leasing, four 
Beechcraft 1900C 
turboprop planes transferred 
from Raytheon, offset 
service firm Blenheim 
developed deal; 2010  
                                                
3 Noor is controlled by National Industries Group Holding 
 
4 This company does not appear in any online business database, and only appears at all in reference to this 
deal with Gazprom.  It is probably a shell company.  
 
5 This is possibly the Electrical Boards Manufacturing Company, owned by Bahjat and Al Mahdi, but the 
contractor CMN only reported this offset as “EBOMAC” with no further details. 
 
6 Al Mahdi also Chairman of National Chemical & Petroleum Industries/NCPI 
 
7 Proposed projects include: vehicle armoring facility; traffic management centre; security risk management 
simulator; vocational training center for disabled persons; project management institute; marine life rehab 
facility; logistics service company; Locrete (building materials) project; laptop manufacturing company; 
Kuwait-Maastricht Business School 
8 NREC is a partner in the Locrete project; see footnote above. 
 
9 Essence is reportedly an air freight business.  Fouad Alghanim & Sons has an established air freight 
business, so he may well be the domestic partner for this offset.  
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Fire Fighting Academy  General Electric (US) 2010; $30 million; could be 
associated with Apache 
helicopter sale10 
Global Bridge Initiative  Thales (UK)  







2010; could also be part of 
Apache sale13 
Green Fodder Factory  AV Technology 
International (Austria and 
US)14 
2000; $54 million 
Greenlife Energy WLL  
 
Tanmiya World 
Asea, Brown Boveri/ABB 
(Switzerland) 
Tanmiya World is a Public 
Private Partnership between 
ISSNAD Real Estate 
Development (possibly part 
of Bukhamseen Group) and 
Public Authority for 
Applied Education & 
Training  
Gulf Industrial Technology 
Company  
Raytheon, formerly Hughes 
(US): 49% 
Foud Alghanim & Sons 
Group: 51% 
$27.6 million; first 
company established under 
offset program 
Heavy equipment 
calibration center  
Matra BAE Dynamics (UK 
and France), now part of 
MBDA (France) 
BAE obligation could be 
part of Apache deal15 
                                                
10 GE was prime contractor on Apache sale (it manufactures the engines); engine contract portion for GE 
worth $30 million  
 
11 This is part of the University of Texas at Austin’s IC2 Institute, which markets technologies developed in 
university laboratories; other partners include Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) and Kuwait 
University; but program was developed by NTEC and GCG.  Thales Group probably provided most of the 
up-front financing. 
 
12 part of Kuwait Investment Authority, the state’s sovereign wealth fund 
 
13 Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin formed a joint venture, Longbow International, to manufacture 
the weapons package for the Apache helicopters, so this could be an offset for Northrop’s portion of this 
contract 
 
14 JV between Steyr Daimler-Puch of Austria and AV Technology Ltd of US 
 
15 BAE builds the HIDAS (Helicopter Integrated Defensive Aids System) electronic warfare platform, 
which was included in Kuwait order 
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Home Health Services 
Project 




Systems/Thales Air Defense 
(UK) 
Aerospatiale (France) 
Thales share of offset was 
$22 million; Aerospatiale’s 





Foud Alghanim & Sons 
Group (?) 
$292 million;17 254 Desert 
Warrior armoured vehicles; 
purchase made in 1993; 
equipment contract was for 
$700 million  
Information Technology 
Institute (expansion) 
Atlas (subsidiary of 
ThyssenKrupp and EADS, 
of Germany and France) 
 
Institute for Private 
Education & Training/ 
IPETQ  
Tec.Quipment (UK) 
Al Wazzan Holdings 
Group:18 100% 
$9 million 
International Co. for 
Logistics Project Firing 
Ranges  
 






Holdings (Al-Sabah family) 
$19 million 
Islamic Art Multimedia 
Company  
Aerospatiale Matra (France) 




ART (US): 18% 
AH Alsagar & Bros: 10% 
Musaed Bader Al Sayer 
Group: 7.5% 
Commercial Bank of 
Kuwait: 6.6% 
Star Real Estate: 4.2% 
Bayt Al Mal Investment 
Co.: 3.8% 
Japan Energy Corp.: 2.4% 
Japanese prime contractor 
was Mitsui-Mitsubishi-
Sasakura; project 
established in 1996; $67 
million 
                                                
16 Used by Kuwait University medical faculty; first completed offset 
 
17 This dollar amount includes GKN’s offset for the British Council project also listed on this table 
 
18 via Al Burhan Holdings 
 
19 Oerlikon Contraves now part of Rheinmetall (Germany) 
 
20 SCM Panhard (France) 
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Kuwait International 
Aircraft Leasing Company  
Gulf Stream Aerospace, 
now part of General 
Dynamics (US) 
Fouad Alghanim & Sons 
Group of Companies  
 
Low-energy glass factory Unknown  Unknown  
MidEast LTA21  TCOM (US) $12 million; 1995; another 
contract in 2002; TCOM 
provides unmanned 
surveillance blimps 
National Offset Company 
Advisory Program/Project 
Faraasha  
Raytheon (US) In-house 14 month program 
to coordinate efforts 
between NOC, MOF and 
MOD (2009-2010); offset 
service firm Blenheim 
developed deal 
National Testing & 
Certification Centre  
Torishima (Japan) 
Foud Alghanim & Sons 
Group 
2010; probably part of 2005 
contract with Public 
Industry Authority for oil 
industry services  
Occam Investment Fund  EADS (France) 
Rotch Consensus Business 
Group (UK) 
Noor Financial Investment 
Company (51% owned by 
National Industries Group 
Holding/Al Kharafi) 
2008 







Flagship Training (UK) 
Rosoboronexport (Russia) 
Harris (US) 
Managed by NBK Capital; 
launched April 2008; 
contractors contributed 
$300 million, another $125 
million raised from 
domestic investors 
                                                
21 LTA stands for “lighter than air.” Kuwaiti offset project reportedly provides logistics services for the 
blimps operating in Kuwait 
 
22 Projects financed through this fund include the Industrial Company for Saving the Environment; Gulf 
Excellence Company; Al Salaam International Hospital. 
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Offset Fund (2) KAMCO 




Siemens (Germany)  
Rohde & Schwarz 
(Germany) 
United Gulf Bank (Bahrain) 
Action Group Holdings (Al-
Sabah family) 
$135 million; fund managed 
by Kipco Asset 
Management Company 
(also called Kuwait 
Education Fund) 
Offset Fund (3) Al 
MARKAZ Energy Fund  
Indra (Spain)  
Etienne Lacroix (France) 
OCEA (France) 
$4.25 million 
Offset Fund (4) Kuwait 
Universal Strategic Fund 
for Food Security  
  
Pumice Project  CSF-Thomson, now part of 
Thales (France) 
completed in 1996; $15 
million 
Recycling of Construction 
Waste (Industrial Company 
for Saving the Environment, 
part of Fund 1, above) 
Raytheon (US) 
Austronconsult (Australia) 





(Buffalo Wings & Rings) 
South Korean Gen. Trad. 
Co. W.L.L. 
AV Technology (US) 
$52 million  






Universal Services Center 
Business advice and 
training program for 
Essence Group; training 
provided by Tasc Aviation 
(Airbus subsidiary) and 
Blenheim (2010) 
Held at Gulf University of 
Science & 
Technology/GUST 
Technical Training Center 
for National Guard  
AV Technology 
International (Austria and 
US)23 
1996; $170 million for the 
supply of 70 Pandur (6 × 6) 
vehicles 
Total Facility Management 
Academy (Kalpataru, India) 
Tanmiya World 
Coretex International (UK) 
Procurement for Ministry of 
Electricity & Water 
Traffic Control Cameras 
Maintenance Officer 
Training Program  
Global Projects GT (?) Ministry of Information 
procurement; part of Traffic 
Management Centre 
 
                                                
23 JV between Steyr Daimler-Puch of Austria and AV Technology Ltd of US 
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BITG (US): 10% 







Overhaul and Maintenance 
Company: 50% 
Al Bilad International 
Company (Alireza): 30% 
NCB: 10%  
Saudia Airlines: 10% 
Aircraft Accessories & 
Components/AACC  
Original Investors: 
BITG and BAE (US and UK): 
50% 
Arabian Aircraft Services 
Co./ARABSCO/ARABASCO: 
30% 
Saudia Airlines: 10% 
SAIC: 10% 
Current shareholders: 
Overhaul & Maintenance 
Company: 86%  
Saudia: 14% 
Interim shareholder: Al 
Mozoon Group (Khaled Al 
Sadoum)1 
 
Alsalam Aircraft Company Boeing Industrial Technology 
Group/BITG (US): 50%2 
Saudia Airlines: 25% 






1985; $100 million Saudia  
 
Arabian Amines Co./Saudi 
Ethylene and Polyethylene 
Company  
Huntsman (UK): 50%  
Zamil Group: 50% 
Zamil Group: Zamil 
Family 
Arabian Diagnostic & 
Medical Co. 
Ltd/ADAMCO 
FAL Holdings Arabia Co. Ltd 
(Athel/Azel Family)  
FAL Holdings Arabia Co.: 
Athel/Azel Family 
Arabian Metering Co.  Actaris/Itron (France) 
Market Trading Co.  
Schlumberger (Germany): 
30% 
Market Trading Company 
subsidiary of Taher Group 
                                                
1 “Saudi Arabia: Terrorism Hits Offset Program.” Intelligence Online. 23 July-26 August 2004. Issue 481. 
Sadoum is listed as a shareholder in a number of firms with shares in offset companies.  
 
2 BITG has divested from all the other Peace Shield I Offset projects 
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Arabian Shrimp Co.  Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France): 7.3% 
Aqua Farms Ltd.: 29.33% 
Aquad for Commerce: 18.3% 
Arab Authority for 
Agricultural Investment & 
Development/AAAID: 45% 
Aquad for Commerce 
owned by retired General 
Ibrahim Al Mishari 
Al Bilad Catalysts Co.  Eurocat (France): 35% 
Al Bilad Est. Trade & Econ. 
(Alireza): 20%  
Nat’l Contracting Co. 








FAL Group: 15% 
(Athel/Azel)  
Abdulaziz Saleh Bin 
Mansour Al Jarbou: 15% 
CAD Middle East 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.  
British Offset Office 
Saudi Pharmaceutical 





Takamul Holding Co.: 20% 






& Chemicals: 30% 
Arab Co. for Drug 




Cyclar Project at Ibn 
Rushd (Arabian Fibers) 
BAE (UK) 
UOP/BP (UK): 25% 
Saudi Arabian Basic Industries 
Corporation/SABIC  
Ibn Rushd/Arabian Fibers 
 
Al-Dahab  Thomson-C.S.F (France) 
Shairco: 100% (bought out 
French share) 
Shairco: Al Shair Family 
                                                
3 List from “Middle East Petrochemicals Original projects and Announced Expansions.” 20 July 2010. 
Amanpour Consulting. 
 
Appendix D: Defense Offsets in Saudi Arabia, 1984-Present 
 
 409 
Offset Project Partners Notes 
Dar Al Faisal University  BAE Systems (US)4  
Boeing (US) 
Thales (France) 
United Technologies (US) 
King Faisal Foundation (Royal 
Family private investment) 
King Faisal Specialist Hospital 
and Research Centre (Gov’t-
owned) 
3 unnamed “Saudi 
conglomerates”  
Collaboration with 
Stevens Institute of 




SIC (Banaja Holdings) 
majority owner 




BITG & Hughes Aircraft 
(US): 50% 
United Systems Engineering: 




Al Athel/Azel family; 
Saudi Royal Family; Al 
Bulaihid Family; Al 









General Organization for 
Technical Education & 
Vocational Training  
BAE (UK) 
BAE: 50% 
Al Gosaibi: 50%  
Now listed as 100% gov’t-
owned6 
GE El-Seif Healthcare 
Arabia  
US Offset 
GE Gulf (UAE): 51%7 
El Seif Group Company Ltd. 
El Seif Group Company 
Ltd.: El Seif Family 
                                                
4 largest defense sector shareholder 
 
5 Online business databases list a Saudi company called “Int’l Co. for Engineering Systems Ltd.,” whose 
parent company is Overhaul Maintenance Co. (which is a shareholder in many of the Peace Shield firms). 
BAE is listed as one of ISE’s biggest customers. 
 
6 Probably due to Gosaibi bankruptcy. Now named Technical & Vocational Training Corp. (but Arabic 
name still includes ‘General Organization’); 
http://www.tvtc.gov.sa/English/AboutUs/Pages/OrganizationChart.aspx 
 
7 GE International Incorporation/GE Gulf owns 87% of Saudi American General Electric 
Company/SAMGE; other 13% owned by Abdulghaffar Gamgoum 
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Glaxo Saudi Arabia  Original Investors:  
BAE (UK) 








UK (?)  
Gulf Petroproducts 
Company 
Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France): 50% 
CITL: 50% 
Certus Investment & 
Trading, Ltd./CITL: 
overseas investment arm 
of Tamilnadu 
Petroproducts Limited; 
formed to invest in this 
project with SOLP 
Helm Arabia  HELM AG (Germany) and 






Zamil Group: 9.6% 
Ikarus Industrial Holdings 
(Al-Kharafi Family): 8.3%  
Olayan Financing: 5.3% 
Public Pension Agency: 
7.7% 
Interactive Saudi Arabia 
Ltd.  
Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France): 50% 
Hoshan Group 50% 




Co./IAC   
Thales Offset (France) 
SIPCHEM: 76% 
Ikarus: 11% 
Helm Arabia: 10% 
Ministry of Endowments: 3% 
 
International Vinyl 
Acetate Co./IVAC   
Thales Offset (France) 
SIPCHEM: 76% 
Ikarus Petroleum Industries 
Co.: 11% 
Helm Arabia: 10% 
Ministry of Endowments: 3% 
Ikarus Petroleum 
Industries Co. (aka Ikarus 
Industrial Holdings): Al-
Kharafi 
                                                
8 Possibly affiliated with Global Chemical Company owned by Al Mansoori Petroleum Industries/AMPI 
(UAE) 
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DOW Chemical (US) 
Rolls Royce (UK) 
Saudi Aramco 
Acxiom (US) 
General Electric (US) 
LyondellBasell (UK) 
Xenel (KSA) 





Sumimoto Chemical (JA) 





Midroc/Al Amoudi Trading 
Co.9 
KANEKA (Japan)10 
Cristal Global (Shairco) 
JGC Corp. (Japan)11  
Al Rushaid (Rushaid family) 
Selex 
Galileo/Finmeccanica tech 
transfer in 2011; 
Cristal Global: owned by 
Shairco/Al-Shair Family; 
Al Amoudi Trading Co.: 
Al Amoudi Family 
 
Middle East Battery Co.  Raytheon & General Motors 
(US): 51% 
Al Jomaih Holding Co.: 6.8% 
Abdulatif Alissa Holding 
Group: 6.8% 
AlMutlaq Group: 14.74% 
Zamil Group: 14.73% 
Balubaid 
SASCO: 7.94% 
Current Investors:  
Johnson Controls Int’l 




                                                
9 BITG partner and Industrial Collaboration Partner for KAUST 
 
10 also partner with AMHSCO (FAL Group) 
 
11 JGC awarded major deal with Aramco after it signed up for KAUST technology transfer. Alireza Family 
has JGC agency agreement for KSA. 
 
12 Other sources list this shareholder as Al Salem Johnson Controls, which is a 50/50 joint venture between 
Johnson Controls International and Saudi Binladin Group 
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Middle East Power 
Company/MEPCO 
General Electric (US) 
Tamimi Group  
Possibly part of latest 
Typhoon contract; GE 
Aviation builds pieces for 
the Typhoon 
Middle East Propulsion 
Co. (US, UK companies 
invested later under Al 
Yamamah) 
Original Investors:  
General Electric, Pratt & 







Saudia Airlines: 25%  
P&W (through United 
Technologies Int’l): 24.4% 
Wamar: 9.3%  
MTU: 19.3%  
Shomokh Al Hemam: 22% 
National Prawn Co.  Raytheon (US) 
Al Subeaei Investment Co. 
Al Ballaa Investment Co.  
Al Rajhi Investment Co.  
 
Olayan Baxter Company 
Ltd.  
US Offset 
Baxter Healthcare Corp.  
Olayan Financing  
Olayan Financing: Olayan 
Family 
Oman Int’l Shrimp Co.  Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France) and 
Sea Farms Int’l (US): 50% 
Shanfari Group, Sindbad 
International Trading, Dhofar 
Int’l Development/DIDI 50% 
Shanfari owned by former 
Omani Oil & Minerals 
Minister Saeed bin Ahmed 
al Shanfari 
Plastbau Arabia  Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France): 20% 
Advanced Projects & Building 
Systems Ltd./APBSL: 50%13 
Plastbau Holdings (Bahrain): 
30% 
 
Rezayat Flover  BAE (UK) 
Rezayat Company 100% 
 
S.A. Talke/Aljabr Talke  UK Offset 
TALKE Logistics Services 
Al Jabr Group - Azmeel 
Saudi Industries Services Co./ 
SISCO: 33% 
S and A stand for SISCO 
and AlJabr 
Saudi Industries Services 
Co./ SISCO: Alireza 
Family 
                                                
13 Possibly Al Gosaibi Family 
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Saudi Communications 
Development Co.  
Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France): 50% 
Aquad for Commerce: 50% 
Aquad for Commerce 
owned by retired General 
Ibrahim Al Mishari 





Al Gosaibi: 50% 
Now listed as 100% 
owned by BAE14  
Saudi-Indo Petrochemical 
Company 
Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France): 30% 
Gulf Petroproducts: 30% 
Zamil Group: 40% 
Zamil Group: Zamily 
Family 




Gulf United Investment: 6% 







Saudi Nat’l Lamps & 
Electricals  
Raytheon & Thales/Saudi 
Offset Limited Partnership 
(US and France) 
IndoAsian Fusegear Co. 
Zoujaj (National Co. for Glass 
Industries) 
Chairman of Saudi Nat’l 
Lamps & Elec: Yusuf 
Abaalkhail (also on Zoujaj 
Board) 




Co./Tasnee: 75%  
Bassell (BASF and Shell): 
25% 
NPIC, owned by Olayan, 
also listed as owner (NPIC 
acquired by NIC/Tasnee in 
2005)  






Saudi Valves  BAE (UK) 
Saudi Pan Gulf: 50% 
Comid (UK): 50% 
BAE buyout of existing 
company (AVK Saudi 
Valves Manufacturing) 
                                                
14 Website is also dead, probably also due to Gosaibi bankruptcy? Martin (p240) lists YBA Kanoo as 
partner with BAE 
 
15 Saudi official documents list different original shareholders for Saudi French Chemical Industries Co.: 
Atiq of France 35% and Sawa (Salwa?) of Qassim 65% 
 
 16List from “Middle East Petrochemicals Original projects and Announced Expansions.” 20 July 2010. 
Amanpour Consulting.. House of Saud lists still other shareholders: Prince Mohammed bin Naif bin Abdul 
Aziz (15%); ‘French Company’ (?); and nine other investors. The House of Saud in Commerce, p135. 
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Synthomer Middle East 
(Formerly Dhahran Harco 
Chemical Industries Ltd)  
BAE (UK) 
Harlow Chemical Co. (UK) 
30%17  
Dhahran Chemical Industries 
Ltd.: 70% 
Current shareholders: Al 




UNILUBE3 BAE (UK) 
Enprotech ME Ltd.: 30% 






Petrochemical Co. ltd.): 50% 
Herdilla: 30%  
Bukaka Group: 10%  
British Offset Office: 10% 
 
United Sugar Company Original Investors:  
BAE (UK) 
Tate & Lyle (UK): 15% 
Savola Company: 51% 
Saudi Imports Co./SIC: 15% 
Savola now owns 74.48% 




Bassell (BASF and Shell): 
25% 
Sahara Petrochemical: 75% 
Sahara shareholders: 
Zamil Group, AlJabr, 
Khaled Bin Mahfouz, 
Hayel Saeed Anam Group, 
and others 
 
                                                
17 taken over by Yule Catto & Co. 
 
18 Synthomer is subsidiary of Yule Catto & Co. (owns 50% of Synthomer) 
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Abu Dhabi Autonomous 
Systems Investments LLC1  
Tawazun: 100% (fund 
capitalized by numerous 
foreign defense firms) 
Developer of UAVs; 
Chairman Homaid Al 
Shemmari/Shammari 
Abu Dhabi Risk & Treasury 
Solutions LLC  
MBDA Missile Systems & 
Macquarie (UK and 
Australia) 
Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank/ADCB: 51% 




Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding 
Company/ADSB  
Northrop Grumman (US) 
Mubadala: 39.96% (fund 
capitalized by numerous 
foreign defense firms) 
Government of Abu Dhabi: 
10% 
Hussein J. Nasser Al 
Nowais: 5.72% 
New harbor for ADSB built 
with financing from GIC 
(General Industry Corp. of 
Sheikh Tahnoon) 
Abu Dhabi Systems 
Integration LLC/ADSI  
Finmeccanica (Italy) 
ADSB: 57% 
Selex Sistemi: 43% 
Selex Sistemi subsidiary of 
Finmeccanica 
Emirates SembCorp Water 
& Power Co.2  
Abu Dhabi Water & 
Electricity Authority: 60% 
SembCorp Gulf Holding 
Co.: (Singapore) 40% 
 
Caracal Light Ammunition3 Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 75% 
UAE Armed Forces: 25% 
Previous shareholder: Ali 
Al Dhaheri: 100%  
Caracal factory located in 
Zayed Military City 
                                                
1 formerly Abu Dhabi Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Investments 
 
2 formerly Union Water & Electricity Company 
 
3 formerly Adcom Munitions Factory (acquired by Tawazun) 
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Addar (Aldar) Real Estate 
Services LLC4  
 
(Additional project for 
Aldar, construction of Raha 
Beach, also completed 
under offset terms)5 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 19.18% (or 
28%)6 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Corporation/ADIC: 5.68%  




National Corporation for 
Tourism and Hotels:? 
Abu Dhabi National 
Hotels:? 
Abu Dhabi National Hotels 
owned by Al Hajeri 
Aldar Properties listed as 








Khalfan Al Shamsi (CEO)7  
2008/9  
Al Ain Shooting Club Tawazun (fund capitalized 




Maintenance, Repair and 
Overhaul Centre/ 
AMMROC  
Sikorsky (equity share) 
Lockheed (equity share) 
Abu Dhabi Aircraft 
Technologies/ADAT 
(majority) 
Offset with Sikorsky 
(Lockheed bought in later) 
ADAT holdings through 
Mubadala  
ASMAK/International Fish 
Farming Company/IFFC  
Dassault (France) 
Hydra Properties: 47.43% 
Chimera Financial 
Investments: 16.61% 
Infinity Television Satellite 
Channel: 9.44% 
All subsidiaries of Royal 
Group, 100% owned by 
Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Zayed 
Al Nahyan8 
 
                                                
4 Subsidiary of Aldar Properties PJSC as of 2006 (owns 99% of Addar) 
 
5 Financing for the $2.1 billion project was designed by the offset services firm Blenheim  
 
6 Zawya reports Aldar is 27.7% Mubadala-owned 
 
7 Shamsi is also involved in another offset project, International Fish Farming Holding Company/ASMAK. 
Also holds executive/director positions at Abu Dhabi National Hotels, Al Diar Hotels, and Eshraq 
Properties. 
 
8 Despite Tahnoon’s ownership of Royal Group, the company’s official documents list 63 founders and 
31,400 shareholders 
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Baynunah Missile 
Technologies  
MBDA and BAE (France 
and UK) 
Baynuna(h) Group: 51% 
MBDA: 49% 
Baynuna(h) Group founded 
and owned by retired 
General Khaled Abdullah 
Abu-Ainnain 





BSI Bern Sapeth 
International LLC  
Deutz AG (Germany) 
Emirates Commercial 
Centre for Shares & Bonds, 
LLC10  
 
Burkan Munitions Rheinmetall Munitions 
(Germany) 
Al Jaber  
Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms) 
AED 268 million (initial 
capital) 
Al Jaber Group 100% 
owned by HE Obeid 
Khalifa Al Jaber Al Murri  
Caracal International 
LLC/Caracal Group 
Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms) 
2006; Caracal ammunition 
factory located in Zayed 
Military City (where Bin 
Jabr also has manufacturing 
operations) 
Caracal Shooting Club Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms) 
 
Centuria Capital  Groupe Financiere Centuria 
(France): 49% 
Baynuna(h) Group: 51% 
Baynuna(h) Group founded 
and owned by retired 
General Khaled Abdullah 
Abu-Ainnain 
CERT Thales Institute/CTI  Thales (France) 
Other shareholders 
unknown 
CERT (Center of 
Excellence for Applied 
Research & Training) 
CITYZZ Visitor Center 
Emirascope  
 





                                                
9 Reem Shehab, Director of Berlitz Dubai states on organization’s website that it is operated  “under the 
patronage of” Sheikh Nahyan Bin Mubarak Al Nahyan, Minister of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research  
 
10 possibly part of SHUAACapital, which owns numerous brokerage firms; SHUAA is owned by al 
Ghurair, who acquired 50% of a company called ECC in 2002  
 
11 Alireza (Saudi Arabia) and Ibrahim Bin Ayed Al Kahtani (Mejdaf Group) both have agency agreements 
with Rohde & Schwartz.  They are possibly domestic partners for this offset. 
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Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 50% 
ADIC: 50% (Invest AD) 
 
Previous shareholders: 
In 2004 Eships was owned 





(investment arm of Giat); 
and ADIC15 
Condor Medical Waste 
Management-Abu Dhabi  
Giat (France) 
General Investments FZE 
(investment arm of Giat) 
ADIC 





President & CEO Salwa 
Saleh Saeed Ali Shaibani 
UTS is 100% owned by 
Omar Ziad Al Askari and 
Abdullah Darwish Al Katbi 
Danway Fusion Glass LLC  Diehl IWS and Rohde & 
Schwarz (both Germany) 
Emirates Holdings: 100% 
Offset services firm 
Blenheim designed this 
project 
Emirates Holding is 100% 
owned by HE Hussein 
Jassim Al Nowais 
DASBAT Aviation  Dassault (France) 
Baynuna(h) Group 
Baynuna(h) Group founded 
and owned by retired 
General Khaled Abdullah 
Abu-Ainnain 
                                                                                                                                            
 
12 Previously Combined Cargo UAE 
 
13 Giat brought in third party (Torvald Klaveness Group) to fulfill offset obligation 
 
14 OEIHC itself is largely owned by ADIC, either directly or through ADIC holdings in other OEIHC 
shareholders 
 
15 Before that, in 2002, Eships was owned ¼ each by ADIC, UAE Offsets Group, Torvald, and OEIHC 
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Denel Al-Jaber 
Maintenance & Technology 
Company LLC/DAMTEC  
Denel (South Africa): 49% 
Al Jaber Transport & 
General Contracting 
Establishment/AJE: 51% 
AJE 100% owned by HE 
Obeid Khalifa Al Jaber Al 
Murri (via Al Jaber Group) 
Dolphin Energy Limited Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 




Processes natural gas from 
Qatar, transports via new 
pipeline to UAE 
 
ELTBAT Electronic 





2009; Baynuna(h) Group 
founded and owned by 




EADS Defence & Security 
(consortium France, 
Germany, and Spain) 
C4 Advanced Solutions/ 
C4AS 
C4AS is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Emirates 
Advanced Investments, 
owned by Ibrahim Al 
Hammadi 
Etihad Shipbuilding  Fincantieri (Italy): 35% 
Al Fattan Ship Industry: 
51% 
Melara Middle East: 14%18 
 
Fibrex Company WLL19  Rohde & Schwarz 
(Germany) 
Alfia Fund (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms) 
Bina/BENA Group (?)20 
Alternative list of 
shareholders: Saeed Bin 
Shaiban (UAE); Sufian Al 
Saleh (Leb); and Tatweer 
(UAE) 
Bina Group: Al Mazrouei 
                                                
16 Occidental took over from Enron 
 
17 Simulation/training in electronic warfare 
 
18 Melara is a Finmecannica Company (created regional subsidiary for this venture); This offset came at a 
time when the Italian Government was trying to merge the private sector Finmecannica with the state-
owned Fincantieri, because the latter had become unprofitable. 
 
19 provides prefabricated building materials 
 
20 Bina Group is also the partner for another Alfia Fund investment, which itself is also with technology 
partner Rohde & Schwarz 
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G2 International  GEAP International LLC 





Systems/GTS (GAMCO is 




Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 100%22 
GAMCO’s first two 
contracts have been with 
France (L’Avion) and 
Tunisian Air Force  
 
German & Emirates 
Company Limited/GECO23 
Alfia (fund capitalized by 
numerous foreign defense 
firms): 33% 
Bina/BENA Group: 40% 
Coppins Holdings: 27% 
Bina Group: Al Mazrouei 
Coppins part of Rubaya 
Holdings, owned by Al 
Muhairi or Al Rubaya 
family 
Ghantoot Polo Club Defense partner (unknown) 
International Capital 
Trading (ICT) 
ICT owned by Sheikh 
Zayed24 
Gold & Silver Refining 
Plant Projects  
Elettronica SPA (Italy): 
49% 
Global Force Capital: 51% 
2009; Global Force Capital 
owned by Khalid Ahmad Al 
Mansour 
Gulf Business Center  Dassault (France) 
United Technical 
Services/UTS 
UTS is 100% owned by 
Omar Ziad Al Askari and 
Abdullah Darwish Al Katbi 
Gulf Center for Remote 
Sensing/GCRS/Infoterra25   
 
 
GEC-Marconi and Astrium 
(US and France) 




                                                
21 original partner was Aerospatiale 
 
22 ADAT is Mubadala subsidiary 
 
23 provides precast aerated concrete 
24 “Partnerships for a Better Future” Brochure, U.A.E. Offsets Group. 
 
25 now called Astrium-Geo Information Services 
 
26 Infoterra website lists it as an “EADS company,” and GCRS was once at CERT Technology Park (which 
has numerous European defense technology partnerships); perhaps ADIDCO was set up to invest in this 
single project, since it appears nowhere else. ADIDCO does have a “cgchouse” email address, which could 
stand for Combined Group Contracting from Kuwait, a large industrial conglomerate with significant 
interests in the defense sector. Astrium/EADS also supplies technology for the UAE’s civilian and military 
satellite system (Yah Sat), so it may also be linked to this ongoing project.  
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Gulf Diagnostic Center  Lockheed Martin (US) 
Ibn Khaldoon Drug Stores 
Ibn Khaldoon Drug Stores 





Emirates National Oil 
Company/ENOC: 25% 
International Petroleum 
Investment Corp.: 30% 
Oman Oil Company: 30% 
Thales Group: 5% 
Alternative Shareholder 
List: ENOC 35%, IPIC 
30%, OOC 30%, Thales 
5%27 
Gulf Logistics and Naval 
Support LLC  
BAE (UK): 30% 
Abu Dhabi Ship Building/ 
ADSB: 70% 
 
2010; ADSB Chairman is 
HE Abdullah Nasser bin 
Huwaileel Al Mansouri 
Gulf Solar Power Company  GEC-Marconi (US) 
Emirates Holdings: 100% 
Emirates Holdings: 100% 
owned by HE Hussein 
Jassim Al Nowais  
Previous Shareholder: Al 
Nasser Holding  
Gulf Turbines Services 
LLC  
General Electric (US): 49% 
ADAT 51% 
ADAT holdings are via 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms) 
Gulf Union Equipment 
Rental Company LLC 
Mohammed Abdulrahman 
Al Bahar Group/MAB: 49% 
Saeed Matar Saeed Hamr 
Ain Al Mehairbi: 51% 
MAB (Kuwait) 
Al Hikma Development 
Company 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms) 
2006; real estate services; 
manages UAE University  
 
Horizon International Flight 
Academy 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 100% 
 
Imperial College London 
Diabetes Centre 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 100% 
ICLDC Chairman Suhail Al 
Ansari 
                                                
27 Zawya.  
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Injazat Data Systems  
 
EDS Defense & Security 
(US), acquired by Hewlett 
Packard: 40% 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 60% 
 
Chairman Jassem 




Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 26%  
Kaabi family: 74% 
IGG has JV with Paramount 
(South Africa) to 
manufacture or distribute 
armored vehicles 
Laser Re-nu  Boeing (US) 
Emirates Printing Forms 
Est. 
Emirates Printing Forms 
Est. owned by Al Dhaheri 
Family28 
LeasePlan Corporation LeasePlan Corp. 
(Netherlands): 49% 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 




Liwa Energy Limited 
(operates in Libya) 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 100% 
Liwa is a subsidiary of 
Mubadala Oil & Gas29  
Mahaleel/National Medical 
Solutions 
Alfia (fund capitalized by 
numerous foreign defense 
firms): 49% 
Bin Nawi Group: 51% 
Chairman of Bin Nawi 
Group is Mohammed 




Franserres   
Dassault and Thales 
(France) 
Al Hamed Enterprises 
Probably owned by Sheikh 
Shaya Bin Hamed Al 
Hamed and Sheikh Hamed 
Bin Ahmed Al Hamed 
(through Falcon Group) 
NAS United Healthcare 
Services LLC31  
Alfia (fund capitalized by 
numerous foreign defense 
firms) 
The National Investor/TNI: 
46% 
2001; TNI listed as 
subsidiary of Al Mansoori 
Specialized Engineering 
(owned by Mansoori 
Family)  
                                                
28 website lists E. Karian  as owner of Laser Re-nu, but Zawya profiles list Al Dhaheri as ultimate owner  
 
29 Other Mubadala oil & gas subsidiaries include Pearl Energy in Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, 
Singapore, Bahrain, Kazakhstan & Malaysia 
 
30 also Chairman of Abu Dhabi Media 
 
31 provides administrative services for insurers and employers (outsourcing); TNI financial statements 
suggest that Nextcare and NAS United Healthcare Services are two separate entities 
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National Telesystems & 
Services  
Thales (France) 
Bin Jabr Group 
Abu Dhabi Group 
Bin Jabr Group owned by 
Saeed Bin Jabr Al Suwaidi 
Abu Dhabi Group owned by 
Royal Family members 
Nextcare Global FZE LLC The National Investor/TNI: 
51% 
Alfia (fund capitalized by 
numerous foreign defense 
firms)  
Reports indicated that 
Nextcare is to be liquidated 
after “certain legal issues” 
are resolved, but NAS 
United will remain solvent 
Nimr  Advanced Industries of 
Arabia: 40% 
Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 60% 
Advanced Industries of 
Arabia is JV between 
Jordan’s KADDB and Bin 
Jabr Group (owned by 
Suweidi) 
Piaggio Aero Industries Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 35% 
Piaggio was an Italian 
company; Mubadala merely 
purchased shares; still 
manufactures in Italy  
Productivity & Leadership 
Consortium 
Westinghouse and Northrop 
Grumman (US) 
Center of Excellence for 
Applied Research and 
Training/CERT32  
CERT also has private 
equity arm, called CERT 
Innovations and capital 
fund, CERT Capital33  
Remaya Shooting Club Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 100% 
 
Safewater Chemicals  Specialist Mechanical 
Engineers (South Africa) 
Al Jaber Group: 100% 
Al Jaber Group owned by 
HE Obeid Khalifa Al Jaber 
Al Murri 




Baynuna(h) Group founded 
and owned by retired 
General Khaled Abdullah 
Abu-Ainnain 
                                                
32 CERT is the commercial arm of the UAE Higher Colleges of Technology 
 
33 ARTOC Group of Egypt, owned by Mohammed Shafik Gabr, is a major shareholder in CERT.  Gabr 
ranked #50 on ArabianBusiness’ 2011 Rich List.  Gabr was a staunch Mubarak loyalist, and in the early 
days of the 2011 uprising he described the protests as highly-coordinated, suggesting they were launched 
by an organized opposition with ties to Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.  
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Sanad Aero Solutions  Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 100% 
Aircraft leasing company  
Schmidlin LLC (Inovex) ANC Holdings 100% ANC 100% owned by 







Baynuna(h) Group founded 
and owned by retired 
General Khaled Abdullah 
Abu-Ainnain 
Solex Robotics Services  General Electric (US) 
Al Mansoori Specialized 
Engineering 
Al Mansoori Specialized 
Engineering owned by 
Mansoori family  
SR Technics  Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 70%-
100%35  
Originally Swiss defense 
firm; Mubadala reportedly 
owns between 70% and 
100%; still operates in 
Zurich, no manufacturing in 
UAE 
Strata  Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 




Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 10.87% 
GOSI: 7.38% 
General Investments FZE: 
5.92% 
HSBC Bank Plc: 4.45% 
Al Bitar (KSA): 3.79% 
ADIC: 3.48% 
Al Dhaheri 3.16% 
General Investments FZE 
(investment arm of French 
defense firm Giat) 
Tadreeb/National Training 
LLC 
Alfia (fund capitalized by 
numerous foreign defense 
firms) 
Chairman Saif Al Hajeri 
(Director in UAE Offsets 
agency)  
                                                
34 Baker is also chairman of Thomas Bennett Gulf Co. LLC; Al Nekhreh Contracting; and Dhofar Fisheries. 
 
35 additional shares in SR Technics are owned by Dubai Aerospace Enterprise/DAE, an investment vehicle 
established to buy up global aviation companies to establish a UAE-owned aviation conglomerate.  DAE 
has $31 billion in aircraft acquisitions as of 2008 (much of them through purchases of shares through 
intermediary private equity firms, including Carlyle Group). Robin Wigglesworth. “Sky's the limit for Gulf 
states with soaring aerospace ambitions.” 14 July 2008. Financial Times.  
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Al Taif Technical Services  Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 100% 
2007; meant to perform 
maintenance/overhaul of 
military vehicles, weapons 
systems and electronics, but 
majority of work is done by 
US firm Dyncorp 
Tanqia Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 30% 
Elwan Group (aka 
Infrastructure Capital 
Group) 
Overseas Trading Company 
(Oman) 
Overseas Trading Company 
owned by Fujairah Gov’t 
Tawazun Precision 
Industries36 
Tawazun (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 




Thales (France): 49% 
Baynuna(h) Group: 51% 
 
Baynuna(h) Group founded 
and owned by retired 





C4 Advanced Solutions  
 
C4 Advanced Solutions is 
subsidiary of Emirates 
Advanced Investments, EAI 
chairman is  
Hussein Ibrahim Al 
Hammadi (also on board of 
ADSB) 
Trakker ME38 Alfia (fund capitalized by 
numerous foreign defense 
firms): 20% 
Al Jaber Group: 51% 
Trakker Group (Pakistan): 
29% 
Al Jaber Group owned by 
HE Obeid Khalifa Al Jaber 
Al Murri 
 
                                                
36 formerly Emirates Precision Industry 
 
37 Logistics and support services for electronic equipment on the Mirage 2000-9 
38 GPS-based tracking system, technology developed by South African defense firm DigiCore; perhaps this 
is an offset emanating from a South African supplier  
 
Appendix E: Defense Offsets in UAE, 1991-Present 
 
 426 
Offset Project Partners Notes 
Trans Continental Industries 
Company LLC 
Vectra Azad (UK): 49% 
Advanced Industries of 
Arabia: 51% 
 
Advanced Industries of 
Arabia is JV between 
Jordan’s KADDB and Bin 
Jabr Group (owned by 
Suweidi) 
$15.5 million initial capital  
UAE University 
Development and 
Management Project  
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms) 
 
UTS Burnstop LLC  Dassault (France) 
United Technical 
Services/UTS 
UTS is 100% owned by 
Omar Ziad Al Askari and 
Abdullah Darwish Al Katbi 
Waha Capital39 /expansion 
of Oasis Leasing by 25 new 
planes (consortium of 
contractors) 
 
(Additional projects for 
Waha were carried out 
under offset program, 
including Project Blue I and 
II, which added total of 31 
new aircraft to leasing 
fleet)40  
BAE (UK) 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
defense firms): 15.14% 
Hussein J. Al Nowais: 
7.11% 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Corporation/ADIC 
Hussein J. Al Nowais owns 
Emirates Holdings also  
Al Wathba Marionnet41  Kranti (France) 









General Investments FZE: 
39% (investment arm for 
French defense firm Giat) 
Mubadala: 10% 
 
World Trade Center Abu 
Dhabi 
Defense firm partner 
(unknown) 
Aldar Properties PJSC: 
100% 
UAE Offsets Group has 
franchise rights (Trinity 
Works, LLC) 
Mazroui is either Chairman 
or Board Member (Tabreed 
prospectus) 
                                                
39 previously Oasis International Leasing Co., became Al-Waha after additional expansion 
 
40 The total for these aircraft came to $1.4 billion; Blue I involved six contractor obligations, while Blue II 
involved four contractor obligations.  Financing was designed by offset services firm Blenheim.  
 
41 Date palm tissue cloning 
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Al Yah Satellite 
Communications Company  
Thales, Astrium, EADS 
(France) 
Mubadala (fund capitalized 
by numerous foreign 
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